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Günter Whittome

Taiwan 1947

Der Aufstand gegen die Kuomintang




Taiwan 1947:
The Uprising against
the Kuomintang

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Hamburg 1991

德文原版：„Taiwan 1947: Der Aufstand gegen die Kuomintang“

英文：“Taiwan 1947: The Uprising against the Kuomintang”¹

中文：「臺灣 1947：反國民黨之民變/起義」

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中文摘要

本書「臺灣 1947：反國民黨之民變/起義」於 1991 年由德國漢堡亞洲研究所出版(參見網址 www.giga-hamburg.de, 再點選“*Institute of Asian Studies*“之連結), 是第一本探討 228 之西文專書。其它關於 228 西文專書, 至目前為止只有賴澤涵、Ramon Myers 等人於 1991 年出版的英文著作。² 另外一位德國學者於 2008 年也出版一本與 228 相關的著作, 其重點在探討 228 在台灣民主化過程中及台獨運動中所扮演之角色。³

雖然對德國漢學界的台灣研究者而言, 本書屬必讀之教材, 但由於是以德文撰述、出版, 所以在德國以外的地區較鮮為人知。儘管本書資料基礎是於 1991 年以前取得的資料, 但與賴澤涵著作一樣都是探討二二八專書的僅有西文著作, 且鑒於賴澤涵著作之缺陷, 本人仍認為將本書譯成英文有其必要價值, 必能讓更多研究 228 的讀者了解 228 真相。

收集資料過程

本人於 1986 年來台時, 首次聽到「二二八事件」, 立刻引起本人興趣。1987 年收到台灣友人寄來的「領先」雜誌中, 竟發現裡面有詳細的二二八書目, 該書目的作者為「史為鑑」(為當時教師人權促進會的石文傑先生)。當時部份西文資料

¹ 參見完整的英文翻譯版, 作者聯絡方式: guenter@whittome.de

² 即 Lai, Jeh-hang (賴澤涵), Ramon H. Myers and Wei Wou (魏萼): *A Tragic Beginning: The February 28, 1947 Uprising in Taiwan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 273 pp.

³ 即 Fleischauer, Stefan: *Der Traum von der eigenen Nation. Geschichte und Gegenwart der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung Taiwans* [建國的夢想: 台灣獨立運動的歷史與現況] (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften [社會科學出版社], 2008), 424 pp.

在德國漢堡亞洲研究所便能找到，例如 George H. Kerr: *Formosa Betrayed*，但大部份石文傑書目的資料，是於 1988 年春在台灣所收集。收集資料過程中給予大力協助者，包括有輔仁大學歷史系尹章義教授、中研院社科所張炎憲教授、賴澤涵教授，另外還有王曉波教授、陳菊(台灣人權促進會)、陳永興(二二八和平日促進會)、李敖辦公室、國家圖書館、國家圖書館台灣分館、台南中華日報社等等。

內容概要

由於 1980 年代二二八史料基礎比較薄弱，當時仍有一些可疑的解釋，例如當時官方解讀二二八為「共黨陰謀」等⁴，本專書試圖在豐富的資料基礎上，透過對不同資料的反復對照分析，來釐清二二八的各種脈絡及背景。

第一章及第二章分別介紹 1990 年以前，二二八中西文研究情況及二二八以前的歷史背景。第三章，從 2 月 27 日緝煙血案開始一直到 5 月「清鄉」為止，深入分析台北歷經 228 的過程。第四章探討 228 在其它縣市的發展，外地與台北市的關聯如何。第五章分析中央政府的反應，第六章為總結與結論。第七章則包括 9 篇二二八重要文獻的譯本，例如處理委員會「處理大綱」(即 32(42)項要求)、陳儀廣播詞等。另外還附兩張發生事件地點的台北市及全台灣地圖。

內容要點

書中對賴澤涵的英文二二八專書內容提出質疑，例如賴澤涵稱「百分之八十的人口 - 即鄉村人口 - 並未參與」⁵。本人則認為，雖然二二八中的各項活動重心確實在大城市，但也超越了大城市的範圍。特別是台中縣，還有北部的新店、烏來等，高雄縣的旗山與恆春等地都有鄉下人響應當地處委會或台北處委會的活動，對於鄉村發展情形最詳細的報導則是來自台南縣北門區。⁶

對陳儀長官的評價，主要取決於其誠意的問題，即分析他有沒有誠意與處委會及其它台灣精英一起推動省政改革。本人認為陳儀從一開始便採取緩兵之計的策略，在大陸派遣部隊登陸台灣之前，陳儀早在 3 月 2 日試圖調動鳳山的兵力北

⁴ 例如：蘇僧；郭建成，《拂去歷史明鏡中的塵埃》(美國加州 Alhambra：美國南華文化事業公司，1986)，130 pp. 及：俞國華，《二二八為中共陰謀事件》(台北：閩台通訊社，二二八事件真相(新觀點叢書 7)，1985)，pp. 433-434.

⁵ “Eighty percent – the rural population – did not participate”, p. 174.

⁶ 參見吳新榮回憶錄。

上，但卻在新竹被當地市民攔下。如此重要事件在賴澤涵書中卻隻字未提。雖然陳儀與中央政府的通訊往來尚無法作最後的釐清，但可確定的是，中央政府已於3月5日做出派第21師來台的決定⁷。因此，可以合理地推論，陳儀在此之前早就有提出派出援兵之要求。因鎮壓二二八的兵力是由中央政府派遣，我們同樣可以合理地推論，中央政府及其最高領導人，即蔣介石，必須為二二八血腥鎮壓負起主要責任。

對於二二八定義問題，在台灣數十年來都習慣用「事件」或「事變」等用詞來形容，不論是官方或在野都已成為定調。在本人書中卻採用德文“Aufstand“（相當於英文“Uprising”，“Insurrection”或“Rebellion”等或中文“民變”或“起義”）。「事件」或「事變」的德文詞為“Zwischenfall“（英文：“Incident”），至少在西文的部份，「事件」或「事變」這樣的字眼如果用在如此大規模的運動上，從2月27日起到包括「清鄉」在內持續到5月整整3個月之久的運動中，的確是淡化了二二八的性質及其歷史意義。賴澤涵及Ramon Myers等人在其書中也提到國民黨政權之所以慣用“Incident”（事件/事變）這個詞，是因為「使此歷史事件的意義降到最低程度且消除分化情緒」。⁸雖然台灣學者對此問題持不同看法，而西文詞及相應的中文詞含義也不盡相同，但本人認為從當時官方報紙「新生報」3月及4月的報導中可以發現，官方對二二八的形容從「叛亂」、「叛變」等字眼，隨著鎮壓及清鄉開始走向使用「事件」或「事變」，其目的很明顯地是為淡化其歷史意義及為後續的幾十年政治禁忌鋪路。因此，本人認為如果用「事件」或「事變」來概括形容「二二八」，並不盡妥當，歷史不應遺忘，且應防範人們對歷史的淡化。

⁷ 劉雨卿回憶錄，p. 171.

⁸ “to minimize the episode and dispel divisive feelings“，參見 Lai Tse-han, Ramon Myers et al, p. 7.

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List of abbreviations

- FRUS* Foreign Relations of the United States
- KMT* The Kuomintang 國民黨
- CCP* The Chinese Communist Party
- KSCW* *K'an-luan shih-ch'i chung-yao wen-chien fen-an chi-pien* (戡亂時期重要文件分案輯編), 'Collection of Important Documents from the Period of Suppression of the Rebellion', popularly known as *Ta-hsi tang'an* (大溪檔案), ie 'Ta-hsi files', from Chiang Kai-shek's residence in T'zu-hu (慈湖) near the town of Ta-hsi.
- THCH* *Taiwan-sheng hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-shu hsin-wen-shih* (臺灣省行政長官公署新聞室) (Press Bureau of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office): *Taiwan pao-tung shih-chien chi-shih* (臺灣暴動事件紀實), An Eyewitness Report of the Disturbances in Taiwan.

Preface

My interest in the uprising of 1947 was aroused during a stay in Taiwan in 1986, a time when few Taiwanese dared to speak openly on this subject. I assumed useful source material would be impossible to find, and this prevented me from pursuing the subject further, until I came across a bibliography in the magazine *Ling-hsien* (領先) in 1987. Here I want to thank Lin Ling-ch'iou for sending me this magazine and for thus leading me start work on this subject.

During a subsequent stay in Taiwan in the spring of 1988 I was able to collect the required material myself *in situ*. Professor Yin Chang-i (尹章義) of Fu Jen University helped me initially with valuable suggestions and important contacts. In the first place, I would like to thank Professor Wang Hsiao-po (王曉波) who made available to me material from his private collection which was not available in libraries. Professor Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) from the Academia Sinica also helped me with important advice and gave me a copy of the newly-published collection of biographies of important figures in Taiwan's modern history as well as the subsequently published collection of memoirs of twenty persons who were involved in the uprising in different ways, both of which had been edited by him. I would also like to thank Shih Wen-chieh (石文傑), the Chairman of the 'Society for the Enhancement of the Human Rights of Teachers' and author of the above-mentioned bibliography, who made further additions to this bibliography available to me. Likewise I wish to thank Dr Ch'en Yung-hsing (陳永興), Chairman of the 'Society for Declaring February 28th a Day of Peace', and Mrs Ch'en Chü (陳菊), General Secretary of the 'Society for the Enhancement of Human Rights in Taiwan', who also provided me with material on the subject. Of course, I also thank all the other contributors, who helped me in many ways and who are not listed here.

This volume represents the first work of research in the German language dealing with the most important event in recent Taiwanese history since its return, in 1945, to China from Japanese colonial rule. This event also constitutes one of the most contentious issues in Taiwanese politics. Even in English there is only the work *A Tragic Beginning: The February 28, 1947 Uprising in Taiwan* by the

Taiwanese authors Lai Tse-han (賴澤涵), Wou Wei (魏萼) and the American sinologist Ramon H. Myers, published in 1991 by Stanford University Press. However, this work is unsatisfactory for several reasons. The affinity of the authors to the authorities resulted in an apologetic position biased towards the authorities, and in the omission or false presentation of important events. In addition, source material is often not used with the necessary care. Elsewhere in this work many such instances are identified detail.

The long-term neglect of this important chapter in Taiwan's history is due to poorly developed research into Taiwanese history in Western Chinese studies in general, and this particularly applies to Chinese studies in Germany. Some research into modern Taiwanese literature was undertaken in Germany during the 1980s, and in the field of economics there are a number of works that deal mainly with Taiwan as a 'development model'. However, there is hardly any specifically historical research on Taiwan. I hope to make a contribution to closing this gap and to arouse interest in the history of Taiwan.

The main reason for the lack of research into the uprising of 1947 lies in the fact that it had been a taboo topic for forty years in Taiwan, and source material was thus not easily accessible. With the increasing political liberalisation since 1986, availability of material has improved and the uprising has been stripped of its taboo nature in public discourse.

In light of the scarcity of secondary literature, and shortcomings in the secondary literature that has been published to date, this work aims to provide a reconstruction of the course of events during the uprising that comes as close as possible to historic truth, as well as to offer an assessment of these events. Where clear judgments cannot be made due to the lack of source material, this is made clear in the description of the course of events during the uprising. I do not claim that all relevant material on this subject has been taken into account, as some was not available to me or is still confidential. However, the main source materials relevant to this subject have been thoroughly analysed.

The time span has been deliberately limited to the period from the end of February to May 1947, with the focus on the month of March. This has been done in order to deal with this decisive and highly complex period more thoroughly,

and in this way to reach well-founded conclusions. Despite the dangers of going into too much detail, I feel that this approach is justified in light of so many diverging versions of the course of events during the uprising published in Taiwan, by the independence movement and to a lesser extent in the People's Republic of China. The period between Taiwan's return to Chinese rule after the end of the war until the outbreak of the uprising is therefore not part of the main focus of this work. By way of introducing the reader to the main subject and in order that the events following 27 February are easier to comprehend, I include a brief introductory chapter on the background of the uprising. Further historical research into this both highly complex and interesting background must be left for the future. Lai Tse-han (賴澤涵) et al.'s focus on the background of the uprising seems to be rather rash, particularly considering the shortcomings in the descriptions of the course of events. Other issues which could not be conclusively clarified, and which therefore also require further study are:

- the infiltration and manipulation of local organisations and units by government agents or other KMT bodies, as several sources claim,
- the decision-making process in the Central Government in Nanking and in the provincial administration in Taiwan, and the communication and interaction between them,
- confirmed details of victims and damages,
- the extent to which the social basis of the uprising reached beyond the urban population and young generation, to the wider rural population as well as the indigenous people.

For answers to these questions we must await the publication of further source material by the authorities in Taiwan.

The appendix includes a small selection of important source material in translation. In order to help the readers orientate themselves, a map of Taipei with the most important sites, and a map of Taiwan with the administrative divisions at the time and all locations mentioned in the source material on the uprising are included.

The glossary includes the Chinese characters for all personal and geographical names, as well as other names and expressions mentioned. This work uses the Wade-Giles transcription method widely used in Taiwan, except where other forms of transcription have become generally accepted (such as 'Keelung' and

‘Chiang Kai-shek’). Apostrophes and hyphens are omitted from the names of important and well-known cities.

Hamburg, March 1991

Günter Whittome

1. Introduction

The uprising of 1947 in Taiwan is important not only as an event in itself. It had far reaching political consequences and has had a lasting effect on Taiwanese society up to the present day. It is no exaggeration to describe the uprising as the most decisive event and turning point in the history of Taiwan since its return to China in 1945. From the perspective of the Taiwanese, even the retreat of the Kuomintang regime, with more than two million refugees, in the years 1948-49 from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan represents more a continuation of the patronising relationship and oppression, rather than the beginning of a fundamentally new political era. The consequences of the uprising can be seen particularly clearly in the following three areas:

1. The emergence of the Taiwanese independence movement, the most immediate political consequence of the suppression of the uprising. Many of those who had been persecuted or threatened during the purges (regardless of whether they had actually or allegedly participated in the uprising or not), first fled to Hong Kong and subsequently mainly to Japan or the USA. Even though the independence movement had virtually no impact on politics in Taiwan during the subsequent decades, in recent years its objectives have been embraced by a considerable number of members of the new opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (*Min-chu chin-pu tang*, 民主進步黨, abbreviated to *Min-chin-tang*, 民進黨).
2. The long-term antagonism between the ethnic group that came 'from outside the province', the so-called *wai-sheng-jen* (外省人), i.e. those that came from the mainland to Taiwan after 1945 or from 1948 as refugees with the KMT regime, and the local Taiwanese, the so-called *pen-sheng-jen* (本省人), i.e. the ethnic group that had long ago settled 'within the province', grew out of the brutal suppression of the uprising, irrespective of the influence of the independence movement. This conflict has abated over the course of several decades, but has not yet been fully resolved.
3. The taboo surrounding the issue, which was cultivated by the authorities, and which exacerbated the trauma caused by the suppression of the uprising. This chapter of Taiwanese history did not become the subject of public discussion until around 1986. On the 40th anniversary of the uprising in February 1987 those close to the opposition party founded the 'Society for Promoting February 28th as a Day of Peace' *erh-erh-pa ho-p'ing-jih ts'u-chin-hui* (二二八和平日促進會). It regards the uprising and its suppression as a wound in Taiwanese society that is yet to heal, and therefore calls for February 28th to be declared a Day of Remembrance, a day for peace and reconciliation. But in order for this wound to heal, this Society considers it necessary to 'reveal the truth' (*kung-pu chen-hsiang*, 公佈真相), and for this reason it demands that the authorities publicise relevant historical documents. Due to this public pressure, in March 1988 the report on the investigation in 1947 by Control

Commissioner Yang Liang-kung (楊亮功), (referred to in this work), was released for publication.

The significance of the suppression of the uprising in recent Taiwanese history, as outlined above, lies in striking contrast to the amount of scholarly research carried out into this subject. This applies to Western Chinese Studies as well as to Chinese historiography.

As far as Western research is concerned, the only work worth mentioning is *Formosa Betrayed*, published by George H. Kerr in 1965. However, strictly speaking this work is not a piece of scholarly research, but rather a kind of first-hand personal account, as Kerr was the American vice-consul in Taipei at the time of the uprising in 1947.¹ Other books that touch on the subject are those by Douglas Mendel and Fred W. Riggs. These, however, are more journalistic in nature and base their accounts exclusively on the works of George Kerr, various diplomatic documents from the US and public statements by KMT authorities or the independence movement, as far as they were available in English.² Other, especially Chinese, sources were not taken into account at all. Cynthia Yun Ping Weth's dissertation on the history of the Taiwanese independence movement includes one chapter on the 1947 uprising. However, it is based solely on the above-mentioned American publications.³

As for Chinese research, the number of publications on this subject is larger, but they do not fully meet the usual standards for scholarly studies. This is in part due to an insufficient base of source material, a lack of references to source material or a biased attitude that uses the uprising for partisan ends. Of course, sometimes all of these are found in the same piece of work.

For example, Shih Ming's (史明) *Taiwan-jen szu-pai-nien shih* (台灣人四百年

¹ George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 514 pp., transl. into Chinese by Ch'en Jung-ch'eng (陳榮成): *Pei ch'u-mai-ti Taiwan* (被出賣的台灣), *T'ai-wan wen-shih ts'ung-shu* 9 (台灣文史叢書 9) [Taiwan Literature and History Series 9] (Taipei: Ch'ien-wei ch'u-pan-she (前衛出版社) [Avantgarde Publishing House] 1991, 2007), 466 pp.

² See Douglas Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), 315 pp., in particular pp. 28-42; Fred W. Riggs, *Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule* (New York: Macmillan, 1952). 192 pp. (pp. 40-143 and appendices).

³ Cynthia Yun Ping Weth, *Die taiwanesische Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (Taidu) 1945-1978* [The Taiwanese Independence Movement (Taidu) 1945-1978] (doctoral thesis, Würzburg: [n.publ.] 1981), 283 pp.

史 [Four Hundred Years of History of the Taiwanese People]), which argues, to a certain extent, within the framework of Marxist terminology, reveals a weak base of source material, citing only four sources in the fifty page chapter dealing with the uprising. This work tends to use the uprising for the independence movement by interpreting it as the first manifestation of a 'Taiwanese national identity'. The same applies to *Taiwan: k'u-men-ti li-shih* (台灣 - 苦悶的歷史 [Taiwan: a Depressing History]) by Ong Iok-tek (王育德), whose account of the uprising consists of only a few pages.⁴

The work *Taiwan erh-erh-pa shih-chien tsung-ho yen-chiu* (台灣二二八事件綜合研究 [A Comprehensive Study into the 28th February Incident in Taiwan]) by Lin Ch'i-hsü (林啓旭) actually shows use of quite an extensive range of source materials, though only those available up until 1983, when it was published. The fundamental weakness of this work lies in its interpretation of the uprising as the first manifestation of a 'Taiwanese national identity' and the interpretation that the uprising as a whole was directed against Taiwan being a part of China.⁵ That this is not exactly the case will be demonstrated by the conclusions of this study.

Fu-ch'ü li-shih ming-ching chung ti ch'en-ai (拂去歷史明鏡中的塵埃 [Wipe the Dust from the Mirror of History]) by Su Seng (蘇僧) and Kuo Chien-ch'eng (郭建成), and the less crass *A Tragic Beginning: The February 28, 1947 Uprising in Taiwan* by Lai Tse-han (賴澤涵), Ramon H. Myers and Wou Wei (魏萼)⁶ are examples of works which are close to the official interpretation of the uprising, ie those that reduce it to an 'agitation' of the populace by 'communists, ambitious

⁴ Shih Ming (史明), *Taiwan-jen szu-pai-nien-shih* (台灣人四百年史) [Four Hundred Years History of the Taiwanese People], 2 vols (San José, CA: P'eng-tao wen-hua gong-szu (蓬島文化公司) [Paradise Culture Associates], 1980, 1540 pp. In his introduction (p. 1) Shih Ming describes his sources as 'Documents, popular legends and anecdotes' (*wen-hsien, ch'uan-shuo, i-wen*, 文獻、傳說、佚文). Ong Iok-tek (王育德), *Taiwan - k'u-men ti li-shih* (台灣-苦悶的歷史) [Taiwan: a Depressing History] (Tokyo: T'ai-wan ch'ing-nien-she (台灣青年社) [Taiwan Youth], 1979; Chinese transl. repr. Taipei: Ch'ien-wei ch'u-pan-she (前衛出版社) [Avantgarde Publishing House], 1999), 258 pp.

⁵ Lin Ch'i-hsü (林啓旭), *Taiwan erh-erh-pa shih-chien tsung-ho yen-chiu* (台灣二二八事件綜合研究) [A Comprehensive Study into the 28th February Incident in Taiwan], Hsin T'ai ts'ung-shu 2 (新台叢書) [New Taiwan Series 2] (Kaohsiung: Hsin-T'ai cheng-lun tsa-chih-she (新台政論雜誌社) [New Taiwan Political Debate Magazine Publ. Co.], 1983), 242 pp. (pp. 217 ff.).

⁶ Lai Tse-han (賴澤涵), Ramon H. Myers and Wei Wou (魏萼): *A Tragic Beginning: The February 28, 1947 Uprising in Taiwan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 273 pp.

individuals' etc.) and therefore justify the suppression of the uprising.

Though the title of the first book suggests new findings, in fact it merely justifies the suppression of the uprising by explaining it away with the contention that 'most people were manipulated' (大多數人都是被操縱, *ta tuo-shu jen tou shih pei ts'ao-tsung*).⁷ The authors' bias influenced the selection of source material, which consists almost entirely of material which reinforces the stance and leaning of the book. Other material has largely been neglected, despite it being accessible at the time of publication in 1986. When it is used, it is done so only to serve as polemic reinforcement of the 'Manipulation Theory'. In addition, the publication of the book in the USA was directed against the growing activities of Taiwanese in exile, who mark 28 February every year with demonstrations and gatherings.

The second work can be regarded as the first publication on this subject which claims scholarly objectivity, though it has some serious shortcomings. The authors explicitly claim to have used material of greater quantity and quality than any work previously published on the uprising in Taiwan (up until 1990). They even claim to have used all the relevant material on the subject which was available at the time. They also make the following claim:

'In regard to the facts we have assembled, we have tried to be honest and fair.'⁸

The first claim is actually justified; this was the first work of extensive research to provide a large-scale bibliography on the subject, which forms a good basis for further scholarly research into the uprising. In this respect, it was truly a pioneering feat. However, a large part of the work deals with the Japanese colonial period and the background of the uprising after Taiwan's return to China in 1945. The description of the uprising itself only comprises approximately a third of the book. The same applies therefore to the bibliography. The second claim, however, is not at all justified. This is the case as much for the material used as for the judgements made, which shall be elaborated on in the final chapter.

⁷ Su Seng (蘇僧) and Kuo Chien-ch'eng (郭建成), *Fu-ch'ü li-shih ming-ching-chung ti ch'en-ai* (拂去歷史明鏡中的塵埃) [Wipe the Dust from the Mirror of History] (Alhambra, CA: Mei-kuo Nan-hua wen-hua shih-yeh gong-szu (美國南華文化事業公司) [American Chinese Community Cultural Enterprise Co.], 1986), 130 pp. (p. 129).

⁸ Lai, Myers et al., p. 12.

In a number of cases, the references made do not correspond to the sources. In some cases, important events are ignored, even though the relevant sources were available to the authors. The theory that the uprising was caused by ‘agitation by communists and ambitious people’ is largely disregarded. However, under the pretence of scholarly research, this work still displays the apologist tendency to avoid the question of responsibility for the uprising or for the damage it caused. This is revealed in the title of the work, more clearly even in the conclusion to the unpublished manuscript of 1988, which ends with a quote from Aristotle. According to him, ‘tragedy’ is a condition that befalls those who are

‘not conspicuous for virtue and justice, and whose fall into misery is not due to vice and depravity, but rather some error’.⁹

This work must be regarded as a reaction – albeit an unsatisfactory one – to the increasing pressure to give free rein to scholarly research into the uprising of 1947.¹⁰

The following works, written shortly after the uprising, form the basis of research for this work. First to be mentioned is the account by Lin Mu-shun (林木順), who sympathises with the uprising, then the accounts by Chin Yü (勁雨, a pseudonym used for the Garrison Command) and the ‘Press Bureau of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office’ (*Taiwan-sheng hsing-cheng chang-kuan-kung-shu hsien-wen-shih*, 臺灣省行政長官公署新聞室, abbreviated in the following as *THCH*), which both reflect the official view. The pseudonym Lin Mu-shun is actually a pseudonym of the prominent Taiwanese Communist Party (*Taiwan kung-ch’an-tang*, 台灣共產黨) activist, Su Hsin (蘇新). Until the uprising, he worked as a journalist in Taipei. The sources don’t suggest Su Hsin

⁹ Lai, Myers et al. (unpublished manuscript of 1988), p. 216.

¹⁰ Doubts over the objectivity of the work also arise from the affinity of Lai to the authorities. Lai was the main author (主筆) of the “2.28 Incident Research Report” (*Erh-erh-pa shih-chien yen-chiu pao-kao* (二二八事件研究報告)) commissioned by the Executive Yuan in 1991 and completed in 1992. The purpose of that report was to provide the government with a reference work to decide how to deal with 2.28. This included issues such as erecting a monument to commemorate 2.28 (which led to the monument in 2.28 Peace Park in Taipei), establishing a procedure to compensate the dependants of 2.28 victims (leading to the establishment of the 2.28 Foundation) and declaring 28 February a national holiday. The unpublished manuscript cited here as well as the Stanford publication can therefore be regarded as precursory works to the Executive Yuan report.

had any active role in the uprising, whether on instructions from the Party or not. Although he openly sides with the insurgents, his report is in comparison with official accounts generally more detailed and more reliable, as the purpose of the official accounts is not an objective presentation of facts but rather a justification of the suppression of the uprising. One weakness of Lin Mu-shun's account lies in the fact that he sometimes exaggerates the insurgents' actions, which is reflected, for instance, in the magnified numbers of insurgents involved and the extent to which they were armed. Most relevant is his account of events in Taipei, as a comparison with Chin Yü's work reveals that he literally copied parts of the description of events in outlying regions (for example in Keelung, Taipei County, Taoyüan, Hsinchu, Pingtung, Hualien, Taitung and the Penghu Islands). This would suggest that his first-hand information was limited mainly to events in the major cities and focal points of the uprising. Extracts from his account of the uprising in Taipei have been translated and included in the text in italics. Where appropriate, they are supplemented and commented on in the footnotes.¹¹

The newspapers *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報, published in Taipei) and *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (中華日報, published in Tainan), which have not been given sufficient consideration by previous studies, reported relatively freely before the suppression of the uprising began, despite the fact that they were practically official government publications. These are therefore an important source of material. Even after suppression of the uprising began, they provide interesting details of the ensuing purges. Independent newspapers, which were most likely to reflect the position of the local Taiwanese, can not be taken into account as copies of them either do not exist any more or are not available. A further important source is the published memoirs of twenty-three people who were involved. See the bibliography for a complete list of the sources used.

¹¹ Lin Mu-shun (林木順), *Taiwan erh-yüeh ko-ming* (台灣二月革命) [The February Revolution in Taiwan] (Taipei: Ch'ien-wei ch'u-pan-she (前衛出版社) [Avantgarde Publ. Co.]), 1990), 205 pp. (also in *Pei-mei Jih-pao* (北美日報) [North American Daily], Issues 21 March to 7 May 1980). On the identity of Su Hsin, alias Lin Mu-shun, and his biography, see Chang, Yen-hsien (張炎憲), Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) and Chuang Yung-ming (莊永明), eds, *Taiwan chin-tai ming-jen-chih* (臺灣近代名人誌) [Biographies of Famous Persons in the Modern History of Taiwan], 5 vols (Taipei: Tzu-li Wan-pao-she (自立晚報社) [Independent Evening News Publ. Co.], 1987), vol. 4, p. 255.

Western source material consists of diplomatic documents from the USA published in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, the US State Department's *China White Paper* of 1949, and the collection of documents *A Decade of American Foreign Policy* by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In addition, the New York Times and two articles by George Kerr published in 1947 in the magazine 'Far Eastern Survey' were also used.

2. Background History

It was not until 1885 when Taiwan, until then a prefecture of Fukien Province (福建) neglected by the Emperor's court in Peking, was itself elevated to the status of a province, a result of the foreign powers' thirst for annexation. The ensuing construction of fortifications and a modern infrastructure could not prevent Taiwan (along with the Penghu Islands, 澎湖) being handed to Japan after her victory in the First Sino-Japanese War for Korea, in accordance with the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki (馬關條約). Within six months the Japanese invaders quashed the Taiwanese armed resistance, although the following years saw regular armed clashes.¹ A long period of outward stability and complete isolation from the Chinese mainland followed, imposed by the Japanese authorities with the view that by cutting communications with China the sense of shared identity would be weakened.

Japan developed Taiwan's infrastructure, mining, various industrial sectors, especially agriculture and forestry management, primarily, of course, to satisfy the Japanese 'motherland's' requirements for rice, wood, sugar cane and camphor, and other goods.² Despite widespread discrimination and rioting, the Taiwanese began to appreciate the materially-secure living conditions (compared to pre-1895), as well as the largely incorrupt authorities, and the implementation of clear, if discriminatory and extremely severe, laws. This contrasted with the corruption and despotism of Chinese officials who, until 1895, considered a posting to Taiwan as either punishment, or an opportunity to increase their personal wealth.³

Following the forced cession of Taiwan, China was for decades concerned

¹ Ch'i Chia-lin (戚嘉林), *Taiwan-shih, A.D.1600-1945 (臺灣史)* [History of Taiwan], 2 vols (Chung-ho, Taipei Co.: self-published, 1985), 231, 236 pp. (vol. 2, pp. 148-164).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 167 ff.

³ E.g. (The Memoirs of) Yang Chao-chia (Yang, Chao-chia (楊肇嘉), 'Yang Chao-chia ti hui-i' (楊肇嘉的回憶) [Memoirs of Yang Chao-chia], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 45-53.), p. 47, and of Li Pi-ch'iang ('Li Pi-ch'iang ti hui-i' (李碧鏘的回憶) [Memoirs of Li Pi-ch'iang], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 233-254), p. 239.

entirely with her domestic affairs. Weakened by humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, countless wars between feuding warlords in ever-changing alliances, and later the armed conflicts between the weak Kuomintang (KMT) government under Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Chinese were not in a position to liberate Taiwan from Japanese colonialism. The Taiwanese elite understood this, and from the 1920s persistently sought a degree of equality and autonomy through petitions and public pressure through cultural and related organisations within the Japanese ruling system, however with little success.

China's weakness was thrown into stark relief by Japan's annexation of Manchuria in 1931 and the war of aggression which started in 1937. The situation changed abruptly, however, with the start of World War Two (more specifically the Pacific War), and with the USA and Britain joining the War against Japan. China now had some powerful allies, most importantly the USA. Although China had two million Japanese soldiers tied up within her own borders and was therefore extremely important to the Allies, the Chinese made little progress in winning back lost territory, which caused the Americans to fear China might be tempted into a separate peace with Japan.⁴ This fear, and the assumption that China would become the USA's most important partner in the planned post-war order in East Asia, led the USA to assure the return, after the war, of all Chinese territories lost to Japan. Roosevelt and Churchill gave Chiang Kai-shek their first assurance at the Cairo Conference (22 to 26 November 1943), where the future of Japanese-occupied areas was decided. The decisive clause reads as follows:

[...] all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.⁵

This was reiterated at the Potsdam Conference on 26 July 1945, though the

⁴ George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 514 pp., transl. into Chinese by Ch'en Jung-ch'eng (陳榮成): *Pei ch'u-mai-ti Taiwan* (被出賣的台灣), *T'ai-wan wen-shih ts'ung-shu* 9 (台灣文史叢書 9) [Taiwan Literature and History Series 9] (Taipei: Ch'ien-wei ch'u-pan-she (前衛出版社) [Avantgarde Publishing House] 1991, 2007), 466 pp., see p. 23.

⁵ Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Department of State, eds., *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents 1941-1949* (Washington: Department of State, 1950), 1381 pp. (p. 22).

handover of sovereignty to China was left to a peace treaty to be concluded with Japan.⁶ Thus the USA paved the way for the hand-over of Taiwan to China after Japan's surrender on 15 August, 1945. American and Chinese officers arrived for the first time in Taiwan on 1 September, 1945. Military police units and 12,000 regular troops followed in the first half of October. The official hand-over ceremony took place in Taipei (until then known as 'Taihoku') on 25 October between the last Japanese Governor, General Andō Rikichi (安藤利吉) and the new Chinese Governor of Taiwan, General Ch'en I (陳儀).⁷

Ch'en I had been head of the Taiwan Research Committee (*Taiwan tiao-ch'a wei-yüan-hui*, 台灣調查委員會) in Chungking in 1942, which was charged with preparing for the KMT takeover of Taiwan after the war, and which was under the control of the Central Bureau for Investigation and Statistics (*Chung-yang tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi-chü*, 中央調查統計局), the secret service organisation controlled by the CC Faction. In the middle of 1945 he was made chairman of the committee, which was preparing the finalised plans for the takeover of Taiwan and establishing a new provincial government. Eventually Chiang Kai-shek chose Ch'en I as Taiwan's Governor. Unlike in other provinces, he was also to be head of a provisional provincial administration (*hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-shu*, 行政長官公署; literally the 'Administrative Executive Office') with the leader known as the 'Administrative Executive' (*hsing-cheng chang-kuan*, 行政長官).⁸ This status was increasingly considered a symbol of Taiwan's special and therefore discriminatory treatment. Ch'en I was given more power than Governors of any other province. As Senior Commander of the Garrison Command (*ching-pei tsung-szu-ling-pu*, 警備總司令部) he combined both political and military leadership in his hands. From the point of view of the central government this was deemed necessary in order to control any adjustment problems in Taiwan after

⁶ *A Decade of American Foreign Policy*, p. 49. The peace treaty with Japan wasn't signed until 1951, in San Francisco.

⁷ Kerr (1965), pp. 67-72, 76-78.

⁸ To simplify matters the terms 'Governor' and 'Governor' Office' will be used.

fifty years of colonialism, through an official armed with full authority.⁹

Ch'en I was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, he had been close to Chiang Kai-shek since 1926, and secondly, his personal background suggested he was predestined for the role. From 1934 to 1941 he had been Governor of the culturally-similar province of Fujian, on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, and as a result was familiar with things Japanese. His reputation as Governor of Fujian was dubious, however. Reports of mismanagement through a system of state monopolies, which opened the doors to corruption and officials' private gains, as well as the brutal suppression of student protests coloured his public reputation. It is no surprise then that the announcement naming Ch'en I as Governor of Taiwan unleashed a storm of indignation. However, Chiang Kai-shek trusted him, and his decision was final.¹⁰

The Taiwanese people did not know of this, however, and viewed the 'return to the fold of the fatherland' (*tsu-kuo huai-pao*, 祖國懷抱) with joyful anticipation. They believed that the period of discrimination had finally come to an end and Taiwan would become an equal part of the democratic 'New China' which as a 'victorious power' would play an important role in international politics, as promised in leaflets which had been dropped over Taiwan towards the end of the war. Due to the infrastructure, agriculture and industrial sectors being relatively well-developed, Taiwan was supposed to become a 'model province'. However, the first to be disillusioned were the crowds who greeted the Chinese troops landing at the docks of Keelung (基隆) and Kaohsiung with excited cheers. Instead of the usual sight of Japanese soldiers turned out in dapper uniforms came conscripted farmers' sons in straw sandals carrying cooking pots dangling from poles.¹¹

The Governor's Office's first major task was to repatriate 330,000 Japanese civilians and 170,000 soldiers, which was not completed until April 1946. Around

⁹ Kerr (1965), p. 47; National Government Communiqué, 21 September 1945; Figure: Chung-king, No. 862 (*kuo-min cheng-fu kung-pao*; *Yü tzu, ti pa-liu-erh hao*, 國民政府公報, 渝字, 第八六二號).

¹⁰ Boorman, Howard, and others, eds, *A Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967), I (1967), vol. 1, p. 25-26; Kerr (1965), pp. 47-55.

¹¹ Kerr (1965), pp. 63-64 and pp. 72-74.

50,000 Japanese remained as specialist staff working for the administration and in industry. With the withdrawal of the majority of Japanese, Taiwanese hopes focused on returning confiscated land, mines, factories and banks to their pre-1895 owners. Other confiscated Japanese assets, such as factories established after 1895, houses and private possessions were to be made available for sale as a whole or as shares. The manner in which this problem was actually dealt with quickly became a source of great dissatisfaction. The 'Commission for Settling Japanese Property' (*Jih-ch'an ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui*, 日產處理委員會) and the sub-commissions for the various branches of industries were controlled by department heads from the provincial government – in fact provincial-level ministers; the Taiwanese were barely represented at all. In addition, growing levels of nepotism swelled the administrative system. Relatives of these department heads – or 'Commissioners' - controlled factories through 'interim' committees which were later transformed into boards of directors. Thus enterprises remained public property, but were in effect run as private ventures. This was the beginning of the provincial administration's monopolisation of the economy, much as it had occurred under Ch'en I in Fukien. In particular, through their control of trade, transport and financing, the Commissioners for finance, industry and mining, as well as agriculture and forestry, were largely able to eliminate local Taiwanese competition. Permission had to be sought for all business activities, which was often only available through the payment of bribes. Loans were mostly made to the 'public' enterprises; Taiwanese industry did not stand a chance. The Monopoly Bureau (*chuan-mai-chü*, 專賣局), which had been taken over after the Japanese era, came under the direct control of the provincial administration (i.e. Ch'en I, or his Chief Secretary Ko Ching'en) and controlled the production, trade and marketing of products such as tobacco, alcohol and camphor, whereas before 1945 the monopoly system had covered only production and processing. The Trade Bureau (*mao-i-chü*, 貿易局) was of equal status within the administrative hierarchy and controlled trade with the mainland and imports.

Nepotism and corruption spread to virtually all areas of the economy and administration, such that the Taiwanese elite's aspirations to influence the province's politics were denied. Hung Yen-ch'iu (洪炎秋), who was closely associated with the authorities, quotes an official of the provincial administration

as saying

Some bad habits from the civil service on the mainland have now reached Taiwan, which was just recently returned.¹²

These ‘bad habits’ were obvious even lower down in the hierarchy. Soldiers would rip the material off the seats in trains or steal the light bulbs to sell them. When buying things at the market or other places they either did not pay at all, or only used the mainland currency which was strongly affected by inflation, instead of the Taiwan Dollar (*T'ai-pi*, 台幣) which was relatively stable. Officers and subordinates of the provincial administration did business with merchants in Shanghai, and even set up depots in the ports for the goods being exported. Vehicles, such as Taipei’s dustbin lorries, were seized in order to transport the goods, thereby bringing the rubbish removal service to a standstill. Factories that had become unviable through mismanagement were dismantled and the equipment sold in Shanghai. USA relief supplies and provisions of rice and cane sugar left behind by the Japanese suffered a similar fate.

As a result it was inevitable that within just a few weeks the Taiwanese people’s initial enthusiasm for the ‘return to the fold of the fatherland’ gave way

¹² Hung Yen-ch'iu (洪炎秋), 'Hung Yen-ch'iu ti hui-i' (洪炎秋的回憶) [Memoirs of Hung Yen-ch'iu], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 75-79 (p. 76). For the developments referred to, see Kerr (1965), p. 62, pp. 124-127, p. 130, pp. 139 ff; George H. Kerr, 'Formosa's Return to China', *Far Eastern Survey*, 16 (15 October 1947), pp. 205-208 (pp. 205 ff.); *Report on the current situation in Taiwan* by the News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan (Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], 'Taiwan cheng-chih hsien-chuang pao-kao-shu' (台灣政治現狀報告書) [Report on the current situation in Taiwan], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], Hsin kuan-tien ts'ung-shu 7 (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n.publ.], 1985), pp. 1-32., pp. 5 ff., p. 10. According to Kerr (1965), p. 115, the administrative system had 18,300 personnel under the Japanese, compared with 43,000 under Ch'en I. For information on the Monopoly and Trade Bureaus' positions within the administrative hierarchy, see table 99 of the statistics publication of the Governor's Office in 1946: Taiwan-sheng hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-shu t'ung-chi-shih (臺灣省行政長官公署統計室) [Statistics Bureau of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office], ed., *Taiwan-sheng wu-shih-i nien-lai t'ung-chi t'i-yao* (臺灣省五十一年來統計提要) [A Summary of Statistics of Taiwan Province of the past 51 Years] (Taipei: the editors, 1946), 1386 pp. Lai Tse-han (賴澤涵) lists 211 enterprises which were controlled by officials in the Governor's Office, Table 7, p. 86 (Lai Tse-han (賴澤涵), Ramon H. Myers and Wei Wou (魏萼): *A Tragic Beginning: The February 28, 1947 Uprising in Taiwan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 273 pp.).

to disillusionment, which after a few months deepened into general frustration. Certainly the air of condescension with which the Mainlanders approached Taiwan and the Taiwanese compounded this. To them, Taiwan was a culturally-inferior (*kuan-wai*, 關外), distant province, which due to its ‘slave education’ (*nu-hua chiao-yü*, 奴化教育) under the Japanese, made the Taiwanese second class Chinese.¹³

The independent Taiwanese newspapers, foremost the *Min-pao* (民報), worked tirelessly to uncover police infringements and newly-emerging corruption scandals, as well as disclosing reports on the economic and social effects of these grievances. Alongside unemployment increases, runaway inflation, and a growing lack of food supplies (principally of rice), a cholera epidemic in the middle of 1946, centred around Tainan and Kaohsiung, was blamed on the incompetent administration of the health care service.¹⁴

It was hoped that an improvement in the situation would come about as a result of the elections to the Consultative Assemblies (*ts’an-i-hui*, 參議會) which took place at the municipality and county level in January and March 1946, and at the provincial level in May of the same year.¹⁵ Consultative Assemblies were formed to fulfil advisory roles and were constituted principally of members (*ts’an-i-yüan*, 參議員) who were indirectly voted in, as well as a smaller number of representatives from professional organisations. It was their role to give voice to public opinion (*min-i*, 民意) on current political decisions, and they also had the power to inform officials or government members about complaints from the

¹³ Kerr (1965), pp. 72, 98, 100, 106, 110 ff., 132, 134; *Report on the current situation in Taiwan*, pp. 4-6, 12, 22.

¹⁴ The *Report on the current situation in Taiwan* (pp. 6 ff. and p. 22) lists fourteen large-scale corruption cases in the first half of February alone, which were reported in the *Min-pao* (民報). For details of the consequences of the grievances, see pp. 13-15 and pp. 18-20; Kerr (1965) pp. 140 ff., 169 ff., 179-181 and 233 ff. According to Kerr (1965), p. 179, this was the first cholera epidemic in thirty years. In his memoirs, Han Shih-ch’üan (韓石泉) (‘Han Shih-ch’üan ti hui-i’ (韓石泉的回憶) [Memoirs of Han Shih-ch’an], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch’iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch’u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 135-148, reports on police infringements in the Tainan area (p. 136). Many who resisted arrest were shot by the Police on the spot. For an account of the Resolution Committee’s view of this being the cause of the unrest, see appendix VII.

¹⁵ ‘Municipalities’ were – and are up to today – cities that are directly subordinated to the province and therefore on the same administrative level as the counties.

public. At the lowest level, delegates to the township and district councils were voted by village and neighbourhood plenary assemblies, and from them the municipality and county Consultative Assemblies were elected. These in turn elected the Consultative Assembly for the province as a whole. At every stage of the voting however, the authorities could reject proposed candidates.¹⁶ Despite these restrictions, that led to the election of relatively conservative members of the Taiwanese elite onto these councils, they voiced their strong criticism during the first session of the Provincial Consultative Assembly in May 1946, due to the catastrophic circumstances in Taiwan, and moved to put their right to interpellation into practise. Originally the Consultative Assembly was to meet once every three months, though Ch'en I (陳儀) was startled by the unexpectedly harsh criticism and suspended any further sessions indefinitely.¹⁷

In the meantime the economic problems worsened. The allied aid organisation UNRRA reported 300,000 unemployed in the autumn of 1946, not including those who had left the cities due to lack of work, and returned to their home towns and villages. According to the same source, the average cost of food increased sevenfold between November 1945 and January 1947, and the cost of artificial fertilisers increased two-hundred-and-fifty-fold.¹⁸ A number of observers considered the situation at the end of 1946 so tense they feared an uprising would break out. The US Consulate in Taipei expressed these fears in its Six Month Report at the end of 1946, and the KMT Party Organisation cadre, Ch'iu Nien-t'ai, wrote anxious letters to the Central Government urging a policy change in the Governor's Office. The second session of the Consultative Assembly in December

¹⁶ For more detailed information on this subject, see Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰), *Taiwan chan-hou ch'u-ch'i ti min-i tai-piao* (台灣戰後初期的民意代表) [The People's Representatives in early Post-War Taiwan], Tzu-li ts'ung-shu 25 (自立叢書) [Series of the Independent News 25] (Taipei: Tzu-li Wanpao ch'u-pan-she (自立晚報出版社) [Independent Evening News Publ. Co.], 1986), 289 pp.) pp. 13-27.

¹⁷ Kerr (1965), pp. 194-201.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 141, 233 ff. The UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) was one of the USA's 'disaster control' organisations, which, after the end of the war, worked primarily in Europe, but also in Asia, towards restarting industry, providing people with food, taking precautions against epidemics etc, as well as returning displaced people to their homes. The UNRRA was represented in Taiwan until December 1947. Campbell, John C., ed., *The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947* (New York and London: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1947), 585 pp. (pp. 319 ff.), and Kerr (1965), pp. 158-183.

1946 brought no improvement, but rather revealed to all its powerlessness.¹⁹

The new constitution was proclaimed on 25 December 1946 in Nanking and was to take effect a year later. Hopes were pinned on the opportunities promised by the constitution, including elections to the National Assembly, through which Taiwan would be able to represent her interests, the general election of the provincial governor, the city mayors and county magistrates, whereby the police would come under civilian control, as well as the opportunity to establish a Statute of Autonomy under which the province's internal affairs would be largely self-governed.²⁰ Ch'en I's New Year's speech, in which he described the coming year as the 'Year of Implementing the Constitution' (*chin-nien wei hsing-hsien-nien*, 今年為行憲年) initially seemed to fulfil these hopes.²¹ However, just two weeks later at an 'administrative meeting' (*hsing-cheng hui-i*, 行政會議), Ch'en I announced that the people of Taiwan were not yet ready for a constitution-based form of government and that preparations had therefore not been finalised. As a result, unlike in other provinces, the constitution would not come into force in Taiwan until two years later, and thus the anticipated free elections would similarly also be delayed by two years.²² The disillusionment was complete. The growing shortage of rice, which had pushed the cost up to 20 Taiwan Dollars per *Chin* (斤) since the beginning of the year, led to the threat of a food crisis, even in the traditionally surplus areas of southern Taiwan.²³ The situation had

¹⁹ Kerr (1965), pp. 153, 221 ff.; Ch'iu, Nien-t'ai (丘念台), 'Ch'iu Nien-t'ai ti hui-i' (丘念台的回憶) [Memoirs of Ch'iu, Nien-t'ai], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 117-127 (p. 118).

²⁰ See the Constitution of 25 December 1946, in particular Chapters X and XI., see Ch'ien, Tuan-sheng, *The Government and Politics of China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 526 pp. (pp. 455-457).

²¹ The *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報), 1 January 1947 (p. 4, top right).

²² Kerr (1965, pp. 239-242); Department of State, ed., *United States Relations with China, with special reference to the period 1944-1949 (China White Paper)*, (Washington: 1949), 1124 pp (p. 925).

²³ Wu, Hsin-jung (吳新榮), 'Wu Hsin-jung ti hui-i' (吳新榮的回憶) [Memoirs of Wu Hsin-jung], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 1-44 (p. 2). According to (The Memoirs of) Chou Ming (周明, p. 183), the average monthly income at the time was less than 1000 Taiwan Dollars (Chou, Ming (周明), 'Chou Ming ti hui-i' (周明的回憶)

deteriorated to such an extent, and the prospect of political participation was so bleak, that it took only a spark to transform the US-Consulate and Ch'iu Nien-t'ai's fears of a possible uprising into reality. This spark finally came on the evening of 27 February 1947, in Taipei.

[Memoirs of Chou Ming], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 175-184.).

3. The Course of Events During the Uprising in Taipei

3.1. The Beginnings of the Uprising

3.1.1. The incident on 27 February

On Thursday, 27 February the city's Monopoly Bureau received an anonymous report of a sailing boat which planned to unload its cargo of smuggled cigarettes in Tan-shui (淡水), a suburb of Taipei. When six Monopoly Bureau agents arrived, accompanied by four police officers from the Police Brigade (*ching-ch'a ta-tui*, 警察大隊), most of the shipment had already disappeared.¹ The Bureau received a further anonymous tip-off that the smuggled goods were being sold in front of the T'ien-ma Teahouse (天馬茶店) in T'ai-p'ing Road (太平路), known today as Yen-p'ing North Road (延平北路), which was a gathering place for street traders selling mainly smuggled Western cigarettes.² They arrived around 7.30 pm.³ After they had eaten in a restaurant they required drinking money, and so set out to seize the cigarettes.

Many of the traders had already fled. A woman called Lin Chiang-mai (林江邁) was left behind, so the agents tried to confiscate both her cigarettes and cash. The

¹ According to the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報, 28 February, reproduced in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 201) there were more than ten police officers. See also Huang Ts'un-hou, p. 244, first paragraph (Huang, Ts'un-hou (黃存厚): 'Ai-kuo hu? P'an-kuo hu? Taiwan "erh-erh-pa" shih-chien' (愛國乎? 叛國乎? 台灣二二八事件) [Patriotic? Treasonous? The 2.28 Incident in Taiwan], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], *Hsin kuan-tien ts'ung-shu 7* (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n. pub.], 1985), pp. 243-258). Huang Ts'un-hou's account was first published in the *Sao-tang chou-pao* (掃蕩周報), a publication of the press bureau (*hsin-wen-chü*, 新聞局) of the Ministry of Defence. Huang Ts'un-hou was also Secretary of the Political Department (i.e. propaganda department) of the 21st division that was mainly responsible for the suppression of the uprising (*Chung-hua Jih-pao* (中華日報) [China Daily, Tainan]: March 1947: 28 March, p. 2, top left).

² This version of events is based on the Monopoly Bureau's Special Report which was drawn up for the Garrison Command, see *Chuan-mai yeh-wu t'e-k'an* (專賣業務特刊) [Special Issue of 'Monopoly Affairs'], p. 69 (*Chuan-mai yeh-wu t'e-k'an* (專賣業務特刊) [Special Issue of 'Monopoly Affairs'], ([n.p.]: April 1947, [n. pub.]), in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien tang-an hui-pien (chiu)* (二二八事件檔案彙編(九)) [Archives Materials on the 228 Incident, vol. 9], ed. by Kuo-shih-kuan (國史館) [Academia Historica] (Taipei: 2002), pp. 39-75). See Chin Yü (勁雨), *Taiwan shih-pien chen-hsiang yü nei-mu* (台灣事變真相與內幕) [The Truth and Inside Story on the Incident in Taiwan] (Shanghai: Chien-she shu-tien (建設書店) [Reconstruction Bookstore], April 1947), 78 pp. (p. 1). Apparently Ch'en I described the course of events this way when the Consultative Assembly visited him and his Chief of Staff K'o (柯參謀長). See the account in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (4 March, p. 1, bottom half, from line 9).

³ Lin Mu-shun, p. 9.

woman resisted however, and tried to grab the confiscated cigarettes back from the agents, as they were her only source of income. In the ensuing fight the Monopoly Bureau agent, Yeh Te-ken (葉德根), struck her on the head with the butt of his gun and she fell to the ground, bleeding. In the meantime a large crowd had gathered round which protested loudly at their behaviour. When the Monopoly Bureau agent Fu Hsüeh-t'ung (傅學通) tried to escape he was followed by a crowd throwing stones. On arrival at Yung-le-ting Street (永樂町) he fired a shot in panic, which killed a bystander named Ch'en Wen-hsi (陳文溪). Eventually four military police officers arrived and took four of the Monopoly Bureau agents away with them.⁴ Lin Mu-shun, on the other hand, reports that they were able to escape.⁵ Ch'en I had repeatedly forbidden officials, including police officers, from carrying arms whilst out on patrol, though obviously without success.⁶ Subsequently the crowd set light to the lorry the Monopoly Bureau agents had abandoned, as well as all of its contents.⁷ Various attempts by the crowds outside a local police station and the city's main police station to have the agents and culprits released to them for immediate public execution, as well as a similar attempt in front of the head office of the military police, to whom the culprits had apparently been handed-over, had failed, but the crowds remained until the morning. The crowd's perseverance may be explained by a similar case at the end

⁴ For an account of the incident see also Lin Mu-shun, pp. 9-11. According to him the crowd was five hundred strong; report in the *Min-pao*, (1 March; cited in Yang Chao-chia, p. 46), and (The Memoirs of) Pai Ch'ung-hsi (Pai, Ch'ung-hsi (白崇禧), 'Ch'ien kuo-fang pu-chang Pai Ch'ung-hsi ti hui-i' (前國防部長白崇禧的回憶) [Memoirs of the former Minister of Defence Pai Ch'ung-hsi], in *Taiwan 1947. Ming-chia i-t'an erh-erh-pa shih-chien* (台灣 1947, 名家憶談二二八事件) [Famous people talk of their memories of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Tseng Hsin-i (曾心儀), *Ta t'e-hsieh ts'ung-shu 2* (大特寫叢書) [Great Special Series 2] (Taipei: Tseng Hsin-i (曾心儀), 1986), pp. 67-72 (p. 68). According to the same newspaper report in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (see Appendix 1), the Chief of Police in Taipei went in person to the scene and took four Monopoly Bureau officials to the police station (p. 202, para. 1, final line). *Yung-le-ting* is today called Dihua St. (*Ti-hua-chieh*, 迪化街).

⁵ Lin Mu-shun, p. 10, also Lai, Myers et al., p. 103.

⁶ Main article in the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, (2 March, p. 1, col. 2, lines 7-9), and main article in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, (1 March).

⁷ According to an article by Huang Ts'un-hou (Huang, Ts'un-hou (黃存厚): 'Erh-erh-pa shih-pien shih-mo' (二二八事變始末) [The Whole Story of the 2.28 Incident], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], *Hsin kuan-tien ts'ung-shu 7* (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n. pub.], 1985), pp. 200-242), p. 202, line 3, this occurred at *Hsi-men yüan-huan* (西門圓環, a roundabout at the West Gate).

of 1945 in nearby Keelung, in which the culprit had got off without punishment.⁸

At around 9 pm the crowds forced the publisher, Li Wan-chü⁹ (李萬居) of the official government newspaper *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報, New Life) to publish the story the following day, by threatening to set fire to the editorial building. According to Lin Mu-shun he had been instructed not to report the matter, though he published a short report on 28 February.¹⁰

3.1.2. *The spread of the uprising across the city*

On Friday, 28 February the shops were closed, partly out of solidarity for those protesting, partly because they were forced to stay closed. The people were publicly called to action. At around 9 am several trains of demonstrators of between one and three thousand people started to move from the Lung-shan Temple (in the west of the city) and T'ai-p'ing Road (太平路) (in the north)

⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 10; Chin Yü, p. 1. Page 1 of *THCH* (Taiwan-sheng hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-shu hsin-wen-shih (臺灣省行政長官公署新聞室) [Press Bureau of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office], ed., *Taiwan pao-tung shih-chien chi-shih* (臺灣暴動事件紀實) [An Eye-witness Report of the Disturbances in Taiwan] (Taipei: the editors, 1947), 48 pp.) states that the military police had confirmed the arrest of the officials, though had the crowds not been content with the reassurance they would be convicted according to existing legislation. Yang Liang-kung's Investigation Report (para. 2, line 18) states the same (Yang, Liang-kung (楊亮功), 'Erh-erh-pa shih-chien tiao-ch'a pao-ka'o' (「二二八」事件調查報告) [Investigation Report on the 2.28 Incident], *Lien-ho-pao* (聯合報) [United Daily News], 10 March 1988, p. 3). See also the *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (2 March, p. 1): 'shih-chien ching-kuo' (事件經過), (line 10). For details of the incidents in Keelung see Mendel, p. 31.

⁹ Li Wan-chü came from Yunlin county (then part of Tainan county). From 1923-1932 he studied in Shanghai and Paris, and from 1933 worked for the KMT government. From 1942 he worked together with other Taiwanese in Canton and Hong Kong to try and arouse resistance against the Japanese. In the course of this work he established the newspaper *Taiwan Min-sheng-pao* (台灣民生報, 'Taiwanese Welfare') in 1945 in Chungking, which he ran himself. In August he returned to Taiwan with instructions to transform the official mouthpiece of the Japanese colonial administration, the New Taiwan News (*Tai-wan Shim-pō*, 台灣新報) into the new government newspaper, known from then on as the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報). As a member of Tainan's Consultative Assembly he was voted onto the provincial Consultative Assembly, and was made Vice Chairman. In addition, in November 1946 he was made a member of the National Constitutional Assembly (*chih-hsien kuo-ta tai-piao*, 制憲國大代表). See Chang Yen-hsien's (張炎憲) biography (vol. 2, pp. 163-166). Li Wan-chü was one of those labelled a *pan-shan* (半山, half mainlander), e.g. by Lin Mu-shun. This refers to Taiwanese who went to the mainland before 1945, joined the KMT there and returned to Taiwan in 1945 to take on important roles in Taiwan's politics and economy. They are severely criticised and described as effectively being 'collaborators', who served the authorities but didn't represent the population, see Lin Mu-shun (p. 39) and George H. Kerr in *Formosa Betrayed*, characterisation of Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴) and Stanway Cheng (鄭南渭), pp. 153-154.

¹⁰ Lin Mu-shun, p. 11.

towards the Central Monopoly Bureau.¹¹ As they passed the police station in T'ai-p'ing Road, an incident broke out in which the station was set alight, and the station master, Huang, beaten.¹² An attempt by the mayor of Taipei, Yu Mi-chien (游彌堅), the chairman of the Taipei Consultative Assembly, Chou Yen-shou (周延壽), and the military police commander, Chang Mu-t'ao (張慕陶), to persuade the crowds to disperse by promising that those responsible for the incident would be punished, backfired. The crowd demanded their immediate execution.¹³ When they arrived at the Central Monopoly Bureau at around 11am, they found it already encircled by military and civilian police officers.¹⁴ They then moved on to the local Monopoly Bureau for Taipei City, where agents were busy burning confiscated cigarettes and utensils. It was immediately ransacked and its contents of matches, alcohol, confiscated boxes of tobacco and so on were thrown into the street and burned. During the tumult two Monopoly Bureau agents were beaten to death because they had harassed some children who were selling cigarettes in a

¹¹ Situated at *Nan-men* (南門, South Gate); Lin Mu-shun, p. 12.

¹² For information on the shopkeepers' actions, see Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚, p. 245, line 1), and p. 260, line 1 in: 'Chi-yen shih-chien shih-jih-chi' (緝煙事件十日記) [Notes on the ten days of the Incident of the Confiscation of Cigarettes], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], *Hsin kuan-tien ts'ung-shu 7* (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n. pub.], 1985), pp. 259-268) and Lai, Myers et al. (p. 105). According to Lin Mu-shun (p. 12) the station master tried to stop the crowds advancing by threatening them with his gun. It is not clear whether the shots were aimed at protestors, or intended as warning shots. According to Chin Yü (p. 2, para. 1) this incident was the first time that weapons were looted. See Huang Ts'un-hou, pp. 259 ff. and p. 245, lines 2 to 3 (Huang, Ts'un-hou (黃存厚): 'Chi-yen shih-chien shih-jih-chi' (緝煙事件十日記) [Notes on the ten days of the Incident of the Confiscation of Cigarettes], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], *Hsin kuan-tien ts'ung-shu 7* (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n. pub.], 1985), pp. 259-268) and Wang K'ang (王康, pp. 208-210) for details of the route the demonstrators took (Wang, K'ang (王康), 'Wang K'ang ti hui-i' (王康的回憶) [Memoirs of Wang K'ang], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 197-232.).

¹³ Lai, Myers et al., p. 105 (citing *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 3 March).

¹⁴ The *Hsin-sheng-pao*, remarkably critical considering it was a government newspaper, reported a crowd of two to three thousand people (4 March, p. 2). According to Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚) the crowd had grown to over ten thousand people (p. 245, line 4). It seems that either no instructions were given to collate information, or the journalists allowed themselves a certain amount of freedom in reporting the incident.

side street. Four others were injured.¹⁵ Auxiliary military police were powerless due to the size of the crowd. The crowd returned to the Central Monopoly Bureau in order to negotiate with the head of the Bureau. Five representatives demanded that the culprits of the events during the previous days be publicly executed, that compensation be paid to the victims, that the limit on tobacco imports be lifted and that raids on street traders be forbidden.¹⁶ However, the 30 minute-long negotiations led nowhere as no-one with any authority came forward. The crowd destroyed the homes of some agents and eventually wanted to express their demands directly to Governor Ch'en I.¹⁷

Lin Mu-shun wrote about the spread of the unrest:

In the end there was nothing else the crowd could do but appeal to Governor Ch'en. At around 1 pm groups of people¹⁸ from all over started making their way to the Governor's Office. As they walked they carried flags, beat drums and gongs and loudly shouted out slogans. They demanded punishment for the culprits and the closure of the Monopoly Bureau. However, the Governor's Office was at this point already tightly surrounded by army units who prevented the crowds from getting any closer.¹⁹ By now the crowd was highly charged and pushed forwards, regardless of the guns and bayonets. They hadn't reached the entrance before they were fired upon by bodyguards on the roof of the Governor's Office with machine guns. Three people were killed on the spot, and three injured (they also died later).²⁰ The crowd felt forced to dissolve. They had

¹⁵ Lin Mu-shun and *THCH* agree on this, as do the accounts in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, *ibid.*; Kerr (1965), p. 255 and the *China White Paper*, p. 962. Lai, Myers et al. (p. 105) don't mention the reason for the attacks on the Monopoly Bureau.

¹⁶ According to Kerr (1965, p. 255) the crowd also demanded the head of the Monopoly Bureau's resignation.

¹⁷ According to Huang Ts'un-hou, both offices were ransacked and set alight (p. 245, from line 4).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 246, line 5: approximately one to two thousand people. According to an account in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (4 March) the crowd was just four to five hundred people.

¹⁹ According to Lai, Myers et al. (p. 106, referring to the *Hsin-sheng-pao* of 3 March) the badly-staffed sentries had called for reinforcements. They state that the incident didn't occur until the arrival of the military police (after 2 pm).

²⁰ Some of those injured or killed were picked up by American officials, from the Consulate or the UNRRA (Kerr (1965, p. 256 ff.) and the *China White Paper*, (p. 926). The Defence Minister at the time, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, stated in his memoirs that machine guns had been set up on the roof (p. 68, para. 1). See also Chung, Li-ho (鍾理和), 'Chung Li-ho jih-chi' (鍾理和日記) [The Diaries of Chung Li-ho], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the

petitioned because people, including some of their own, had been killed, but as their petition remained unsuccessful, a new rancour grew to add to the hatred already felt. Within less than an hour an atmosphere of terror had spread throughout Taipei. Around ten thousand people, young and old, were out on the streets, beating every Mainlander they saw, as the majority were corrupt officials or dubious salesmen in cahoots with the officials. A cloud of violence settled over Taipei. The streets were flowing with freshly-spilt blood. Shouts of ‘Kill the A-shan’!²¹ and the cries of those beaten almost to death filled the streets; the military and the police²² dared not intervene. The rage of the masses could be felt everywhere.

(Lin Mu-shun, p. 13)

According to various sources, Taiwanese people lay in waiting for Mainlanders. They searched the city’s hotels, buses and trains arriving in Taipei for them.²³ In nearby Keelung the exits of two cinemas were blocked in order to intercept any Mainlanders coming out.²⁴ Mainlanders were identified partly by their clothing, from the *chung-shan-chuang* (中山裝, Sun Yat-sen suit, which at the time was a symbol of KMT Party membership), from their footwear (the majority of

2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T’ai t’ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], Hsin kuan-tien ts’ung-shu 7 (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n. pub.], 1985), pp. 404-416 (p. 406).

Chief of Staff K’o acknowledged to the city Consultative Assembly only one injury on each side. Members of the public reported two demonstrators shot dead and several injured after more than 20 shots were fired, according to accounts in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (4 March). This incident must be considered the beginning of the uprising as it is the first time the unrest spread throughout the entire city, which gave Ch’en I grounds to impose a state of emergency. It is not without reason that the uprising as a whole is shortened to the ‘228 Incident’ (*erh-erh-pa shih-chien*, 二二八事件), and not ‘227’. The incident is a typical example of a poorly-prepared leadership which presumably failed to instruct its sentries who, when faced with a large crowd of people, immediately reached for their guns. A parallel in European history is Bloody Sunday in St Petersburg, when demonstrating workers were shot at whilst trying to deliver a petition to the Tzar in the Winter Palace. That incident was the start of the First Russian Revolution of 1905.

²¹ The name *A-shan* (阿山) is short for *T’ang-shan-jen* (唐山人), used in Cantonese to describe Chinese from the north. In Taiwan it refers to mainlanders. *T’ang-shan* is also used to mean China (i.e. the mainland). The term *pan-shan* (半山) is derived from this.

²² As reported in *THCH* (p. 3, para. 1), most police officers were Taiwanese who deserted their units, taking their guns with them.

²³ *THCH*, p. 2, para. 3, line 5; Chin Yü, p. 2, para. 2, from line 5; p. 3, final para.; p. 4, para. 1, penultimate line and p. 5, final line.

²⁴ Lin Mu-shun, p. 45. See below (section 4.3, p. 107).

Taiwanese still wore Japanese-style wooden clogs *mu-chi* (木屐) and, of course, linguistic differences. Mainlanders were asked if they were *kan-shu* (甘薯) ('sweet potatoes', i.e. Taiwanese) or *chu* (豬, 'pigs', i.e. Mainlanders).²⁵ As soon as suspected Mainlanders hesitated to answer, they were beaten up. They were questioned in the Min-nan dialect and when they failed to answer were identified as Mainlanders. If they were from Fukien and able to answer, they were questioned in Japanese, which at the time was still commonly understood by Taiwanese, but generally not by Mainlanders.²⁶ Mainlanders were victims of such attacks particularly in the city centre and the suburb of Wan-hua (萬華). In view of this threat they tried to find places to hide. Some even found shelter with Taiwanese, where they remained for nine days until the uprising was crushed by the KMT troops.²⁷

At around 2 pm a large crowd of people gathered in the Sun-Yat-sen-Park (*Chung-shan kung-yüan*, 中山公園), and occupied the Taiwan Radio Broadcasting Station (*Taiwan kuang-po tien-t'ai*, 台灣廣播電台) which was situated in the park. Over the radio, which could reach the whole island, the public were called on to oust all corrupt officials, i.e. representatives of Ch'en I's government. The attacks were thus not directed primarily at Ch'en I, but at several of his

²⁵ Ong Iok-tek ((王育德), *Taiwan – k'u-men ti li-shih* (台灣-苦悶的歷史) [Taiwan: a Depressing History] (Tokyo: T'ai-wan ch'ing-nien-she (台灣青年社) [Taiwan Youth], 1979; Chinese transl. repr. Taipei: Ch'ien-wei ch'u-pan-she (前衛出版社) [Avantgarde Publishing House], 1999), 258 pp.) explains the usage of these insults: the Taiwanese had referred to the Japanese as 'dogs', because 'although they barked, they could also be useful as guard dogs' (*sui-jan hui chiao, yeh hui k'an men*, 雖然會叫, 也會看門). The Mainlanders were called 'pigs' because apart from 'stuffing their faces' they were good for nothing (*chih hui ch'ih, i wu k'o ch'ü*, 只會吃, 一無可取), see p. 157. The departure of the Japanese and the take-over of Taiwan by the KMT was characterised in this way: 'the dogs are going, the pigs are coming' (*kou ch'ü, chu lai*, 狗去, 豬來), see p. 154.

²⁶ Kerr (1965), p. 257; Chin Yü, p. 2 para. 2, line 6, and p. 5 final para. A description of this was written by Chu Wen-po (朱文伯), magistrate of Hsinchu County at the time, who was caught up by the unrest whilst on official business in Taipei (see Chu Wen-po (朱文伯), 'Erh-erh-pa pei ou chi' (二二八被毆記) [Notes on how I was beaten during 2.28], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], Hsin kuan-tien ts'ung-shu 7 (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n. pub.], 1985), pp. 167-169).

²⁷ Chin Yü, p. 6 and Kerr (1965), p. 257. Kerr remarks that after one or two days, apart from military patrols and police, no Mainlanders were seen on the streets, even in other cities. He raises the point, however, that no knives, pistols, or other deadly weapons were used in the violent assaults on Mainlanders.

subordinates, including Pao K'o-yung (包可永, Head of the Department of Industry and Mining/*kung-k'uang-ch'u*, 工礦處), Yen Chia-kan (嚴家淦, Head of the Department of Finance/*ts'ai-cheng-ch'u*, 財政處), Chou I-o (周一鶚, Head of the Department of Civil Affairs/*min-cheng-ch'u*, 民政處)²⁸ and K'o Yüan-fen (柯遠芬, Chief of Staff/*ts'an-mou-chang*, 參謀長), who acted as a barrier between the public and Ch'en I.²⁹ Banners and posters were written aimed specifically at Ch'en I himself. The demands had become more radical. They demanded not merely the resignation of the head of the Monopoly Bureau, but the abolition of the monopoly system altogether. At around 3 pm various companies which were linked with corrupt officials were attacked and set alight, including the only department store in Taipei, the *Hsin-T'ai kung-szu* (新台公司), which was under the control of the Trading Office, and the *Cheng-Hua* Hotel (正華). It seems nothing was looted. The few who tried to loot were beaten up by the crowd. Pupils and students left their schools and colleges, and labourers and office workers left their workplaces. Most shops had not opened, and the effect was virtually that of a general strike.³⁰

At 3 pm the Garrison Commander declared the state of emergency throughout the city. However, it could not be imposed, as many Taiwanese public workers, particularly police officers, had deserted their posts.³¹ There were clashes throughout the city, armed patrols fired shots indiscriminately, killing and injuring numerous demonstrators. In front of the Wan-hua Station, in the south of the city,

²⁸ These departments are the provincial equivalent of ministries.

²⁹ According to Lai, Myers et al. (p. 106, referring to the *Hsin-sheng-pao* on 3 March), the call went out from the radio broadcasting station to gather in the park and in front of the Governor's Office.

³⁰ Lin Mu-shun, p. 14; Chin Yü, p. 3; Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 246, from line 8. For details of how looters were dealt with, see the account in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (4 March). The *Hsin-T'ai kung-szu* sold mainly Western imports, which provided corrupt officials with a much-enjoyed additional income. The Trading Bureau, which controlled the department store, was generally associated with corruption, which explains the attack on it.

³¹ According to Kerr (1965), p. 258, martial law was not declared until 6 pm. For details of the implementation of the state of emergency see *THCH* (p. 3). As far as the imposition and lifting of the state of emergency is concerned, Lai, Myers et al.'s statements (p. 107 and p. 110) do not correspond to the sources they refer to. They do not state when the state of emergency was implemented (though Lin Mu-shun, p. 14, states that it was imposed from 3 pm) and they state that it was lifted again on 2 March, 12 am (ie midnight, though *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 3 March provides no such information). The lifting of the state of emergency at that time is actually announced in *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 2 March, p. 2.

Mainlanders were intercepted as they got off trains coming in to the city, and in front of the main station officials' cars were set alight. Students and young people in particular tried to arm themselves by attacking police stations. Journalists complained about transport and communication lines into and out of Taipei which had been interrupted by the unrest.³²

The city's cigarette sellers now sent five representatives to the Taipei City Consultative Assembly, requesting mediation as a result of the incident.³³

3.2. The Struggle for Reforms

3.2.1. The Taipei Consultative Assembly's first demands

These proceedings marked the start of the second stage of the uprising. Up until this point the anger, which had built up over a year and a half, was the due to corruption, discrimination and government incompetence, as well as indignation over recent events. Now began a phase in which attempts were made initially to control the recent unrest, and later on to present wide-ranging demands for political reform. This phase ended when Ch'en I rejected outright the programme of reforms put forward by the Resolution Committee on 7 March.³⁴

³² *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (2 March, p. 2). It reported very little about this day in Taipei; that there had been unrest, that 'a few citizens' (*jo-kan shih-min*, 若干市民) ransacked branches of the Monopoly Bureau, and that there had been casualties in front of the Governor's Office. In its leading article on 1 March, the *Hsin-sheng-pao* refers only to the incident on 27 February, criticising the Monopoly Bureau agents' and police officers' illegal use of firearms and demanded the authorities responsible be brought to justice. The government was called on to abide by the law, otherwise the public could not be expected to. A more detailed account was not published until 4 March. See also the outline of events up to this point in the Resolution Committee's statement from 6 March (Appendix VII).

³³ Kerr (1965), p. 258; Lin Mu-shun, p. 15. According to the report in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, the cigarette sellers had visited Chief of Staff K'o at 11 am for this purpose.

³⁴ Lai, Myers et al. use a much cruder system of categorisation: according to them the first phase lasted from 27 February to 5 March, during which time the demonstrators were on the offensive and made demands on the authorities. The second phase, which overlaps with the first, was from 5 to 8 March. During this time the Central Government's decision-making process moved from a conciliatory to a hard line. During the third phase, from 8 March to 15 May, this hard line and the 'reforms' were implemented (see pp. 8, p. 105 (from para. 4), p. 142, p. 151 ("The Time of Terror"). This categorisation is not particularly useful, as the subject under investigation is the uprising itself that therefore cannot simply be summarised as one 'phase'. It has the effect of blurring the processes which took place between 27 February and 5 March and after 8 March. Lai, Myers et al.'s 'second phase' does not in fact denote a separate phase, but rather a separate scene and as a result is irrelevant, as the Central Government's decision to violently suppress the uprising was taken on 5 March, maybe even as early as 2 March (see below, sec. 5, p. 170 and sec. 6, p. 188).

In an emergency meeting at 2 pm, the entire membership of the Taipei Consultative Assembly together with the Chairman of the Provincial Consultative Assembly, Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴),³⁵ Taipei Mayor Yu Mi-chien (游彌堅) and public representatives, resolved to call on Ch'en I regarding the events that had occurred. Ch'en I was represented by Chief of Staff K'o, to whom they presented five demands:

1. The culprits (of the 27 February incident) are to be publicly shot,
2. The Monopoly Bureau is to pay funeral costs as well as compensation to the families of the victims,
3. Guarantees must be made that such an incident is never repeated,
4. The head of the Monopoly Bureau is to meet with the public representatives present and apologise to them for the incident,
5. The authorities are to immediately dismiss the Head of the Monopoly Bureau.³⁶

At around 7.30 pm the first official reaction was broadcast over the radio. Chief of Staff K'o promised severe punishment for the culprits of 27 February and clearly ordered that such incidents must not be repeated (foremost by banning the

³⁵ As chairman of the Provincial Consultative Assembly and the 'Taiwan Industrial and Commercial Bank' (*Taiwan kung-shang yin-hang*, 台灣工商銀行), Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴) was one of the most prominent *pan-shan-men* (半山們). After studying in Japan and the USA, Huang, who came from Tainan County, returned to Nanking in 1927, where he joined the KMT and pursued a diplomatic career. Consequently he served as Consulate General in San Francisco from 1935-1939. He had already produced a plan for the Central Government in 1942 for the takeover of Taiwan after the war, and had come into contact with Ch'en I as a member of the Taiwan Investigation Committee, a committee, lead by Ch'en I, charged with preparing for the takeover of Taiwan by the KMT that came under the control of the Central Bureau for Investigation and Statistics (*Chung-yang tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi-chü*, 中央調查統計局), the secret service organisation under the command of the CC Faction. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent him to Taiwan in August 1945. He was mayor of Taipei until February 1946 before sitting on the Taipei Consultative Assembly and Provincial Consultative Assembly. For additional biographical information on Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, see Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) (vol. 1, in particular pp. 173-187). According to Kerr (1965), p. 154, he served as Foreign Affairs Representative to Ch'en I, and as such was responsible for conveying a positive image of circumstances in Taiwan to the outside world (to foreign politicians and journalists, for example).

³⁶ Lin Mu-shun, p. 15. Neither the official sources (Chin Yü, *THCH*) nor Kerr (1965) refer to this first attempt at mediation. Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴) is here wrongly named 'Huang Sheng-ch'in'. The *Chung-hua Jih-pao* on 2 March reveals somewhat different demands. Martial Law is to be lifted immediately, the culprits are to be punished in accordance with the law, and a commission is to be established by the Consultative Assemblies and Political Councils to settle the incident. According to an account in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (4 March), the representatives met with Ch'en I himself, and demanded, among other things, that the Police Brigade (警察大隊) be dissolved. He rejected this however, as it remained necessary in order to support the police forces in the city.

use of firearms), though he did not refer to the demands raised. Apart from that, he blamed ‘trouble-makers’ responsible for the unrest, whom he did not specify any further, who were the reason why a state of emergency had been provisionally declared. He did not reveal details of infringements by the security forces. Huang Ch’ao-ch’in (黃朝琴) and the chairman of the Taipei Consultative Assembly, Chou Yen-shou (周延壽), called on the public to calm down and put their trust in the mediation process. Hsieh O (謝娥), the National Assembly Member, denied that any shots had been fired in front of the Governor’s Office, and claimed that the victims had been crushed by the crowd in the confusion.³⁷ According to Lin Mu-shun, she retracted these allegations on the radio the same day following pressure from angry Taiwanese citizens. Despite this, her private hospital in the Taipei suburb Hsin-tien (新店) was vandalised by an angry crowd.³⁸

That evening the city was deserted after 8 pm. Heavily-armed military personnel and military police stood guard on the main thoroughfares and important crossroads.³⁹ After a relatively quiet night, shots were to be heard all over by the early morning. The army, military police and police officers patrolled the streets. Civilians were killed and injured, which only provided fuel for the resistance.⁴⁰

³⁷ Lin Mu-shun, p. 15-16; Chin Yü, p. 7; Kerr (1965), p. 258. On 28 March charges of common assault were made against six Monopoly Bureau agents in the case against Lin Ciang-mai (林江邁) and Fu Hsüeh-t’ung (傅學通) for the murder of Ch’en Wen-hsi (陳文溪). In accordance with the Taipei City Courts Criminal Division (*hsing-ch’u*, 刑處) Bill (No. 265/1947), the culprits were arrested in the Garrison Command and were handed over to the court (and division, respectively). The sentence conferred is not specified (see the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (31 March, p. 4, top centre).

³⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 18; *THCH*, p. 3, final para. Lai, Myers et al. (p. 109) assert rather implausibly and in reference to an interview with Hsieh O, that she mistakenly provided the radio with this false information without knowledge of the actual situation.

³⁹ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 4 March, lower half, para. 1, from penultimate line.

⁴⁰ According to the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (4 March, p. 1, bottom, para. 2). Wu Chuo-liu (吳濁流) confirms this was also the case on the morning of the following day (‘Wu Chuo-liu ti hui-i’ (吳濁流的回憶) [Memoirs of Wu Chuo-liu], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch’iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch’u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 55-73), p. 60.

3.2.2. *The founding of the Resolution Committee on 1 March and the first negotiations with Ch'en I*

Lin Mu-shun wrote:

At 10 o'clock in the morning [on Saturday, 1 March] the Taipei Consultative Assembly invited representatives from the National Assembly, Provincial Consultative Assembly and Political Councillors to form a 'Commission for the Investigation into the Bloody Incident After the Seizure of Tobacco Products' (*chi-yen hsüeh-an tiao-ch'a wei-yüan-hui*, 緝煙血案調查委員會). Chou Yen-shou (周延壽) was elected in by acclamation to lead the session, and Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, (黃朝琴), Wang T'ien-teng, (王添燈) and Lin Chung (林忠)⁴¹ were elected in to represent the Commission in putting the following demands to Governor Ch'en:

1. To lift the state of emergency immediately.
2. To release citizens in custody immediately.
3. To issue a decree forbidding the army, the military police and police officers from firing weapons.⁴²
4. To establish a Resolution Committee (*ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui*, 處理委員會) consisting of representatives of the authorities and the people.
5. To request that the Governor address the public over the radio.

(We can see from Points 4 and 5 that the Commission members already intended to accept a compromise.)

Regarding Point 1, the Governor agreed on the spot to call together representatives of the government bodies before 4 pm in order to arrange

⁴¹ Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈) was a member of the Taipei Consultative Assembly, Chairman of the Taiwanese Tea Merchants Union and publisher of the newspaper *Jen-min tao-pao* (人民導報). Lin Chung (林忠) was promoted to the position of Candidate for the Tainan County Consultative Assembly, the Political Council, and was head of the Taiwan Radio Station (see Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰, p. 20, 26, 30, 32), and Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚, p. 247, para. 2, line 5)). According to Yang Liang-kung's (楊亮功, para. 3, line 10) Investigation Report, eight representatives approached Ch'en I. The so-called Political Councillors (*ts'an-cheng-yüan*, 參政員) were elected by the Provincial Consultative Assembly. In total eight were despatched as representatives of Taiwan to the National Political Council (*kuo-min ts'an-cheng-hui*, 國民參政會) in Nanking, which was an advisory council at national level and had been in existence since July 1938 (see Li Hsiao-feng, 1986, pp. 29-33 and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, pp. 278-295).

⁴² K'o Yüan-fen's pledge the previous day had obviously not been followed.

the lifting of the state of emergency. In response to Point 2, the fathers, older brothers and heads of neighbourhood committees had to communally sign a guarantee (on various conditions) for those arrested before they would be released. He agreed to Points 3 to 5 as requested⁴³ (though whether or not he actually implemented them, we shall see later).

In the meantime ordinary citizens, students and labourers gradually began to organise themselves, and prepare themselves for a protracted struggle. Walls of houses throughout the streets were covered in an array of flyers proclaiming ‘Down with tyranny!’, ‘Down with the dictatorship!’, ‘Down with Ch’en I’s Kingdom!’, ‘Get rid of the Governor’s Office!’, ‘Taiwanese! Rise up quick, fight for your livelihoods, fight for your freedom, fight for democracy!’, ‘No compromises - only armed struggle will work!’, ‘We will not sit by and watch our fellow citizens and students be shot and arrested!’, ‘We must answer force of arms with force of arms.’⁴⁴

(Lin Mu-shun, pp. 19-20)

⁴³ The nearly identical wording of this account points to the fact that Lin Mu-shun apparently made use of the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (2 March, p. 2, top centre), the contents of which correspond to his own account. The article from the newspaper is also included in Huang Ts’un-hou (黃存厚, p. 206). An assembly formed in such a spontaneous manner in a highly emotional atmosphere was of course bound to be rather chaotic. See (Memoirs of) Wu Chuo-liu (p. 62) and (Memoirs of) Huang Ch’ao-ch’in (Huang Ch’ao-ch’in (黃朝琴), ‘Huang Ch’ao-ch’in ti hui-i’ (黃朝琴的回憶), in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch’iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch’u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 149-155 (p. 152). Individuals such as Huang Ch’ao-ch’in (黃朝琴), Li Wan-chü (李萬居) and Political Councillor Lien Chen-tung (連震東) were called ‘lackeys’ (*tsou-kou*, 走狗, see Huang Ch’ao-ch’in, p. 152).

⁴⁴ This radicalisation of the demands is also noted in other sources. *THCH* (p. 5, para. 1) remarks that the ‘thugs’ (*pao-t’u*, 暴徒) had strengthened their organisational structure and sent representatives to every district and the larger cities in order to mobilise the population. The start of the attacks on Mainlanders in Taoyüan can be traced back to this (see below, p. 114). It had become clear from the slogans and names which had started to appear on walls, such as the Democratic Alliance (*min-chu lien-meng*, 民主聯盟) and the Taiwanese Youth League (*Taiwan ch’ing-nien-t’uan*, 台灣青年團) which called on people to rise up against the government, that the issue was no longer merely about settling an incident. If it had been, it could have been resolved in the way suggested (p. 4, final para.). As it was the government that had initiated the unrest through shooting at the demonstrators and patrols firing their weapons, as such they would have had to prove their sincerity in resolving the situation through negotiations with the Resolution Committee. In such a case, the Resolution Committee would still have had enough authority to prevent further violence.

Ch'en I accepted all four demands in a speech broadcast over the radio at 5 pm. Compensation had been paid to the relatives of the victims of the incident on 27 February. He explained that the woman selling tobacco, Lin Chiang-mai, had been only slightly injured, and that he had provided for her medical treatment. According to an announcement in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報) the previous day, she had in fact been taken to hospital, but had died shortly thereafter. At the same time the Department Head of the Garrison Command, Su Shao-wen (蘇紹文), informed the Taipei Consultative Assembly in writing that 200,000 Taiwan Dollars would be paid to the families of those killed, and 50,000 Taiwan Dollars to those injured. Those entitled to compensation would be able to access it through the Consultative Assemblies. Whether compensation was in fact paid is not confirmed by the newspapers and non-government-biased sources. Kerr traces Ch'en I's acceptance of the demands back to the fact that he had only two thousand soldiers at his disposal in the greater Taipei area, and as such a violent response was not possible at the time.⁴⁵

The state of emergency, which had been imposed at midnight on 1 March, was lifted only in name. Gatherings, demonstrations and strikes remained forbidden. In effect it was a ban on all political activity. The fathers, elder brothers and heads of the neighbourhood committees had together to sign for the release of those arrested during the unrest.⁴⁶ In addition, rail connections were interrupted from

⁴⁵ For the wording of Ch'en I's radio speech, see Appendix I; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 20-21; Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 247, final line; George H. Kerr, 'Formosa, The March Massacres', *Far Eastern Survey*, 16 (5 November 1947), pp. 224-226 (p. 224). For information on the fate of Lin Chiang-mai, see Huang Ts'un-hou (p. 201-202; this would appear to be based on an article in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 28 February). In 1945 the US had helped move 48,000 Chinese troops to Taiwan, but due to the worsening situation on the mainland the majority of these troops had been pulled out during the summer and autumn of 1946 for deployment in Northern China. The size of the armed forces available to Ch'en I towards the end of 1946 therefore only amounted to less than 5000, of which only approx. 3,000 were battle-ready. Police forces consisted mainly of Taiwanese, who for the most part left their posts or defected to the demonstrators during the uprising (see T'ang Hsien-lung (T'ang, Hsien-lung (唐賢龍), *T'ai-wan shih-pien nei-mu-chi* (台灣事變內幕記) [An Inside Story on the Incident in Taiwan] (Nanking: Chung-kuo Hsin-wen-she Ch'u-pan-pu (中國新聞社出版部) [China News Agency Publication Department], 1947). 166 pp.), pp.97-98; Formosa Internal Affairs: Reel 1, Enclosure to Despatch 1206, p. 2 and Enclosure to Despatch 1324, p.2 (United States State Department, *Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files. Formosa: Internal Affairs, 1945-1949* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985), 3 microfilms)).

⁴⁶ Lin Mu-shun, p. 20. Chin Yü (p. 8, para. 1) and *THCH* (p. 4, para. 2) do not report continued restrictions despite the declared lifting of martial law. This undermines the credibility of

this day, 1 March. There were no trains travelling south out of Taipei, whilst trains from the south travelled only as far as Changhua (彰化).

Ch'en I despatched Chou I-o (周一鶚), Pao K'o-yung (包可永), Hu Fu-hsiang (胡福相) (Head of the Police Department, *ching-wu ch'u-chang*, 警務處長), Chao Lien-fang (趙連方) (Head of the Agriculture and Forestry Department, *nung-lin ch'u-chang*, 農林處長) and Jen Hsien-ch'ün (任顯群) (Head of the Department of Transport, *chiao-t'ung ch'u-chang*, 交通處長) as government representatives to the yet-to-be-formed Resolution Committee.⁴⁷

Even the lifting of the state of emergency did not halt the unrest. Official sources reported 'thugs and 'traitors' (*chien-tang*, 奸黨) who continued to stir up the population and attack the authorities, in particular police sentries. In contrast, sources sympathetic to the demonstrators describe military patrols which terrorised the public with indiscriminate shooting during Ch'en I's radio speech, as well as armed sentries throughout the city. Staff of the US Consulate at the North Gate (北門) witnessed the shooting of two pedestrians from a military lorry.⁴⁸ The most serious incident of this 1 March occurred at around 2 pm in front of the Railway Administrative Commission (*t'ieh-lu kuan-li wei-yüan-hui*, 鐵路管理委員會) when students outside the building wanted to enquire when the trains would start running again. Members of the Police Brigade, who were guarding the building, fired into the crowd and a military lorry drove into it. Twenty-five people were killed, and over a hundred were seriously injured. By contrast, official sources claim that 'thugs' and 'traitors' had wanted to attack the building. Of course government employees were also wounded, and twenty-five of them even fled to the US Consulate building opposite for safety.⁴⁹ This put the

subsequent accusations that further demands were made despite all previous demands being fulfilled.

⁴⁷ Lin Mu-shun, p. 21; Chin Yü, p. 8, para. 2; *THCH*, p. 4, para. 3.

⁴⁸ *THCH*, p. 5, paras. 1 and 2; Kerr (1965), pp. 259 ff.; Lin Mu-shun, p. 22; *China White Paper*, p. 927. According to Kerr (November 1947), p. 224, 123 people were shot down during Ch'en I's radio speech.

⁴⁹ Department of State, ed., (*Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS): 1947, Vol. VII: The Far East: China* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 1477 pp. (No. 414, pp. 427-428); Kerr (1965), p. 260; Lin Mu-shun, p. 22; Chin Yü (p. 7, last para. and *THCH*, p. 2, last para.). Here this incident is erroneously dated 28 February and – just as in Chin Yü's text – the 'Headquarters of the Railway Police' (*t'ieh-lu ching-ch'a-shu*, 鐵

Consulate in a difficult position. Blake, the Consul at the time, was anxious to remain out of the conflict completely and not be usurped by either side. By allowing the government staff in quickly caused the angry Taiwanese to throw stones into the Consulate compound. It is possible, however, that they intended only to target the fleeing government personnel. Some of them voluntarily left after a short time. A further ten were picked up the same evening by Ch'en I's agents, at the behest of the Consulate, which also sought increased protection after this incident.⁵⁰

Lin Mu-shun places the blame for the decision to suppress the uprising by armed force on Liu Ch'i-kuang (劉啓光)⁵¹ and other 'Taiwanese traitors' (*T'ai-chien*, 台奸), who had urged Ch'en I to do so. Ch'en I had not only requested troops from the mainland, he also ordered army units from Tainan and Feng-shan (near Kaohsiung) to Taipei. However, they were stopped by people in Hsinchu from travelling on to Taipei by train and road.⁵²

From Sunday 2 March until 5 March Mainlanders moved themselves and their belongings to safety in the airport, which also served as a refugee camp until the arrival of troops from the mainland. In effect Ch'en I only really had the airport, the Governor's Office, the radio broadcasting station, various military facilities

路警察署) is mentioned, that was on the same location. The above mentioned correct designation can be found in the *Synopsis of Statistics on Taiwan Province during the past 51 years (Taiwan-sheng wu-shih-i-nien lai t'ung-chi t'i-yao*, 台灣省五十一年來統計提要), table 99, part 2, published by the Governor's office in 1946. See also Wang K'ang (王康), p. 217. While only referring to Wang K'ang, who sympathises with the authorities, Lai, Myers et al. (p. 110) only mention an attack by 'mobs' on the 'Taipei Railway Police station', though all other sources mentioned above were at his disposal (cf. Lai's bibliography). See also the account of this incident in the Resolution Committee's statement of 6 March (Appendix VII).

⁵⁰ *FRUS*, No. 414, pp. 427 ff. and No. 416, p. 428.

⁵¹ Actually named Hou Ch'ao-tsung. Since 1937 he had called himself Liu Ch'i-kuang (劉啓光) - he was a prominent '*pan-shan*' (半山), and had worked for the KMT since 1935 in the Military Commission in Chungking carrying out propaganda and underground work against Japan. At his suggestion the Taiwan Working Group (*Taiwan kung-tso-t'uan*, 台灣工作團) was formed at the beginning of 1942 to take over the underground work and preparations for the originally planned allied landing on Taiwan. After returning to Taiwan in 1945 he acted as advisor to Ch'en I, then as Hsinchu County Magistrate until the end of 1946, when he took over the South China Commercial Bank (*Hua-nan shang-yeh yin-hang*, 華南商業銀行). Presumably because of his previous connections with Ch'en I and military circles he was suspected by people, including Lin Mu-shun, of having taken over secret service work for the government during the uprising. See Liu Ch'i-kuang's biography in Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲), vol.4, pp. 219-230.

⁵² Lin Mu-shun, p. 21. For details of events in Hsinchu, see below, p. 41 and section 4.4.1, p. 112.

and a few other instalments under his control.⁵³

Despite the Resolution Committee's attempts to find a political solution to the crisis through negotiation, it must be understood that a considerable portion of the population, mainly young people and students, followed the process with suspicion. It is no wonder that many felt they were not represented by the 'Representatives of the People' on the Resolution Committee, as the indirect vote for the Provincial Consultative Assembly was twice-removed, and that for the Political Councillors and members of the National Assembly were in fact three times-removed. The government's loss of control of most of Taipei is not down to the Resolution Committee's activities, but rather due to the partly spontaneous, and sometimes armed, resistance from the public, in particular young people and students.

At around 10 am several thousand school pupils and students gathered in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall to discuss forming their own organisations.⁵⁴ Their purpose was to maintain order and transport connections, as well as the armed campaign against Ch'en I. The remains of burnt-out cars and other objects lay strewn throughout the city.⁵⁵ The cause of this was doubtless the incident in front of the Railway Administrative Commission building the previous day, in which mainly school pupils and students had been killed. Maintaining the transport links served many aims; to enable pupils and students to return to their home towns as had been requested of them the previous day, and to secure the supply of foodstuffs to Taipei, as well as to prevent undercover movement of troops by the Ch'en I government to Taipei.

Several unplanned meetings between Ch'en I and representatives of various councils and organisations took place that day.

⁵³ Kerr (1965), p. 262 and Kerr (November 1947), p. 225.

⁵⁴ According to Lin Mu-shun (pp. 21-22), they came from Taiwan University (*Taiwan ta-hsüeh*, 台灣大學 – wrongly titled *Taipei ta-hsüeh*, 台北大學 there), Yen-p'ing College (*Yen-p'ing hsüeh-yüan*, 延平學院), the Law and Trade College (*Fa-shang hsüeh-yüan*, 法商學院) and the Teacher Training College (*Shih-fan hsüeh-yüan*, 師範學院). The Sun-Yat-sen Hall (*Chung-shan-t'ang*, 中山堂) was a type of civic hall. Similar halls of the same name were found in all other large cities.

⁵⁵ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 3 March, p. 1, first article, para. 2. For example, in Tai-ping-ting (太平町) where the incident on 27 February had occurred, in Pen-ting (本町) and in Pei-men Road (北門路), at the North Gate, where the US Consulate was located.

At around 9 am the chairman of the Political Reconstruction Association (*cheng-chih chien-she hsieh-hui*, 政治建設協會),⁵⁶ Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川), visited Ch'en I to ask him to dispel fears that the government was going to lay the blame for the unrest on members of the public (*min-chien fu-tse jen*, 民間負責人). He also asked that Ch'en I agree to other organisations joining the Resolution Committee, mainly in order that his own organisation was accepted.⁵⁷ The gathering of students and this meeting were not reported in the government-biased newspapers.⁵⁸

The Consultative Assemblymen, Political Councillors and members of the National Assembly also met at 9 am in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall to discuss solutions to the conflict. At 9.30 am Ch'en I granted them an audience for one hour. Most importantly they raised four demands, a few of which had been previously presented, but had obviously not been satisfactorily fulfilled. These included the release of those arrested during the unrest, compensation for victims and an end to the persecution of those involved. In addition was the demand that the Committee be opened up to wider participation. The head of the Garrison Command, K'ò Yüan-fen (柯遠芬), and the Commander of the Military Police Regiment, Chang Mu-t'ao (張慕陶), were to be admitted as additional representatives of the government, as without their cooperation it would be impossible to put a halt to the incidents which were caused by the patrols. All province-wide organisations, including unions, chambers of commerce, student organisations and the Political Reconstruction Association, were to despatch representatives of the people. This suggestion may have come from Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川), as Lin Mu-shun suggests.⁵⁹ Assemblyman Chien Wen-fa (簡文發) was supposed to work with the

⁵⁶ An organisation which was founded on 2 February 1946 in order to support the provincial government in implementing political measures, or rather, to ensure they were accepted. Its members were landowners, intellectuals and members of the Taiwanese elite. In fact, this organisation was more critical than Ch'en I would have liked. See Lai, Myers et al., p. 111; Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 256, para. 2 and Kerr (1965), p. 207.

⁵⁷ Lin Mu-shun, p. 22; *THCH*, p. 5, final para.

⁵⁸ See the *Hsin-sheng-pao* and the *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (3 March).

⁵⁹ *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (3 March, p. 2), and Lin Mu-shun, pp. 22-23. Lin Mu-shun does report on the later meeting of the Resolution Committee, but his account refers explicitly to the meeting in the morning between the political representatives before they met with Ch'en I. The 'unions' were not independent organisations, but were rather part of the KMT. In this situation however, union members seemed to begin to act independently.

government to reinstate the rail connections, as the students had demanded.

At a reception with these political representatives Ch'en I accepted the first set of four demands, which he announced over the radio at 3 pm.⁶⁰ From now on all that was required to ensure the release of those arrested was a guarantee from an appropriate family member. Compensation was paid for the deaths, and those injured received free medical treatment. It was agreed that five subcommittees would be established: A Communications Subcommittee (*lien-luo-tsu*, 聯絡組), a Propaganda Subcommittee (*hsüan-ch'uan-tsu*, 宣傳組), a Sanitation Subcommittee (*chüu-hu-tsu*, 救護組, whose job it was to deal with the injured and dead still lying in the streets), and an Investigation Subcommittee and a General Affairs Subcommittee (*tsung-wu-tsu*, 總務組).⁶¹

Lin Mu-shun reports that Ch'en I had by this point already been promised 100,000 soldiers as reinforcements.⁶²

Kerr believes that the initiative to broaden the Committee's membership actually came from Ch'en I himself. He wanted to force all important organisations and individuals to make their positions clear so that he would know who his enemies were when it came to 'resolving' the situation. This stance is incorrect, in light of the Chinese sources' unequivocal statements. This motive may well have had a role in his decision to agree to the demands.⁶³

Ch'en I also met with the Taipei Consultative Assembly's Investigation

⁶⁰ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 3 March, p. 1. This source also contains the exact wording of his radio speech. Printed also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚) p. 209.

⁶¹ The *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (3 March, p. 2). The members of the subcommittees were (according to the above order):

1. Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴), Lin Chung (林忠), Li Wan-chü (李萬居), Chou Yen-shou (周延壽), Wu Kuo-hsin (吳國信).

2. Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈), Lin Tsung-hsien (林宗賢), Chang Ch'ing-ch'uan (張晴川), Lin Jih-kao (林日高).

3. Tu Ts'ung-ming (杜聰明), Chou Pai-lien (周百鍊), Huang Chao-sheng (黃朝生) and Hsieh O (謝娥).

4. Wu Ch'un-lin (吳春霖), Luo Shui-yüan (駱水源), Hsü Chen-hsü (許振緒), Li Jen-kui (李仁貴), Chen Wu (陳屋), Huang Huo-ting (黃火定), Chen Hai-ho (陳海河), Lin Shih-t'ien (林氏田), Chien Sheng-yü (簡聖堉) and Lin Ch'ao-ming (林潮明).

5. P'an Ch'ü-yüan (潘渠源), Ch'en Ken-huo (陳根火), Wu Yu-jung (吳有容), Ch'en Pi-nan (陳比南), Wang Kuei (王貴), Lin Chang'en (林章恩) and Hsü Ch'ing-feng (許慶豐).

⁶² Lin Mu-shun, p. 23.

⁶³ Kerr (1965), p. 265.

Commission (*tiao-ch'a wei-yüan-hui*, 調查委員會) at midday,⁶⁴ which put essentially the same demands to him. Some of Ch'en I's publicised responses point to underhand dealings on his part. He agreed to the withdrawal of patrols, but said this had to happen 'gradually'; the guns were to remain on the vehicles, pointing inwards. They could therefore be used once more on the public at any time, if required. The injured would receive free treatment if they registered their personal details, such as their full names and addresses. This could have been considered an attempt to collect details about those involved in the unrest. If they were aware of this, they would chose to go without medical care than risk reprisals or acts of revenge.⁶⁵

The first official and public meeting of the Resolution Committee was opened at 2.50 pm in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall, which was overflowing with audience members. First Chang Ch'ing-ch'uan (張晴川) and Chou Yen-shou (周延壽) reported on the meeting with Ch'en I that morning and on the demands he had accepted. According to Chou Yen-shou, these included the 'immediate' withdrawal of all armed patrols; he did, however, not mention the reservation as stated earlier to the Investigation Committee. At the time of the meeting the sound of gunshots was still audible; the head of the Police Department, Hu Fu-hsiang (胡福相), who was at the meeting, agreed, under pressure from those gathered, to personally order patrols in the city to hold fire. The seriousness of the situation is exemplified by a dum-dum bullet that a doctor took to the US Consulate that day. It had landed in his hospital. He requested the Consulate to forward it to the embassy in Nanking, as evidence of Ch'en I's ruthless clampdown. However, in accordance with its 'hands-off-policy' the Consulate declined.⁶⁶ Lieutenant General Huang Kuo-shu (黃國書) of the Garrison Command wanted to join Hu Fu-hsiang on his round and use the opportunity to visit Chief of Staff K'o. It seems Chief of Staff K'o and the Commander of the Military Police Regiment Chang Mu-t'ao (張慕陶) were not yet involved in this meeting. Hu Fu-hsiang had authority only over the police however, and could therefore not force the

⁶⁴ According to the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (3 March, p. 1), it took place from 12.10 pm to 1.20 pm.

⁶⁵ The *Hsin-sheng-pao* (3 March), p. 1, para. 1, fig. 2.

⁶⁶ Kerr (1965), p. 264 and *FRUS*, No. 449, p. 430.

withdrawal of the military and the military police. During the meeting the demand was put forward to disband the Police Brigade, which was responsible for the deaths in front of the Railway Administrative Commission the previous day. However, Hu Fu-hsiang passed authority for its deployment onto the Taipei City Police Authorities; only Ch'en I had the power to disband it.⁶⁷ According to Lin Mu-shun, the military police and the Public Security Corps (*chih-an fu-wu-tui*, 治安服務隊), which was founded by the students, were to remain under public control, though this is not confirmed by the newspapers. The Resolution Committee would thus have approximated the students' demands, although they wanted to take over the maintenance of public order themselves.⁶⁸ For the first time the demand that censorship be abolished and that all the important posts be filled by Taiwanese people was raised at the meeting.⁶⁹ The suggestion to broaden the Committee membership was accepted, and new members were elected accordingly.⁷⁰ From that point on the Committee would meet every day at 10 am and 3 pm. Each citizen had the right to personally present their concerns to the Commission (before 10 March), which would then summarise them and negotiate them with the government. According to American sources, Ch'en I had agreed a draft program of reforms to be formulated by 10 March. At the behest of the Resolution Committee, the newspapers were to issue joint special issues (*lien-ho*

⁶⁷ The *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, (3 March, p. 2) and the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, (3 March, p. 1), also printed in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 207-209.

⁶⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 22. A comparison with other sources, particularly newspapers, shows that Lin Mu-shun obviously confused that morning's meeting of parliamentary members (of which he reports nothing more) with the Commission's meeting that afternoon. Chinese sources do not mention that Ch'en I had agreed at this point to the military police and the students maintaining order, as Kerr (1965), p. 263, asserts.

⁶⁹ The *Hsin-sheng-pao* (3 March, p. 1, article in centre column, lines 12 and 15), see also Huang Ts'un-hou (p. 208, lines 11 and 14).

⁷⁰ In addition to the government representatives and the new members, these included the following: All the Consultative Assembly members of Taipei, the members of the Provincial Consultative Assembly who were in Taipei: Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴), Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈), Huang Ch'un-ch'ing (黃純清), Li Yu-san (李友三), Lin Jih-kao (林日高), Yin Chan-k'ui (殷占魁), Ch'en An-ch'a (陳按察), Hung Huo-lien, Yang T'ao (楊陶), Ting Jui-pin (丁瑞彬), Lin Wei-kung (林為恭), Liu K'uo-ts'ai (劉闊才), Lin Pi-hui (林璧輝); the Political Councillors: Lin Chung (林忠), Tu Ts'ung-ming (杜聰明), Lin Tsung-hsien (林宗賢), Wu Kuo-hsin (吳國信), Lin Hsien-t'ang (林獻堂), Wu Hung-sen (吳鴻森), Ch'en I-sung (陳逸松) and the members of the National Assembly: Lien Chen-tung (連震東), Huang Kuo-shu (黃國書), Li Wan-chü (李萬居), Yen Ch'in-hsien (顏欽賢), Liu Ming-ch'ao (劉明朝). See the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, (3 March, p. 1).

hao-wai, 聯合號外), due to the scarcity of paper caused by the disrupted transport networks. No records of these special issues remain in the source material.

The fate of those responsible for events on 27 February had not yet been clarified. Representatives were elected to work with journalists to trace them and publish photos of them. Photos of the six Monopoly Bureau agents appeared in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* on 4 March. The reported arrest of the police officers involved was not verified, however.⁷¹

The next meeting of the Resolution Committee, which had come to be known as the Commission for Settling the 28 February Incident (*erh-erh-pa shih-chien ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui*, 二二八事件處理委員會),⁷² took place on 3 March at 10 am, this time without government representatives. They no longer wanted, or were no longer able, to take part in a committee which put forward demands to disband police units. As a result subsequent action against members of the Committee would be more easily justified. The Committee, however, thereby lost its official political legitimacy.⁷³

It had emerged the evening before that Ch'en I had tried to move troops from southern Taiwan to Taipei. Some citizens reported to the meeting of more than 10 lorry-loads of soldiers travelling towards Taipei which had reached Hu-k'ou, but were stopped there by the local people who had blockaded the road, so they returned to Hsinchu. The trains were also used to try and transport troops to Taipei,

⁷¹ *Hsin-sheng-pao* (3 March, p. 1), reprinted in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 208, lines 13 to 14 and 4 March, p. 1 (also in Huang Ts'un-hou, p. 212, No. 4, lines 6-8). For details on the meeting with Ch'en I, see Kerr (1965), p. 263, Kerr (November 1947), p. 224 and *FRUS*, No. 439, p. 429. No Chinese sources (either official or unofficial) report this meeting, just a date set by the Resolution Committee itself. This does not rule out, however, that Ch'en I was pressurised by circumstances into making such a promise. Of course official sources do not report this promise, for obvious reasons. If the information in the American sources is correct, this promise was given on 2 March. It is not possible to determine at which of the various gatherings it was made. Journalists' questioning of the Police Brigade into those responsible for the events on 27 February revealed that the police had taken them into custody, though because no order had been given, they hadn't been handed over to the judiciary. See the *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (3 March, p. 2, top right, para. 2, final line) for the newspapers' special issues, as well as Wang K'ang (王康), p. 219: according to Wang, Chief of Staff K'uo Yüan-fen (柯遠芬) approved the publication of these special issues with him and other journalists.

⁷² *THCH*, p. 8, para. 1, line 1.

⁷³ According to *THCH* (p. 6, para. 2, line 5, and p. 8, para. 1, line 1) the government officials had left the Commission on 2 March. In contrast, Chin Yü (勁雨, p. 8, para. 2, lines 7-8 and from penultimate line) reports that they didn't leave until 4 March. The *Hsin-sheng-pao*, (4 March, p. 1, centre article, lines 3-4) reports, however, that government representatives who should really have been at the Committee meetings met a delegation at the Governor's Office.

but the rails were similarly blocked by the people.⁷⁴

According to a report on the negotiations with Ch'en I the previous day, the issue of the incidents was raised, which were still occurring, regardless of government announcements. It is no wonder then that the number of voices calling for the formation of Self-defence Corps (*tzu-wei-tui*, 自衛隊) increased, in order that they would be prepared for any further attempts by Ch'en I to bring more troops to Taipei. The broadened membership of the Resolution Committee brought stark differences between its members to the fore, particularly at this juncture. Whilst most of the older and more conservative members still seemed to be prepared to trust Ch'en I enough to continue dealing with him, the younger ones, for example representatives of the student organisations, were more in favour of armed resistance.⁷⁵ The meeting's chair, P'an Ch'ü-yüan (潘渠源) tried to find a compromise by suggesting discussing the establishment of these units with Ch'en I. A group of around 20 people was immediately formed, including Lin Chung (林忠) and Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈), representatives of the students, unions, and other organisations.⁷⁶ At around 11 am they met with Ch'en I and Chief of Staff K'o. Ch'en I agreed to seven points:

1. the retreat of all military personnel to the barracks by 6 pm the same day.
2. as well as the joint maintenance of order by the military police, police officers, students and young people, he also agreed to the formation of a 'Righteous Service Corps'.
3. all transport connections would be restored by 6 pm.
4. the rice shortage would be alleviated by opening up military stores.
5. should any more incidents occur involving military personnel, the individuals involved should be handed over for him to sentence personally.
6. the attending 20 representatives would be held responsible for any incidents instigated by the public, for example Mainlanders being beaten, or disruptions.
7. under no circumstances would troops be brought to Taipei from the south.

⁷⁴ Hu-k'ou (湖口) lies near the coast, around fifteen kilometres to the north of Hsinchu (新竹) and about forty kilometres from Taipei. See the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (4 March, p. 1, top right, line 6). (Article reprinted in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 212 ff.). See also Kerr (1965), p. 266; Lin Mu-shun (林木順), pp. 21-22.

⁷⁵ Kerr (1965), p. 267 ff. Also, according to *FRUS* (No. 451, p. 431) on 4 March Ch'en I had broken the terms of the ceasefire and had not yet recalled the patrols.

⁷⁶ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 4 March, p. 1, top right.

In contrast, Chief of Staff K'o told the representatives that he could in no way abandon the 'stance of the state and nation' (*szu yeh pu ta-ying*, 死也不答應); this was his duty as a soldier. This was a clear threat to the Committee that certain demands might be construed as treason, with the ensuing consequences.⁷⁷ The fourth demand reflects the critical food supply problem caused by the disrupted communications network: a *Chin* of rice now cost 60 Taiwan Dollars (*T'ai-pi*, 台幣) on the black market.⁷⁸

During further deliberations those present demanded the abolition of the Trading and Monopoly Bureaus and the Police Brigade. A Taiwanese person should take over as Head of the Secretariat of the Governor's Office, and more than a half of the department heads should be Taiwanese. These demands were rejected by the Governor's Office in a meeting during the night.⁷⁹

The Committee also decided that the newly-formed Propaganda Committee should ensure that news of the actual run of events should reach the mainland and abroad. An announcement on Radio Manila had been heard, which described Taiwanese people 'attacking' the US Consulate, a reference to events there the previous day. It also told of armed troops fighting against the central authorities with machine guns.⁸⁰ Kerr reports that Stanway Cheng (i.e. Cheng Nan-wei, 鄭南渭), one of Ch'en I's inner circle who was head of the Taipei office of the national Central News Agency (*chung-yang t'ung-hsün-she*, 中央通訊社), had set these rumours in circulation. As a result a group of five people immediately went to the US Consulate, which was attempting to remain out of the conflict completely. The representatives were merely informed that the appropriate material would be forwarded to the embassy in Nanking.⁸¹ Eight students from Taiwan University

⁷⁷ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 4 March, p. 1, centre article; the seven points are also translated in Kerr (1965), p. 268. See also *THCH*, p. 8, para. 1 and *Chin Yü*, p. 8, para. 2; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 23-24. For K'o's explanation see the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 5 March, p. 1, bottom left and Kerr (1965), p. 271.

⁷⁸ Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 262.

⁷⁹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 24. According to Huang Ts'un-hou (p. 248), the demands relating to the department head extended to the administrative sub-departments (*t'ing*, 廳).

⁸⁰ The *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, top left.

⁸¹ The *Hsin-sheng-pao* (4 March, p. 1, top right), also in Huang Ts'un-hou's (黃存厚) work, (p. 213, from line 6). According to him the five people involved were Lin Tsung-hsien (林宗賢),

(*T'ai-ta*, 台大) also went to the US Consulate and allegedly requested, rather naively, its support and even guns and ammunition.⁸²

In the ensuing discussion on how order was to be maintained, a man named Hsü Te-hui (許德輝) spoke up explaining he could mobilise 'several thousand citizens' (*shu-shih-wan min-chung*, 數十萬民眾) to form a Self-defence Corps. Thus the Taipei City Provisional Commission for Maintaining Public Security (*Taipei-shih lin-shih chih-an wei-yüan-hui*, 台北市臨時治安委員會) was officially formed, which was under the command of the Resolution Committee's recently-established Public Security Subcommittee (*chih-an-tsu*, 治安組). Hsü Te-hui (許德輝) was the head of its executive body, the Righteous Service Corps (*chung-i fu-wu-tui*, 忠義服務隊). The Committee met at 4 pm in the City Police Department building; Police Chief Ch'en Sung-chien (陳松堅), Mayor Yu Michien (游彌堅) and other members of the Committee were also present. The Resolution Committee provided 770,000 Taiwan Dollars from donations towards establishing this organisation and for it to perform its duties. It is doubtful, however, whether the Resolution Committee later did indeed have control over it. It is not mentioned in connection with the Resolution Committee's other activities.⁸³ Official sources even hold it in part responsible for further acts of

Lin Shih-tang (林詩堂), Lü Po-hsiung (呂伯雄), Luo Shui-yüan (駱水源) and the publisher of the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, Li Wan-chü (李萬居). See also Kerr (1965), p. 267 and Lin Mu-shun, p. 24. This is confirmed in *FRUS*, No. 448, p. 429. Consul Blake received the Resolution Committee's Executive Committee (consisting of the same five people) which made this request. Blake explained to them that the Consulate was not a news agency. Thereupon the representatives announced they wanted to return the next day with a written statement for the US government. On the same day the Consulate received a petition addressed to General Marshall with 141 signatures representing 807 people. For Cheng Nan-wei (鄭南渭) see Kerr (1965), p. 154, where his anglicised name 'Stanway Cheng' is used. The Chinese name can be found in the Chinese translation of Kerr's book (pp. 146 and 267).

⁸² According to *THCH*, p. 8, para. 2.

⁸³ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 4 March, p. 1, top left. Also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 214, and Kerr (1965), p. 269. Lai, Myers et al., p. 114, state that Hsü Teh-hui was to organise "hundreds of thousands of people from around the island", thereby mistaking a bragging statement by Hsü Teh-hui for a fact, see Huang Ts'un-hou, p. 214. The number is not realistic with a total population in Taiwan of 6 million. The other members of the Taipei City Provisional Commission for Maintaining Public Security were Huang Chao-sheng (黃朝生), Ch'en Ch'un-chin (陳春金), Huang Huo-ting (黃火定), Ch'en Hai-sha (陳海沙), Chen Wu (陳屋), Lin Shui-t'ien (林水田), Chou Pai-lien (周百練) and Liu Ming (劉明), a student representative. Lai, Myers et al., p. 114, also write of the Commission and the organisation as being separate from the Resolution Committee.

violence against Mainlanders, though they fail to mention that Hsü Te-hui (許德輝) was at the same time the Head of the Taipei Brigade of the 'Operations Unit' which was formed by the Garrison Command. Lin Mu-shun holds both units responsible for the persecution, attacks and assassinations of opposition activists. It stands to reason, as Lin Mu-shun indicates, that the military infiltrated the Resolution Committee in order to allow *agents provocateur* in such units to become active, whereby they could then justify a bloody clampdown of the uprising later on. There is however no sound proof of this. What role the Righteous Service Corps actually played remains unclear. It is possible it had a very mixed composition, so that the contradictory qualities various sources accredit it with actually relate to the actions of its various members.⁸⁴

3.2.3. *The composition of the Resolution Committee*

At around 3 pm the military did in fact pull out of the city. However, as Lin Mu-shun states, the soldiers reappeared later in the uniforms of the military police, who were supposed to maintain order together with students, as had been arranged. The shooting did not stop completely; at least four Taiwanese were shot on this day.⁸⁵ At this time Lin Ting-li (林頂立),⁸⁶ the influential Whampoa Faction

⁸⁴ Chin Yü, p. 8, para. 2, lines 8 to 10. There is no mention here of Hsü Te-hui's identity, though Chin Yü is itself a pseudonym for the Garrison Command. See also *THCH*, p. 8, line 4, and Lin Mu-shun, pp. 23-24. According to details provided by Lin Mu-shun, Ch'en I agreed to the formation of the Righteous Service Corps because it was headed by Hsü Te-hui.

⁸⁵ *FRUS*, No. 439, p. 429.

⁸⁶ Also a so-called *pan-shan* (半山), Lin Ting-li (林頂立) had worked for the KMT since 1931, initially for the military police news service in Fukien and Vietnam. He won renown for his accurate prediction of the Japanese attack on south Fukien. He was sent to Taiwan in August 1945 to take over both the leadership of the Secret Service Bureau (*pao-mi-chü*, 保密局) and Supreme Command of the Garrison Command's Armed Agents Corps (*ching-pei tsung-szu-ling-pu pieh-tung-tui szu-ling*, 警備總司令部別動隊司令). During the February uprising he undertook secret service work. For his biography, see Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲), vol. 3, p. 310. Wu Chuo-liu (吳濁流) states in *Taiwan lien-ch'iao* (Wu Chuo-liu (吳濁流), *Taiwan lien-ch'iao* (台灣連翹) [Formosan Weeping Forsythia] (Taipei: T'ai-wan wen-i ch'u-pan-she (台灣文藝出版社) [Taiwan Literature and Arts Publ. Co.], 1987), 285 pp.), p. 204, that military personnel from Chief of Staff K'o's (柯遠芬) inner circle were behind the Whampoa Faction in Taiwan, and they were instructed to infiltrate the Commission for Settling the 28 February Incident (i.e. the Resolution Committee), to push it to make such extreme demands, such as the abolition of the Garrison Command, as to provide the government with a pretext for military intervention. The Main Volunteers Corps (*i-yung tsung-tui*, 義勇總隊) was formed by Wang Min-ning (also a *pan-shan*, 半山), a Major General who was head of the Garrison Command Adjutancy, and

representative and head of the Secret Service in Taiwan, organised the Operations Unit (*hsing-tung-tui*, 行動隊) at the behest of the Garrison Command⁸⁷. He was head of the organisation, and, as such, higher ranking than Hsü Te-hui (許德輝). According to Lin Mu-shun, he had command over several hundred people.⁸⁸

Lin Mu-shun wrote the following regarding the various groupings:

That afternoon Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈) addressed the people of Taiwan by radio for the first time in his role as Head of the Propaganda Committee.⁸⁹ He reported on the course of the Resolution Committee meeting and the negotiations with Governor Ch'en and Chief of Staff K'o. Finally, Wang warned the population of Taiwan as a whole of the news that according to the Investigation Committee's report, the Garrison Command had agreed to the army and guard soldiers being withdrawn from the city, as they had merely exchanged their uniforms and turned up in the city as military police and were threatening the population. In order to test the government's trustworthiness, clashes between the army and the public were to be avoided, as they only raised doubts. He hoped everyone would therefore be constantly watchful and ready to contribute to maintaining order, prepared for any eventuality.

Later Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川), representative of the Political Reconstruction Association, also went on air: he called on students, young

from 9 March head of the Police Authority), Liu Ch'i-kuang (劉啓光) and Lin Ting-li (林頂立), who were to act as *agents provocateurs* by attacking Mainlanders. Presumably this also refers to the Operations Unit mentioned by Lin Mu-shun.

The Whampoa Faction (*Chün-t'ung*, 軍統 or *Huang-p'u-hsi*, 黃埔系) in Chinese) was one of the three groupings fighting for influence within the KMT. It included people who had come through the Whampoa Military Academy and those who were associated with it.

⁸⁷ See above, p. 51.

⁸⁸ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 23-24. Taiwan lü Hu liu t'uan-t'i (台灣旅滬六團體) [Six Taiwanese Organisations in Shanghai], 'Kuan-yü Taiwan shih-chien pao-kao-shu' (關於台灣事件報告書) [Report on the Incident in Taiwan], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], Hsin kuan-tien ts'ung-shu 7 (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n.publ.], 1985), pp. 276-280: this report written by six Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai also places the blame for the worst atrocities on the *pieh-tung-tui* (別動隊), by which presumably the *hsing-tung-tui* (行動隊) is meant, which also came under Lin Ting-li's command (p. 277, line 1, and para. 2, line 3).

⁸⁹ Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 248-249, points out that the radio station was occupied by members of the public.

people and particularly former soldiers who had fought overseas during the war⁹⁰ to gather at a specified place the next day to discuss issues of public security.⁹¹ (As a result of evidence which became clearer later on, Chiang Wei-ch'uan gave up his share of control over the Resolution Committee and took measures of his own accord to challenge Wang T'ien-teng's (王添燈) leadership. Furthermore, he intended to win over the young people and students, in accordance with the CC Faction's orders,⁹² in order to overthrow the CC Faction's political rival, Ch'en I.⁹³)

⁹⁰ I.e. primarily conscripted Taiwanese who had fought under the Japanese abroad, mainly in the Philippines and South-east Asia, but also on the Chinese mainland. A survey by Japan's Ministry for Social Affairs found that a total of 207,183 Taiwanese had fought for Japan during the Second World War (according to Ch'i Chia-lin (戚嘉林), vol. 2, p. 164). After the war around 8000 Taiwanese were interned by the KMT as prisoners of war on Hainan Island. At the end of 1945, 2000 of them were able to return to Taiwan as a result of UNRRA efforts (Kerr (1965), p. 89).

⁹¹ According to *THCH*, p. 8, para. 1, Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈) had requested the establishment of a Joint Bureau for Public Security (*chih-an lien-ho pan-shih-ch'u*, 治安聯合辦事處), i.e. between the government and the Public Security Subcommittee. The same source states that the meeting of the Autonomous Student Union Representatives (*hsüeh-sheng tzu-chih-hui tai-piao*, 學生自治會代表) began at 6.05 pm in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall. Thus some students had formed a Student Army (*hsüeh-sheng-chün*, 學生軍) that afternoon, and had tried to raise funds from the public and to arm themselves.

⁹² The CC Faction was the second of the three groupings vying for power within the KMT; it was headed by brothers Ch'en Kuo-fu (陳國夫) and Ch'en Li-fu (陳立夫). Their influence grew out of their control over the Party's Administrative Department from 1926-1936, 1938-1939 and 1944-1948. They were able to eliminate all 'communist' influences on the Party, and Ch'en Li-fu, in particular, systematically extended Chiang Kai-shek's position of power. At the same time they were able to increase their own following, which came to be known as the CC Faction in the 1930s. The abbreviation does not refer to their surnames, but rather to the name *Chung-yang chü-lo-pu* (中央俱樂部 – 'Central Club'). The CC Faction was the far right-wing of the KMT. For information on the CC Faction, see Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China. The Political Struggle, 1945-1949* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1978), 472 pp. (p. 47) and appendices, and the short biographies of the Ch'en brothers in Boorman, vol. 1, pp. 201-211.

According to Wu Chuo-liu (*T'ai-wan lien-ch'iao*, 台灣連翹, p. 202-203), the CC Faction's power base in Taiwan was the party organisation (*sheng tang-pu*, 省黨部). It was, however, condemned to inaction, as the Governor's Office's Propaganda Commission (*hsüan-ch'uan wei-yüan-hui*, 宣傳委員會), of which Ch'en I was in charge, controlled all organisational work. In 1946 Chiang Wei-ch'uan joined the CC Faction, which had infiltrated the Resolution Committee through Chiang Wei-ch'uan as leader of the Political Reconstruction Association, in order to challenge Ch'en I. This was also the reason for the establishment of the Righteous Service Corps. This contradicts Lin Mu-shun's claims that the Corps was guided by the Garrison Command, which was certainly not under the control of the CC Faction.

⁹³ Ch'en I is generally ascribed to the Political Studies Faction (*cheng-hsüeh-hsi*, 政學系), the third of the competing groupings. It was described as 'liberal', mainly by foreigners. This may be due to the fact that many people ascribed to this faction had much experience of the rest of the world, through studying abroad, for example, and were therefore considered capable administrators. The Political Studies Faction was the weakest of the three groupings, as far as its

Moreover, the CC Faction's official mouthpiece, the Ch'ung-chien Jih-pao (重建日報, *The Reconstruction Daily*),⁹⁴ the same day suddenly increased output and from 1 March issued three to four special issues, day in and day out. This is also an indication of the CC Faction's activities.

The events of the day showed that not only was there no longer opportunity to find a quick solution to the current situation, it even seemed to be gradually becoming increasingly complicated. The Whampoa and the CC Factions had already infiltrated the Resolution Committee and the populace.⁹⁵ Ch'en I's and K'o's unexpected concession raised a sense of sinister foreboding amongst the people. It was already widely known that Ch'en I had requested troops from the Central Government. At the same time the people's demands broadened from the punishment of murderers, to the struggle for political reform.

The most difficult aspect among all these concrete demands were the progressive students and young people. As the incident had already developed to such an extent, victory could not be won without armed struggle. Therefore they held numerous secret meetings during which they decided to form a student army, as well as to review guidelines for creating groups and the course of action for attacking designated targets. It was very difficult however, to form this organisation and establish contacts because of the tumult caused by the Whampoa and CC Factions' henchmen. In addition they lacked arms, with the result that their impassioned desire to fight was not able to fully develop.

influence over the Party was concerned. For information on how this grouping came into being, see Pepper, pp. 436-440.

⁹⁴ This gives the wrong impression, as if the CC Faction were a fixed organisation. Rather, the label 'CC Faction' was a general term to describe a tight-knit though informal network of relations between conservative, staunchly anti-communist Party members who supported Chiang Kai-shek unconditionally, see Boorman, vol.1, pp. 204 and 208.

⁹⁵ The portrayal of Chiang Wei-ch'uan's role is here inconclusive or at least unclear: either the CC Faction's influence was in fact limited, which is why Chiang Wei-ch'uan, as their 'frontman', pulled out of the Resolution Committee in order to challenge it, or the CC Faction retained its influence and Chiang Wei-ch'uan attempted to build up his own power base, independent of it.

⁹⁶ *THCH*, p. 8, final para., from line 4, reprinted the content of the leaflet. It reported conflicts in Chia-i (嘉義) and Taichung (台中) in which the insurgents were successful, and on key facilities in Taipei under the insurgents' control, and called for all former soldiers to join the armed struggle against Ch'en I.

On that day a leaflet from the 'Taipei Branch of the Association of Youth Concerned for the Homeland' (yu-hsiang ch'ing-nien-t'uan T'ai-pei chih-pu, 憂鄉青年團台北支部), Soku-hō (速報)⁹⁶ in Japanese, could be found throughout the city. It covered news of the uprising throughout the Province. Many more leaflets of every variety could be seen in the city. Including 'Students, Workers, Citizens – Arise!', 'Officers and soldiers of yesterday, hold your swords aloft again!', 'Special Service fighters - arise! The time has come for a surprise attack!', 'We must gather our strengths and weapons and use this opportunity to strip the enemy of their weapons! Compatriots! Let us jointly arm ourselves, let us support the effort for the victory of all Taiwanese people, let us achieve a high level of autonomy for Taiwan' and so on.

(Lin Mu-shun, pp. 24-26)

Lin Mu-shun elaborated further on this issue:

Certainly the composition of the Taipei Resolution Committee was extremely complicated. Members included Ch'en I's representatives (such as Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴), Li Wan-chü (李萬居) and others), the Whampoa and CC Factions' henchmen, and a few ambitious political players, opportunists and thugs, who caused trouble. Viewing the situation as a whole, members of the CC Faction had taken over the leadership.⁹⁷ Thus the progressive and enlightened dignitaries still present were under such pressure that they had neither the opportunity nor the courage to push themselves to the fore. The population of Taipei as a whole had for a short time risen up, but after days of turmoil and delays, a feeling of despondency grew. One of the reasons for this was that they hadn't brought the military installations and government authorities under their control in the initial stages, so that they were deceived by Ch'en I several times and wasted time. Another reason was that the majority of members

⁹⁷ This doesn't seem altogether coherent, as Lin Mu-shun himself states that Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川), whom he described as the CC Faction's 'Frontman', pulled out of the Resolution Committee in order to challenge it, see above p.53.

of the Resolution Committee were preoccupied in the attempt to secure their positions, to establish a power base, to oust others and to plot against each other. They also relied too much on victories in southern and central Taiwan, almost in the belief that they had achieved their main target and now they only had to secure the right position for themselves later on. In the process they failed to pay attention to the changing situation, and were not prepared for all eventualities. Therefore they adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards organising the public, and had no fundamental plan. As a result bad elements caused more and more trouble, whilst high-calibre individuals gradually left. The thugs in the Main Operations Unit and the Righteous Service Corps under Lin Ting-li (林頂立) and Hsü Te-hui (許德輝) became increasingly reckless in causing trouble; they looted in broad daylight, threatened upright people and affiliated themselves to groups in order to go on the rampage with them. They pursued their own private interests, on the pretext of protecting the common good. The owner of the Yüeh-kung (月宮) Restaurant at Hsiang-ch'eng-ting was blackmailed for over 100,000 Taiwan Dollars and the waitress was kidnapped. The Chia-i-ko (嘉義閣) Inn at Yuan-ch'üan was blackmailed for over 300,000 Taiwan Dollars, Wang T'ien-teng's (王添燈) house was occupied and he himself was threatened; this was all committed by members of these units. The public began to doubt the purpose of the uprising and were full of resentment for the incompetence of its leaders. This experience taught the public they couldn't rely on political overachievers,⁹⁸ thugs, politicians and opportunists.

(Lin Mu-shun, pp. 27-28)

Even though Lin Mu-shun denounced the underground activities of the CC and Whampoa Factions and their 'lackeys', these accusations have no basis, as almost no references to specific people are given.

⁹⁸ A group officially believed to be part of the Taiwanese elite, which was made jointly responsible for the spread of the uprising, see Yang Liang-kung (楊亮功), Part II, No. 7 and Part III, No. 3.

3.2.4. *The organisational work of the Resolution Committee and of the students and young people*

3.2.4.1. The Resolution Committee expands

On 3 March the Committee created the following provisional organisational structure:

A General Affairs Subcommittee (*tsung-wu-tsu*, 總務組), a Public Security Subcommittee (*chih-an-tsu*, 治安組), which was supposed to have control over the Public Security Corps formed by the students, an Investigations Subcommittee (*tiao-ch'a-tsu*, 調查組), a Propaganda Subcommittee (*hsüan-ch'uan-tsu*, 宣傳組), a Transport Subcommittee (*chiao-t'ung-tsu*, 交通組), a Food Supply Subcommittee (*liang-shih-tsu*, 糧食組) and a Finance Subcommittee (*ts'ai-wu-tsu*, 財務組). A Secretariat (*mi-shu-shih*, 秘書室) was formed alongside, and each Subcommittee had a Standing Committee (*ch'ang-wu wei-yüan-hui*, 常務委員會), which was chaired by the respective Subcommittee Chairman (*tsu-chang*, 組長).⁹⁹

The Resolution Committee met again at 10 am on 4 March and discussed a 'Draft General Organisation Statute' (*tsu-chih ta-kang ts'ao-an*, 組織大綱草案), which was completed after 8 pm during a meeting that evening.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the following decisions were made and demands formulated:

1. The public busses in Taipei are to restart immediately.
2. The Garrison Command should be called upon to order that armed soldiers must not be deployed anywhere on the island.
3. Regarding the armed soldiers driving around the city in lorries, Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴), Chang Ch'ing-ch'uan (張晴川) and Yen Ch'in-hsien (顏欽賢)¹⁰¹ are to visit Chief of Staff K'o immediately, requesting that he issue the order that soldiers must not leave [the barracks] carrying weapons.
4. When soldiers leave their barracks to buy rice or vegetables, they are to tie a small banner from their lorry, and they must not carry any firearms, swords or other weapons with them.

⁹⁹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 24.

¹⁰⁰ For the complete wording of the Draft General Organisation Statute, see Appendix II.

¹⁰¹ Yen Ch'in-hsien (顏欽賢) represented Keelung City in the Provincial Consultative Assembly and operated a mine in the north, see Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰), p. 26 and Kerr (1965), p. 298.

5. It should be made known that the views [aired] on the radio station *Min-hsiung* (民雄) which is occupied by the people should be consistent.
6. The Consultative Assemblies of all cities and districts in the province should be notified to form Resolution Committees as a matter of urgency, with the Consultative Assemblies as the core institution. They should elect representatives and send them to the province-wide Resolution Committee in Taipei.
7. As far as the provisional Chair of the Resolution Committee is concerned, it should continue to be temporarily held by the chairman of the City Consultative Assembly [i.e. Taipei, namely Chou Yen-shou (周延壽)].
8. In order that [publicly-aired] opinions are consistent, all billposting is to be forbidden within the city.

Demands 1. to 4. merely repeated previous demands which had not yet been satisfied. Despite the pledge the previous day that all patrols would be pulled off the streets, armed patrols had been sighted, though there were no more reports of larger incidents. Because of the fourth demand, Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴), Chang Ch'ing-ch'uan (張晴川) and Yen Ch'in-hsien (顏欽賢) were called upon to visit Chief of Staff K'o, who once again pledged that soldiers would not leave their barracks armed. They could not remain in their barracks all the time, however, as they relied on going to the markets for food supplies. Demands 5. and 8. document the Resolution Committee's attempt to focus political initiative in the city on itself. It was pursuing greater authority in negotiations with Ch'en I and in the planning of a reform programme. It was to be made clear to the mainland and the rest of the world that all demands for reform were to apply only to the provincial government. In the Shanghai press, for example, it was reported that the Taiwanese had demanded the island be placed under the trusteeship of the Allies (i.e. the USA). The impression of a secession movement was to be avoided at all costs, as this would be an ideal pretext for military intervention by the Central Government. The motive behind the sixth demand is to unify political initiative throughout the province under the Resolution Committee. In the meantime the unrest had spread throughout the entire island and the Resolution Committee feared that the insurgents' victory in Taichung, who by now controlled the whole of central Taiwan, as reported by Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈) during the meeting, could lead to a new centre of power developing in competition.

The first demand was aimed at the previous day's unfulfilled pledge. Far more significant than the bus network in the city were the rail connections to other cities, particularly given the irregular food supply. Apparently the military stores had not been opened as promised. Therefore the Committee requested the Hsinchu (新竹) Consultative Assembly to ensure the supply of rice to Taipei. However there was also a shortage of rice in central and southern Taiwan and as a result their actions were not very successful. Lin Tsung-hsien (林宗賢) reported that by this point the energy supply was being run and controlled solely by Taiwanese.¹⁰²

At around 10 am a group of forty Committee representatives, including Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川), Ch'en Hsin (陳炳) and Lin Wu-ts'un (林梧村)¹⁰³ from student and other organisations, met Ch'en I. According to Kerr, the demand to arm youth organisations was also made in order to assume policing duties. Ch'en I vehemently refused this as he had already given the order that military and civil police officers should not carry arms. The fact that this demand was presented to Ch'en I at all shows on the one hand the political naivety of these representatives, but on the other, it is proof that the joint maintenance of order by the civilian police, military police, students and young people was not effective, contrary to previous expectations. The representatives then raised the issue of Ch'en I's responsibility for the start of the unrest, and referred particularly to the government's economic policies adopted since the KMT's take-over of Taiwan.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² For information on the course of events during the meeting and the demands outlined, see the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (5 March, p. 1, top), also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 218 ff. There were also problems with the food supply to Hsinchu (新竹, see section 4.4.1, p. 111), Taichung (台中, see section 4.5.1, p. 116) and Tainan (台南, see section 4.6.2, p. 141).

¹⁰³ *THCH*, p. 11, para. 1. Chin Yü (p. 9, para. 1) suggests that the initiative was again one of Chiang Wei-ch'uan's (蔣渭川). This is more evidence of his rushing ahead on his own authority. Ch'en Hsin's (陳炳) background was in the autonomy movement during the time of the Japanese occupation; he was also involved in business activities. In December 1946 the government tasked him with reorganising a business he had previously run (before it had come under Japanese ownership). After the incident on 28 February he was arbitrarily arrested on 11 March and was missing since then. See also Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲), vol. 3, pp. 143-168. The sources offer no information on Lin Wu-ts'un's (林梧村) identity at the time. After the uprising had been suppressed he was head of the Taipei branch of the KMT Youth Organisation, see report in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 25 March, p. 2, top left.

¹⁰⁴ They consisted of the excessive expansion of the state sector, according to Kerr (1965), p. 47 and Chapters V. and VI. Ch'en I called it 'Necessary State Socialism' (*pi-jan kuo-chia she-hui-chu-i*, 必然國家社會主義), and had put it into practise during his governorship of Fukien (福建) from 1934 to 1942. The monopoly system and control of the banks and the currency was continued from the Japanese colonial era, which hugely disadvantaged Taiwanese entrepreneurs.

As well as other effects, they led to an economic downturn and high unemployment. Ch'en I defended his policies and blamed mistakes in the implementation wholly on his subordinates and their staff, and government employees.¹⁰⁵

During the afternoon session the Committee decided to establish a single unified price for rice for both the production regions and Taipei. The authorities or the Committee would make up any shortfall. To this end the Committee, at Huang Ch'ao-ch'in's (黃朝琴) suggestion, sent three of its members, Liu Ming-ch'ao (劉明朝), Chien Sheng-yü (簡聖堉) and Ch'en Hai-sha (陳海沙),¹⁰⁶ to the Industrial and Commercial Bank (*kung-shang yin-hang*, 工商銀行), which was run by Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, to borrow 20 million Taiwan Dollars for the purchase of rice in central and southern Taiwan. The railway employees themselves took on the problem of the rail network by forming a Commission for Reorganising the Railway (*t'ieh-lu t'iao-cheng wei-yüan-hui*, 鐵路調整委員會), which also aimed to close down the despised Railway Police. At the same meeting the now province-wide Resolution Committee took on two representatives from each union, as well as two journalist representatives who had been accepted that morning.¹⁰⁷

Another delegation visited the head of the Department of Transport, Jen Hsien-ch'ün (任顯群), and demanded he remove the Taipei Chief of Police who was responsible for the Railway Police, Ch'en Shang-wen (陳尚文),¹⁰⁸ and to decommission the entire Railway Police until further notice. Their role would be filled by a new body made up entirely of Taiwanese (*t'ieh-lu fu-wu-tui*, 鐵路服務

In addition came the explosion in the size of the administrative system (compared with the Japanese era), which was accompanied by rampant nepotism. The result was corruption and also the sale of raw materials, including rice, factory equipment and other goods to the mainland, mainly through traders from Shanghai. The lead article of the *Chung-hua Jih-pao* Special Issue (5 March) was similarly critical.

¹⁰⁵ See the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 5 March, bottom right; also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 220 ff.

¹⁰⁶ *THCH*, p. 11, para. 1.

¹⁰⁷ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 5 March, p. 1, centre of page; also in Huang Ts'un-hou (pp. 219 ff.); *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, same day, Emergency Issue, top right, final para. and Kerr (1965), p. 273. This inclusion of representatives from unions and journalists corresponds with the KMT's policy at the time to send representatives voted in through constituencies as well as representatives from professional associations to political councils.

¹⁰⁸ See Kerr (1965), p. 191 and p. 273.

隊). In the presence of a Lieutenant General of the Garrison Command they also demanded, in vain, that Ch'en I be removed from office.¹⁰⁹

Wider-reaching demands were still in circulation on leaflets which were going round the city. They were aimed at a 'Democratic Autonomous Taiwanese Government' (*T'aiwan min-chu tzu-chih cheng-fu*, 台灣民主自治政府), and warned caution against the 'High Lords' (*ta-jen hsien-sheng-men*, 大人先生們) in the Committee.¹¹⁰

The tension of the situation eventually eased after the end of the Committee meeting. At around 4.40 pm a train arrived in Taipei from Hsinchu (新竹) carrying rice. At 5.30 pm a passenger train from Kaohsiung (高雄) arrived, according to schedule. The shops also gradually began to open.¹¹¹ That evening Chief of Staff K'ö issued the order, by radio, for all soldiers to return to their barracks and to stay there.¹¹²

As a result of an appeal by Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai to Chiang Kai-shek to investigate the events in Taiwan and the animated response it triggered amongst the press, the Control Yüan in Nanking decided that day to authorise Control Commissioner Yang Liang-kung (楊亮功) to travel to Taiwan and report on the unrest.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Kerr (1965), p. 273, and the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*. For details of the proceedings of the Resolution Committee meetings that day, see (in addition to the newspaper reports mentioned) Kerr (1965), p. 271-274; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 26-27; Chin Yü, p. 8, final para. to p. 9, para. 1; THCH, p. 10, para. 3 to p. 11, para. 1.

¹¹⁰ THCH, p. 11, para. 1.

¹¹¹ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 5 March, p. 1, centre left. *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 5 March, p. 1, top right, para. 1.

¹¹² *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 5 March, p. 1, top right, para. 2. In his translation of K'ö's announcement, Lai, Myers et al. (p. 115) don't mention that he had agreed that order was to be jointly maintained by the military police, the police and the Consultative Assembly.

¹¹³ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, centre and bottom left; Kerr (1965), p. 275. In theory, the Control Yüan, one of the five branches (or *Yüan*, 院) of government under the Republican Chinese system, supervised all other government bodies and the entire administration. It responded to reports and could investigate individuals or issues throughout the country, and where necessary could raise charges against officials or politicians, and remove them from office. In practise, investigations could easily be manipulated by the department in question. The lack of personnel, both in terms of quantity and quality, added to the pressure. In addition to the Control Yüan at the national level, Regional Control Yüans were established in each of the country's seventeen regions (*ch'ü*, 區), each of which was comprised of several provinces. They were led by a Control Yüan delegate. The delegate for Fukien and Taiwan was Yang Liang-kung. In this instance the Control Yüan was not acting on a complaint, but of its own initiative despatched Yang and several aides, including Control Commissioner Ho Han-

The situation in Taipei on Wednesday, 5 March was alleviated to such an extent that the rail and bus connections to surrounding cities were re-established. All the shops had re-opened and lessons in the primary schools had started again.¹¹⁴

At around 10 am three Resolution Committee representatives, Tu Ts'ung-ming (杜聰明), Chang Ch'ing-ch'uan (張晴川) and Lin Chung (林忠), visited Chief of Staff K'o in order to elicit a promise from him that the code of conduct for military personnel agreed upon for Taipei would be issued in other areas as well, as clashes were still reported in several places.¹¹⁵ He did in fact agree to extend the relevant rules and regulations to the whole island, but this was merely another instance of the daily ritual whereby Committee representatives would 'be obliged' to visit K'o regarding continued clashes, demonstrating that K'o was from the beginning uninterested in a peaceful resolution. As he explained to the representatives, he had sent General Ch'en Han-p'ing (陳漢平) to Chia-i (嘉義) to 'deal with' the clashes (*ch'u-chih*, 處置).¹¹⁶

At the same time members of the Committee made a radio broadcast to counter the rumours started by the Radio Manila report on 3 March, for example that there had been a Taiwanese 'attack' on the US Consulate, and that they were amassing troops to fight the central authorities with automatic weapons. This could have proven to be extremely dangerous in terms of the Central Government's reaction. As well as Taiwan, this was also targeted at the mainland and abroad. They confirmed that the Taiwanese were only seeking political reform.¹¹⁷

During the Resolution Committee's morning meeting, led by the Political Councillor Ch'en I-sung (陳逸松), the new General Organisational Statute was officially adopted, as per the existing draft. Representatives of colleges and organisations at a municipality and county level as well as people described as

wen (何漢文), to Taiwan. The aides were to accompany Yang Liang-kung on his tour of inspection and were also involved in compiling the report, see the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 10 March p. 1, top left. For an introduction to the Control Yüan system, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, pp. 262-277.

¹¹⁴ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, short article, bottom centre. See also Lin Mu-shun, p. 29; Kerr (1965), p. 281 and (November 1947), p. 225.

¹¹⁵ For example in Chia-i (嘉義), Chu-tung (竹東), Luo-tung (羅東), Ta-hsi (大溪), Tan-shui (淡水), Hua-lien (花蓮) and T'ai-tung (台東).

¹¹⁶ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, centre left.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2, top centre.

‘famous persons’ by political office-holders became members; in total between ten and thirty people.¹¹⁸

The Resolution Committee elected a fifth of its members to sit on the Standing Committee (*ch'ang-wu wei-yüan-hui*, 常務委員會) which, as the Resolution Committee's executive body, was to implement its decisions. This body elected from its members a seven-strong Steering Group (*chu-hsi-t'uan*, 主席團) to represent the Committee and to convene Resolution and Standing Committee meetings. The Standing Committee established a Resolution Bureau (*ch'u-li-chü*, 處理局) and a Political Bureau (*cheng-wu-chü*, 政務局), each with one leader and two deputies. It was the Resolution Bureau's duty to manage day to day tasks, to which end it formed six subcommittees: the General Affairs Subcommittee (*tsung-wu-tsu*, 總務組), the Public Security Subcommittee (*chih-an-tsu*, 治安組), the Investigations Subcommittee (*tiao-ch'a-tsu*, 調查組), the Transport Subcommittee (*chiao-t'ung-tsu*, 交通組), the Food Supply Subcommittee (*liang-shih-tsu*, 糧食組) and the Finance Subcommittee (*ts'ai-wu-tsu*, 財務組). The Political Bureau, however, was tasked with raising suggestions for fundamental political reform on Taiwan; work on this area had, of course, been underway for several days. Under the Political Bureau was the Planning Subcommittee (*chi-hua-tsu*, 計劃組) which was responsible for drawing up concrete suggestions, and the Negotiation Subcommittee (*chiao-she-tsu*, 交涉組) which was to maintain ties with Ch'en I and the government, and was responsible for propaganda work. Ch'en I was to be 'asked' to provide 50 million Taiwan Dollars (*T'ai-pi*, 台幣) for the Committee's work.¹¹⁹ This detailed General Organisational Statute gives the impression of a seamless organisation with clearly defined responsibilities. It is an impression that does not quite correspond with the truth. Subcommittees which had been formed

¹¹⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 29; General Organisational Statute, (Article 4). According to *THCH* (p. 13, final para.) it was the intention that there be a representative of the aboriginal people in each county and municipality, though this did not appear in the publicised text of the statute (as mentioned above in section 2, p. 22, fn. 15, 'municipalities' were – and are up to today – cities that are directly subordinated to the province and therefore on the same administrative level as the counties).

¹¹⁹ For a breakdown of the terms, see the General Organisational Statute, in particular Articles 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 19, 20 and 21 and *THCH*, p. 13, final para. to p. 14, para. 1; Chin Yü, p. 9, para. 2. lines 3-5; Lin Mu-shun, p. 29.

earlier and which were not mentioned in the Statute continued to exist. The Propaganda Subcommittee was one example of this; its responsibilities should have been taken on by the Negotiation Subcommittee. It was no wonder that Lin Mu-shun described the structure of the Resolution Committee after the restructuring as 'large and unwieldy' (*p'ang-ta*, 龐大).¹²⁰

During the afternoon session each of the subcommittees presented their findings at 4.40 pm. The Public Security Subcommittee continued to expand the Righteous Service Corps by recruiting mainly school pupils and students. The Finance Subcommittee worked to raise funds from large companies, banks, business associations, but also from private individuals, in order to finance the Committee's work. The Propaganda Subcommittee planned to send representatives to the Central Government to report the false rumours which were circulating about events on Taiwan, from their point of view, and to gain authorisation for the Resolution Committee's Political Bureau to manage the restructuring of the Governor's Office until 15 March. The assumption that the Central Government would so easily hand over power was, of course, rather naive.¹²¹ To the same end the subcommittee also intended to send various telegrams to the mainland and in particular to publish an 'open letter to all compatriots' (*kao ch'üan-kuo t'ung-pao-shu*, 告全國同胞書). It also demanded a price freeze, as many traders had taken advantage of the disrupted food supply to gain horrendous profits. The rice shipments the day before had not been sufficient. As a result the Food Supply Subcommittee had had to muster between 30 and 60 million Taiwan Dollars from various departments and organisations to make further purchases in central and southern Taiwan.¹²²

¹²⁰ Lin Mu-shun, p. 29, penultimate para. In the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, top right, from line 4; also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 224; a Communications Subcommittee (*lien-luo-tsu*, 聯絡組) and a Sanitation Subcommittee (*chiu-hu-tsu*, 救護組) are mentioned.

¹²¹ Ch'en I-sung (陳逸松), Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈), Wu Ch'un-lin (吳春霖) and Huang Chao-sheng (黃朝生) were appointed to this job. It never got to this stage, as the troops that had been sent to suppress the uprising landed three days later. See also Chin Yü, p. 9, para. 2, from line 5.

¹²² For details of these events see the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, top right, final para.

3.2.4.2. The foundation of the young peoples' and students' organisations

At 9 am on 4 March, Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川) and other citizens held a meeting together with students and pupils in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall (*Chung-shan-t'ang*, 中山堂)¹²³ to discuss organisational issues, as the intention was that they take on a policing role, according to the agreement with Ch'en I. Representatives who had been at the meeting with Ch'en I returned to report his refusal to arm the students and pupils.¹²⁴ Representatives of the various schools and colleges stayed behind after the meeting ended at 11.15 am. They decided initially that the Self Defence Corps which already existed in schools and colleges should be combined in a 'United Corps'.¹²⁵ This was the beginning of what Lin Mu-shun described as a 'secret meeting'. They would try, in addition, to create organisational structures which would extend beyond Taipei. These included unsuccessful attempts to gain the support of the insurgents in Taichung, and to contact the aboriginal people in Hsin-tien (新店),¹²⁶ who were then still known as *Shan-ti-jen* (山地人), as well as the insurgents in Taoyüan (桃園), who should advance to Taipei. Attacks on military facilities were planned for 3 am on 5 March. This never happened though, due to heavy rainfall and bad communication networks.¹²⁷

Lin Mu-shun wrote about the young people and students' organisations:

The founding meeting of the Autonomous Taiwanese Youth Alliance
(*Taiwan-sheng tzu-chih ch'ing-nien t'ung-meng*, 台灣省自治青年同盟)

¹²³ This was the meeting Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川) had the previous day called for.

¹²⁴ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 5 March, bottom right, line 2; also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 220, fig. 4, line 2.

¹²⁵ For details of this meeting see the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 5 March, p. 1, bottom edge, right; also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 221, lines 10-13.

¹²⁶ This tallies with Kerr's report (1965) of aborigines (*yüan-chu-min*, 原住民) visiting the US Consulate to seek 'instructions' on how to proceed! There were members of the Ami (阿美) and Atayal (泰雅) tribes present. The Atayal come from the area bordering Taipei and Hsin-tien. He 'advised' them to return straight back home and to stay there until everything was over (p. 277).

¹²⁷ Lin Mu-shun, p. 28. Lin Mu-shun does not report on the general gathering that morning, therefore the 'secret meeting' is said to have taken place in the afternoon.

took place at 10 am on 5 March in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall.¹²⁸ Chiang Shih-ch'in (蔣時欽) read out the alliance's agenda:

1. To establish a high degree of autonomy in order to develop Taiwan into a model province of the new China.
2. To carry out a general election for Provincial Governor, county and city magistrates as soon as possible, thus laying the foundation stone of a new political system.
3. To bring the model, law-abiding character of the Taiwanese to the fore, and to take over the role of spearheading the promotion of a democratic system.
4. To be part of the rising tide of the new culture in China and the world, and to make a contribution to the nation and humanity as a whole.
5. To expand production and rejuvenate business, to stabilise the economy and to create a prosperous people.
6. To improve public spirit and community morale, and thus promote social progress.

At the meeting many young people reported on the uprising in central and southern Taiwan, in particular the victory in central Taiwan, and they encouraged the young people to take up arms. Subsequently, on the same day Taiwanese-born people were signed up as ground troops, for the navy and the air force, and were organised into district and medium units [...]¹²⁹

(Lin Mu-shun, pp. 28-29)

The recruitment of volunteers was supposed to be completed by 2 pm. It was organised through bill posters around the city which called for meetings at specified places, and from which Mainlanders were kept away. In some places young people also went from door to door to recruit new members. The cadres met again at 5 pm in order to discuss how to proceed and to adopt an Alliance Statute. In it they underlined their loyalty to the Central Government and

¹²⁸ Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川) had put a call out over the radio at 9 am (*THCH*, p. 14, final para.). According to *THCH*, p. 11, final para., the Taiwanese Democratic Alliance (*Taiwan min-chu lien-meng*, 台灣民主聯盟) had also called a gathering.

¹²⁹ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, bottom right, also reports on this gathering (also in Huang Ts'un-hou, (黃存厚), pp. 222 ff. It reported that Pai Ch'eng-chih (白成支), Chiang Wei-ch'uan and Lin Chung (林忠), the head of the radio station, were also present. Under pressure from those present at the meeting, Lin Chung agreed to provide a broadcast of the gathering.

Chiang Kai-shek, and explained that their purpose was merely to maintain order.¹³⁰

Lin Mu-shun further described other organisations:

[...] In addition the following organisations emerged: The Society of Young People for the Reconstruction of Taiwan Province (*Taiwan-sheng ch'ing-nien fu-hsing t'ung-chih-hui*, 台灣省青年復興同志會), The Independent Students' Association (*hsüeh-sheng tzu-chih t'ung-meng*, 學生自治同盟), The Student Union (*hsüeh-sheng lien-meng*, 學生聯盟), The Association for People Returning to Taiwan from Hainan (*Hainan-tao kui T'ai che t'ung-meng*, 海南島歸台者同盟), The Wakasa Suicide Command ([*jap.*] *Wakasa [chin. 'Jo-ying'] kan-szu-tui*, 若櫻敢死隊),¹³¹ The Society for Taiwan's Reconstruction (*hsing T'ai t'ung-chih-hui*, 興台同志會), The Association for Police Reform (*ching-cheng ko-hsin t'ung-meng*, 警政革新同盟) and others. This shows that the Resolution Committee could neither control nor guide the young people and they were themselves not run by any unified organisation.

(Lin Mu-shun, p. 29)

In Taipei groups were organised into 'Large units (*ta-tui*, 大隊) and 'Medium units' (*chung-tui*, 中隊), according to city district. Apart from Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川), Pai Ch'eng-chih (白成支) was the most important organiser. He is reputed to have gained 1,900 war conscripts for his organisation in Taipei. *THCH* observed that the reason for this organisational work was that Chiang Wei-ch'uan was not able to achieve any influence of note in the Resolution Committee. According to Huang Ts'un-hou a power struggle had broken out which was fought out through wall posters. Thus a few emerged who called for the 'fall' of Chiang

¹³⁰ The Alliance Statute was printed in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (7 March, p. 1, centre left), also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 223 ff. For details of the methods they used to recruit people, see Huang Ts'un-hou, p. 263 and *THCH*, p. 15, line 1.

¹³¹ According to *THCH*, p. 16, para. 1, these were former kamikaze fighters.

Wei-ch'uan and Lü Po-hsiung (呂伯雄).¹³²

3.2.5. *The Resolution Committee draws up a fundamental reform programme*

At around 5 pm on 5 March, the Committee announced a draft reform programme (*kai-ko pen-sheng cheng-chih fang-an*, 改革本省政治方案) which included demands that had already been put forward but were still not satisfied, as well as several new ones. The original demands included the public execution of the culprits of 27 February, compensation payments to the victims of the unrest, the release without charge of all those arrested in connection with the unrest, the abolition of the Monopoly Bureau¹³³ and Trading Bureau (*chuan-mai-chü*, 專賣局 and *mao-i-chü*, 貿易局), and maintenance of public order by the Committee.

The following demands were added:

- All soldiers are to hand their firearms in to the Resolution Committee for 'safekeeping' (*pao-kuan*, 保管).
- All government organisations are to be headed by a Taiwanese person.
- A minimum of half of the heads of government departments (including the Governor's Secretariat) and the members of the Legal Commission (法制委員會) should be Taiwanese.
- All senior judges and senior public prosecutors¹³⁴ should be Taiwanese, and
- Re-elections are to be held immediately for municipality mayors and for county magistrates.¹³⁵

The demand that the Governor's Office Propaganda Commission (*hsüan-ch'uan wei-yüan-hui*, 宣傳委員會) be abolished was also presented, as well as the guarantee of freedom of opinion and assembly, and that no troops would be sent from the mainland. Rumours were already circulating that Ch'en I had requested

¹³² Chin Yü, p. 10, final para.; *THCH*, p. 15, para. 1, and p. 14, para. 4. See above p. 48 and Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 252, line 4. For details of Chiang Wei-ch'uan's role, see also above p. 48.

¹³³ According to Chin Yü, p. 9, the monopoly on tobacco and alcohol would remain.

¹³⁴ According to Chin Yü, p. 9, penultimate para., this demand was presented the following day by Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈) at a meeting of the Taipei Consultative Assembly.

¹³⁵ Lin Mu-shun, p. 29-30. The *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, para. 2, also reported eight political demands that were to be handed to Ch'en I.

troops, who would soon be leaving Fukien for Taiwan.¹³⁶ That evening Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈) reported on the Resolution Committee meeting over the radio, and of the demands which had been delivered to Ch'en I and had been accepted.¹³⁷

As far as the government-biased sources were concerned, the Resolution Committee had become an illegal opposition government (*wei cheng-fu*, 偽政府)¹³⁸ because it had demanded the soldiers disarm, which was justification for violent suppression.

Some leaflets suggested as a solution that Taiwan should be handed over to the trusteeship of the USA. The American Consulate was informed of this suggestion, and asked to pass on it on to the rest of the world.¹³⁹ Indeed, a delegation from the Political Reconstruction Association approached the Consulate to ask that they forward a letter to Chiang Kai-shek through the American Ambassador, John Leighton Stuart, in Nanking.¹⁴⁰

At around 11 am on Thursday, 6 March, the heads of the various Resolution Committee subcommittees and their deputies met in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall to determine their duties and working methods in greater detail. The General Affairs Committee would collect suggestions and demands from the public and pass them on to the appropriate subcommittee every morning for processing or implementation. Specific reports which were to be publicised had to be handed to the Propaganda Sub-Committee by 2 pm each day, which would forward them to the newspapers or broadcasters at 3 pm.¹⁴¹

The Taipei City Consultative Assembly convened at 2 pm, chaired by Wang T'ien-teng. He reported on the Resolution Committee's suggested reform measures from the previous day and took over the formulation of further

¹³⁶ Kerr (1965), p. 281, reported an amateur radio operator who had received this news from Fukien.

¹³⁷ Lin Mu-shun, p. 30.

¹³⁸ *THCH*, p. 14, para. 3.

¹³⁹ Chin Yü, p. 11, para. 1.

¹⁴⁰ Kerr (1965), p. 284-285 and *FRUS*, No. 479, p. 435. For details of events on this day, see Lin Mu-shun, pp. 29-30; Chin Yü, p. 9, para. 2 to p. 11, para. 1; *THCH*, p. 13, para. 4 to p. 14, para. 3; Kerr (1965), pp. 281-285.

¹⁴¹ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, top centre.

suggestions put forward during the meeting.¹⁴²

The afternoon meeting, which began at 2 pm, constituted the Provincial Resolution Committee's founding meeting. More than three hundred people crammed into the hall, reflecting the public's continued intense interest in the activities of the Resolution Committee. In accordance with the General Organisational Statute, which had already been adopted, they elected a total of seventeen of their members onto the Standing Committee.¹⁴³ Judging by the electoral procedure, the Committee as a whole had eighty-five members at that point. The Taipei City Resolution Committee's suggestion of sending a representative to the Bank of Taiwan (*Taiwan yin-hang*, 臺灣銀行) to monitor it was adopted. The Committee also issued a 'Message to all Fellow Compatriots' (*kao ch'üan-kuo t'ung-pao-shu*, 告全國同胞書) directed primarily at all Mainland Chinese in Taiwan and at the KMT. It explained that the reforms were not aimed against Mainland Chinese, and incidents in which Mainlanders were beaten up could only be due to 'misunderstandings'. All Mainlanders in Taiwan were called upon to support the Taiwanese in their fight for democracy. The Committee also took on the task of determining who would be permitted to enter Taiwan. This was without doubt a reaction to increasing rumours that KMT troops had already left Shanghai and their arrival on Taiwan was imminent.¹⁴⁴ During the same meeting Wang T'ien-teng read out an explanation to be sent to the Central Government and to other countries explaining the incident on 27 February and the events which followed. This explanation was to be broadcast over the radio in Mandarin, the Min-nan (閩南) and Hakka (客家) dialects, and in Japanese and English. The most important part of the message however, was the summary of

¹⁴² Lin Mu-shun, p. 31.

¹⁴³ According to the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, bottom right, they were the following: Political Councillors Lin Hsien-t'ang (林獻堂) and Ch'en I-sung (陳逸松), Members of the National Assembly Li Wan-chü (李萬居), Lien Chen-tung (連震東), Lin Lien-tsung (林連宗) and Huang Kuo-shu (黃國書), Members of the Taipei City Consultative Assembly Chou Yen-shou (周延壽), P'an Ch'ü-yüan (潘渠源), Chien Sheng-yü (簡聖堉), Hsü Ch'un-ch'ing (徐春卿) and Wu Ch'un-lin (吳春霖), and Members of the Provincial Consultative Assembly Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈), Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴), Huang Ch'un-ch'ing (黃純清), Su Wei-liang (蘇惟梁), Lin Wei-kung (林為恭) and Kuo Kuo-chi (郭國基). See also *THCH*, p. 15, para. 2.

¹⁴⁴ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, top right, also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 226. See also Lin Mu-shun, pp. 30-31. See Appendix III for the wording of this 'Message'.

the thirty-two demands as part of the reform programme, which were to be presented to Ch'en I. This was expanded upon during the meeting the following day.¹⁴⁵

Support for the Committee was also reflected in the many donations being made. Several companies and organisations donated sums of several tens of thousands of Taiwan Dollars, but the majority of donations seemed to come from private individuals. As a result, the Finance Subcommittee was able to announce 2,670,000 Taiwan Dollars that had been received in donations for the purchase of foodstuffs.¹⁴⁶ Due to shortages in the coal supply (the most important fuel), the miners and their unions had several days previously taken control of the mines, most of which were state-run, and had implemented measures to ensure production, protect the sites and as far as possible safeguard the supply of coal to Taipei, in particular. To this end they had formed the Miners' Corps of Loyalty and Righteousness (*mei-k'uang chung-i fu-wu-t'uan*, 煤礦忠義服務團) with over 40,000 members throughout Taiwan. The union organised the sale of coal at a greatly reduced price through the Mining Cooperatives. Wang T'ien-teng announced the method by which the coal would be sold at a meeting of the Taipei Resolution Committee.¹⁴⁷

The Political Councillors representing Taiwan province despatched a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, essentially repeating the previous demands in nine points. In addition, the unsolved problem of Japanese assets left behind in Taiwan, the settlement of which had thus-far caused wide-spread dissatisfaction among the Taiwanese population, was raised. Chiang was urged not to resort to a military solution, but rather to send a high-ranking official to Taiwan to assist in solving the crisis.¹⁴⁸ A similar telegram was sent jointly from the members of the National Assembly and the Taipei Consultative Assembly to Chang Li-sheng (張曆生), the

¹⁴⁵ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, *ibid.*, bottom right and 8 March, p. 2. For the contents of the reform programme, refer to the accounts on 7 March and Appendix VII.

¹⁴⁶ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 2, top left and the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, Report No. 8.

¹⁴⁷ According to the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, message No. 7, it was to be sold at 30% of the 27 February price, and according to the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, bottom right, message No. 2, at 70% of the price. See p. 2 (centre), for details of the formation of the Corps.

¹⁴⁸ See Appendix IV for the exact wording of the telegram. *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 2, top right, also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 227. See also Chin Yü, p. 10, para. 2. Chin Yü asserts here that 'traitors and thugs' had 'usurped' the councillors' names.

Central Government's Minister for the Interior, who had sent a telegram on 4 March expressing his concern over developments in Taiwan. They were obviously feeling apologetic, and emphasised that their only goal was political reform on a provincial level.¹⁴⁹

Many other organisations met on this day to draw up suggestions for political reform (some in opposition to the Resolution Committee), or to prepare militarily for the landing of KMT troops.

On the same day the Political Reconstruction Association, whose chairman had been overlooked in elections to the Resolution Committee's Standing Committee, presented the Resolution Committee with its Reform Programme for Taiwan's Political System (*sheng-cheng kai-ko kang-yao*, 省政改革綱要). They demanded the formation of a Commission for the Reform of Taiwan's Political System (*sheng-cheng kai-ko wei-yüan-hui*, 省政改革委員會) to which representatives from the city and county Consultative Assemblies would be despatched. In addition to the demands made thus far, they called for all positions in provincial government departments, offices and committees to be held only by Taiwanese. As soon as the Central Government had agreed, the Governor's Office was to be transformed into a normal provincial government, and open elections were to be held for mayors of municipalities and county magistrates by June. The Supreme Commission for National Defence (*kuo-fang tsui-kao wei-yüan-hui*, 國防最高委員會) in Nanking had in fact already agreed in principle to the transformation of the Governor's Office, though merely in its political structure, not in substance. In addition, the Commission had decided to send a high-ranking official to Taiwan to 'reassure' (*hsüan-wei*, 宣慰) the people. At this stage the people in Taiwan knew nothing of these decisions.¹⁵⁰ The demands, some of which had already been put forward, included that all remaining Japanese assets be dealt with by a new ordinary provincial government exclusively, that as many Taiwanese as possible would be appointed to the justice system, particularly judges, that the Governor's Office's Propaganda Committee and the work and re-education camps be

¹⁴⁹ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, bottom left and the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, paras. 5 and 6.

¹⁵⁰ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 9 March, p. 1, and *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 9 March, p. 1.

abolished.¹⁵¹ In addition to the demands already publicised, a not further specified plan, signed by 'Young Comrades' demanded that Taiwanese arrested or prosecuted for being 'traitors and war criminals' (*han-chien chan-fan*, 漢奸戰犯) be released.

This last demand was poorly worded, but there was a very real reason behind them. Many Taiwanese were conscripted by the Japanese during the Second World War, and all those who had fought on the Japanese side were considered 'traitors'. There were no clear criteria for distinguishing collaborators from straight forward conscripts, and as a result many Taiwanese had been unjustly imprisoned. They also demanded that payments for sugar and lime delivered to the mainland be made by the Central Government. The Taiwan Democratic Alliance (*Taiwan min-chu t'ung-meng*, 台灣民主同盟) also demanded the Consultative Assemblymen and Political Councillors be re-elected. This shows that for some the activities of the Resolution Committee, which was made up of members from both of these groups, did not go far enough.

Paramilitary groups such as the Youth Alliance for Great Harmony (*Ta-t'ung ch'ing-nien t'ung-meng-hui*, 大同青年同盟會)¹⁵² and the Alliance of Returners from Hainan Island (*Hainan-tao kwei-T'ai-che t'ung-meng*, 海南島歸台者同盟) had held gatherings in the *T'ai-p'ing* (太平) and *Lao-sung* (老松) schools since the previous day, which were attended by over 3000 people. The Wakasa (若櫻) Suicide Squad met in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall.¹⁵³ Members of these organisations were reputed to have planned to recruit one young person from each family, and to have carried this plan out in Taipei's northern district of Sung-shan (松山), by means of house-to-house raids. Cadres from the Righteous Service Corps met at 4 pm to discuss taking steps towards strengthening their organisation. A telephone

¹⁵¹ For the exact wording of this plan, see Appendix V: Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 227-228. See also *THCH*, p. 16, para. 2. Up until this point it had not been permitted for Taiwanese people to be appointed as judges, regardless of their professional qualifications, because their spoken and written Mandarin was apparently not up to the required standard. Being Taiwanese they spoke the Min-nan dialect, and as they had been trained under the Japanese, or in Japan itself, they worked primarily in Japanese. Using this as a reason to keep them out of the justice system can only be regarded as discrimination.

¹⁵² Former soldiers, who had fought under the Japanese.

¹⁵³ *THCH*, p. 16, paras. 1 and 3; Chin Yü, p. 12, para. 1.

line was to be installed the following day for people interested in joining the unit to get in contact.¹⁵⁴

At around 2 pm Ch'en I received news that the 21st Division had already left Shanghai, and that two battalions of the 4th Regiment of the Military Police had left Fuchou (福州);¹⁵⁵ the Resolution Committee was not informed of this, though rumours were already in circulation.

In a radio speech at around 8.30 pm Ch'en I accepted some of the demands made by the Resolution Committee the previous day. According to him he had requested that the Central Government permit him to transform the Governor's Office into an ordinary provincial government. This concession was easy to make, given that it did not entail any loss of power. As far as possible, Taiwanese were to be appointed at every level of government. Ch'en I chose the following wording:

[...] I hope that the Provincial Consultative Assembly, as well as all other legal organisations which represent public opinion, nominate for election appropriate Taiwanese individuals of noble character, correct attitude and with outstanding abilities, for them to be recommended to the Central Government.¹⁵⁶ [...]

This was simply a statement of intent, as he again deferred the decision to the Central Government, despite the fact that as Governor of the Province he could select the members of his government himself. Moreover, he completely ignored the Resolution Committee, even implicitly describing them as unrepresentative and illegal. Mayor and county magistrate re-elections were set for 1 July, with the proviso that preparations, such as a new election law, had been completed by then. Unsuitable office-holders could be removed beforehand if local Consultative Assemblies or 'other legal organisations' proposed three candidates from which Ch'en I would select one.¹⁵⁷ Other reform measures were to be left to the new provincial government and city and county administrations. He also referred to

¹⁵⁴ *THCH*, p. 15, para. 1; Chin Yü, p. 12, paras. 1-2; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 2, centre left.

¹⁵⁵ Lin Mu-shun, p. 31.

¹⁵⁶ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, top right, from line 8 (also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 229, lines 3-4.

¹⁵⁷ Ch'en I specified this in a telegram to the city and county Consultative Assemblies the following day; if an office-holder should be removed, they should inform him of this by telegram within three days (*Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, top left).

‘lawless elements’ (*pu-fa chih t’u*, 不法之徒) who had that afternoon stripped soldiers of their rifles; he held these ‘elements’ alone responsible for the still-limited rice supply. There was no mention of opening the military stores, as had been agreed earlier. He even used the supply situation to put pressure on the people, by explaining that the rice supply would only be fully restored when ‘order’ had returned, i.e. when resistance against the military ceased.¹⁵⁸ One source reports that the situation in Taipei on this day had generally settled down. Mainlanders were going out onto the streets again, and there were only isolated cases of beatings.¹⁵⁹

3.3. The End of Negotiations – the Suppression Begins

3.3.1. *Wang T’ien-teng announces the final reform programme*

Lin Mu-shun wrote about Ch’en I’s stance:

As for Ch’en I’s radio speech, the majority of Resolution Committee members did not realise that Ch’en I was playing for time. They thought Ch’en I was sincere in his intention to change Taiwan’s political system, and that the day was in sight on which they would take over leadership themselves. Who could have known that catastrophe would soon come crashing in?

The humble young people, students and the public saw the situation

¹⁵⁸ See Appendix VI for the wording of Ch’en I’s speech. *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, also in Huang Ts’un-hou, pp. 228-230; *FRUS*, No. 480, p. 437; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 31-32; *THCH*, p. 17, para. 2. The city of Tainan (台南) took Ch’en I by his word on the afternoon of 9 March: during a gathering attended by all the city’s Consultative Assemblymen, representatives of various organisations and by students, three candidates were elected to replace the existing mayor, see Lin Mu-shun, p. 95; Chin Yü, p. 33, para. 1; see also below (section 4.6.2., p. 150). According to Yang Liang-kung (楊亮功), the Hsinchu (新竹) Resolution Committee planned to elect a Taiwanese person as the new mayor on 12 March. With the arrival of the troops, presumably on 10 March, this plan was quickly abandoned and an official from the existing administration was elected and approved by Ch’en I (Part I, ‘*Hsinchu*’, lines 14-15); see below (section 4.4.1., p. 114). In Taichung County (台中), three candidates were selected on 8 March to replace the county magistrate (see below, section 4.5.2., p. 133). The incumbent county magistrate returned shortly after to his post (*ibid.*, *Taichung-hsien*, 台中縣, lines 9-10). In Taichung City candidates were also chosen, whom Ch’en I rejected due to ‘irregularities’ (*Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 17 March, p. 1, centre left: the date of the election and the candidates names are not mentioned there, however; see below, section 4.5.1., p. 131).

¹⁵⁹ *THCH*, p. 17, para. 3.

clearly, however. They had fully understood that Ch'en I was taking the Resolution Committee for a ride. In order to improve the critical situation, preparations were made to expel the compromisers and traitors from within the Resolution Committee, and in addition a number of young people were sent to Taichung, where, after arming themselves and organising themselves into groups they were to return to Taipei to wipe out the armed enemy units there. The high and low-ranking bureaucrats under Ch'en I were to be taken captive, and most importantly Ch'en I's severed head was to be offered to the Spirits of the Killed as a sacrifice.¹⁶⁰

Wang T'ien-teng's last appeal and the Resolution Committee's 'General Outline for Resolution'

On [Friday] 7 March, talk of the imminent arrival of large numbers of Chiang's troops resounded throughout Taipei. The people were full of fear. The city appeared deserted and as evening drew in not a soul was to be seen on the streets. Every single shop was closed.

As Chiang's troops neared Taiwan, Ch'en I's attitude gradually changed. On the same day he sent a letter to the Resolution Committee, stating: From the outset the grievances of the representatives of the various groupings were confused, and it was impossible to reach an agreement taking all the suggested measures into account. From now on I expect all of the Resolution Committee's grievances to be handed over for discussion, that they be summarised and representatives selected to submit them to the Governor's Office together with a corresponding name list." This was the greatest mockery of the Resolution Committee. Chief of Staff K'o also began to attack from the wings. On the evening of the previous day he gathered all agents in the city together to brief them ...

(Lin Mu-shun, p. 32, second para. to p. 33, first para.)

¹⁶⁰ In this section Lin Mu-shun focuses on the contradiction between the official representatives of the public opinion and the people themselves, who no longer trusted the representatives and therefore took the resistance into their own hands. To some extent, this contradicts the claim that members of the CC Faction were organising young people, through Chiang Wei-ch'uan, for their own uses. According to Lin Mu-shun, the organisations led by Hsü Te-hui (許德輝) and Lin Ting-li (林頂立) were also no examples of 'spontaneous' people's resistance (see above pp. 50 f.).

Ch'en I's description was correct in so far as various organisations continually came forward with their own reform programmes. However, Ch'en I negotiated only with the Resolution Committee and the Consultative Assembly, as far as he was prepared to discuss reforms at all. Even the Association for Political Reconstruction also did not deal with Ch'en I regarding its own reform programme, but instead handed it to the Resolution Committee as a suggestion. The request for a name list was obviously intended to collate material on relevant people for subsequent persecution.

A meeting of Taiwanese police officers, directed by the Resolution Committee, took place at 9 am in the Fu-hsing School (復興), where they discussed issues of organisation and arming themselves. During the Committee's meeting (at around 11.30 am), Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈) read out the 32 demands summarised in the reform programme thus far.¹⁶¹

Lin Mu-shun further wrote:

The Resolution Committee continued its session the entire day. The audience stood tightly packed, with grim expressions on their faces; one could see immediately that they were 'people on a special mission'. The tragedy could also be seen in the faces of the Committee members. The Chairman reported on Ch'en I's letter. Wang T'ien-teng raised the issue of the lack of structure in the Resolution Committee in the past and voiced his regrets on the matter. In response to Wang T'ien-teng's speech a great clamour broke out amongst those 'on a special mission'. Sometime later Wang T'ien-teng said 'The authorities have, without exception, accepted our demands for political reform. Making promises and fulfilling those promises are two separate matters, however. What value do promises carry if they are not put into practice? Over several days Committee members

¹⁶¹ *THCH*, p. 17, final line to p. 18, line 1 and p. 18, para. 2. This lacks credibility, however, as armed groups were always formed independently and consciously in opposition to the Resolution Committee. The issue here was in fact the maintenance of order, particularly in view of the terror that Lin Ting-li's (林頂立) and Hsü Te-hui's (許德輝) units were unleashing.

and ordinary compatriots who were present in the audience put forward many suggestions. Now the time has come that we are able to summarise the suggestions. The reform of the political system in Taiwan will not be implemented by incessant lamenting here. Therefore I present today a final programme for settling the recent incident and for political reform, and call on the authorities to put it into practice. Should the authorities stay with their promises and not make any of them a reality, I need not clarify here what is to be done.'

The 'people on a special mission' once again arose in great clamour and functionaries from the Association for Political Reconstruction loudly admonished 'The reason the Resolution Committee has failed to achieve a positive outcome lies in the fact that it is made up of members of the National Assembly, Political Councillors, Consultative Assemblymen or other Ch'en I lackeys. As a result the Association for Political Reconstruction demands that these Gentlemen collaborators step down from the Committee and think about their roles!' Thereupon others rose up and argued in opposition. Now is not the time to divide into good and bad and to oust each other. The Gentlemen of the Association for Political Reconstruction would do well to view things more soberly. The 'people on a special mission' immediately started shouting and instigated a wrangling match with the result that the gathering descended into chaos. Nothing could be done. When the gathering settled down Wang T'ien-teng arose slowly and explained his 'General Outline for Resolution [of the Incident]' and the 'Programme for Political Reform'.

(Lin Mu-shun, p. 33, second para. to p. 34, first para.).

The Plan comprised seven articles regarding the resolution of the incident and the unrest (*tui mu-ch'ien ti ch'u-li*, 對目前的處理), three articles on further military measures, and twenty-two articles pertaining to political matters (*ken-pen ch'u-li*, 根本處理). The first seven articles stipulated the disarming of all 'the government's armed forces', i.e. soldiers, military police and civilian police. This demand was a result of Ch'en I's and K'o Yüan-fen's unfulfilled promise to

withdraw all patrols. The clashes had continued. Other demands, including the 'joint maintenance of order', the ban on persecuting those involved in events in the past few days, and the obligation to resolve all problems peacefully and not to call in troops from the mainland, also grew out of unfulfilled promises. It was too late however. The troops had already been called for long before. They were on their way, and were due to land in Taiwan the following day. Similarly it was too late for the Resolution Committee's further reform suggestions to be dealt with at a later date. Presumably the reform programme was published in the knowledge of the imminent landing of Mainland troops. The fact that the programme was announced during the meeting not by the Provisional Chairman of the Resolution Committee, Chou Yen-shou (周延壽), but by the Chairman of the Propaganda Subcommittee, Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈) would support this view. Chou Yen-shou did not want to expose himself too much. Wang T'ien-teng's intention was to document for the last time the public will for fundamental change. Ch'en I's rejection of this final push for reform would then legitimise the armed resistance to his regime and the expected troops, even if there was very little chance of success. Lin Mu-shun's quotes of Wang T'ien-teng's statements allude to this. Another demand stipulated that all further 'government' (i.e. the Governor's Office) action would have to be agreed with the Resolution Committee. The 'agreement' did not mean that the Resolution Committee wanted to take on governmental power, but rather it was intended to force Ch'en I into cooperating with the Resolution Committee. In view of the situation at the time and the lack of trust in Ch'en I, cooperation through good will on both sides would have been the only reasonable alternative to violent suppression. By this point, however, it was an impossibility.

The following three articles regarding military issues included the demand that soldiers stationed in Taiwan were there solely to defend Taiwan. This conveyed their anxiety of being pulled into the civil war on the mainland. The twenty-two demands regarding political issues included ratification of an autonomy statute in accordance with the not-yet implemented constitution.¹⁶² Other demands covered the agreed re-election of the mayors and county magistrates, the Provincial

¹⁶² See Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, p. 456, 1946 Constitution, Chapter XI, Part 1; in particular Article 112.

Consultative Assembly re-election, the abolition of the Governor's Office Propaganda Commission; for all levels of government, the justice system and state-run enterprises to appoint at least fifty percent Taiwanese, and a new regulation for settling former Japanese assets in Taiwan. This had led to a great deal of dissatisfaction, as the heads of the Departments for Industry and Mining, and Agriculture and Forestry, Pao K'o-yung (包可永) and Chao Lien-fang (趙連方) alone had control of the assets.¹⁶³

During the session various participants delivered a further ten articles. According to Lin Mu-shun, they were representatives of the Association for Political Reconstruction, the students, the unions, the Democratic Alliance and people of 'unknown origin'. The new articles included a controversial one that demanded all Taiwanese arrested on suspicion of being a 'traitor' or 'war criminal' be released. This article made it easier for the government to denounce the entire movement as being a rebellion directed against Central Government. According to Lin Mu-shun, this article was put forward by the people of 'unknown origin', who did so with the intention that the whole Committee could later be labelled 'traitors'. Other demands called for the abolition of the Garrison Command, to 'avoid the misuse of military power', and the transformation of the Governor's Office into an ordinary provincial government by the Resolution Committee's Political Bureau, even before receiving Central Government approval. According to Ch'en I, the Central Government had already consented. Either they did not trust his assurances, or this demand was put forward with the aim of later documenting that the Resolution Committee wanted to override the Central Government. A further demand was intended to legitimise the Political Bureau as democratic. It called for the city and district Consultative Assemblies to elect between two and four representatives, according to population size, to a total of thirty people. This approach corresponded with the system applied to the election for the Provincial Consultative Assembly. The demand for the abolition of the 'work camps and other unnecessary facilities' was targeted against the internment

¹⁶³ Kerr (1965), p. 125.

of disagreeable intellectuals and uncooperative Taiwanese landowners.¹⁶⁴ The final three demands correspond with the Association for Political Reconstruction's programme of the previous day in terms of their content, though they are not as radical. In their programme it was suggested that the transformation of the Governor's Office be subject to the consent of the Central Government. Until they had agreed, the 'current system' was to be maintained. The demand for the abolition of work camps and other facilities was eventually not raised, but was instead to be reviewed by the Reform Committee which would be formed. The radical aspects of the Resolution Committee's forty-two demands could therefore be of varied origin, given that based on currently available sources it is not possible to determine who put forward which demands.¹⁶⁵

Huang Ts'un-hou, the scathing critic, describes how this reform programme was viewed in military circles. According to him, it is a call to rebellion and practically constitutes high treason (*pei-p'an ti sheng-ming*, 背叛的聲明). He points not only to the demands which refer to 'traitors' and 'war criminals', but also to those which call for the abolition of the Garrison Command and the full-scale disarming of all government units. As Taiwan was an indispensable outpost for defending the south-east coast, for which reason alone the Garrison Command was installed and troops stationed there, this was considered high treason.¹⁶⁶ The firearms were not to be safeguarded by the Resolution Committee alone however, but jointly with the military police. Despite the points which were unacceptable to the Central Government, the programme shows a good understanding of democracy, and with good-will they could have formed the basis of negotiations.

At around 6 pm a handful of members of the Resolution Committee's Standing

¹⁶⁴ See Appendix VII for the exact wording of the reform programme. Lin Mu-shun, pp. 33-34. The most reliable version of the reform programme is found in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 2, reproduced in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 223-234. The additional ten articles were added to the reform programme during the afternoon session, at around 3.30 pm. Lin Mu-shun traces these articles back to the activities of representatives from the Association for Political Reconstruction, the students, the unions, the Democratic Alliance and the people of 'unclear origin'. See also Lin Mu-shun, p. 34. See Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) for information regarding the election of the Provincial Consultative Assembly. For information on the work camps see Kerr (1965), p. 120.

¹⁶⁵ See the Association for Political Reconstruction's reform programme (Articles 1, 6, 7 and 9), Appendix V and above, p. 72).

¹⁶⁶ Huang Ts'un-hou, p. 252.

Committee handed the reform programme over to Ch'en I and K'o Yüan-fen (柯遠芬), who rejected it outright. Ch'en I would only accept demands for the reform of the provincial administration in the narrower sense; the Central Government must decide on all other matters. As a result the Provincial Propaganda Commission prepared to disband the following day, in accordance with the increasingly strong demands of the previous days. Once the uprising had been suppressed, this too was irrelevant. The Propaganda Commission was in fact merely renamed the Governor's Office Press Office (*hsin-wen-shih*, 新聞室), which it remained under the later provincial government.¹⁶⁷

At 6.20 pm Wang T'ien-teng announced the finalised reform programme in a speech on the radio in his capacity as head of the Propaganda Subcommittee, and explained in a tone full of resignation that the Resolution Committee could do no more, that the people must take matters into their own hands to make the reforms a reality.¹⁶⁸

3.3.2. *Armed groups prepare for resistance*

The phase during which negotiation was used to find a solution had come to a definitive end. It was followed by the final, and bloodiest, phase, which was launched the following day with the arrival of troops from the mainland.

The Resolution Committee's political role had reached its conclusion. In the short time that remained before the entire movement was suppressed, the initiative shifted completely to the resistance groups which had sprung up spontaneously. They attempted to take the last military strongholds and buildings and to put up resistance against the troops about to land for as long as possible, to which end they attacked army supply depots in order to equip themselves with arms and ammunition. In Taipei only the Governor's Office building, the Garrison Command, and the Military Police Regiment buildings were still under military control. The Garrison Command prevented the insurgents who had gathered in the

¹⁶⁷ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 8 March, p. 1; 16 March, p. 1, bottom centre and 19 March, p. 1, centre left. The Press Office published the *THCH* report referred to in this work.

¹⁶⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 34; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 2, final para.; Kerr (1965), p. 290.

Chien-kuo Middle School and at Taiwan University from causing unrest.¹⁶⁹

According to Lin Mu-shun, the units led by Hsü Te-hui (許德輝) and Lin Ting-li (林頂立) contributed to the atmosphere of terror by spreading the news that the KMT troops had landed. They were already preparing for the persecution of activists in the Resolution Committee and other organisations.¹⁷⁰

Lin Mu-shun wrote:

On [Saturday] 8 March a large number of Resolution Committee members started to waver, as the demands they had made the previous day had been resolutely rejected by Ch'en I and K'o Yüan-fen (柯遠芬).¹⁷¹ As a result of Ch'en I and K'o Yüan-fen's offensive moves, and the Resolution Committee's wavering, the group of 'pan-shan-men' (Huang Ch'ao-ch'in (黃朝琴), Li Wan-chü (李萬居), Lien Chen-tung (連震東) and Huang Kuo-shu (黃國書)¹⁷²) launched their own offensive. They called some of the despondent Committee members to a gathering in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall, where an 'Important Statement' reached by consensus was to be fabricated. It stated that the 42 demands were drawn up the previous day when the meeting was in a state of chaos, and it was thus not possible to structure them; even the choice of words was at times incorrect. This led to many misunderstandings amongst the authorities and the public, and they therefore do not correspond at all with the will of the people. We

¹⁶⁹ Chin Yü, p. 12, para. 2, and p. 13, para. 1; *THCH*, p. 18, para. 3.

¹⁷⁰ Lin Mu-shun, p. 39.

¹⁷¹ Kerr (1965), p. 290, reports that during the morning the Resolution Committee was certain that the landing of troops was imminent. On the other hand, it was made known that Minister of Propaganda of the Central Government, P'eng Hsüeh-p'ei (彭學培) had stated as late as 6 March that in any event a political solution would be found for Taiwan; this was a contradiction that didn't serve to increase the Central Government's credibility (see *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, 2nd article). Contrasting with this information *THCH* (p. 22, para. 2) reports that the Resolution Committee had taken stock of vehicles and petrol supplies, planning to confiscate them for use by the insurgents. This probably referred to some of the Commission members who had not become 'despondent' yet. This day the Resolution Committee as a whole didn't function any more. See the subsequent decision made by the Plenary Assembly of military personnel, to collect vehicles.

¹⁷² Lien Chen-tung (連震東) was a Political Councillor representing Taipei City, Huang Kuo-shu (黃國書) was Political Councillor for Hsinchu County (新竹) as well as Lieutenant General in the Garrison Command.

beg the authorities and the entire population for their forgiveness (etc)¹⁷³ - the opportunists' true colours thus came to light.

(Lin Mu-shun, pp. 39-40).

A similar shift in emphasis was seen in Chang Ch'ing-ch'uan's (張晴川) statement to the press at 11.30 am. Using patriotic rhetoric he urged the people to work together with Mainlanders, in maintaining order for example, and to support them in any way necessary. This was the only way reforms could be implemented, though they had in fact been condemned to failure with the arrival of the first contingent of troops that same day. Looting and embezzlement were obviously occurring, and Chang warned of the consequences if it were discovered. He did not refer to the extent of the looting, nor who was responsible.¹⁷⁴ On the same day further deliveries of rice arrived in Taipei from central and southern Taiwan, which was sold to the public through the City District Offices at a price of around 23 Taiwan Dollars/*Chin*.¹⁷⁵

Lin Mu-shun wrote about further events:

A large group of citizens, young people and students, who were gathered in the Jih-hsin (日新) School, called for a 'Plenary Meeting of All Members of the Ground Troops, the Navy and the Air Force'. They resolved to form suicide squads. They were to assemble vehicles and arms in order to prepare to battle the enemy.¹⁷⁶ The several hundred students who had been maintaining public order for more than a week stood at their sentries as usual, directing the traffic and taking precautions against

¹⁷³ All workers, business people, school pupils and so on were asked to carry on with their usual activities the following Monday (10 March), and not to support anyone who resisted the authority of the state. See the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 9 March, p. 2, top right, for the full wording, reproduced in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 234-235.

¹⁷⁴ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 9 March, p. 1, top right.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, bottom centre, and *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, same date, p. 1, bottom left. This source states that the whole delivery was around 2000 sacks. In total 700 sacks of rice were sold on this day, though the amount was to be increased to 1200 sacks. The city had a daily requirement of around 1200 sacks of rice, and so it had to remain rationed.

¹⁷⁶ According to *THCH*, p. 22, para. 2, the gathering took place at 2 pm. The participants were mainly former members of the Japanese navy.

troublemakers. Who could have guessed that these youngsters, the angels of ‘Taiwan’s Seven Days of Democracy’, would the next day be motionless corpses, strewn outside the Yüan-shan (圓山) Zoo [in the north of the city]!

(Lin Mu-shun, p. 40)

The Governor’s Office announced on the same day that the Head of the Police Authorities, Hu Fu-hsiang (胡福相), would be replaced by the Taiwanese Wang Min-ning, who until then had been a Major General and Head of the Garrison Command’s Adjutancy. This was a very superficial response to the Resolution Committee’s and the public’s demand to allocate a majority, as far as possible, of Taiwanese to public office positions. Superficial because Wang Min-ning, like other Taiwanese appointed soon after, was a *pan-shan* (半山). They were not expected to be able or willing to carry through demands for democratisation, due to their long-term connections with the KMT. They could better serve as mere external symbols of the government’s ‘willingness to reform’.

In a radio speech at 8 pm, the new Department Head called on the public to abide by the law and to support the police in maintaining order. Police officers were to return to their former posts the following day (9 March). This announcement implied that the Government had in the meantime become extremely confident of its position.¹⁷⁷ The Commander of the 4th Regiment of the Military Police, Chang Mu-t’ao (張慕陶), visited the Resolution Committee ‘privately’ at around midday, and told them he guaranteed on his life that the Central Government would not send any troops to Taiwan. On the other hand he expressly warned against calling for the decommissioning of government bodies (excluding the military police), as this would only ‘provoke’ (*tz’u-chi*, 刺激) the Central Government. From the public he demanded only that order be re-established. As far as he was aware, Ch’en I had already agreed to various reform demands and was merely waiting for approval from the Central Government

¹⁷⁷ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 2, bottom right and *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 10 March, p. 1. See also Lin Mu-shun, p. 40.

before starting to restructure the provincial administration.¹⁷⁸

3.3.3. *The landing of the troops and the end of the uprising*

This could only have been a conscious deception, as at 4 pm two battalions of the 4th Regiment of the Military Police, under the command of Chang Mu-t'ao (張慕陶), landed at Keelung (基隆) on the ship *Hai-p'ing* (海平) from Fuchou (福州). The harbour was occupied by armed insurgents, so two thousand men landed first to secure the harbour area before eight thousand men of the 21st Division followed on the warship *T'ai-k'ang* (太康) from Shanghai, at around 10 pm.¹⁷⁹ The 21st Division, under General Liu Yü-ch'ing (劉雨卿), had been restructured at the end of 1946 and equipped with modern Japanese weaponry. It consisted of two brigades under the command of Officers Ling Chien-hsien (凌諫銜) and Yueh Hsing-ming (岳星明), as well as an 'independent regiment' (*tu-li-t'uan*, 獨立團) which was under the direct command of the Division (i.e. Liu Yü-ch'ing). News of the fighting in Keelung quickly travelled to Taipei. People locked themselves in their houses; only those armed were out on the streets, from both sides. The insurgents began a major offensive, for which they had been preparing for days, on the remaining bases and buildings in government control, including the base at Yüan-shan (圓山), the Governor's Office building, the Garrison Command, the Infantry Supply Depot, the Police Department, the Police Brigade, the Southern Taipei Military Police Unit, and the Bank of Taiwan. At the same time they pushed from the northern city district of Pei-t'ou (北投) and the eastern district of Sung-shan (松山) towards the city centre. However, they were forced back within an hour by government units, which, though they were smaller in number, had superior fire power. The sound of gunfire and exploding hand grenades was to be

¹⁷⁸ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 9 March 1947, p. 1 and Kerr (1965), p. 291. On this day the newspapers publicised the Supreme Commission for National Defence's approval for transforming the Governor's Office. In view of the imminent arrival of troops, this decision was rather meaningless (see above, p. 64).

¹⁷⁹ According to the report in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 1, these 8000 men had already arrived on the warship at 10 am that morning in Keelung. It had been en route to Japan, to provide Chinese support to the Allies controlling the area. Due to events in Taiwan, however, it was instantly diverted.

heard throughout the night. These events were worthy of only a short mention in the government-biased newspapers, which described the instigators as ‘communist bandits’ (*kung-fei*, 共匪).¹⁸⁰

At the same time around three thousand soldiers from the ‘Independent Regiment’ from Lien-yün-kang (連雲港, in northern Kiangsu) had landed in Kaohsiung. According to Kerr, the warships which transported the troops were mainly American ships whose original names had hastily been written over in Chinese. The original names were still visible, however, so that America’s support for the KMT troops in suppressing the uprising was plain to see. Some of the equipment was also of American origin, for example the Jeeps, as noted in the *China White Paper*.¹⁸¹

On 9 March Chief of Staff K’o announced over the radio that due to the insurgents’ attacks the previous night, the state of emergency was to be re-imposed in the Taipei and Keelung areas. The reason given was to suppress the uprising and to seize the ‘troublemakers’. The announcement was followed by various instructions for the public which were continuously repeated on the radio.

Schools, factories and businesses were to resume their usual activities; gatherings and demonstrations were immediately banned. Nobody was permitted to carry weapons, though they had to take them to the State of Emergency Enforcement Headquarters to register them, a contradiction in itself. Arms which had been seized from the police or military had to be returned within a day. Every offender was seen as a ‘rebel’. He asked the public to report ‘rebels’ and offered large rewards for them.¹⁸² All ‘illegal organisations’ were ordered to close down,

¹⁸⁰ Chin Yü, p. 13, para. 1. Wang K’ang, p. 221; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 10 March, p. 1, bottom left: ‘Communist Rebels Discovered in Taipei’ (*Taipei fa-hsien kung-fei*, 台北發現共匪) (also 11 March, p. 1, bottom left). See the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 2, bottom left. For information on the 21st Division, see (The memoirs of) Liu Yü-ch’ing (Liu, Yü-ch’ing (劉雨卿), ‘Liu Yü-ch’ing ti hui-i’ (劉雨卿的回憶) [Memoirs of Liu Yü-ch’ing], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch’iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch’u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 169-173), p. 171.

¹⁸¹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 40; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 9 March, p. 1, top left; Kerr (1965), pp. 291 ff.; *The China White Paper*, p. 931; Chin Yü, p. 13, para. 1; Liu Yü-ch’ing (劉雨卿), p. 172, para. 3.

¹⁸² Lin Mu-shun, p. 41. For information on the beginning of the state of emergency, see Chin Yü, p. 40, para. 1.

and this included the Association for Political Reconstruction.¹⁸³ In order to deprive the demonstrators of all freedom of movement, a billboard announced that only vehicles which possessed a Vehicle Pass (*chiao-t'ung-cheng*, 交通證) issued by the Garrison Command were permitted to travel. All others were immediately stopped by patrols. Similarly, the head of the 4th Detachment of the Garrison Command, Major General Hsiung K'o-hsi (熊克熙), was given the assignment to win back control over the communications and news networks through use of the military.¹⁸⁴

People who tried to act in accordance with the instructions given, whether to actually hand in weapons or to return to work, were shot dead in the street by soldiers. This may partly be explained by linguistic misunderstandings, as Taiwanese may not have understood calls by the sentries in Mandarin Chinese. This can not however be the only reason behind such occurrences, as sources close to the official line made out. An additional factor in relation to this is that, unlike the Mainlanders, the Taiwanese had no experience of a state of emergency, and to an extent did not understand the implications.

The new Head of the Police Department declared the arrival of the 21st Division and 'reassured' the public that only 'rebels and troublemakers' (*chien-fei pao-t'u*, 奸匪暴徒) would be 'eliminated' (*ch'ing-ch'u*, 清除).¹⁸⁵ Yet further fighting occurred on 9 March. Approximately four hundred insurgents attacked the radio station in Shui-tao-ting (水道町). As the greater part of the 21st Division had advanced to Taipei to back up the government units already there, they were able to force the insurgents back at around 4 pm. Sixteen people were arrested during the fighting.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Garrison Command Communiqué 131 of 9 March, *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 1, bottom centre. See also Kerr (1965), p. 294 and Lin Mu-shun, p. 44. For information on the Association for Political Reconstruction, see Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 256, para. 2, final line.

¹⁸⁴ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 1, bottom right, and the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 12 March, p. 1, bottom right.

¹⁸⁵ Lin Mu-shun, p. 41. *FRUS*, No. 499, p. 438, also refers to the 'frequent firing by sentries'. Chin Yü, p. 40, penultimate line; Wang K'ang (王康), p.223; Wu Chuo-liu (吳濁流), p. 61. Under Japanese colonial rule unrest and uprisings had been suppressed without the imposition of a state of emergency, see Ch'i Chia-lin (戚嘉林), vol. 2, pp. 162-164.

¹⁸⁶ Chin Yü, p. 13, para. 1; the anonymously-published collection of documents titled *K'an-luan shih-ch'i chung-yao wen-chien fen-an chi-pien* (戡亂時期重要文件分案輯編 [A

In a statement broadcast over the radio at 6 pm, the Resolution Committee demonstrated clearly that it was finished. It even defended the newly-imposed state of emergency, which it said was justified in light of the looting and disturbances caused by a section of the population. It called on the people to remain calm. This announcement can hardly be explained by the previous day's anticipatory submissiveness, when it repealed its reform programme. In view of the fact that the insurgents' attacks had already been quashed by the time this statement was broadcast, it is likely that it was made under duress, if it was not an outright fabrication.¹⁸⁷

Lin Mu-shun described the suppression of the uprising:

It was later made known that the Control Yuan representative for Fukien and Taiwan [Min-T'ai chien-ch'a-shih (閩台監察使)], Yang Liang-kung (楊亮功), had landed the previous day [8 March] at Keelung, escorted by two battalions of the 4th Regiment of the Military Police and ordered the Fortress Headquarters as well as the Military Police Regiment to seize the population of Keelung in a pincer movement. [...]. He travelled directly on to Taipei accompanied by two lorries. Anyone who crossed paths with them on their journey was killed. He didn't arrive in Taipei until 3 o'clock in the morning.

(Lin Mu-shun, pp. 41-42).

Collection of Important Documents from the Rebellion Period]), No. 38: Taiwan's Politics: The 2-28 Incident (vol. 2, Taipei: Sept. 1955), in the following referred to as *KSCW*, popularly known as *Ta-hsi tang'an* (大溪檔案), ie 'Ta-hsi files', from Chiang Kai-shek's residence in T'zu-hu (慈湖) near the town of Ta-hsi, repr. by Academia Historica (國史館) in the series *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien tang-an hui-pien* (二二八事件檔案彙編) [Archives Materials on the 228 Incident] as vol. 17, 599 pp, see *KSCW*, doc. 49, p. 193) and (The Memoirs of) Liu Yü-ch'ing (劉雨卿), p. 172. Lai, Myers et al. further report that sections of the 21st Division were also sent directly to other Taiwanese cities, for example to Chia-i (嘉義) and Taichung (台中) and that on Monday, 10 March, two more divisions of government troops had landed in Kaohsiung (高雄), which partly provided backup for the troops in Taipei, and partly advanced along the east coast as far as Hua-lien (花蓮) and I-lan (宜蘭). This can not be verified, however, as it is unclear to what source Lai, Myers et al. refer to (p. 147).

¹⁸⁷ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 10 March, p. 1, top right. There are no details of the day's events in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, as for unspecified reasons it was not published on 10 March (see the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 1, bottom right).

A report in the *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (中華日報) provides evidence that at least some of the Resolution Committee members were not revolutionary in their outlook, but rather they hoped for the authorities' understanding. According to the newspaper, members of the Taipei and Keelung Resolution Committees had the previous day decided they would actually send a representative to the harbour to greet Yang Liang-kung. Given the fighting there this is unlikely to have happened.¹⁸⁸

Lin Mu-shun wrote further:

At 10 am [9 March] K'o Yüan-fen (柯遠芬) took Yang Liang-kung (楊亮功) to the square in front of the Infantry warehouse at Yüan-shan (圓山), pointed to the several hundred corpses strewn about and said 'These are the rebels and thugs who yesterday evening attacked the warehouse and were killed by the national army.' Yang Liang-kung did not say anything. Later he disclosed to his escorts, 'There was no trace of fighting near the warehouse. The dead were all 18 or 19-year-old high school pupils who were not carrying weapons...'¹⁸⁹

The several hundred eighteen or nineteen-year olds were the high school pupils who had been posted at the police stations the evening before to maintain public order. Before the machine guns and other weaponry were fired, the school pupils had been arrested by the military police and police officers of Lin Ting-Li's Operational Unit and the Righteous Service Corps, and taken to the square in front of the warehouse at Yüan-shan where they were shot by the 'National Army'. In addition, the several dozen young people and students who worked for the Resolution Committee in the Sun-Yat-sen Hall were captured by the National Army and, except for the ones who managed to get away in time,

¹⁸⁸ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 9 March, p. 1, top left.

¹⁸⁹ Yang Liang-kung's Investigation Report makes no mention of this, though the appendices to the report have not yet been made public.

were killed on the spot.¹⁹⁰

The more than thirty people who were working on the Committee for the Railway Administration were captured by the National Army. Each one of them was thrown from the second floor, breaking every bone in their bodies. Those who didn't die were stabbed by bayonet; no-one survived.¹⁹¹

At the Governor's Office building, the Garrison Headquarters, the Bank of Taiwan and other sites reputedly attacked by rebels and thugs not a body nor a bullet was to be found. Not a single member of the so-called National Army, the Military Police or civilian police was injured or killed in the fighting.

At 2 pm¹⁹² the same day the warship *T'ai-k'ang* (太康) arrived in Keelung from Shanghai. It was fully-loaded with the restructured 21st Division of Chiang's Army. Before they arrived on land, the soldiers had no idea that they were in Taiwan, or that Taiwan was a province of China, nor even what kind of a war they were involved in.

(Lin Mu-shun, pp. 42-43)

Due to the bad experience the people had had with an inconsistent state of emergency, few dared onto the streets during the following days.

On Monday, 10 March at 10 am Ch'en I once more went on air to extend the state of emergency from the Taipei and Keelung areas to the entire province. This was intended to 'flush out' the tiny minority of 'traitors and thugs' who had looted and attacked government and army facilities, and thereby 'protect' the public from them. These statements reveal the official version of the uprising which appeared

¹⁹⁰ According to *THCH*, p. 23, para. 1, the Sun-Yat-sen Hall was on 9 March already in the area secured by the National Army in which martial law had been imposed. There was no escape for those still there. This area was continually extended though the city area was not entirely under the army's control yet.

¹⁹¹ This is confirmed in the *Report on the Incident in Taiwan*, p. 277. It actually mentions forty to fifty people killed.

¹⁹² See above, p. 86 and fn. 178 on p. 86.

later, and the majority of official sources and reports use them as their basis.¹⁹³ After Chiang Kai-shek and the Defence Minister, Pai Ch'ung-hsi (白崇禧), who had been sent to Taiwan, had made public their interpretation of the situation on 10 and 27 March, respectively, the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報) was able to summarise the established official version of events on 28 March under the headline 'The [uprising on] 28 February was not a general uprising' (*erh-erh-pa pu shih min-pien*, 二二八不是民變). According to them the uprising had been planned well in advance by 'political plotters, careerists and former Japanese lackeys'. The 'Japanese-sponsored racketeers' as well as several 'misled or coerced young people and students' had joined them. The Japanese were to blame, as they had cultivated a sense of disdain for China. This argument lacks conviction when one considers how the Taiwanese had cheered the arrival of Chinese soldiers and officials to liberate them, and that they had experienced Ch'en I's administration for themselves for the previous year and a half. According to the same article, several dignitaries, who in good faith had wanted to resolve the situation, had been 'abused' by the rebels. The great majority of Taiwanese had carried on with their day-to-day activities and had protected Mainlanders. Hence it was not a national uprising. Here, as in Ch'en I's speech, one can recognise the attempt to divide the population into 'upright citizens' and 'thugs' in order to isolate the insurgents and to undermine the significance of the uprising in general.¹⁹⁴ Ch'en I did in fact renew his pledge to implement the reforms as promised, such as the re-election of mayors and county magistrates. In reality, he only replaced the mayor of Hsinchu (新竹) with the then General Secretary of the city government, Ch'en Chen-pin (陳貞彬), a purely superficial measure which bore no relation to the substance of the original reform demands. Ch'en I rejected the candidates put forward for Taichung (台中) due to 'irregularities'.¹⁹⁵ The fact that practically every Taiwanese could be disqualified from running for mayor, contrary to claims otherwise, is dealt with in an explanation by the Head of the Department for Internal Affairs, Chou I-o (周一鶚):

¹⁹³ For example, Chin Yü and *THCH*. See Appendix VIII for Ch'en I's speech.

¹⁹⁴ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 28 March, p. 2, top left.

¹⁹⁵ See below, section 4.5.1, p. 131.

all candidates were required to have a good grasp of Mandarin (*kuo-yü*, 國語), had to be ‘trustworthy’, and could not have been suspected (sic!) of having ‘collaborated’ with the Japanese. Everywhere else the former office-holders were hastily reinstated by the relevant Consultative Assemblies. In this atmosphere of terror no-one dared put forward real alternatives when it came to appointing people to posts.¹⁹⁶ In addition to the bans already imposed, Ch’en I decreed that no-one, regardless of who they were, could collect donations, and the price of commodities could not be increased. Two further orders that day referred to the Resolution Committee’s transgression of its authority, when it abandoned its original objective of resolving the incident of 27 February, and had instead published the ‘treasonous’ (*p’an-ni-hsing*, 叛逆性) reform programme containing demands to abolish the Garrison Command and the decommissioning of all government units, which clearly fall outside the limits of provincial administration reform. Therefore the Resolution Committee and all its branches in the districts and county towns must dissolve immediately. The Association for Political Reconstruction was later also explicitly included in this ban, as it was alleged to have planned the mobilisation of soldiers who had formerly served under the Japanese.¹⁹⁷ Suggestions for political improvements should now only be presented to the relevant Consultative Committee or in writing directly to the Governor’s Office. A meeting of the Consultative Committee members loyal to the government was scheduled for the same day at 2 pm, practically simultaneous with the Resolution Committee’s dissolution. In addition, these speeches and orders by Ch’en I were publicised on billboards and in leaflets dropped from aeroplanes.¹⁹⁸

By evening the army had largely brought the situation in Taipei under their control, including the all-important radio stations, so that during the day Chief of Staff K’o, the Commander of the 21st Division, Liu Yü-ch’ing (劉雨卿), and various current heads of departments in the Governor’s Office were able to

¹⁹⁶ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 17 March, p. 1, centre left, with the misleading headline ‘Governor Ch’en fulfils his promise’ (*Ch’en chang-kuan shih-hsing no-yen*, 陳長官實行諾言) and 19 March, p. 1, top left.

¹⁹⁷ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 15 March, p. 1, top left.

¹⁹⁸ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 2, bottom centre and bottom right; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 11 March, p. 1, centre and 10 March, p. 1, bottom right; see also Kerr (1965), pp. 294 and 296.

address the public from the point of view of their respective departments, and to call for calm and cooperation with the authorities and army. The details in these speeches were at times contradictory and unclear. In contrast to the previous day, the Head of the Department for the Interior, Chou I-o (周一鶚), announced that school pupils and students could for the time being stay at home, for 'security reasons'. The rest of the population should not walk the streets 'as much as possible', unless they were on their way to work or other urgent matters. The Head of the Department for Education, Fan Shou-k'ang (范壽康), said that the students and pupils 'must' actually stay at home until further notice.¹⁹⁹ Chief of Staff K'o did not announce the daily timings and exact implementation measures of the state of emergency until 10 pm on 10 March over the radio; they were then repeated everyday in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報) until 15 March.

- I. During the period of the state of emergency everyone may move about freely between 6.30 am and 8 pm, except in the specially restricted zones by observing the following rules:
 1. If citizens want to pass a sentry they are forbidden from doing so as a group (they are advised to walk alone or in two's) and they must move past slowly. If a sentry calls to them to stop, they are required to stop immediately. They will only be allowed to continue on their way once the guard sentry's questions have been answered.
 2. Anyone wanting to pass a sentry in a vehicle (motorised or bicycle) is required to stop when about thirty steps away, get out of the vehicle and inform the sentry: 'I am travelling because...' and will only be able to continue on their way once permission has been granted.
 3. Anyone on the streets or in public squares is not permitted to look around themselves, make loud noises or gather in groups in order that they don't arouse the sentries' suspicions.
 4. Anyone encountering patrol vehicles is not permitted to obstruct it in groups, nor to encircle it.
- II. Between 8.10 pm and 6.30 am the next morning, no-one is permitted on the streets or public squares, except vehicles with special 'transport licenses' as well as officers and soldiers performing their duties.

[According to information in our newspaper] The 3rd Detachment of the Garrison Command has publicised Chief of Staff K'o's personal order:

¹⁹⁹ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 11 March, p. 1, centre and 12 March, p. 1.

‘All military and police personnel as well as ordinary citizens who carry out revenge attacks or reprisals, looting or raping during the period of the state of emergency, will be executed on the spot (by gunshot), pending permission from the Acting Commander of the Military Police Regiment, Chang (張).’

This can be taken as an implicit confession that cases such as this did occur. The *China White Paper* does in fact report of soldiers looting.

On the same evening Major General Hsiung K’o-hsi (熊克熙) made a remarkably blunt announcement to all railway, transport and telecommunications employees informing them that anyone interfering with the operation of the above services will be executed on the spot (*ko-sha wu-lun*, 格殺無論). Suspects were to be reported to him immediately.²⁰⁰

Huang Ts’un-hou reports that all city and county administrations were functioning again as normal from 11 March, though it seems this was not the case in other areas. In addition to a general call for reconciliation, that evening Yang Liang-kung felt compelled to appeal over the radio to all school pupils, students and workers to return to their studies and workplaces.²⁰¹ There was good cause for their reluctance.

The announced ‘elimination of traitors and thugs’ did not bode well. According to unofficial reports, an atmosphere of terror developed in Taipei. This manifested itself in soldiers arbitrarily killing Taiwanese on the streets²⁰² and the targeted pursuit of participants, prominent and otherwise, in political and military activities. People were taken away by the lorry-load. The majority of Resolution Committee members were arrested and many of them executed, including Wang T’ien-teng (王添燈, probably on 13 March), Sung Fei-ju (宋斐如), Lin Mao-sheng (林茂

²⁰⁰ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 12 March, p. 1, centre left, and the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 12 March, p. 2, bottom left. See the *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (ibid., top left) and the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (ibid., bottom right) for details of Hsiung K’o-hsi’s announcement. The *Hsin-sheng-pao* did not mention immediate execution but ‘severe punishment’. *China White Paper*, p. 931.

²⁰¹ Huang Ts’un-hou (黃存厚), p. 256, line 2, and the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 12 March, p. 2, top left.

²⁰² Kerr (1965), p. 293 and pp. 300-306, reports several cases. According to him one foreigner counted over thirty mutilated students’ bodies. During the night of 9 March alone fifty students were killed in Sung-shan (松山), and thirty in Pei-t’ou (北投). On 18 March, twenty handcuffed students were seen on their way to the Garrison Command (Kerr, November 1947, p. 225-226). Taiwanese were easy to distinguish from Mainlanders due to their clothing (see Lin Mu-shun, p. 43).

生),²⁰³ Shih Chiang-nan (施江南), Huang Chao-sheng (黃朝生) and Ch'en Hsin (陳焯). Others who had been involved in any way with events during the previous fortnight were under threat of persecution, in particular journalists, publishers, doctors,²⁰⁴ and business people, but also students and young people - those who had joined the Righteous Service Corps, for example. According to them the authorities searched through the list of members. Thus over seven-hundred students were killed or 'disappeared' up until 17 March. According to Lin Mu-shun, the streets and alleyways were full of bodies and the Tanshui River (淡水河), which flows past Taipei, carried innumerable dead.²⁰⁵ The official interpretation of events is of course very different. Just a few days after the arrival of the troops, 'order' had been restored. According to official statements there were only a few deaths or injuries and these were virtually all among Mainland Chinese who had been persecuted by Taiwanese. They acknowledge a handful of 'incidents' which were traced back to simple 'linguistic misunderstandings'.²⁰⁶ The public transport system did indeed start functioning and the shops opened again on 14 March. It was not until 25 March that the transport network was re-established to the whole island, including between Taipei and the surrounding

²⁰³ Lin Mu-shun, p. 43. The removal 'by the lorry-load' of those arrested was also witnessed by foreigners (see the New York Times, 23 March, p. 16, col. 1). Sung Fei-ju (宋斐如) was the founder of the *Jen-min tao-pao* (人民導報) and deputy to Fan Shou-k'ang (范壽康), Head of the Department for Education. Lin Mao-sheng (林茂生) was the publisher of the *Min-pao* (民報) which was extremely critical of Ch'en I, as well as Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Taiwan University, see P'u, Jen (蒲人), 'I-ch'ang li-shih o-meng ti hui-hsiang - Taiwan erh-erh-pa shih-chien shen-li-chi' (一場歷史噩夢的回想 - 台灣二二八事件身歷記) [Recollections of an historical nightmare], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], Hsin kuan-tien ts'ung-shu 7 (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n.publ.], 1985), pp. 340-345. (p. 343); and Lai, Myers et al., p. 154. They state that the reason for Lin Mao-sheng's arrest was that his name had 'allegedly appeared on a document stating that he would be the Minister of Education in the independent Taiwan government'. Their source - P'u Jen (p. 343) - however, only states that there had been 'rumours' (被傳說) that he was to become the Minister of Education in an 'Autonomous Government' (自治政府). Once again, Lai, Myers et al. are stretching the sources to portray the whole movement as treasonous which would make its brutal suppression more justifiable.

²⁰⁴ Doctors were targeted because they were Taiwan's true, and perhaps only, intellectuals. This came about as a result of discrimination under the Japanese. Studying medicine at that time was the only means by which a Taiwanese person was able to gain an academic training. The most well-known example is Chang Ch'i-lang (張七朗), a doctor and National Assemblyman from Hua-lien (花蓮), who together with his two sons was executed for having been a 'ringleader'.

²⁰⁵ Kerr (1965), pp. 298-299, and November 1947, p. 225; Lin Mu-shun, p. 43.

²⁰⁶ See above, p. 83.

suburbs. Only in Taichung had the transport network not been affected, as the insurgents had quickly brought the whole of central Taiwan under their control. Due to the disruption to the transport network, the rice supply to Taipei was still not secure. Therefore on 12 March the Garrison Command ordered on the threat of military punishment that all traders and farmers who had stores of rice sell it on the market at the maximum price set by the authorities. Nevertheless, farmers from the area surrounding Taipei sold their rice at more than double the price (up to 50 Taiwan Dollars), until around 20 March when supply was secured through deliveries, including beans and sweet potatoes, from Taichung and the south.²⁰⁷

On Thursday 13 March the journalists fled (insofar as was still possible), as they had heard rumour that the Garrison Command were planning a raid on them. They certainly had cause for their fear. It had been they who had articulated the dissatisfaction and had increased demands for reform. Among those individuals killed and whose names are listed by Lin Mu-shun are seven who had been publishers, directors or managing editors of newspapers, three of them even from the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報). The Garrison Command did in fact order the closure of several newspapers on 15 and 24 March, though the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報) (Taipei) and the *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (中華日報) (Tainan), both closely associated with the government, continued to be published. In total eight newspapers had to close down in connection with the suppression of the uprising. Another four were able to continue for another year and a half, until their economic foundations had been destroyed as a result of events during and after the disturbances. In so far as the remaining newspapers had not already shifted towards the official line, the necessity for censorship and ‘cooperation’ between journalists and the government was emphasised at meetings such as with the commander of the 21st Division, Liu Yü-ch’ing (劉雨卿).²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ See the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 17 March, p. 2, top left, column 4, line 6 and 21 March, p. 2, top left, for details of the problems in the transport network; see the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 15 March, p. 1, top left, for information pertaining to the shops opening; see the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 12 March, centre left and 21 March, p. 2, top centre and the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 17 March, p. 1, bottom right and 20 March, p. 2, centre left, for the food supply problem.

²⁰⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 44; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 28 March, p. 2, centre left; Ch’en Kuo-hsiang (陳國祥) and Chu P’ing (祝萍), *Taiwan pao-yeh yen-chin 40 nien* (台灣報業演進40年) [The Development of Taiwan’s Press during the last 40 Years] (Taipei: Tzu-li Wan-pao-she (自立晚

As life in the Taipei and Keelung areas had superficially normalised from Friday 14 March, the state of emergency was in place only from 8 pm to 5 am the following morning.²⁰⁹

A 'general census' was announced for 14 March. This was a euphemism for the planned cleansing, which was now easier to carry out as in the meantime (i.e. by 11 March) another 12,000 men had arrived from the mainland as reinforcements. The cleansing, whereby the various army units combed through a specific area, moved from Taipei out to the surrounding areas, eventually covering the whole island.²¹⁰ The objectives of the cleansing was to search out young people in particular who had withdrawn to the countryside at the beginning of the suppression and were in hiding there, as well as to find hidden weapons and to destroy armed groups of insurgents who were still operating in some parts of the island. In order to focus on these objectives, a 'Pacification Gathering' (*sui-ching hui-i*, 綏靖會義) was held in the middle of the month in Taichung involving the Consultative Committees, mayors from all the county municipalities and all county magistrates. For the cleansing to be carried out as efficiently as possible, Taiwan was split into three Pacification Zones (*sui-ching-ch'ü*, 綏靖區), presumably the north, the Taichung area and the south of Taiwan. The old principle of shared responsibility was used for the cleansing, whereby family members or various patriarchs were required to go bail for one another. According to Kerr this was carried to the extreme that when the authorities were unsuccessful

報社) [Independent Evening News Publ. Co.], 1987), 221 pp. (pp. 34-35). The newspapers affected were the *Min-pao* (民報), which had been destroyed during a raid on 9 March, according to Wu Chuo-liu (1989), p. 67, the *Jen-min tao-pao* (人民導報), the *Chung-wai Jih-pao* (中外日報) and the *Ch'ung-chien Jih-pao* (重建日報, on 15 March); the *Ho-p'ing Jih-pao* (和平日報, Taichung on 24 March). Others were the *Ta-ming-pao* (大明報), the *Tzu-yu Jih-pao* (自由日報), *Kuo-sheng-pao* (國聲報) and the *Hsing-T'ai Jih-pao* (興台日報). The following closed in 1948: The *Kuo-shih Jih-pao* (國是日報), the *Kung-shang Jih-pao* (工商日報), the *Taiwan ching-chi Jih-pao* (台灣經濟日報) and the *Tzu-ch'iang-pao* (自強報). See *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 28 March, p. 2, top left, for the enforced conformity of the press.

²⁰⁹ Garrison Command Communiqué, No. 136, see *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 15 March, p. 1, top centre.

²¹⁰ On 11 March a Cleansing of Rural Areas (*ch'ing-hsiang* 清鄉) was announced over the radio, to begin on 21 March, see Chin Yü, p. 46, para. 2, final line. See also Kerr (1965), p. 314. *New York Times*, 12 March, p. 14, col. 4. For details on the army's systematic approach, see the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 27 March, p. 4, top right, para. 2 line 4 (Pai Ch'ung-hsi's (白崇禧) speech).

in their search, family members or fellow students were arrested or killed.²¹¹ The authorities adopted a carrot-and-stick tactic. ‘Rebels’ who surrendered were often offered amnesty. The rest were threatened with being shot immediately upon discovery. The same went for the public who were offered a reward for revealing ‘rebels’ in hiding. Particularly in the latter phase of the cleansing the aborigines living in the mountain regions were subjected to these appeals, as many of those who fled had travelled to those areas.²¹² Anyone providing cover for those in hiding could expect the same punishment as the people the authorities were looking for. In order to implement the cleansing, the heads of the Neighbourhood Associations and the city districts, amongst others, were mobilised. On 20 March the Headquarters for the Implementation of the State of Emergency (*chieh-yen szu-ling-pu*, 戒嚴司令部) in Taipei gathered together the heads of more than 400 Neighbourhood Associations and city districts from Taipei and the surrounding area. They were ordered to search their areas for suspects and report them within five days.²¹³ The Garrison Command’s Communiqué No. 144 on 24 March publicised more detailed regulations.

1. All district and city governments were to implement a system of close mutual bail in which citizens gave surety for each other. Those giving surety must all be patriachs from the same neighbourhood association. If the person for whom they are giving surety acts unlawfully those giving surety shall incur the same punishment as the suspect.
2. If an arson attack, murder, looting or other disturbance occurs within a city district, a township, a neighbourhood association, in business streets or other areas in which rebels or other troublemakers are hiding out, the leaders and members of the nearest neighbourhood association together with everyone within a one hundred meter radius of the scene must immediately cooperate to detain the relevant people and inform the army unit in the area, the police station or the local authorities. Otherwise the leaders and members of the nearest neighbourhood association as well as everyone within a radius of one hundred meters will all be arrested and severely punished for protecting rebels and troublemakers.
3. If anyone suspects they have discovered a rebel or troublemaker, or clues to the whereabouts of one, they must immediately inform the local army unit, military police, county or city government, or the relevant township or

²¹¹ Liu Yü-ch’ing (劉雨卿), p. 172, para. 3; Kerr (1965), p. 299 and Chin Yü, p. 47, para. 3, line 1. The Chinese expression for this is *lien-pao-lien-tsoo-fa* (連保連座法).

²¹² Chin Yü, p. 45, para. 1, lines 12-14 and p. 46 para. 2 to p. 47 para. 3. Pai Ch’ung-hsi’s appeal to the aborigines in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 27 March, p. 4, top right, line 5.

²¹³ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 15 March, p. 1, top right; 19 March, p. 1, top left and 22 March, p. 2 centre.

neighbourhood association leaders. They may also detain the suspect and present him to the local army unit or county or city government. Anyone who does not declare troublemakers hiding out and provides them with shelter will be viewed as an accomplice and punished in the same manner.

4. Anyone who stole weapons, ammunition or military goods during the unrest must immediately make a detailed statement to the local army unit, county or city government, and hand them in so that they may be passed on to the cleansing area headquarters. This should take place in line with the Garrison Command's measures for finding missing weapons, ammunition and other goods.
5. Anyone in possession of weapons, including all types of firearms, ammunitions, bayonets, or similar, must immediately register them with the local army unit, or county and city government, and hand their weapon in to them. They will be handed on to the Garrison Command in the relevant Pacification Zone. A reward will be paid according to what is handed in. Anyone maintaining possession of weapons and ammunition and not reporting it is guilty of hiding weapons of war, and will be sentenced to capital punishment.
6. Anyone reporting a troublemaker or weapons over will be paid a reward of between 500 and 5000 *Taiwan Dollars* if their tip-off turns out to be correct. Anyone who detains and delivers a troublemaker or weapons will receive an award of between 1000 and 10,000 Taiwan Dollars, dependent on what kind of weapons are handed in. Once a report is received [from the army unit] from the Pacification Zone, or county or city government, the reward will be paid by the Garrison Command. If a tip-off proves to be slander, the informant will be sentenced to the same punishment as stipulated for the charge he brought forward.²¹⁴

It is not difficult to imagine the air of fear and distrust which such regulations created. As a result it was almost impossible for any citizen, even for those who were prepared to collaborate, not to come into conflict with the authorities. Citizens could be punished if a suspect was in hiding nearby, even if they were unaware of it. They were forced to disclose suspects under threat of punishment, and could be punished if that disclosure proved false.

Calls for denouncing suspects were repeated at least towards the end of March, and on 28 March the leaders of the city districts and neighbourhood associations met again with a commanding officer to extend the deadline for exposing suspects until 15 April. The Garrison Command announced that the cleansing would be

²¹⁴ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 25 March, p. 2, top left.

completed by the end of April.²¹⁵

Anyone wanting to hand themselves over was required to fill in a Letter of Conversion (*tzu-hsin-shu*, 自新書) in which they were expected to state, for example, that they had been 'misled by the rebels' during the uprising. This offer was not, however, open to those considered to be ringleaders (*chu-fan*, 主犯), but only to those who had been 'forced' by the ringleaders to take part in the uprising, (or merely in demonstrations) or who had 'blindly followed' (*mang-ts'ung*, 盲從) them. Weapons were to be returned by family members, and in addition five families related to the suspect's, and above suspicion themselves, were required to guarantee that it would not happen again.²¹⁶ School pupils and students were subject to the following regulations.

1. All those returning to class must be verified by the school.
2. All boarders should return to their boarding schools by 17 March at the latest.
3. Anyone not involved in the violence should reregister in their school between 17 and 22 March, or risk being struck off.
4. Each student must be accompanied to school by a family head or someone else who can provide a written bail for them.
5. On their way to and from school students walk alone and wear their school emblem.
6. Students are not allowed to gather in school, and outside of school they are prohibited from participating in any organisations.

This meant that officially all school pupils and students would walk away without punishment if they could convince the authorities that they had merely been 'followers'. This process was simplified towards the end of the month; the student need only be accompanied by the head of the family and 'repent' their role in the uprising in front of the school head. In Taichung, a final deadline of 31 March was set, after which any pupils or students who had not yet returned to their school would be expelled and their personal details passed on for the 21st

²¹⁵ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 27 March, p. 2, top left, *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 29 March, p. 4, centre, and *Chin Yü*, p. 47, para. 3, lines 5-6.

²¹⁶ *Chin Yü*, p. 47, final para. to p. 48, para. 2.

Division to search them out.²¹⁷

Given the soldiers' brutality, those involved in the events of the previous weeks could hardly expect leniency. Kerr reported almost one hundred students killed, whose bodies, sometimes horrifically mutilated, he himself or other foreigners saw in Taipei, and of several hundred others whose executions he heard of in Taipei and other places during March. Anyone who could understand English or who had had any contact with foreigners were suspected, and if they had caused a Mainlander to 'lose face' any time since 1945, they lived in fear of revenge attacks. Even the *Hsin-sheng-pao* complained that the innocent became suspects, and appealed to the authorities to differentiate between those who had been pressurised into taking part in the uprising, or were involved in organisations, which had later been 'illegalised', in order to bring the situation under control, and those who were 'actually guilty'.²¹⁸ On 13 March Ch'en I received a telegram from Chiang Kai-shek ordering him to ensure that his troops did not carry out acts of revenge. Ch'en I subsequently published in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* under his own name (on 16 March, after the state of emergency had been lifted in Taipei), seven rules for the behaviour of officers and soldiers which went into more detail than those released by Chief of Staff K'o on 10 March.

1. The military police alone are responsible for eradicating traitors and arresting law-breakers.
2. The combat troops are tasked only with garrison service duties and warfare.
3. It is absolutely forbidden for officers and soldiers to loot or shoot innocent citizens, under any pretext. Offenders will be executed by gunshot upon discovery.
4. Guard soldiers are strictly prohibited from searching or harassing innocent citizens, under any pretext. If a case of this was discovered, the offenders would be put before a military court.
5. When vehicles are despatched by the military to transport troops, these troops must not assume a shooting posture, so as to avoid unsettling the public.
6. Officers and soldiers are strictly forbidden from shooting at random, as this would only alarm the public.

²¹⁷ The contents of the regulations are provided in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 23 March, p. 2, centre left. See also *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 31 March, p. 4, top centre and *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 28 March, p. 2, top right. See *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 27 March, p. 4, top left, for the final deadline.

²¹⁸ Kerr (1965), pp. 298-306 and the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 28 March, p. 2, top left, final para. This may have been an attempt to protect the publisher of the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, Li Wan-chü (李萬居), who had played an active role in the Resolution Committee.

7. The military police are to pay more attention to army discipline.²¹⁹

On 17 March the Garrison Command announced that the regulations which the population of Taipei were subjected to during the period of the state of emergency were valid throughout Taiwan, unless local institutions had issued other terms. On 22 March the Garrison Command again declared that, with immediate effect, between 9 pm and 5 am the next day it was forbidden for anyone to leave their homes. During the day they were free to go where they chose, subject the sentries' restrictions. In the newspapers at least, this was not publicised until 23 March.²²⁰

The official victim count varies greatly from the figures provided by unofficial sources. Lin Mu-shun claims over 2000 were killed and 1000 arrested in Taipei alone, whereas Yang Liang-kung states only 7 dead, 44 injured and one missing person on the Taiwanese side in Taipei, compared to 33 dead, 866 injured and 7 missing amongst the Mainlanders. However, he concedes that the true number of victims must be far higher than in the statistics (*yüan tsai t'ung-chi shu-tzu chih shang*, 遠在統計數字之上). The financial losses are said to have reached 274,268,862 Taiwan Dollars for the authorities and Mainlanders and 56,023,806 Taiwan Dollars for the Taiwanese.

Only officials and employees of national organisations and companies could expect compensation, which covered family members and even household staff. 200,000 Taiwan Dollars were paid in the event of death, and in cases of injury and loss of assets, the victim received limited support payments.²²¹ Lin Mu-shun estimates a total of at least 10,000 killed throughout Taiwan, and several thousand arrested. 52 of the dead are named, as are 35 of those arrested, and a further 22

²¹⁹ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 16 March, p. 1, bottom left. See *KSCW* for the telegram mentioned here (doc. 94, p. 254).

²²⁰ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 23 March, p. 2, top left.

²²¹ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 43-44. The death toll of over 2000 corresponds with the figure provided in the *Report on the Situation in Taiwan*, p. 276. It may be that Lin Mu-shun used the figure in the report. Kerr (1965), pp. 298-306, 310; Chin Yü, p. 41, paras. 1-4, p. 48, final para.; *THCH*, p. 24, para. 2 and p. 25, para. 1; Yang Liang-kung, Part I, column 3, third last para.. The *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 25 March, p. 2, top centre, lists by name fifty-seven dead and injured in Taipei. Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), referring to information from the Department for Internal Affairs, writes of four hundred killed and injured Mainlanders in Taipei alone, and of material losses of more than 500 million Taiwan Dollars. See *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 23 March, p. 2, centre left, on the issue of compensation.

people who were being searched for.²²²

Those arrested include the Provincial Consultative Assemblymen Kuo Kuo-chi (郭國基) and Lin Jih-kao (林日高), the former leader of the KMT Youth Organisation Li Yu-pang (李友邦) along with a group of 'Communists', and Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川). Some of them were released after up to a year in custody without trial, either because their innocence was proven, or because, as members of the Taiwanese elite, they promised to help the KMT regain a degree of trust from the Taiwanese population.²²³ For several months afterwards arbitrary arrests were made in connection with the uprising, to the extent that even Yang Liang-kung was pushed to formally remonstrate to the new provincial government under Wei Tao-ming (魏道明) that many arrests were made using the uprising as a pretence. He criticised that those arrested were not put before a judge and therefore sat in prison for an undetermined length of time.²²⁴ The available sources and secondary literature provide no information as to how many people were arrested in connection with their involvement, or alleged involvement, in the uprising, or for how long they were kept in custody.

²²² Lin Mu-shun, pp. 115-119.

²²³ Lai, Myers et al., pp. 155, 167. Li Yu-pang was arrested because some branches of the Youth Organisation, foremost in Kaohsiung, had turned against Ch'en I and sided with the insurgents.

²²⁴ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 3 June 1947; acc. to Lai, Myers et al., p. 164, see also p. 167.

4. The Uprising Beyond Taipei

4.1. Introductory Comments

This section will look at events in other parts of Taiwan. Within a few days the unrest in Taipei had spread throughout the whole province. A point worth noting here is the ‘catalyst effect’ the uprising in Taipei had on all other areas of Taiwan. There was a veiled tension in the air so that just the news of the beginning of the uprising in Taipei was enough to trigger similar events elsewhere. Information about what had happened in Taipei reached the rest of the island through the radio, newspapers, people travelling from Taipei and by word of mouth.

The areas surrounding Taipei as well as Taichung reacted as early as 28 February, Hsinchu (新竹) and Chia-i (嘉義) on 1 March, Tainan (台南) and Pingtung (屏東) on 2 March. The uprising didn’t spread to Kaohsiung (高雄) and the remote areas of Hualien (花蓮) and Taitung (台東) on the east coast until 3 March. Events in these eastern areas were really only of local significance, as the poor communications networks made contact with the other centres of the uprising virtually impossible. Only on the Penghu Islands (澎湖) did the military maintain control of the situation from the start.¹

The categorisation of events in Taipei into three phases is relevant for all other areas of Taiwan, compared to Taipei only with a shift of a few days, however.

4.2. Taipei County

The first area of Taiwan to react to the unrest in Taipei was the small city of Pan-ch’iao (板橋), just five kilometres to the southwest of Taipei, and the seat of the Taipei County administration. On the afternoon of 28 February several hundred people occupied the station, where they stopped trains and beat passengers whom they recognised as officials or Mainlanders. Ten people were injured, three of them seriously. All trains travelling to the north were turned back.

¹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 45, p. 49; p. 53 (*Taoyüan*, 桃園); p. 61 (*Chung-pu*, 中部); p. 57 (*Hsin-chu*, 新竹); p. 81 (*Chia-i*, 嘉義); p. 93 (*Tainan*, 台南); p. 97 (*Kao-hsiung*, *Feng-shan*, 高雄、鳳山); p. 103 (*P’ing-tung*, 屏東); p. 107 (*Hua-lien*, 花蓮); p. 109 (*T’ai-tung*, 台東); p. 111 (*P’eng-hu*, 澎湖).

The following day officials and staff of the county administration were herded together and guarded, whilst their homes were ransacked. Warehouses, primarily those storing military goods, were looted and set alight, apparently causing around 300 million Taiwan Dollars-worth of damage.² Similar cases occurred between 28 February and the first week of March in several other areas near Taipei, for example Ying-ko (鶯歌), Wan-hua (萬華), Hsi-chih (汐止), Shih-lin (士林), Tan-shui (淡水), Hsin-tien (新店), Jui-fang (瑞芳), Chin-kua-shih (金瓜石), San-ch'ung (三重), Luo-tung (羅東) and Su'ao (蘇澳).³ The Political Councillor Lin Tsung-hsien (林宗賢) and the Provincial Consultative Assemblyman representing Taipei county, Lin Jih-kao (林日高), organised a kind of 'Citizens' Corps' (*fu-wu-tui*, 服務隊) to maintain order. A Resolution Committee for Taipei County was elected only shortly before the troops landed in Keelung, which despatched representatives to the Provincial Resolution Committee in Taipei. Contradictory information in the source material make it impossible to determine whether or not Lin Jih-kao (林日高) was at this point a member of the Taiwanese Communist Party, or whether Lin Tsung-hsien (林宗賢) led the Citizens' Corps in the fight against the authorities and the KMT troops in order to make himself mayor of Pan-ch'iao, as Chin Yü claims. On 9 March the KMT troops reached Pan-ch'iao and crushed all resistance by the same violent means as in Taipei and Keelung.⁴

The residents of I-lan (宜蘭), a city about fifty kilometres to the south-east of Taipei by road, held a meeting on 4 March which served the added purpose of forming an I-lan Resolution Committee. At the meeting demands were made for the administration to be cleared of corrupt officials, for army personnel and officials to be disarmed, and for Mainlanders to be 'concentrated'. These demands were handed over to the city government in the afternoon. At the same time, however, they were put into practice by students and other citizens. Around five

² Lin Mu-shun, pp. 46, 49; *THCH*, p. 3, para. 3.

³ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 49, 51; Chin Yü, p. 20, para. 2; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, centre left and 7 March, p. 1, top left.

⁴ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 49-50; Chin Yü, p. 20, para. 1. As a member of the Taiwanese Communist Party, Lin Jih-kao (林日高) had had to serve a sentence of seven years under the Japanese. After the end of the uprising he was tried (though not until April 1948) on charges of being the cadre responsible for the Taipei area, see Lin Mu-shun, pp. 49-50. He was later released, however, and took on positions in the provincial government, see *Memoirs of Wang K'ang* (王康), p. 206.

hundred rifles and over one hundred pistols were captured during a raid on an air force arsenal, and in addition the weapons from the local police station were seized. A joint order from the Resolution Committee and the mayor led all the soldiers to lay down their weapons and declare themselves ready to 'work with' the residents. Only Chou Ching-yü (周競宇), the Garrison Commander at the airfield, refused, and left the airfield that night to an unknown destination, whether of his own decision, or forced to by the insurgents is unclear from the sources. Weapons were also captured from a military depot in nearby Su'ao (蘇澳). The Operational Headquarters (*tso-chan pen-pu*, 作戰本部) was formed in the city government's guest house, and was to lead armed actions in the I-lan area.

Kuo Chang-yüan (郭章垣), the director of I-lan's hospital, was elected to chair the Resolution Committee. However, according to Lin Mu-shun, on 13 March KMT troops advanced to I-lan and ended the uprising there with a massacre of the young people. Kuo Chang-yüan was executed as a 'ringleader'. The sources disagree on whether he was involved in the fighting, as Chin Yü claims, or whether he was just attending to the injured in hospital, as Lin Mu-shun maintains. Some of the young people were able to escape abroad from the ports of Su'ao (蘇澳) and Ch'ing-shui (清水). Apart from five injured officials, Yang Liang-kung makes no reference to victims and damages in Taipei County. In contrast, the report of the Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai describes more than one thousand dead in Tan-shui (淡水) alone.⁵

4.3. Keelung

News of the incident in Taipei reached Keelung (基隆) as early as 8.30 pm on 28 February. The people reacted spontaneously through attacks on police stations and by destroying the homes of hated officials. In fact, anyone who appeared to be a Mainlander became the target of attacks. Groups of Taiwanese besieged two

⁵ Lin Mu-shun, p. 51; Chin Yü, p. 20, para. 2; the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 5 March, p. 1, bottom centre, also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 221, the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, top left and 8 March, p. 2, centre; Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Taipei-hsien* (台北縣) and *The Report into the Incident on Taiwan*, p. 276.

cinemas, the *Chung-yang hsi-yüan* (中央戲院) and the *Kao-sha hsi-yüan* (高沙戲院), and after the showing they beat up every Mainlander who came out onto the street. Shih Hung-hsi (史宏熹), the commander of the Keelung Fortress - one of two fortresses (*yao-sai*, 要塞) in Taiwan; the other was in Kaohsiung - responded to this on 1 March by imposing a state of emergency, which was in place until 3 March, 6 pm. During this time public life came to a complete standstill, including transport connections with the outside, and most people locked themselves in their homes. Nevertheless, clashes continuously occurred between patrols and demonstrators, or 'thugs', in the rhetoric of the official sources. The most serious incident occurred on 3 March when dockworkers at the post tried to storm one of the army's weapons stores at quay 14 but were beaten back by army units. Many people were killed in the process.⁶ The Consultative Assembly met on 1 March under its deputy chairman Yang Yüan-ting (楊元丁) and, as in Taipei, formulated demands for political reforms, autonomy and the lifting of the state of emergency.⁷

On 4 March a Resolution Committee was formed under the chair of Yang Yüan-ting (楊元丁), though the chair of the Consultative Assembly, Huang Shu-shui (黃樹水) remained in the background. The Committee included members of 16 organisations and all the city's Consultative Assemblymen. As in Taipei, subcommittees were formed, the most important of which was the Food Supply Subcommittee, as the disrupted transport connections meant that the food supply was no longer secure. Plans to share out five thousand sacks of flour from the Trading Bureau's stores, or to buy food stuffs in I-lan (宜蘭) and other cities, remained either unsuccessful or inadequate. Even after the uprising had been suppressed, the military authorities had to deal with this problem which was not resolved until 15 March.⁸

After the state of emergency was lifted on 3 March the situation calmed down somewhat, and certain transport connections were re-established. According to

⁶ Lin Mu-shun, p. 45; Chin Yü, p. 21, paras. 1-4; Lai, Myers et al., pp. 121-122. For information on the attack in the port area, see Lin Mu-shun, p. 46, and Lai, Myers et al., p. 122.

⁷ Lin Mu-shun, p. 46.

⁸ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 5 March, top left; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, bottom centre; 15 March, p. 1, bottom centre and 17 March, p. 2, centre right; Yang Liang-kung, Part I (*Chi-lung-shih*, 基隆市), line 11.

Lai, Myers et al., on 3 March fear and terror spread throughout the city as three Chinese destroyers had docked in Keelung harbour. They had been on their way to Japan as part of the symbolic occupation of Japan by Chinese armed forces, but had been redirected to Keelung before reaching their destination. There are no reports, however, of an attack or bombardment of the city.⁹ As rumours of the imminent landing of KMT troops were circulating, and information on the uprising elsewhere was available from alternative sources, such as the Japanese-language leaflet *Soku-hō* (速報), young people in Keelung also prepared themselves to prevent the landing of the troops. To this end they met on the afternoon of 7 March. Fresh clashes occurred the same evening between insurgents and army patrols. As a result representatives of the Resolution Committee approached Shih Hung-hsi (史宏熹) the next day at 2 pm. They agreed with him that the Citizens' Security Corps (*shih-min chih-an-tui*, 市民治安隊) work to prevent clashes, and appealed to the public to 'maintain calm' and to be satisfied with the reforms promised by Ch'en I. This only highlighted the powerlessness of the Resolution Committee. Only the army and the armed insurgents played a role in further developments.¹⁰

At the same time when the Resolution Committee was still in negotiations with Shih Hung-hsi (史宏熹), groups of armed young people attacked the fortress without success, leading the state of emergency to be re-implemented in Keelung. The same afternoon two thousand military police disembarked to secure the port area and thus triggered street fighting all over the city, before further eight thousand soldiers went ashore at 10 pm.¹¹ Several hundred people, mainly young people, were arrested as the resistance was quashed. According to Lin Mu-shun, the mayor of Keelung, Shih Yen-han (石延漢), proved to be particularly active in the process. Many of them were killed in a barbaric manner. They were thrown into the harbour tied together in groups of three to five using wire pierced through

⁹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 46; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, bottom centre. Lai, Myers et al., p. 122, reference *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 9 March. However, there (p. 1, bottom left: see below) only information on the meetings of young people in Keelung can be found. Neither do other sources report on the destroyers' arrival.

¹⁰ Lin Mu-shun, p. 46; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 9 March, p. 1, bottom left; Lai, Myers et al., p. 122.

¹¹ See *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 11 March, p. 1, bottom, and Lin Mu-shun, p. 46. For details on the landing of the troops, see also above, section 3.3.3 (p. 86).

their ankles, or individually tied in hemp sacks. According to Kerr at least three hundred were killed in this way. Others had their ears, noses and genitals removed before being stabbed by soldiers. Yang Yüan-ting (楊元丁) was also one of the victims. Because the bodies were not dragged out to sea, they were repeatedly washed aground in the harbour over the following weeks, a sight confirmed by American diplomatic sources.¹² Yang Liang-kung concedes that 90 people were arrested after house-to-house raids. He gives the figure of 153 dead and injured officials,¹³ and 103 members of the public and insurgents. The financial cost is said to have reached 6,684,730 Taiwan Dollars. By contrast the Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai speak of over 2000 Taiwanese dead as was in the case of Taipei.¹⁴

As in Taipei, from 14 March the state of emergency was in place during the night, as the situation had on the surface quietened down, and the shops, factories, schools and authorities were operational again. Under this superficial calm, the cleansing was carried out, to which end the Fortress Headquarters and the Consultative Assemblies called a meeting with city district leaders to instruct them to comb their areas for suspects and encourage the public to disclose them. Otherwise they would be held responsible for any unrevealed 'thugs'. A further such 'cleansing gathering' (*su-ch'ing hui-i*, 肅清會義) was held on 22 March, led by Shih Hung-hsi (史宏熹). In general the same regulations applied as in Taipei. The cleansing would continue at least until the end of the month.¹⁵

¹² Lin Mu-shun, pp. 46-47: according to him more than three hundred bodies were washed up during the following days; Kerr (1965), p. 302; *FRUS*, p. 442, No. 713 and p. 454, No. 659): '...continuing presence of fresh bodies in Keelung Harbor.'

¹³ This includes government employees. Generally speaking, this can be taken to mean Mainlanders.

¹⁴ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 45-47; Chin Yü, p. 22, para. 4; Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Chi-lung-shih*, (基隆市), from line 16. Yang Liang-kung relies mainly on reports published by the relevant city or county administrations after the uprising. *Report into the Situation in Taiwan*, p. 276.

¹⁵ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 15 March, p. 1, bottom centre and p. 2, centre; 30 March, p. 4, top centre; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 25 March, p. 2, centre left.

4.4. The Hsinchu region

4.4.1. Hsinchu

News of events in Taipei first reached Hsinchu (新竹) on 1 March. Protests triggered by this news led to widespread disruption to public life. The following morning young people from Taipei arrived and addressed the people in public squares, as they had done in Taoyüan (桃園), calling them to participate in the uprising. It would seem their words fell on interested ears. As a result groups formed spontaneously at around 8 am, and attacked the sugar factory in Hsinchu, as well as the police station, to arm themselves. They attacked the sugar factory because, generally speaking, factories which came under state administration had their own armed guards. Weapons were also taken from the military police. As elsewhere, when Mainlanders went out in public they were beaten up, and their businesses and homes were destroyed, particularly those of officials, who lived in the former Japanese areas of the city, and others who had worked with the authorities. The Kuomintang Party offices were also ransacked. Here, as in Taoyüan, stockpiles of luxury goods and suitcases full of cash were discovered and thrown into the streets and burned. When a crowd of people approached the seat of the city government at around 3 pm, they were shot at with rifles and machine guns. 8 people were killed, and 18 injured. The mayor, Kuo Shao-tsung (郭紹宗), and other officials had already fled to the police station, the military police headquarters and barracks in the city's suburbs.¹⁶ The city's Consultative Assembly and representatives of other organisations called a public gathering in which a Resolution Committee for Hsinchu was formed and demands to the mayor formulated.

1. He was to provide details of the existing rice supplies, and resolve the rice shortage problem.

¹⁶ Lin Mu-shun, p. 57-58; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, centre, from line 7; Tseng, Ch'ung-lang (曾重朗), 'Tseng Ch'ung-lang ti hui-i' (曾重朗的回憶) [Memoirs of Tseng Ch'ung-lang], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 111-116 (pp. 112-114); Chin Yü, p. 24, paras. 2-3.

2. The Central Chamber of Commerce (*tsung-shang-hui*, 總商會) was to be dissolved, as it merely exploited the public [more detailed information is not provided].
3. The military units based in the city should retreat to the suburbs.
4. Those responsible for the shooting in front of the city government building should be severely punished.

Kuo stated that he was willing to negotiate, though a retreat of the military units was beyond his powers, and he could only put pressure on the relevant authorities. This was an empty promise, and the Resolution Committee had to repeat the demand on 4 March. It was pointless to demand of Kuo that those responsible for the shooting be punished, as it was he himself who was responsible, politically at least.¹⁷

The people of Hsinchu held the key to carrying reform efforts in Taipei forward. When the troops which Ch'en I had ordered to Taipei from Feng-shan (鳳山, near Kaohsiung, 高雄) arrived in Hsinchu by train on the evening of 2 March, the train driver made off, on top of that the local people had blocked the train tracks and roads towards Taipei and thereby prevented them from reaching Taipei. It is interesting that this attempt to move troops, and the peoples' successful blockade of them are not mentioned in the source material or secondary literature, which represents the official interpretation of the uprising. This is most probable because it is the most conclusive evidence that Ch'en I's promise not to call for backup troops was just empty words. According to Lin Mu-shun, these troops surged into the city of Hsinchu and suppressed all protests and resistance activities. Cruel practices, such as were seen later in Keelung, occurred. Several young people who were travelling from Taipei to Hsinchu were seized by soldiers. After cutting off the ears and noses of some of them, they strung them up, stabbed them with bayonets, or beat them to death.¹⁸

On 4 March the Garrison Command in Taipei despatched Major General Su

¹⁷ Lin Mu-shun, p. 58; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, centre, from line 12.

¹⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 58; Kerr (1965), p. 266. For examples of sources not mentioning the troop transports, see Chin Yü, pp. 22-25, *Hsin-chu*; *THCH*, p. 7, final para. to p. 8, line 1, regarding Hsinchu on 2 March and Lai, Myers et al., pp. 123-124. Lai, Myers et al. barely mention developments in Hsinchu at all and most importantly fail to mention the call-up of troops, despite the relevant sources being at their disposal (e.g. Lin Mu-shun and Kerr). This clearly shows political prejudice disguised under the mantle of science, and the nature of a politically commissioned work.

Shao-wen (蘇紹文) to Hsinchu to take over the command of the troops there and to implement the state of emergency, under which the random killings of civilians again occurred. According to Lin Mu-shun, Su Shao-wen had all the shop owners arrested and only set them free once they had paid 200,000 Taiwan Dollars in bail. Other sources do not confirm this, however, and his role in Hsinchu remains unclear.

Despite the presence of Su Shao-wen, the young people and the rest of the public continued for a time with their peaceful activities. On the day of Su Shao-wen's arrival, the Hsinchu Resolution Committee was formed as a branch committee of the Provincial Committee in Taipei, chaired by the chairman of the Consultative Assembly, Chang Shih-ku (張式穀). The Committee was able, for example, to put forward the demand for the formation of a body to maintain order to be established in the following days by young people and ready to be operational by 7 March.¹⁹ The Resolution Committee met again on 5 March and drew up ten demands which five representatives immediately took to Taipei where the Provincial Resolution Committee was discussing the final reform programme. They largely corresponded with the demands drawn up by the Provincial Resolution Committee,²⁰ though Hsinchu in addition demanded:

1. The establishment of an Economic Commission to take over the currency and financial policy, price control and food supply.
2. Relief for youth unemployment.
3. Reform of the loan system for teachers.

The food supply situation was also critical in Hsinchu, and as a result people were sent on 6 March to southern Taiwan to buy rice and sweet potatoes.

Tseng Ch'ung-lang (曾重朗), one of the representatives who took the demands from Hsinchu to Taipei, reports that they returned, disillusioned, to Hsinchu on 6 March. They were disillusioned on the one hand as they had not met any other representatives from outside Taipei, and on the other due to the chaos of the meeting (*hui-ch'ang chih-hsü hun-luan*, 會場秩序混亂). In fact, at least

¹⁹ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 58-59; Chin Yü, p. 25, line 2; the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, centre, para. 3 and 7 March, p. 2, top left, reports 4 and 5.

²⁰ See above, section 3.2.5, p. 68. See *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 2, top left, for information on Hsinchu's demands.

representatives from Changhua (彰化) had also been there. As late as 7 March a subdivision of the 'Autonomous Taiwanese Youth Alliance', established just two days earlier in Taipei, was set up in Hsinchu.²¹ KMT troops moved into Hsinchu, most probably on 10 March, putting an end to all the peoples' activities. The intended mayoral re-election on 12 March, as Ch'en I had specified, was in the end farcical. Originally the intention had been to put a Taiwanese person in this position. With the arrival of the troops, the Consultative Assembly dared put only three candidates forward from the existing city administration, from which Ch'en I selected the General Secretary, Ch'en Chen-pin (陳貞彬).

Yang Liang-kung put the number of dead and injured in Hsinchu at 14 officials and 30 citizens, with damages amounting to 10 million Taiwan Dollars. The report from the Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai speak of between 100 and 200 Taiwanese dead in Hsinchu.²²

4.4.2. *Taoyüan and Hsinchu County*

In Taoyüan (桃園), the seat of the Hsinchu County administration, young people from Taipei played a role in mobilising the people by reporting events in Taipei. On 28 February over forty people came to Taoyüan, some students, some members of the Association for Political Reconstruction. As early as around 8 pm on the 28 February, an angry crowd of people demonstrated in front of the Great Temple (*ta-miao*, 大廟), and around eight hundred young people who had returned from serving in the Japanese army demonstrated in front of the cinema and demanded that all corrupt officials (*t'an-kuan wu-li*, 貪官污吏) be removed from their positions. At the same time the attacks on Mainlanders and officials began, and the next day the whole city was engulfed. Young people disarmed the station guards and searched through incoming trains for Mainlanders and officials,

²¹ Tseng Ch'ung-lang (曾重朗), p. 115. *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 2, top left. See above, Section 3.2.4.2, p. 65. For details on the representatives from Changhua; see below, p. 132. At around the same period representatives from Taipei County and Taichung were also in Taipei, though maybe not on the same day; see above, p. 106 and below, p. 132.

²² *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 2, top left, report 2, and 17 March, p. 2, centre; Tseng Ch'ung-lang, p. 115; *THCH*, p. 8, line 1; Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Hsin-chu-shih*, final 9 lines. *Report into the Incident on Taiwan*, p. 276.

whom they beat up. Full-scale street fights broke out, during which the insurgents occupied the county administration. It was there that the County Consultative Assembly discussed with the township mayors and others how the situation could be brought under the authorities' control. For this reason a Resolution Committee was not formed in Hsinchu County, as it was elsewhere. Those present at the meeting retreated to the police station, which was later laid under siege. When the demonstrators, who were better armed after taking control of an air force depot, sent representatives into the police station to force the besieged to surrender, those inside opened fire killing several people. Not until 3 am on 1 March, after the insurgents had fled during the night, were those inside the police station taken back to Taipei in lorries which had been sent to get them.

At the same time the homes of officials were searched and ransacked. Anyone whom the demonstrators found were 'concentrated' in two areas of the city, along with their relatives. They found bank notes to the value of 3 million Taiwan Dollars hidden in suitcases in the home of the county magistrate, Chu Wen-po (朱文伯), who had only been in the post two months, though he was not present at the time. 6 million Taiwan Dollars were found in the home of the head of the county administration's Internal Affairs Division, a man named Hung (洪). He had been in his post one year. These corruption cases unleashed an intense rage amongst the crowd, and the division leader Hung was almost lynched. Three days later the arrested officials were forced to 'admit their crimes' (*jen-tsui*, 認罪) in front of the Great Temple, and were lead through the streets.²³ The unrest quickly spread from Taoyüan to other areas of the county, including Chung-li (中壢), Kuan-hsi (關西), Chu-tung (竹東), Chu-nan (竹南), Ta-hsi (大溪) and Miao-li (苗栗). The ports were also guarded, and presumably in coastal areas some of Ch'en I's radio messages between Fukien and Taipei were picked up, such as that troops were being massed in Fukien to land on Taiwan imminently. The sources do not

²³ *THCH*, p. 5, para. 1; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 53-55; Chin Yü, p. 23, paras. 2 and 3, the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 5 March, p. 1, col. 2, from line 8; also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), p. 220, lines 2-4. For information on the occupation of the police station, see also Chu, Wen-po (朱文伯), 'Chu Wen-po ti hui-i' (朱文伯的回憶) [Memoirs of Chu Wen-po], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 99-110 (p. 107).

mention when the KMT troops moved in and quashed the uprising. However, when Su Shao-wen (蘇紹文), was sent to Hsinchu to implement the state of emergency, he also took over command of Taoyüan and Hsinchu County. Chou Ch'ing-chih (周清之), one of Ch'en I's advisors and a *pan-shan* (半山), was made the new magistrate.²⁴

Yang Liang-kung makes no reference to victims and damages in Hsinchu County. The report by the Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai claim one to two hundred Taiwanese people were killed in Taoyüan and Miao-li.²⁵

4.5. The Taichung Region

4.5.1. Taichung and eastern parts of Taichung County

The Taichung region encompasses the municipal cities of Taichung (台中) and Changhua (彰化) as well as Taichung County and can be seen, to a certain extent, as one unit as it had a shared Resolution Committee, even though the city of Changhua and some other parts of Taichung County had their own Resolution Committees.

The unrest began here along the same lines as in other areas. News of events in Taipei spread through the whole of Taichung as early as 28 February. Radio reports were broadcast at about midday from the radio station in Taipei, which at the time was occupied by the public. They called on all to support the people of Taipei. People who had travelled directly from Taipei also brought information.

What set Taichung apart was that the Consultative Assemblymen of Taichung City, Changhua City and Taichung County met with representatives of other organisations in an emergency meeting to discuss the situation as early as 1 March, as most of the schools and shops had already closed. Demands were formulated

²⁴ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 57-58; Chin Yü, p. 23, final para. and p. 25, line 2; the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 2, top left, report No. 5 and *FRUS*, p. 456, Kerr's memorandum. For information on troop reinforcements, see below, Section 5, p. 169 and Kerr (1965), p. 281. Though Chin Yü claims that as early as 2 March troops had already advanced as far as Taoyüan, from the north and the south, in order to put an end to the uprising, this must be false, for two reasons: on 4 March officials were still led through the streets and the troops called in from Feng-shan (鳳山) had been stopped in Hsinchu on 2 March.

²⁵ Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Hsin-chu-hsien*, 新竹縣; *Report into the Situation on Taiwan*, p. 276.

here which were almost exactly repeated several days later by the Taipei Resolution Committee, namely

1. The transformation of the Governor's Office and the immediate re-election by general vote of the provincial governor, county magistrates and mayors of municipalities.
2. The dissolution of the Governor's Office.
3. The abolition of all institutions which 'disregarded public opinion'.
4. The employment of Taiwanese people at all levels of the administration.

These demands were written under the heading

'Immediate preparations for the implementation of constitutional government'.

This demonstrates the unease the Taiwanese felt over the continued discrimination exemplified by the implementation of the new constitution, which was planned for the whole of China, being postponed in Taiwan for one year. These demands were communicated to the Governor's Office telegraphically, though remained unanswered. It is also noteworthy that at this early stage, after the conclusion of this meeting, the member of the Consultative Assembly of Taichung City and the city's representative in the Provincial Consultative Assembly, Lin Lien-tsung (林連宗), was sent to Taipei to establish contact directly. During the course of the day the famous writer Yang K'uei (楊逵) and Chung I-jen (鍾逸仁), an activist in the uprising, handed out small, inconspicuous cards throughout the city and its suburbs announcing a people's meeting (*shih-min ta-hui*, 市民大會) the following day in Taichung's cinema. They were taking advantage of the meeting of the Democratic Reconstruction Association which had originally been planned.²⁶

²⁶ Lin Mu-shun, *Chung-pu*, 中部, pp. 61-63; Chin Yü, p. 25, *Taichung*, 台中, para. 2; (Memoirs of) Li Pi-ch'iang (李碧鏘), p. 241 and (Memoirs of the famous writer) Yang K'uei (Yang K'uei (楊逵), 'Yang K'uei ti hui-i' (楊逵的回憶) [Memoirs of Yang K'uei], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 129-134.), p. 129-130; the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, top centre. Other organisations involved in the meeting were the Taichung County Farmers' Association, The 'Taichung County Committee for Guaranteeing the People's

On Sunday, 2 March, the cinema was closed, and a poster announced the meeting had been ‘postponed’. The cinema employees did not want to admit the crowd of protestors streaming to the peoples’ meeting, but relented when the crowd threatened to storm the building. The attempts to prevent the meeting taking place came from the mayor, Huang K’o-li (黃克立) and several dignitaries. The journalist Yang K’o-huang (楊克煌), of the newspapers the *Ho-p’ing Jih-pao* (和平日報) and the *Tzu-yu Jih-pao* (自由日報), opened the meeting at around 9 am. First of all he reported on events in Taipei, and received general consent when he proposed they follow Taipei’s model and join the uprising. Hsieh Hsüeh-hung (謝雪紅), the prominent and controversial female functionary from the small Taiwanese Communist Party, was voted in by acclamation to chair. Her high standing in Taichung primarily stemmed from her role as a board member of the Taiwanese Women’s Association, and from the fact that she had spent several years in prison as a Communist during the Japanese era. During this meeting, at which twenty young people from Taipei and others who had returned from serving under the Japanese abroad were present, Hsieh Hsüeh-hung proposed far more radical demands than were to be heard in Taipei at this stage. She called for the ‘fight to the end’ (*tou-cheng tao-ti*, 鬥爭到底), for an end to the one-party dictatorship under the KMT and for a democratic and self-governing Taiwan (*min-chu tzu-chih*, 民主自治).²⁷

Freedom’ (*Tai-chung-hsien jen-min tzu-yu pao-chang wei-yüan-hui*, 台中縣人民自由保障委員會), the Taichung City and County Women’s Associations, the Taichung City Chamber of Commerce and the Taichung Solicitors’ Guild. It is not possible to determine the total number of people were involved, as Lin Mu-shun refers only to citizens (*shih-min*, 市民). Kerr (1965), p. 283, reports that the Taipei City Consultative Committee was informed of the demands formulated in Taichung days before the passing of the final reform programme on 7 March.

Presumably they were communicated to Taipei by Lin Lien-tsung (林連宗).

²⁷ Chin Yü, p. 25, *Taichung* (台中), para. 2, p. 26 and p. 27, final line; *THCH*, p. 6, final para.; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 62-63; Lai, Myers et al., pp. 125-127; Yang K’uei (楊遠), p. 130. The emergence of Hsieh Hsüeh-hung and several of her comrades from the TCP in Taichung led to accusations from the government that the uprising was partly, or indeed fully, caused by a ‘Communist conspiracy’. See the suggestions to this effect in Chiang Kai-shek’s speech on 10 March, or more explicitly, Premier Yü Kuo-hua (俞國華) as late as 20 March 1985: ‘2.28 was a CCP plot’ (*erh-erh-pa’ wei chung-kung yin-mou shih-chien*, 二二八為中共陰謀事件). Chin Yü’s chapter heading (p. 25) shows the extent to which their wrath was centred on Hsieh Hsüeh-hung, the fact that she was a woman challenging the state in this way seemed to aggravate the issue even more: ‘The main culprit in the uprising was a woman’ (*huo-shou shih i-ko nü-jen*, 禍首是一個女人). The KMT Central Committee’s 6th Group actually dedicated a special publication to her,

After the peoples' meeting had finished, at around 11 am, thousands of people demonstrated in the city and, like elsewhere, officials and Mainlanders were beaten up. The first clashes occurred at the *Chin-ting* (錦町) police station; the police officers there fled and the demonstrators occupied it. The growing crowd, led by Hsieh Hsüeh-hung, moved on to the city police station and demanded Chief of Police Hung Tzu-min (洪字民) to disarm the police and lock up their weapons. After the armed police officers on the roof had been dragged down by the crowd or forced to surrender, Hung delivered the demand. Similar sieges occurred at the city government buildings, the military police, the Party Office, the office of the KMT Youth Organisation, the fire brigade, the air force's Aeroplane Factory No. 3, and several other mainly military facilities, some of which were taken. This was made all the easier as the buildings were generally not in use on a Sunday. Conscripts under the Japanese, who had returned from Hainan Island, formed armed groups and established the 'Headquarters for Maintaining Public Order' (*chih-an pen-pu*, 治安本部) in the Teachers' Training College. At midday the city's dignitaries met to discuss ways to wrest power away from Hsieh Hsüeh-hung over the armed groups and young people. The force behind this was Lin Hsien-t'ang (林獻堂), veteran of the autonomy movement during the Japanese era, who was a member of the Political Council and Provincial Consultative Assembly, representing the Taichung County Consultative Assembly. The sports teacher at the Teachers' Training College, Wu Chen-wu (吳振武), who as a former Lieutenant in the Japanese marines enjoyed a good reputation amongst young people, was chosen to take over guidance of the young people in the college, in order that they thereby come under the dignitaries' control. Around two hundred Mainlanders were protected there by these groups during the uprising, as reported by Hung Yen-ch'iu, who was close to the authorities. Meanwhile, the insurgents had occupied Taichung's radio station.²⁸ The next target was the Regional

with the title 'The Tragedy of Hsieh Hsüeh-hung' (*Hsieh Hsüeh-hung ti pei-chü*, 謝雪紅的悲劇 (Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang wei-yüan-hui ti-liu-tsu (中國國民黨中央委員會第六組) [6th Group of the Central Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang], ed., *Hsieh Hsüeh-hung ti pei-chü* (謝雪紅的悲劇) [The Tragedy of Hsieh Hsüeh-hung] (Taipei: [n. pub.], 1958), 50 pp.).

²⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 63, from '十一時許'; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, top left; Yang K'uei (楊達) p. 130; Li Pi-ch'iang (李碧鏘), pp. 241-242; (The Memoirs of the Head of the Taichung Teachers' Training College) Hung Yen-ch'iu (洪炎秋), pp. 77-78.

Monopoly Bureau, as the monopoly system was as hated here as it was in other areas. They demanded the abolition of the monopoly system, that all the Bureau's weapons be locked away, and that 'the People' should safeguard all the goods stored there. The head of the Bureau, Chao Ch'eng (趙誠), had already fled to Liu Ts'un-chung's (劉存忠) house for protection, so his representative received the demands. Even so, the crowd is said to have burned goods belonging to the Bureau. Another crowd of people occupied Liu Ts'un-chung's house, who until recently had been the Taichung County magistrate, and was particularly hated for being corrupt. At this time he was a high-ranking staff officer in the Garrison Command. As well as Chao Ch'eng, he was also sheltering his deputy, a man named Yang (楊), and an official called Liu Ch'ing-shan (劉青山). He responded to the siege by opening fire, killing one and injuring several. The sources are contradictory regarding whether or not the insurgents were at this point armed or not. Nevertheless they forced him to surrender by threatening to spray his house with petrol through fire engine hoses and set fire to it. Together with other officials he was taken to the police station and put under guard, though they were beaten in front of the crowd first. The crowd of people dispersed at around 5 pm.²⁹

Upon receiving news of the formation of the Resolution Committee in Taipei, a 'Taichung Regional Commission for the Management of the Current Situation' (*Taichung ti-ch'ü shih-chü ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui*, 台中地區時局處理委員會) was created, and the young people were organised into Public Order Maintenance Corps (*chih-an-tui*, 治安隊) under the leadership of Hsieh Hsüeh-hung (謝雪紅). As elsewhere in Taiwan, these corps' role was ambivalent. Nominally their function was to replace the collapsed police system, though they also formed the backbone of the groups who attacked military facilities and later fought against

²⁹ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 64-65. According to him the crowd was not yet armed; *Hsin-sheng-pao* (6 March), p. 2, top left, from line 12, and Chin Yü, p. 28, para. 2, lines 1-5, Chin Yü claims that Hsieh Hsüeh-hung had had the weapons collected from the police station at this early stage. Lai, Myers et al., p. 125 state: 'The ordinary people liked and respected Liu and they would not attack his house.' The reference they cite for this is Ch'üan (權), *T'ai-chung li-hsien-chi* (臺中歷險記) [Dangerous Experience in Taichung], in Taiwan erh-erh-pa shih-chien ch'in-li-chi (台灣二二八事件親歷記) [Personal Experience during the 2.28 Incident in Taiwan], ed. by Taiwan cheng-i ch'u-pan-she (台灣正義出版社) [Taiwan Justice Publishing House] ([n.p.]: 1947), pp. 121-122: however, the original text reveals no such statement, whatsoever.

the KMT troops.³⁰ Rumours that the government forces were nearing, which were later proven false, speeded up the establishment of these corps and particularly their arming themselves from police stations and smaller military support points with weapons, including three machine guns and many hand grenades. In the course of these preparations, the new corps took control of all major thoroughfares and crossroads, as well as the radio station. During the night the insurgents thus gained control over most of the city. Only the attacks on the army's 75th Supply Station's 4th Depot (*ch'i-wu kung-ying-chan ti-szu chih-k'u*, 七五供應站第四支庫) and the air force's No. 3 Aeroplane Factory's depot at around 8 pm were driven off. They were not taken until the following day. Hsieh Hsüeh-hung broadcast a call over the radio to all central Taiwan to participate in the uprising. Several areas formed Self-defence Corps (*tzu-wei-tui*, 自衛隊) and young people from the surrounding areas poured into Taichung to join them. Yang K'uei (楊遠), head of the Resolution Committee's Organisational Subcommittee, had leaflets printed with information about events in the city, to be distributed in the suburbs.³¹

The city's dignitaries attempted to limit all activities directed against the authorities, or participated in them as a pretence to collect information on what was happening and who was involved to supply to the authorities' representatives, who had gone into hiding. This included the chairman of the Taichung Consultative Assembly, Huang Ch'ao-ch'ing (黃朝清) and his deputy, Lin Chin-piao (林金標). Lin Hsien-t'ang (林獻堂) behaved in a similar way and sheltered Yen Chia-kan (嚴家淦), the head of the province's Department for Finance, during the unrest. They sent two representatives as early as 2 March to the Garrison Command in Taipei to protect themselves by explaining to Chief of Staff K'o Yüan-fen that the corps in the Teachers' Training College was created by Lin Hsien-t'ang (林獻堂) at the command of Wu Chen-wu (吳振武) in order to limit the influence of 'communist' Hsieh Hsüeh-hung. According to Hung Yen-ch'iu (洪炎秋) it was for this reason that none of the young people involved in this

³⁰ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 62-64; Chin Yü, p. 28.

³¹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 66., from line 3 – p. 67; Chin Yü, p. 28, para 2, from line 6; Yang K'uei (楊遠), p. 132.

corps were arrested after the suppression of the uprising.³²

On 3 March Hsieh Hsüeh-hung began to lead the conflict centrally through the formation of the 'Taichung Regional Commission for the Maintenance of Public Order Operational Headquarters' (*Taichung ti-ch'ü chih-an wei-yüan-hui tso-chan pen-pu*, 台中地區治安委員會作戰本部), which was nominally under the control of the Resolution Committee. The description in the titles of these organisations (i.e. 'maintaining public order' and 'operational') reflects their ambivalent nature. Street fights broke out in the morning when soldiers from the depot of the No. 3 Aeroplane Factory pushed into the city and wantonly fired their guns about. The young people, who had been posted at important crossroads by Hsieh Hsüeh-hung and armed with hand grenades, were able to force the soldiers back to their depot, where other Mainlanders and their families had also withdrawn to. As news of the fighting spread, factory workers and government employees similarly formed Public Security Corps (*chih-an-tui*, 治安隊) and groups from Changhua (彰化), Ta-chia (大甲), Feng-yüan (豐原), P'u-li (埔里), Tung-shih (東勢), Yüan-lin (員林), T'ien-chung (田中) and T'ai-p'ing (太平), as well as between one and three hundred aborigines (probably from Wu-she, 務社) who hurried to Taichung to support the groups there. According to Lin Mu-shun, at around 4 pm Hsieh Hsüeh-hung ordered an attack on the No. 3 Aeroplane Factory depot, as the soldiers barricaded inside were shooting indiscriminately at passers-by. The armed groups of young people from Changhua, Yüan-lin and Feng-yüan were only able to take the depot after six hours, as they were less-well armed and in a strategically weaker position than the soldiers. According to Chin Yü, they didn't take the depot until the fire brigade started using their fire engines as flame-throwers. They sprayed petrol on the depot then lit it with hand grenades. By the following morning other army and military police barracks were taken in further fighting. Between one and three hundred weapons were taken, and more than thirty officers and over three hundred soldiers and officials were 'concentrated' (ie

³² Hung Yen-ch'iu (洪炎秋), p. 78. These events and the fact he sheltered Yen Chia-kan can be regarded as the main reasons Lin Hsien-t'ang (林獻堂) received so many honours from the authorities later. Yen Chia-kan later became the long-term premier, deputy president and Chiang Kai-shek's brief successor. For information on the problem of 'collaborators', see Lin Mu-shun, p. 65; Chin Yü, p. 27.

put under guard in the captured depot).³³

On 4 March, after negotiations, the No. 3 Aeroplane Factory, where the last groups of government troops had fled to, was surrendered to a garrison of around one hundred and fifty people. In addition to the existing garrison, around five hundred Mainlanders, mainly officials and their families, were inside the factory. According to Lin Mu-shun, negotiations were made easier as a third of the people barricaded inside the factory were young Taiwanese who would have defected to the insurgents in the event that fighting had started. However, this can not be confirmed in other sources. At least some of the supervisors in the factory were in fact Taiwanese, including General Yün, the factory director. They showed some understanding for the insurgents' motives, as the insurgents did not know whether the garrison would break out of the factory in order to gain control over the city. The garrison thus intended to convince the demonstrators that the garrison had no such plans, and wanted to avoid bloodshed. The Taiwanese second lieutenant Li Pi-ch'iang (李碧鏘) went into the city, with the factory director's permission, to persuade Hsieh Hsüeh-hung and Wu Chen-wu (吳振武) to negotiate. Both consented, and so the two sides agreed that Taiwanese youths would take over the factory garrison, in order to reassure the public; they were given the guards' weapons for this purpose. In return the factory's stores would not be touched, and the Taiwanese officers would cater for the soldiers and Mainlanders in the factory. This agreement seems to have been held until the arrival of the KMT troops from the mainland, when the youths handed their weapons back and dispersed.³⁴

The news that all central Taiwan was in the hands of the insurgents was immediately broadcast over the radio. It is possible that this report was slightly

³³ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 67-69; *THCH*, p. 9, lines 4-8; Chin Yü, p. 28, para. 2, line 6-12 and final line; Yang Liang-kung (楊亮功), Part I, *Tai-chung-shih*, 台中市, from line 12, and the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, top left, col.2, lines 8-12 and col. 4, from line 4. Chin Yü and Yang Liang-kung don't mention 'captured soldiers', but rather 'officials, government employees and their families'. They report that the insurgents had captured every Mainlander in the city. A report in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, centre left, also describes soldiers in the street indiscriminately firing rounds of shots. Ya San (雅三), p. 5, also describes an attack on a military camp by insurgents from Changhua with aborigines from P'u-li. (Ya San (雅三), 'Erh-erh-pa shih-pien ti t'ou-shih' (二二八事件的透視 [A Detailed Analysis of the 2-28 Incident], in *T'aiwan Yüeh-k'an* (台灣月刊) [Taiwan Monthly], No. 6 ('T'ai-wan Erh-erh-pa shih-pien chuan-chi' (臺灣二二八事變專輯) [Special Issue on the 2.28 Incident in Taiwan], 10 April 1947, pp. 1-15).

³⁴ Lin Mu-shun, p. 69, and Li Pi-ch'iang, pp. 242-248.

pre-emptive, and was in fact true only for Taichung City. The *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新報) qualified this when it reported that the military police headquarters had not yet been taken.³⁵ At least the Taichung area was now largely under the insurgents' control. The situation was not stable, however, as repeated attacks by government soldiers had to be fought off.

Now that military victory had been achieved in most of central Taiwan, the question of organisation had to be dealt with again. As a result over five hundred representatives of various organisations re-formed a Resolution Committee for the Taichung region on the afternoon of 4 March. The meeting, led by Chuang Ch'ui-sheng (莊垂勝), outlined its main objective as fully establishing 'democracy and autonomy' (*min-chu tzu chih*, 民主自治) on the foundation of military power. The new Resolution Committee developed into a sophisticated organisation, much like Taipei's Resolution Committee. There were some who demanded the formation of a 'provisional government',³⁶ though it seems this never came to fruition. At least as far as central Taiwan was concerned, the Resolution Committee did act as a *de facto* provisional government. All armed groups were subordinated to a 'Commission for Maintaining Public Order' (*pao-an wei-yüan-hui*, 保安委員會), with a body of staff, adjutants and other sub-departments. Wu Chen-wu (吳振武) was put in command.³⁷ Other more moderate forces together with the city's dignitaries responded to the call from Taipei to form branches of the Committee in cities and counties in order to wrest back control from Hsieh Hsüeh-hung over the groups under the Resolution Committee.³⁸ A consequence of this power shift was the end of deliveries of weapons and direct military support to other areas, such as Taipei, Chia-i (嘉義) and Hu-wei (虎尾), to the north of Chia-i. On the same day Hsieh Hsüeh-hung's forces were able to dislodge government soldiers stationed at Wang-t'ien. According to Lin Mu-shun, Chang Hsüeh-liang (張學良), who had been in KMT hands since the Hsi'an Incident (西安事變), was imprisoned in

³⁵ Lin Mu-shun, p. 73; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p.2, top left, col. 3 and col. 4, lines 1-3 and line 16. Reports in the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 10 March, p.1, centre right and *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p.1, centre right, confirm the procedure by which the aeroplane factory was surrendered, however, they report the date as 6 March.

³⁶ Lin Mu-shun, p. 70, final line; *THCH*, p. 9, from line 9.

³⁷ For details of the formation of the new Resolution Committee, see Lin Mu-shun, pp. 69-70.

³⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 70; Chin Yü, p. 29, line 2.

Chu-tung (竹東). Plans by a group of young people to free him were stifled by Kuomintang 'agents'. The Resolution Committee remained from then on passive, not responding to requests for support.³⁹ The new Resolution Committee was established on 5 March. Although the available weapons had been distributed and new groups created, due to differences of opinion in the Committee regarding how to proceed, no action was taken. Instead, they met again at around 4 pm and repeated demands made previously, and adopted the additional demands made in Taipei. It should be mentioned that they explicitly demanded 'complete autonomy for the province' (*wan-ch'üan sheng tzu-chih*, 完全省自治), an independent justice system (*szu-fa tu-li*, 司法獨立) and that the rice stores be opened. It would seem that the rice supply to Taichung, where people had been sent from the north to try and buy rice, had not yet been secured. Lin Mu-shun sees the infiltration by agents of the authorities as being responsible for the Committee's inaction. As a consequence many young people remained in the Operational Headquarters under Hsieh Hsüeh-hung's command. The Resolution Committee responded hesitantly to requests for help from Hu-wei (虎尾), Chia-i (嘉義), Kaohsiung (高雄) and Taipei. The Operational Headquarters, in contrast, handed out its last supplies, and sent a Special Voluntary Corps (*t'e-pieh chih-yüan-tui*, 特別志願隊) to fight for Hu-wei airport. It provided further material support to other areas, within the limits of its now-limited opportunities. Hsieh Hsüeh-hung formed the '27th Army' (*erh-ch'i pu-tui*, 二七部隊), consisting of young people from a unit called the 8th Army. The name was styled from the incident on 27 February, and this new unit was intended for deployment against the KMT troops expected from the mainland. Chung I-jen (鍾逸仁) was made leader of this army, Ts'ai T'ieh-ch'eng (蔡鐵成) was staff officer, and Yang K'o-huang (楊克煌) also played a leading role. According to Lin Mu-shun, Hsieh Hsüeh-hung was able to prevent agents from the Whampoa Faction from carrying out a planned massacre of civilians by sending the P'u-li (埔里) Corps to the agents' meeting place, arresting the forty or so people there and placing them in the Taichung Prison. On the same day students from all of the colleges in Taichung met with their teachers to form a

³⁹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 70.

Taichung Student Corps for Maintaining Public Order (*Taichung hsüeh-sheng wei-ch'ih chih-an fu-wu-tui*, 台中學生維持治安服務隊). Presumably their duties were actually limited to pure police work, as they are not mentioned in the sources again.⁴⁰ Lin Mu-shun described the Resolution Committee on 7 March as a large but cumbersome organisation whose activities were limited to putting up posters and carrying out police duties. The situation in the city had for the most part settled down. Schools and businesses gradually resumed their activities. In the meantime, the Resolution Committee had to maintain the supply of food to over five thousand people.⁴¹

On the same day the Taichung Consultative Assembly formed a 'Provisional Committee for the Control of the Taichung City Administration' (*Taichung shih-cheng lin-shih chien-li wei-yüan-hui*, 台中市政臨時監理委員會) which temporarily replaced the inoperative city administration. Competent people were called for to register to take on roles in the city administration. The newly-formed Committee was at the same time to uncover corrupt officials in the previous administration, so that the public could press charges against them. It is not possible to determine exactly what objectives lay behind this committee being formed. Instead of creating a new, democratic city administration, it is likely that the Consultative Assembly (ie the 'dignitaries', who did not support the military aims of the insurgents) merely wanted calm to return to the city until the uprising was over. The use of the word 'provisional' (*lin-shih*, 臨時) in the organisation's title offers evidence for this view, and the fact that, according to Lin Mu-shun, the chairman of the Consultative Assembly, Huang Ch'ao-ch'ing (黃朝清), as well as Lin Hsien-t'ang (林獻堂) collected money from the public for 'welcome arches' to be erected before the arrival of KMT troops in Taichung.⁴²

Taichung seemed to have been stuck in a kind of hiatus since 7 March. Central Taiwan was indeed in the hands of the insurgents, but they lacked vision for the

⁴⁰ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, centre, Report No. 3 and the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 10 March, centre right, Report No. 4.; Chou Ming, pp. 178 ff.

⁴¹ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 70-71; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, bottom centre; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 10 March, p. 1, centre right, Report No. 5; Chin Yü, p. 29, lines 2-4.

⁴² *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, centre; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 10 March, centre right and Lin Mu-shun, pp. 75-76.

future. News of the imminent landing of KMT troops must have compounded this. The groups which were subordinate to the Resolution Committee, despite being well-organised and armed, were not sent to support other areas, such as Hu-wei (虎尾), Kaohsiung (高雄) or Taipei (台北). Lin Mu-shun again places the responsibility for this on 'agents' and several dignitaries who prevented this happening, on the orders of the authorities acting underground. Those involved in running the Resolution Committee waited for instructions from the Taipei Resolution Committee before they did anything at all, and they were always prepared for compromise. The situation was the same in many other areas in Taichung, where many young people were ready to fight, but were unable to act, and therefore stood by doing nothing, watching as the KMT troops arrived. According to Lin Mu-shun this had a decisive influence on the course of the uprising throughout Taiwan. The Resolution Committee showed signs of disintegration as early as 8 March, when the first reports of the landing of KMT troops in Keelung (基隆) and Kaohsiung (高雄) arrived. This intensified during the following two days with the news of the killing of innocent people in Taipei and Kaohsiung, as well as the mass arrests being made. Very few appeared at the Resolution Committee building on 11 March, and those who did, did so only in order to burn documents. Lin Mu-shun reports a final meeting between several dignitaries and Hsieh Hsüeh-hung (謝雪紅), in which they officially dissolved the Resolution Committee and wanted to reinstate the former mayor. Hsieh Hsüeh-hung was strongly opposed to this and went her own way with the 27th Army, so that the Resolution Committee disintegrated as ever more of those involved fled to the countryside.⁴³

The 27th Army was ready for action from 8 March and took up their positions. They are said to have had anti-aircraft guns and grenade launchers at their disposal, though they lacked the numbers to attack across the province. However, they prepared to put up as much resistance to the expected KMT troops as

⁴³ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 72-74. Lin Mu-shun lists the following persons as 'dignitaries': Chuang Ch'ui-sheng (莊垂勝), Huang Ch'ao-ch'ing (黃朝清), Chang Huan-kui (張煥奎), Yeh Jung-chung (葉榮鐘), Huang Tung (黃棟), Wu Yung-ch'ang (巫永昌) and Lin Jun (林潤). For information on the Resolution Committee's dissolution, see also the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 16 March, p. 2, centre, Report No. 3.

possible and they received back-up from a unit from Chia-i (嘉義), led by a man named Huang Wen-hui (黃文輝), who had unsuccessfully attempted to take the airport there. When rumour reached them on 12 March that the KMT troops would arrive in Taichung that day, the 27th Army guarded the barracks where Mainlanders, officials and others associated with the authorities were imprisoned, in order that they were not able to disrupt the preparations for the fighting. As there was no hope of holding Taichung City, the 27th Army moved weapons, ammunition and supplies throughout the night from an army depot in Ts'ao-t'un (草屯) to P'u-li (埔里), a small town in the mountains around 40 km east of Taichung, and 10 km north of the Sun Moon Lake (*Jih-yüeh-t'an*, 日月潭), where they barricaded themselves in.⁴⁴

Lin Mu-shun sees the presence of the 27th Army in P'u-li, which was reinforced through the arrival of young people from surrounding villages and aborigines, as the reason why the 21st Division's 146th Brigade and 436rd Regiment, which reached Taichung on 13 March, did not carry out a massacre as in other places, but instead concentrated on their enemy entrenched in the mountains.⁴⁵ Many were arrested, not just insurgents, but also several dignitaries who had worked in the Resolution Committee and who Lin Mu-shun had criticised for their hesitation. As in Taipei, in a speech broadcast over the radio Regiment Commander Luo Chou-neng (駱周能) laid down ultimatums for all weapons to be handed in and to report 'thugs' (*pao-t'u*, 暴徒, i.e. insurgents) in return for a reward. Young people who had been 'led astray' were to return to classes, and would be let off without punishment if they 'repented'. The same applied to 'Communist thugs', if they handed in their weapons. The systematic search for insurgents began on 16 March according to the familiar model, and representatives of city districts and neighbourhood committees were made responsible by the authorities. All papers critical of the government were forced to

⁴⁴ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 73-75; Chou Ming (周明), p. 178. According to p. 72, para. 2, youths from Taipei wanted to provide the insurgents in Taichung with three seized planes. The airport was prepared for their arrival, though it seems they were never sent.


⁴⁵ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 75-76, mentions over one thousand armed fighters, a figure which must be exaggerated. The *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 16 March, p. 1, centre, reports over 120 fighters. Chou Ming, p. 178, who himself fought with the 27th Army to the end, describes only around two hundred involved.

close down, for example the *Ho-p'ing Jih-pao* (和平日報) on 24 March, as it had reported demands made in the Legislative Yüan in Nanking for Ch'en I's dismissal. Only the *Min-sheng-pao* (民生報), which according to Lin Mu-shun was controlled by the Whampoa Faction, continued to be published.⁴⁶

The following day the 21st Division's 146th Brigade and 436th Regiment attempted to attack P'u-li (埔里) with around eight hundred soldiers. They gained positions in Kuei-tzu-t'ou (龜子頭), but were pushed back to Ts'ao-t'un (草屯) by units of the 27th Army, which in the meantime had adopted the name 'United Democratic Taiwanese Army' (Taiwan min-chu lien-chün, 台灣民主聯軍), after Ch'en Ts'uan-ti's (陳篡地) army in Hu-wei (虎尾). They used guns, machine guns and ammunition they had looted from Neng-kao (能高). Another government battalion reached Erh-shui (二水), about 20 km west of the Sun Moon Lake. They reached Shui-li-k'eng (水里坑) via Chi-chi (集集) and as two separate companies they occupied the hydroelectric power stations at the Sun Moon Lake and at Men-p'ai-t'an (門牌潭; or Men-p'ai-kou, 門牌溝). From Yu-ch'ih (魚池), near the northern shore of the Sun Moon Lake they attempted to encircle P'u-li (埔里) though without decisive results. On 15 March the KMT troops in Ts'ao-t'un (草屯) contacted the 27th Army by telephone to offer them amnesty in return for their surrender. They didn't accept, and instead increased their guard numbers and mobilised young people from the surrounding area, such as from Wu-she (務社). As their line of communications had already virtually been cut off, they attacked the KMT soldiers at the Sun Moon Lake at around 2 am. They injured thirty, and marched the rest back to Shui-li-k'eng (水里坑), but did not follow them through the darkness in order not to stray too far from their own position.

⁴⁶ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 75-76 and pp. 78-79; Wang K'ang (王康) p. 225. People whom the KMT was searching for included Hsieh Hsüeh-hung (謝雪紅), Lin Hsi-lu (林西陸), Yang K'o-huang (楊克煌), Ts'ai T'ieh-ch'eng (蔡鐵成), Chung I-jen (鍾逸仁), Li Ch'iao-sung (李喬松), Ch'en Ch'ing-piao (陳清標), Chuang Ch'ui-sheng (莊垂勝), Wu Yung-ch'ang (巫永昌), T'ung Ping-hui (童炳輝), Lai Yüan-hui (賴遠輝), Chang Hung-mo (張鴻模), Chang Shen-ju (張深儒) and Chang Wen-huan (張文環). For details of the military's actions see the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 16 March, p. 1, centre; 20 March, p. 2, bottom left, 22 March, p. 2, top centre, 24 March, p. 2, top left and 28 March, p. 2, centre left, and the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 25 March, p. 2, top centre.

The following map illustrates the fighting locations:



ill. from Shih Ming (史明), p. 787⁴⁷

The following day, the 16 March, reinforcements arrived at Ts'ao-t'un (草屯), therefore the KMT launched an attack against the 27th Army. The heaviest fighting between insurgents and KMT troops on Taiwan followed. It started at around 11 am and carried on until dusk. According to Lin Mu-shun, the 27th Army killed over two hundred KMT soldiers and suffered only eight deaths among their own, though many were injured. As their ammunition stocks were depleted and the supply lines down, the 27th Army retreated to Wu-she (霧社) and decided to break up into small groups and join the insurgents under Ch'en Ts'uan-ti (陳篡地) in Hsiao-mei (小梅), an area in the mountains around ten kilometres north-east of Chia-i (嘉義) with whom they had had contact for the previous three days. On 17 March KMT troops occupied P'u-li (埔里), ending the uprising in the Taichung region.⁴⁸ Despite posters everywhere in search for Hsieh Hsüeh-hung (謝雪紅)

⁴⁷ Legend from right to left: 1) 27th Army position, 2) KMT troops' direction of attack, 3) 27th Army counterattacks, 4) Roads.

⁴⁸ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 75-78; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 19 March, p. 1, bottom left; Chou Ming (周明) pp. 178, 181. Lai, Myers et al., p. 128, assert, themselves referencing Lin Mu-shun (p.28), that in light of the KMT's superior fire and manpower, the 27th Army abandoned further fighting and doesn't mention the fighting on 16 March at all. This in fact totally contradicts Lin Mu-shun's actual description of the events in the Taichung region. This is a further instance of careless

and Yang K'o-huang (楊克煌) and a 200,000 Taiwan Dollar reward for their capture, they were able to escape with Chou Ming (周明) via Tso-ying (左營) near Kaohsiung (高雄) to Hsiamen (廈門) on the Chinese mainland.⁴⁹

Despite the uprising having been suppressed, the mayor, Huang K'o-li (黃克立) was replaced, though this made little difference as far as the public were concerned; his successor was a Major General named Li Hui,⁵⁰ who now assumed this civilian post.

Yang Liang-kung (楊亮功) puts the figures for the injured and dead in this area at 280 officials, 16 members of the public (*min-chung*, 民眾) and 34 demonstrators (*pao-min*, 暴民). The physical damage to Taichung was estimated at 9,861,963 Taiwan Dollars, and 35 million Taiwan Dollars for Taichung County. According to the report of Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai the number of Taiwanese dead was between one and two hundred.⁵¹

4.5.2. *Changhua and other places in Taichung County*

The day after the public became aware of events on 28 February in Taipei the Changhua (彰化) Consultative Assembly met and expressed its support for the demands made in Taipei. The first clashes occurred in the early afternoon of 2 March when citizens from Changhua gathered in front of the station and beat up a group of government soldiers travelling in a lorry. Thereafter the anger was directed at Mainlanders in general, and particularly at the home of the local police station's supervisory officer, who was the epitome of a corrupt official. All his effects were pulled out into the street and set alight. Then the crowd forced the mayor, Wang I-ch'ing (王一慶) to appear in front of the Consultative Assembly and suffer severe criticism of his administration (*meng-lieh kung-chi*, 猛烈攻擊).

treatment of source material, especially when it is unfavourable to the KMT's interpretation of events. That central Taiwan was the focus of resistance after the landing of KMT troops is further evidenced by the fact that the 21st Division transferred its headquarters on 19 March from Keelung (基隆) to Taichung (*Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 22 March, p. 2, top left).

⁴⁹ Chou Ming, pp. 183-184.

⁵⁰ *FRUS*, p. 456, Memorandum from Kerr.

⁵¹ Part I: *Tai-chung-shih* (台中市), final three lines and *Tai-chung-hsien* (台中縣), final three lines.

Those present demanded that all posts in the city administration above the level of division head (*ku-chang*, 股長) be taken by a Taiwanese person, as well as the immediate dismissal of the hated official in the police station, which was occupied during the course of the day. The mayor accepted all the demands and had the official imprisoned in the city gaol.⁵² On 3 March the Changhua Resolution Committee and others formed a Changhua City Resolution Committee (*shan-hou ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui*, 善後處理委員會), according to the same model as those in Taipei and other places. The members of the Propaganda Subcommittee went onto the streets to keep the public informed of developments in other parts of the island. In Changhua the unrest remained limited, so that on the evening of 3 March the new Resolution Committee called on the people to return to their everyday activities. According to Lin Mu-shun, some youths did in fact loot guns from the police station in Changhua, though there are no reports of armed clashes in the area. One armed group from Changhua did in fact participate in the fighting in Taichung.

The Resolution Committee met several times over the following days and on 5 March sent three representatives to Taipei for the meeting of the Provincial Committee at which the reform programme to be presented to Ch'en I was discussed. The sources provide no information as to how long the Changhua Resolution Committee existed, or when KMT troops recaptured the city.⁵³ It would seem that even two weeks later many students and school pupils did not dare return to their lessons, so that the authorities felt compelled to issue threats that they would be expelled. As the authorities considered the young people's active participation in the uprising an 'educational issue', people such as a Regiment Commander and Mayor Wang I-ch'ing (王一慶) were 'requested' to visit colleges to 'enlighten' the students.⁵⁴ One can assume that this was common practise in other areas as well.

According to Yang Liang-kung, there were only seven injured in Changhua,

⁵² *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, bottom centre; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 61-62 and Chin Yü (勁雨), p. 29, final line to p. 30, line 3.

⁵³ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, bottom centre, final line; 9 March, p. 1, centre left; Lin Mu-shun, p. 68, final line.

⁵⁴ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 27 March, p. 2, centre left, Reports Nos. 1 and 3.

and the physical damage was similarly minimal.⁵⁵

The events in Taichung and Taipei had an impact on many of the smaller towns in the county. On 2 March unrest broke out in the small town of Yüan-lin (員林), the seat of the Taichung County administration, around thirty kilometres south of Taichung. People from other areas poured into Yüan-lin, Mainlanders were beaten up, the police station was besieged and prisoners released. County Magistrate Sung Chen-chü (宋振矩) and all Mainland administration officials fled if they were able to. Various armed groups were formed, and in line with Ch'en I's promise for the re-election of mayors and county magistrates three candidates were chosen to succeed Sung Chen-chü. However, he was soon reinstated after 7 March. Resolution Committees were formed in Ta-chia (大甲) and in Feng-yüan (豐原), two towns in the north of the county, on 3 and 7 March respectively.

Young people and students especially reacted spontaneously to the news of the uprising by forming armed groups, or at least with the intention to do so, and poured into Taichung, the focus of the uprising in central Taiwan. As mentioned above, groups came from Feng-yüan (豐原), Ta-chia (大甲), Tung-shih (東勢), T'ien-chung (田中) and T'ai-p'ing (太平) to Taichung for deployment.

After the end of the uprising community gatherings were held, as elsewhere, in order to convey the 'correct' explanation for the uprising, and at which the cleansings were organised, as the majority of scattered insurgents were hidden in the mountains of central Taiwan.⁵⁶

4.6. The Tainan Region

4.6.1. Chia-i and northern Tainan County

In addition to Chia-i, the small towns of Hu-wei (虎尾), Tou-nan (斗南) and Lin-nei (林內), which lie slightly to the north and formed a self-contained centre of

⁵⁵ Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Changhua-shih*, 彰化市, final two lines.

⁵⁶ Lin Mu-shun, p. 65-66; Chin Yü, p. 29, para. 4; Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Taichung-hsien*, 台中縣; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 9 March, p. 1, bottom left and 10 March, p. 1, centre right, Report No. 3; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 29 March, p. 4, centre left.

resistance, are included here due both to their geographical proximity, and also because they were involved in the fighting in Chia-i. Even before the '2-28 Incident' there were signs of instability in Chia-i. According to the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報) the head of the Agriculture and Forestry Training College (*nung-lin chih-yeh hsüeh-hsiao*, 農林職業學校), Liu Ch'uan-lai (劉傳來), appointed his brother-in-law, Ts'ai P'eng-fei (蔡鵬飛), as his successor when he became a Provincial Consultative Assemblyman. The Department for Education did not accept this and despatched Ch'en Lin-ts'ang (陳霖蒼) on 20 February from I-lan (宜蘭) to take on the post. However, Ts'ai resisted the handover and organised student demonstrations in opposition. After the uprising broke out, it is said he organised the students into a 'Student Army' and took an active role in the unrest as their 'supreme commander'.⁵⁷

News of the 2-28 Incident reached Chia-i on 1 March and led to the first clashes between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. When military police and soldiers, who were patrolling the city in lorries, noticed them they began to beat people. This heightened the situation further and that evening youths clashed with security forces, which continued during the following days. On 2 March young people from Taichung and Changhua brought news of events there and called on the public to 'bring down the corrupt officials'. Mainlanders were indeed beaten up, such as those on a train travelling via Chia-i to Kaohsiung. The homes of hated officials as well as the mayor's office were ransacked and the police station attacked and weapons looted. Primarily young people and students were involved, and they even searched houses for Mainlanders.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 31 March, p. 4, top centre; see also Chin Yü, p. 31, para. 5. As far as the actual background to this incident, the report in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* must be taken with a pinch of salt. At the end of March, when the cleansing was still in full progress, the paper was fully involved with propagandising.

⁵⁸ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, top right; Lin Mu-shun, p. 81; Chin Yü, p. 31, para. 1; (Memoirs of the Presbyterian minister) Huang Wu-tung ((黃武東), 'Huang Wu-tung ti hui-i' (黃武東的回憶) [Memoirs of Huang Wu-tung], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 185-189), p. 186; Hung P'eng-wan (洪鵬萬), 'Tainan pao-hsing-lu' (台南暴行錄) [Violence experienced in Tainan], in *Taiwan erh-erh-pa shih-chien ch'in-li-chi* (台灣二二八事件親歷記) [Personal Experience during the 2.28 Incident in Taiwan], ed. by Taiwan cheng-i ch'u-pan-she (台灣正義出版社) [Taiwan Justice Publishing House] ([n.p.]: 1947), pp.

In a meeting called for the next day by the Chia-i Consultative Assembly and the chairman of the regional branch of the 'Three Principles of the People Youth Corps', Ch'en Fu-chih (陳復志), the 'Chia-i Resolution Committee of 2 March' (*Chia-i san-erh ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui*, 嘉義三二處理委員會) was formed, with a Defence Headquarters (*fang-wei szu-ling-pu*, 防衛司令部) and a Warfare Headquarters (*tso-chan pen-pu*, 作戰本部). Ch'en Fu-chih took over the chair and gave himself the rather ostentatious title of 'Commander-in-Chief of Land, Sea and Air Forces' (*lu-hai-k'ung-chün tsung-szu-ling*, 陸海空軍總司令). This was also developed into a complex organisation which devised a dedicated department for every imaginable purpose. Groups of aborigines joined the insurgents who, on the same afternoon, seized the No. 19 Weapons Depot (*shih-chiu chün-hsieh-k'u*, 十九軍械庫) and were able to better arm themselves. At around 9 pm they occupied the city government building, and military police and officials retreated to the army's East Gate barracks (*tung-men ying-fang*, 東門營房). It seems the regional commander of the military police, a man named Li (栗), was particularly hated by the people. The predominantly Taiwanese policemen left their posts and their weapons behind, or took them with them and defected to the insurgents. Around 1400 Mainlanders were held under guard in the Consultative Assembly Building, the Sun-Yat-sen Hall and the KMT Party Office.⁵⁹ After further attacks

168-171; Man Hsi (曼西): 'Chia shu pao p'ing-an' (家書報平安), *ibid.*, pp. 137-138; Shen Hsiao-shen (沈孝申): 'Tsai-hui pa! Chia-i' (再會吧! 嘉義), *ibid.*, p. 146: according to him Mainlanders in the train were forced to undress down to their underwear. On arrival in Chia-i they were forced out of the train and beaten up. A poster in the train window stated that 'Mainlanders are forbidden from boarding this train.'

⁵⁹ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 81-82; Chin Yü, p. 31, paras. 1-4; *THCH*, p. 9, final para.; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, top right; Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Chia-i-shih*, 嘉義市, lines 7, 11 and from 14: according to this source, the No. 19 Weapons Depot belonged to the Hung-mao-p'i (紅毛埤) arsenal and wasn't captured until 7 March. He states that only between eight and nine hundred Mainlanders were captured in the city, and a further two hundred fled to the airport with soldiers (see below).

The Youth Corps was the KMT's youth organisation, in Chinese: *san-min-chu-i ch'ing-nien-t'uan*, 三民主義青年團, usually abbreviated to *san-ch'ing-t'uan*, 三青團. It is noteworthy that in Hualien, too, Youth Corps functionaries took on leadership of the uprising, see Lin Mu-shun, p. 107; Chin Yü, p. 38, para. 2; *THCH*, p. 13, para. 2. In the case of Tainan, the chairman of the regional Youth Corps, Chuang Meng-hou (莊孟侯), was arrested after the end of the uprising, on charges of having incited young people to join the resistance movement (Lin Mu-shun, p. 95). In Kaohsiung all the regional Youth Corps are said to have joined the insurgents (Lin Mu-shun, p. 98); see also *KSCW*, doc. 142, p. 357).

Since 1938 the Youth Corps had existed as an independent organisation set apart from the Party and was answerable only to Chiang Kai-shek. Before the Corps lost its independence in

involving three thousand armed insurgents, military police officers took the mayor, Sun Chih-chün (孫志俊), as well as Mainlanders and their families to safety in the airport. Due to the unrelenting attacks, the army units and military police together with civilian Mainlanders fled on 4 March at around 3 pm to the *Shan-tzu-ting* (山子町) Middle School in Chia-i and then at 5 pm to Hung-mao-p'i (紅毛埤), the largest military arsenal in Taiwan at the time and to Chia-i airport. With this the whole city came under the control of the insurgents, including the water and electricity supplies, the radio station and the transport network. They were supplied with food by the public.⁶⁰ With support from groups from Chu-shan (竹山) and Tou-liu (斗六) and deliveries of ammunition from Taichung the fighting at the arsenal raged until 8 March, when the troops detonated the arsenal and retreated to Chia-i airport.⁶¹ When the soldiers and military police officers, with the Mainlanders under their protection, retreated to the airport, fighting had already been going on since 5 March, with support for the insurgents from groups from Hsin-ying (新營) and Yen-shui (鹽水). According to Lin Mu-shun, between 5 and 11 March a series of failed 'peace negotiations' took place. The electricity and water supply to the encircled troops was shut off. As a result they wanted to surrender the airport, though they set requirements for the insurgents. They demanded the insurgents to lock their weapons away in the police station and

September 1947, the Whampoa Faction had virtually complete control over it. The obvious assumption is that the Whampoa Faction wanted to use its control over the Youth Corps during the uprising to weaken Ch'en I's position. It seems more plausible, however, that the lower level functionaries and the ordinary members undertook similar activities to the insurgents, as they were mostly all Taiwanese, and their loyalty to a KMT organisation was therefore not great. For information on the Youth Corps, see Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, pp. 126-128 and Pepper, p. 60, fn.

⁶⁰ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 81-83; Chin Yü, p. 31, paras. 1-5; *THCH*, p. 9, final para.; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 31 March, p. 4, top centre. According to Ying (英), 'Kaohsiung ch'i-jih' (高雄七日) [Seven Days in Kaohsiung], pp. 188-194, the army unit referred to is the 1st Battalion of the 21st Division. It is possible that the figure of 3000 armed insurgents, which Lin Mu-shun claims, is exaggerated. *THCH* mentions only several hundred (*shu-pai*, 數百), who attacked the Hung-mao-p'i (紅毛埤) arsenal and the airport. For details of the food supply to the demonstrators see Huang Wu-tung (黃武東), p. 187; one may consider his account to be reliable as he played no direct part in the insurgents' actions, but severely criticises Ch'en I and the suppression of the uprising.

⁶¹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 83; Chin Yü, p. 31, final para., confirms the retreat to the airport and implies that the insurgents took the arsenal. According to Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Chia-i-shih*, 嘉義市, lines 12-13, only a small section of the arsenal was destroyed, and the majority of guns and ammunition fell into the hands of the insurgents. See also the description of these events in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 31 March, p. 4, top centre, which confirms the details in Lin Mu-shun and Chin Yü's accounts, though it does not mention the explosion and seizure of the arsenal.

provide the soldiers with food, a demand that was accepted. The reasons given for this were the high numbers of casualties and the decreasing ammunitions stocks. The besieged soldiers had continually been radioing for reinforcements from Taipei. They did in fact receive a supply of ammunition and food airdropped that same afternoon, which led to an attempt to break out under the leadership of the military police Commander Li (栗), which according to Lin Mu-shun, left over three hundred of the insurgents dead or injured. Calls for help from Chia-i, presumably by radio, were heard throughout Taiwan, upon which units of the 'United Democratic Taiwanese Army' (*Taiwan min-chu lien-chün*, 台灣民主聯軍) arrived in the city the same day. The army units involved were led by Ch'en Ts'uan-ti (陳篡地) from the Hu-wei (虎尾) area, about twenty-five kilometres to the north of Chia-i. With the public's support, particularly from the young people, the soldiers and military police were forced back into the airport on 8 March, after three days of fighting in the streets. Ch'en Ts'uan-ti's unit then returned with plentiful supplies of guns and ammunition to Hu-wei, where fighting was also raging for control of the airport there.⁶²

During this period the Consultative Assembly adopted a passive, pro-KMT stance. On 6 March at around 6 pm they sent a telegram to the Tainan Resolution Committee which reported untruthfully that the situation in Chia-i would soon be resolved. The Assembly expressed its hopes that no further incidences would occur in Tainan and espoused the patriotic phrase often used by the authorities that the people of Tainan should 'apply themselves to the state and the nation' (*wei kuo-chia min-tsu li-ch'ang erh nu-li*, 為國家民族立場而努力). This is tantamount to demanding that the uprising come to an immediate end.⁶³

According to Lin Mu-shun peace negotiations took place once again on 9 March between the soldiers and the demonstrators, in which the mayor and the Provincial Consultative Assemblyman, Liu Ch'uan-lai (劉傳來), took part. The

⁶² Yang Liang-kung also mentions over 300 dead and injured on 5 March (Part I, *Chia-i-shih*, line 10). The *Hsin-sheng-pao* (6 March, p. 2, top right) by contrast refers to only 100-200 dead and injured. For details of further events, see the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 31 March, p. 4, top centre; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 83-84, p. 88. The male youths played a direct part in the fighting, whilst the female youths provided medical services.

⁶³ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, bottom left, Report No. 2.

soldiers repeated their requirement that the insurgents lock their guns in the police station and supply those trapped in the airport with food. The insurgents in turn required the soldiers to surrender and hand over their guns to the Resolution Committee. The head teacher of the Middle School for Girls, Tu (杜), was flown to Taipei to request reinforcements from Ch'en I. Tu returned the same afternoon with news that the suppression of the uprising had already begun in Taipei and conveyed the plea for them to hold the airport at all cost, until reinforcements arrived. On the same day supplies were again airlifted to the soldiers trapped in the airport. This, as well as the reinforcements which were confirmed on 10 and 11 March by the Governor's Office, caused the soldiers to be even less compromising in the 'peace conditions'. No fighting took place, but the airport remained encircled. Presumably because of the news of the troops landing on 8 March the insurgents, still led by Ch'en Fu-chih (陳復志), were prepared on 11 March to accept the mayor's requirements. When he arrived at the airport with many other representatives and two lorry-loads of food they were immediately detained, including Ch'en Fu-chih. According to Lin Mu-shun, many of them were shot on the spot, and only three were able to escape or were permitted to return. This was reported in the city, but as their weapons had been locked in the police station, in accordance with the Peace Requirements, they were unable to take up the fight again.⁶⁴ It was not until the 12 and 13 March, when paratroopers from Taipei and further units from Kaohsiung arrived in Chia-i by lorry that the ring of insurgents around the airport could be broken and the uprising brought to a conclusive end. The rest of the insurgents, according to Chin Yü, fled to Hsin-ying (新營), the seat of the Tainan County administration, around 20 km south of Chia-i. As elsewhere, people were immediately arrested and mass executions also occurred, which lasted, according to sources, until 22 March. According to Huang

⁶⁴ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 84-85. According to him there were twelve representatives. One of those who returned to the city was a committee member of the Women's Association; Fan (飆), 'La-tsa hua Ping-tung' (拉雜話屏東) [Rambling Talk from Pingtung], in *Taiwan erh-erh-pa shih-chien ch'in-li-chi* (台灣二二八事件親歷記) [Personal Experience during the 2.28 Incident in Taiwan], ed. by Taiwan cheng-i ch'u-pan-she (台灣正義出版社) [Taiwan Justice Publishing House] ([n.p.]: 1947), pp. 195-198; Shen Hsiao-shen (沈孝申), p. 144; Huang Wu-tung (黃武東), p. 187: He reports eight representatives, of whom Liu Ch'uan-lai (劉傳來), the Consultative Assemblyman Ch'iu Yüan-yang (邱鴛鴦) and a *pan-shan* (半山) lawyer were allowed back. In the two newspapers referenced in this work and in the official sources, these events are not covered at all.

Wu-tung (黃武東), soldiers opened fire in the street as soon as anyone appeared (*chien jen chi k'ai-ch'iang*, 見人即開槍). Many young people, particularly from the Agriculture and Forestry Training College and those who had stayed in Hung-mao-p'i's (紅毛埤) military arsenal, were killed and their bodies left in front of the fountain in the city centre as a deterrent. Ch'en Fu-chih (陳復志) was among those executed; on 13 March he was driven through the town in a lorry and eventually shot in front of the station.⁶⁵ In Chia-i too, the heads of the city district organisations and neighbourhood associations were given the duty of finding guns or hidden insurgents. The mayor instructed them in this during a meeting he called. The responsibility for the cleansing throughout southern Taiwan, including Chia-i, fell to the Commander for the Defence of Southern Taiwan (*nan-pu fang-wei szu-ling*, 南部防衛司令) and the commander of Kaohsiung Fort, Lieutenant General P'eng Meng-chi (彭孟緝).⁶⁶ In his report Yang Liang-kung describes 188 dead and injured members of the public, 69 dead and injured officials, as well as 20 executions. Yang does not provide figures for victims among the soldiers and military police. In contrast the report of the Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai speaks of over 1000 Taiwanese dead in Chia-i.⁶⁷

Unrest broke out in Hu-wei (虎尾), Tou-liu (斗六, north of Chia-i), Tung-shih (東石, on the coast), and Pei-kang (北港, about fifteen kilometres to the north east of Chia-i) upon arrival of news of the events in Taipei on 2 March, and the same night groups of young people took over all the police stations and municipal administration buildings, arming themselves in the process.

During a public meeting on 3 March Ch'en Ts'uan-ti (陳篡地), a well-known

⁶⁵ Lin Mu-shun, p. 85; Chin Yü, p. 32, line 2; *THCH*, p. 24, line 5; the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 13 March, p. 1, centre and 24 March, p. 2, top centre; the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 16 March, p. 2, top centre. Lin Mu-shun lists eleven Consultative Assemblymen and representatives of other organisations who were also publically executed by 22 March, including Lu Ping-ch'in (盧炳欽), P'an Mu-chih (潘木枝), Ch'en Ch'eng-i (陳澄液) and K'o Lin (柯麟). Huang Wu-tung, pp. 187-188: According to him fourteen people were executed in total on 22 March, including those detained during the mediation attempt on 9 March. According to Kerr (1965), p. 315, as late as 24 March twenty-four Taiwanese were executed in Chia-i.

⁶⁶ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 17 March, p. 2, centre, *Hsin-chu shih-chang*, Report No. 2; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 16 March, p. 1, bottom right.

⁶⁷ Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Chia-i*, final 3 lines); *Report into the Situation on Taiwan*, p. 276.

eye specialist from Tou-liu,⁶⁸ took over the leadership there. He called on all students, young people and former soldiers to become involved in the formation of a Committee for Maintaining Public Order (*chih-an wei-ch'ih-hui*, 治安維持會), though from the beginning it was considered more of a fighting body than a 'reserve police force'. At the same time in Hu-wei a group of armed youths launched an attack on the garrison of between two hundred and three hundred KMT soldiers in the airport, who retreated to the fortified area inside. They fought for three days without the soldiers being able to break out, but neither were the insurgents able to take control of the airport. After around 5 March (the exact date is unknown), Ch'en Ts'uan-ti's units returned to Chia-i with a large haul of looted weapons. He divided the committee he had formed into two medium-sized units, which were further divided into three smaller units, and named the whole the Tou-liu Garrison (*Tou-liu ching-pei-tui*, 斗六警備隊). Lin Mu-shun does not provide any indication of the size of this force. Ch'en Ts'uan-ti despatched the 2nd Middle Unit (*ti-erh chung-tui*, 第二中隊) under Chien Ch'ing-chiang's (簡清江) leadership together with units from Taichung (台中), Chu-shan (竹山) and Tou-nan (斗南), whom Lin Mu-shun refers to as the 'United Army' (*lien-ho pu-tui*, 聯合部隊), to the airport at Hu-wei to continue the attack. That evening the soldiers, whose supplies were depleted, broke out. The insurgents chased them to Lin-nei (林內), fifteen kilometres away. The 1st Middle Unit was waiting for them there, as Ch'en Ts'uan-ti (陳篡地) already knew of the break out. Some of them were able to escape under the cover of darkness. A further forty were surrounded by the insurgents and forced to surrender. They were held in the school in Lin-nei, and guarded by local residents. Following street fighting with the KMT troops, which had arrived in Tou-liu (斗六) on 14 March, Ch'en Ts'uan-ti retreated towards Hsiao-mei (小梅), where he joined the rest of the 27th Army of Taichung. They led a guerrilla war until 1948, possibly even longer.⁶⁹ According to Yang Liang-kung, government troops had pushed forward to Hsiao-mei by 13 March, killed over

⁶⁸ He was thus part of Taiwan's intellectual elite of the time.

⁶⁹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 87-88 (Lin Mu-shun is the only useful source for information on the events around Hu-wei); Chin Yü, p. 33, para. 3; Yang Liang-kung (楊亮功), Part I, *Tainan-hsien*, 台南縣, lines 1-4.

sixty insurgents there, and captured twelve. However, many were able to escape into the mountains, Ch'en Ts'uan-ti among them.⁷⁰ It is therefore not surprising that thorough cleansings were carried out in the countryside as well.⁷¹ An official source claims that Ch'en Ts'uan-ti handed himself over to the authorities on 3 June 1952 and was given amnesty. In return he was required to do propaganda work for the authorities.⁷² This was a traditional method used often later on in Taiwan to render political enemies harmless.⁷³

4.6.2. *Tainan and the southern parts of Tainan County*

On 2 March the newspapers in Tainan were full of reports and supplements on the events in Taipei from 27 February to 1 March. Even the *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (中華日報), which was closely allied with the authorities and was based in Tainan, reported on the incident on 27 February, the shootings and deaths in front of the Government Office building on 28 February, the implementation of the state of emergency in Taipei as well as the formation of the Resolution Committee on 1 March. It may be that the people of Tainan heard about events in Taipei before 2

⁷⁰ Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Tainan-hsien*, lines 7-9.

⁷¹ As in Pei-kang (北港) from 21 March, see *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 28 March, p. 2, centre left.

⁷² Lin Mu-shun, p. 90. Lin Mu-shun reveals here that Ch'en Ts'uan-ti had fought under Ho Chi-minh during the Second World War, and had thus learned the tactics of guerrilla warfare. For information on Ch'en Ts'uan-ti's later life, see Ch'en, Ts'uan-ti (陳篡地), 'T'an-t'an wo ho Hsieh Hsüeh-hung ti wang-shih' (談談我和謝雪紅的往事) [On my Past with Hsieh Hsüeh-hung], in *Hsieh Hsüeh-hung ti pei-chü* (謝雪紅的悲劇) [The Tragedy of Hsieh Hsüeh-hung], ed. by Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang Chung-yang wei-yüan-hui ti-liu-tsu (中國國民黨中央委員會第六組) [6th Group of the Central Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang] (Taipei: [n.pub.], June 1958), pp. 26-31 (p. 26 and p. 30). In this article published under the name of Ch'en Ts'uan-ti (陳篡地), he calls on other 'Communists' to give themselves up. If one takes this article to be correct, Ch'en Ts'uan-ti's life had followed the typical path of a Taiwanese Communist, such as Su Hsin or Hsieh Hsüeh-hung. In his youth he was involved in anti-Japanese activities, then he studied medicine in Japan and joined the Japanese Communist Party through student groups. He was conscripted during the Second World War and lost contact with the Communist Party. When he returned home after the war he ran an eye specialist's practice in his hometown up until the uprising in 1947. He soon came into contact with members of the Taiwanese Communist Party, and at around 7 pm on 1 March 1947 a cadre named 'Huang' from Chia-i arrived at his house and conveyed the Party's orders that he take over the leadership for the Hu-wei area. This 'Huang' may have been Huang Wen-hui (黃文輝) referred to above, see p. 128. While in their unpublished manuscript of 1988 Lai, Myers et al., p. 151, briefly mention the reinforcements sent from Taichung to Hu-wei (虎尾), they make no reference to the events in the Hu-wei area at all in their 1991 published book (cf. *A Tragic Beginning*, pp. 128-129).

⁷³ The former leader of the Taiwanese Independence Movement, Liao Wen-i (廖文毅) [Thomas Liao] during the 1960s, for example.

March, via the radio, for example, though the sources make no mention thereof.⁷⁴

The same evening young people took over police stations and armed themselves. The police officers mostly did not reach for their weapons at all, but rather merely left their positions. According to *THCH*, the young people were lead by T'ang Te-chang (湯德章), a lawyer and activist in the 'Committee for Safeguarding the Freedom of the People' (*jen-mi tzu-yu pao-chang wei-yüan-hui*, 人民自由保障委員會) as well as a candidate for promotion to the Provincial Consultative Assembly for Tainan City. *THCH* asserts that Chuang Meng-hou (莊孟侯), the chair of the Tainan KMT Youth League and particularly a man named K'o Pao-hsiang (柯寶象) were involved in the planning stages. On this and in following days Mainlanders were beaten up and sought safety with the military police.

On the evening of 2 March at around 8 pm Commander Ting (丁), who was responsible for the military units in Tainan, met with the Battalion Commander of the military police, Liao Chün-yeh (廖駿業), Police Chief Ch'en Huai-jang (陳懷讓), and Mayor Chuo Kao-hsüan (卓高烜), as well as the heads of all the colleges in Tainan, in order to discuss how they were to tackle the situation. Their goal was to bring an end to the incidents and unrest as quickly as possible. The mayor requested that they replace him by forming a 'Support Committee for Maintaining Order' in Tainan (*pen-shih chih-an hsieh-chu wei-yüan-hui*, 本市治安協助委員會). At 2 am these same officers and dignitaries called an emergency meeting with the Tainan City Consultative Assembly in order to establish the committee as requested by the mayor. According to *THCH*, on the morning of 3 March alone, more than one hundred injured Mainlanders appeared at the military police building, which was subsequently besieged by over two hundred students from the Engineering College (*kung-hsüeh-yüan*, 工學院) and several hundred 'thugs'. Apart from the feelings of hatred for the officials who had fled there, the aim to prevent patrols by the military police may also have played a role. The middle school teacher Li Kuo-tse (李國澤) is accused of having incited the students and

⁷⁴ Lin Mu-shun, p. 93; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 2 March, p. 2.

'thugs'. However, it is more probable that he followed the Committee's instructions and went onto the streets to try and 'persuade' (勸導) the students and young people to refrain from violence. He may not have been very successful, which might explain the allegations against him. The same source claims that the fact that Mainlanders everywhere were beaten and displaced, their homes ransacked and looted, as were the warehouses of the customs authority, goes back to T'ang Te-chang (湯德章) and the Tainan Consultative Assemblyman, Hou Ch'üan-ch'eng (侯全成), who had agitated the public. This is doubtful, in the case of Hou Ch'üan-ch'eng at least, as he was also on the Dignitary Committee.

On the same day youths attacked the seat of the 'Police Unit for Maintaining Public Security' (*pao-an ching-ch'a-tui*, 保安警察隊) and looted further weapons and ammunition. As the police were obviously incapable of operating, the youths took over their functions.⁷⁵

In the afternoon a spontaneous town meeting took place. All there agreed to support the people of Taipei in their demands to resolve the incident of 28 February. The following seven demands were added:

1. Soldiers, military police officers and the police were forbidden from firing their weapons indiscriminately and from doing anything which could lead to clashes.
2. The Monopoly and Trading Bureau must be abolished.
3. Incompetent and irresponsible officials and government employees must be immediately dismissed.
4. The rice supply problem must be resolved.
5. Public elections for municipality mayors and county magistrates should be held immediately.
6. Taiwanese people should be chosen to fill the positions of department heads in the provincial administration as well as senior official posts in the most important departments.

⁷⁵ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, top right, Report No. 9; *THCH*, p. 7, para. 4 and p. 10, para. 1; (Memoirs of) Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉), pp. 137-138; Lin Mu-shun, p. 95, para. 3; Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) 1986, p. 27. The first 'Committee for Safeguarding the Freedom of the People' was established in Taipei on 5 March 1946 in order to take action against police infringements and monitor press freedoms and other basic rights, see Kerr (1965), p. 208.

7. Companies and factories which had been taken over [from the Japanese] should be run by Taiwanese people.⁷⁶

These demands corresponded with the additional demands made in Taipei. The demand for the re-election of mayors and county magistrates had also been adopted in Taichung the day before, though not in Taipei until one or two days later. The seventh demand reflects the dissatisfaction Taiwanese people felt that Japanese enterprises did not fall into Taiwanese hands after the end of the War, but instead were monopolised by Government Office officials. Many of these enterprises had originally been confiscated by the Japanese from the Taiwanese, or had been constructed on dispossessed land. These demands were telegraphed to Ch'en I, presumably by the military police. The response was given on the afternoon of 4 March at around 3 pm, as follows:

1. Accepted in principle, though until normal order is re-established, no-one is permitted into military or military police facilities.
2. The response is still under consideration.
3. Accepted.
4. Naturally.
5. Forwarded to Central Government for further instruction.
6. Appointments are pending.
7. Trained and qualified people will, as far as possible, be recommended by the Governor to the Department for Industry and Mining.⁷⁷

Attached were nine directives and requirements:

- Weapons and other goods must be returned, but otherwise past actions will not be further pursued. From the date this is made public, all law-breaking will be punished according to the law.
1. The administration must not be impeded in its work.
 2. Maintain the administration's power in its entirety.
 3. Weapons and goods belonging to the police must, without exception, be returned to the police.
 4. Initiate investigations into private individuals' losses.
 5. The freedom of movement of the police and military police must not be impeded.

⁷⁶ Han Shih-ch'üan, pp. 137-138.

⁷⁷ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 5 March (Special Issue), bottom right, Report No. 1 and Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉), pp. 138-139.

6. Compensation is to be paid for injuries and deaths.
7. Immediately initiate investigations into the authorities' losses.
8. All police officers must return to service and fulfil their duties today.
9. All schools are to immediately resume teaching.⁷⁸

No real political concessions resulted, nor any indication of negotiations going on with the Taipei Resolution Committee on these issues. As the directives indicate, the authorities' only goal was to retain and increase their control over the situation. Lin Mu-shun accuses the KMT functionary and Provincial Consultative Assemblyman for Tainan City, Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉) as well as Hou Ch'üan-ch'eng (侯全成) as having double dealings. After the demands compiled at the public meeting had been handed over, they remained behind in order to discuss with the mayor and the commander of the Tainan military police measures to prevent the unrest, which was by no means over, from developing further. This was Han Shih-ch'üan's declared intention.⁷⁹

According to Lin Mu-shun, on the evening of 3 March the students of the Business College formed a unit which was despatched to Taichung as a garrison for the captured No. 3 Aeroplane Factory. The 'No. 2 Middle School Alumni Association' (*erh-chung-hui*, 二中會) took part in the insurgents' actions in Tainan itself.⁸⁰

On the morning of 4 March at around 10 am the large demonstration which had been announced at the public meeting took place. The banners and slogans were directed against corrupt officials (*ta-tao t'an-kuan wu-li*, 打倒貪官污吏), and also, uniquely during the uprising, against the civil war on the mainland (*fan-tui nei-chan*, 反對內戰), for improved living conditions (*yao-ch'iu sheng-huo ti pao-chang*, 要求生活的保障) and for Taiwanese autonomy (*yao-ch'iu Taiwan tzu-*

⁷⁸ Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉), p. 139.

⁷⁹ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 93-94; Chin Yü, p. 32, *Tainan*, 台南, para. 3, line 1; Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉), pp. 137-138; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 6 March (Special Issue, top left and 7 March, p. 1, top right, Report No. 9.

⁸⁰ Lin Mu-shun, p. 94. There may be a connection between these units being formed and the Business College students' activities that morning (as revealed in *THCH*), though the sources don't draw the connection explicitly.

chih, 要求台灣自治). The second slogan was not merely an expression of nationalistic solidarity, but rather reflected a real worry among young Taiwanese men especially. As long as the war continued they were in danger of being called up by the KMT for service on the mainland, as Ch'en I had already attempted in January 1946.⁸¹ The third demand was in response to the economic problems, principally inflation, unemployment and corruption.

In addition to demonstrations, young people, including soldiers who had formerly served under the Japanese, organised themselves into armed groups. Two sources refer to a more than two hundred strong 'United Student Army' (*hsüeh-sheng lien-ho-chün*, 學生聯合軍) or a 'United Autonomous Army' (*tzu-chih lien-chün*, 自治聯軍) with more than six machine-guns, more than three hundred rifles, forty small arms and six lorries at their disposal. They attacked all the police stations, the No. 3 Prison and the seat of the 'Police Unit for Protecting Public Security', as they had done that morning, and took Police Chief Ch'en Huai-jang (陳懷讓) captive. They looted large numbers of weapons and ammunition. These clashes were accompanied by further attacks on Mainlanders. By the evening of 4 March, many of the department buildings were in the hands of the insurgents, or were at least under siege by them.⁸²

At 4.30 pm the Tainan Consultative Assembly representatives Huang Pai-lu (黃百祿), Hou Ch'üan-ch'eng (侯全成) and Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉) announced Taipei's response with the nine additional requirements to an angry crowd of students and young people. Han Shih-ch'üan summarised these directives into four guidelines for the public.

1. Do not extend [the uprising].
2. No bloodshed.
3. Acknowledge the existing political institutions.
4. Solve political problems politically.

⁸¹ Kerr (1965), pp. 103-104. Ch'en I intended for young Taiwanese to be deployed on the mainland from September 1946. Public opinion, however, would only accept volunteer soldiers for the defence of Taiwan. Following intense protests Ch'en I was forced to abandon his plan.

⁸² Lin Mu-shun, p. 94; Chin Yü, p. 32, *Tainan*, 台南, paras. 3-4. See the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 13 March, p. 1, top left and *THCH*, p. 15, from line 8, for information on this army.

Taipei's response and their requirements were accepted in a gathering at around 5.30 pm of the chairmen and their deputies of the city districts, representatives of the city district assemblies, the chairs of the neighbourhood associations and the city's Consultative Assemblymen. The representatives gathered there were tasked with bringing the public, and the students in particular, in line with the new regulations. Han Shih-ch'üan remarked that a few 'bad elements' (*pu-liang-fen-tzu*, 不良份子) had wanted to further incite the public, but they had been unsuccessful. At 7 pm Huang Pai-lu (黃百祿) and Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉) agreed the following points with the military police on the basis of Taipei's requirements.

1. The National Army soldiers will return to the barracks.
2. The number of troops in the city will not be increased in order to resolve the current situation.
3. Public order will be maintained by the Consultative Assembly [more likely young people working for it], the military police and the civilian police force.
4. The city residents will immediately work towards protecting the lives and property of Mainlanders.
5. All stolen weapons or belongings should be handed to the Consultative Assembly so they may be returned to their original owners.
6. If individuals behave within the law in the future, their past crimes will not be investigated.
7. The authorities must find workable solutions to unemployment and the rice supply problems.⁸³

This agreement could not have satisfied many, particularly the students and young people. The soldiers may have been ordered to stay inside their barracks, but the military police were not, against whom the insurgents' activities were also targeted. For the same reason the young people would hardly have been prepared to cooperate with the military police to maintain order, when they had previously been taking this task into their own hands. It was questionable whether or not they would hand in their weapons now that the city was practically in the hands of the insurgents.

⁸³ Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉), pp. 139-140; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 5 March, Emergency Issue, bottom right, Report No. 2.

On the morning of 5 March Huang Pai-lu (黃百祿) and Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉), together with high-ranking military personnel in Kaohsiung who were responsible for the whole of southern Taiwan, accepted the agreements reached with the military police. They would come into force that afternoon at 3 pm, though several points would be made more precise and specific. Anyone not handing in their weapons was explicitly threatened with punishment. Head teachers were liable for their students' actions, and students and KMT party-members, chairmen of the neighbourhood associations and family leaders were obliged to stop any 'thugs' in their area. This meant that, in theory, in Tainan the cleansing took place at least one week earlier than elsewhere. At 1.50 pm Mayor Chuo Kao-hsüan (卓高烜), the Consultative Assembly Chairman Huang Pai-lu (黃百祿), Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉) and Chuang Meng-hou (莊孟侯) broadcast from the Tainan radio station. They announced the agreed principles and requirements and called upon the public to preserve 'peace and order' and to return home. They requested all school pupils and students to return to their lessons and all police officers to return to their posts by 3 pm, otherwise they would be dismissed.

Various sources confirm that these measures did indeed have the effect of settling the situation. There were no more clashes between Taiwanese and Mainlanders, though this may be because the majority of Mainlanders had retreated to one building in the city, and the soldiers had returned to their barracks. In accordance with Point 3 of their agreement the Consultative Assembly, civilian police and military police maintained order. The Consultative Assembly's apparently successful approach led the *Chung-hua Jih-pao* (中華日報) to promote the solution developed in Tainan for other areas, in its lead article the same day.⁸⁴

On the evening of 5 March at around 8 pm, the dignitaries of the 'Support Committee for Maintaining Public Order in Tainan' met with representatives of

⁸⁴ Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉) pp. 140-141; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 6 March, Emergency Issue, top left and bottom; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, top left. Chin Yü also reveals in praising tones that from 5 March 'normality' returned gradually to Tainan, which was thanks to the efforts of 'not a few individuals'. It is possible that the calmed situation from 5 March is the reason Lin Mu-shun wrote nothing of the period between 4 and 9 March. There was obviously nothing to report on the activities of the fighters (*yung-shih*, 勇士). Lai, Myers et al. p. 130, also omit all details of developments in Tainan between 4 and 11 March.

other organisations, including the Business and Solicitors' Guilds, in order to replace the organisation with a Tainan City Resolution Committee. Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉) took over the chair on the proviso that the four principles and other requirements were accepted. Huang Pai-lu (黃百祿) and Chuang Meng-hou (莊孟侯) were made his deputies. The Committee established a similar structure to those in other cities, though it lacked a Political Subcommittee (*cheng-chih-tsu*, 政治組) to take up the concerns of members of the public. One wasn't formed until 8 March, following public pressure. It indicates that this role was not the dignitaries' main concern. As well as coordinating police duties, the Public Security Subcommittee (*chih-an-tsu*, 治安組) was also concerned with collecting the weapons from the police stations and elsewhere. In contrast to Chia-i, Taichung and other cities, the politicians and dignitaries retained control over the Resolution Committee from the beginning and were able to steer the direction of further events, certainly from 5 March onwards. On 6 March several thousand college students from Tainan marched peacefully for the reform of the corrupt political system in Taiwan (*kai-ko pen-sheng fu-pai cheng-chih*, 改革本省腐敗政治). Han Shih-ch'üan and Huang Pai-lu were at the front of the demonstration with a banner reading 'Support the National Government' (*yung-hu kuo-min cheng-fu*, 擁護國民政府). No incidents occurred during the march. It is not possible to determine from the sources to what extent it was a fully controlled demonstration, or whether it was influenced just far enough that no incidents arose.⁸⁵

The following day Mayor Chuo Kao-hsüan (卓高烜) returned to resume his duties. The first measure was to borrow 2 million Taiwan Dollars in the name of the Resolution Committee in order to alleviate the rice scarcity. In a Resolution Committee meeting Consultative Assemblyman Chang Shou-ling (張壽齡) and

⁸⁵ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, top left, Reports Nos.1-3; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, top right, Reports Nos. 9 and 11-12; *THCH*, p. 10, para. 1, lines 5-6; Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉), pp. 141-143: according to him the students had requested permission for the demonstration and the commanding officer in Tainan had granted it on condition that they did not march near any military facilities. It is, of course, also conceivable that the students demonstrated spontaneously and the dignitaries only placed themselves at the front at the last minute, in order to steer the column.

the deputy chair of the Tainan Consultative Assembly, Yang Ch'ing (楊請) were despatched to Taipei to report to Ch'en I on the situation in Tainan, and to request that he bring the situations in Chia-i (嘉義) and Kaohsiung (高雄) under control so that the unrest would not spill over into Tainan again. In light of this, Lin Mu-shun's allegations must surely be partly justified that the dignitaries' main concern was not to get the Taiwanese peoples' legitimate political demands through, but rather solely to bring the situation under their own control again as quickly as possible.

At 3 pm on 9 March a 'General Meeting of all Socially Relevant Groups in Tainan City' (*Tainan-shih ko-chieh lien-ho ta-hui*, 台南市各界聯合大會), which had been called by the Consultative Assembly, took place in order to evaluate the incumbent mayor's suitability for the position, and if necessary select three candidates, in accordance with Ch'en I's announcement on 6 March. In addition to all the city's Consultative Assemblymen, the student representatives, businesses, factories and chairmen of the city districts and neighbourhood associations all had a vote. In total up to 4000 people are said to have been present. The gathering was united in its dissatisfaction with the incumbent Mayor Chuo Kao-hsüan (卓高煇), and selected candidates to replace him. With a total of 424 eligible votes, the three candidates with the highest numbers were Huang Pai-lu (黃百祿) (179 votes), Hou Ch'üan-ch'eng (侯全成) (109 votes) and T'ang Te-chang (湯德章) (105 votes). This was the first reasonably democratic election in Tainan, and the last one for a long time. It lost its practical relevance the next day when Ch'en I imposed the state of emergency. In a meeting of the Consultative Assemblymen that evening, the Resolution Committee, which had been declared illegal, was to be dissolved the following day and its duties taken over by the Consultative Assembly. The Resolution Committee was obviously already in the process of dissolving itself when the Independent Regiment of the 21st Division reached Tainan on 11 March at 10 am and surrounded the Resolution Committee building. The soldiers checked the personal details of all present - including students,

Consultative Assemblymen and others - and arrested over a hundred people.⁸⁶

The officer for Tainan, Yang Chün (楊俊), who had been appointed by the commander of Kaohsiung Fort, Lieutenant General P'eng Meng-chi (彭孟緝), implemented the state of emergency immediately, in line with the announcements made on 4 and 5 March. The following were added:

- Weapons must to be handed in to the Consultative Assembly by 4 pm on the same day, after which house searches will be carried out. If weapons are found at anyone's house, they will be shot on the spot. Accessories who fail to inform the authorities will also be punished [possibly in the same manner, though no details are given here].
- Anyone who returns stolen goods to the owner or the police by 15 March will be exempted from punishment.
- Anyone spreading oral or written rumours will be punished according to military procedure.⁸⁷

T'ang Te-chang (湯德章) was publicly executed on 12 March. Others were put in prison, though the sources do not provide names. Rewards were offered for tip-offs. The house searches, which were carried out on 11 and 12 March by local dignitaries accompanied by civilian and military police officers, did not produce the desired results. As a result the state of emergency was lifted from 7 am to 6 pm to provide an opportunity to return weapons. If this were unsuccessful, the state of emergency would be re-imposed and armed house searches (*wu-chuang sou-ch'a*, 武裝搜查) carried out. This was the case, and the searches were repeated on 17 March, and possibly on other dates as well. From 14 March the state of emergency was in place during the night only (8 pm to 6 am) and the beginning and end was marked by sirens. Students and young people were urged by various ultimatums to turn themselves in in return for impunity. The final ultimatum referred to in the sources expired on 10 May. The night-time state of

⁸⁶ Han Shih-ch'üan (韓石泉), pp. 142-144; Lin Mu-shun, p. 95; Chin Yü, p. 33, para. 1; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 10 March, p. 1, centre; 12 March, p. 1, top right and 13 March, p. 1, top right, Report No. 4, line 5; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 2, bottom left; Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Tainan-shih*, 台南市, lines 13-14.

⁸⁷ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 12 March, p. 1, top.

emergency remained in place at least until the beginning of May.⁸⁸ The public was pushed to make ‘donations’ for the soldiers. Especially Han Shih-ch’üan (韓石泉) was enthusiastically involved, though in his memoirs he describes Hou Ch’üan-ch’eng (侯全成) as playing a particularly prominent role in the cleansing. Lin Mu-shun is certainly right in writing that the dignitaries blackened each others names with the authorities after the uprising had been suppressed. Later, when writing their memoirs, they may have rather blamed others for having cooperated too closely with the authorities. Han Shih-ch’üan, Hou Ch’üan-ch’eng and two dignitaries called Ch’en T’ien-shun (陳天順) and Ts’ai P’ei-huo (蔡培火) passed the responsibility for the uprising on to Chuang Meng-hou (莊孟侯) by finding some young people who announced that Chuang had incited them to rebel.⁸⁹

The exact number of victims in Tainan is very difficult to calculate. Lin Mu-shun refers only vaguely to indiscriminate killings and arrests. Han Shih-ch’üan himself confirms the arrest of many innocent people, and scores of people sentenced to prison. For example, on 17 March alone thirty suspects were arrested. According to Yang Liang-kung, the number of victims in Tainan City alone was 48 injured and killed, though only the Mainlanders were counted. More than 100 were arrested on 11 March, and the cost of the damage amounted to 9,283,064 Taiwan Dollars. According to the report of the Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai 100-200 people fell victim to the suppression of the uprising in Tainan.⁹⁰

Starting from 2 March the unrest spread to Tseng-wen (曾文, around fifty

⁸⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 95; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 20 March, p. 2, bottom right; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 13 March, p. 1, top centre; 18 March, p. 1, centre right; 16 March, p. 1, bottom left and 15 March, p. 1, bottom centre; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 1 May, p. 4, top right; (Memoirs of a Tainan Shopkeeper) Wu Tsun-hsien (吳尊賢), pp. 164-166: this source also describes the process of checking of people’s personal details (Wu Tsun-hsien (吳尊賢), ‘Wu Tsun-hsien ti hui-i’ (吳尊賢的回憶) [Memoirs of Wu Tsun-hsien], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch’iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch’u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 163-167.).

⁸⁹ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 16 March, p. 1, bottom left, Han Shih-ch’üan (韓石泉), p. 144; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 95-96. As an activist of the autonomy movement during the Japanese era, Ts’ai P’ei-huo (蔡培火) worked closely with Lin Hsien-t’ang (林獻堂) and like him was one of the most prominent individuals in Taiwan.

⁹⁰ Lin Mu-shun, p. 96; Han Shih-ch’üan (p. 144), lines 5 and 7; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 18 March, p. 1, centre right; Yang Liang-kung, Part I: *Tainan-shih* (台南市), final 2 lines; *Report into the Situation in Taiwan*, p. 276.

kilometres northeast of Tainan), Pei-men (北門, around thirty kilometres north of Tainan on the coast), to Hsin-feng (新豐) and later to Hsin-ying (新營, the seat of the Tainan County administration). In the Pei-men area dignitaries and the police chief together set up a committee on 3 March which aimed to prevent clashes in the area without the use of force. From 5 March it officially named itself a Resolution Committee. It is possible that similar committees existed in other smaller areas, though they were not documented. The Tainan County magistrate, Yüan Kuo-ch'in (園國欽), had already fled into the countryside by 2 March.⁹¹ Armed young people are reported to have travelled by lorry from Hu-wei (虎尾) through Hsin-ying (新營) and Hsin-hua (新化) on 3 March, where they instigated clashes.

The same demands were made at a special sitting of the County Consultative Assembly on 4 March as had been made the previous day at the public meeting in Tainan. A demand specific to the rural areas was for the distribution of state-owned land in order to alleviate unemployment. On 8 March a Resolution Committee for Tainan County, and all its subcommittees, was formed during a meeting involving more than 2000 people. The Consultative Assembly chairman, Ch'en Hua-tung (陳華宗) introduced the Taipei Resolution Committee's reform programme. Forty-seven county administration officials who had left their posts or who had fled, were relieved of their positions by those gathered. Two Consultative Assemblymen who had accompanied the county magistrate when he fled were also relieved of their posts. Even if those present were not legally in a position to do this, it was a clear vote of no confidence for the incumbent administration. The new Resolution Committee was then to select three candidates to succeed the county magistrate. As in other areas of Taiwan a paramilitary youth organisation, the 'Tainan County Autonomous Youth Alliance', formed at the same time as this meeting, though here it remained insignificant.⁹²

The cleansing began slightly later in Tainan County than it had in the city.

⁹¹ Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Tainan-hsien* (台南縣), lines 3-5. Details on the developments in the Pei-men district can be found in (The Memoirs of the Doctor, Author and Tainan County Consultative Assemblyman) Wu Hsin-jung (吳新榮), pp. 2-44.

⁹² Chin Yü, p. 33, paras. 3-4; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 5 March, Emergency Issue, bottom, Report No. 3, and 10 March, p. 1, bottom left; Wu Hsin-jung (吳新榮), pp. 4-10.

Soldiers advanced against insurgents on 15 March in the area of Tseng-wen (曾文), and in Hsin-ying (新營) house searches were carried out on 19 March. As well as the young people who had joined the various spontaneously-formed groups, the searches also hoped to uncover important progressive dignitaries, particularly those who had been involved with the Resolution Committees or even the armed groups. Thus the Provincial Consultative Assemblyman Huang Ma-tien (黃媽典) was publicly executed in Hsin-ying (新營) in the middle of March, though the sources do not provide information on the reasons for this. At the beginning of April the chair of the Pei-men Area Resolution Committee was arrested, and later even the Police Chief, who had been involved. Wu Hsin-jung (吳新榮), a moderate who was also being searched for, was caught in the second half of April, after being warned several times. In his memoirs he describes the atmosphere of terror in the Pei-men area (北門). With the arrival of the troops the county magistrate, Yüan Kuo-ch'in (園國欽), took up his duties again, which included dictating to the Consultative Assembly who it should suggest as candidate for the new county magistrate. They were three officials from the incumbent county administration. Together with the Consultative Assembly and the KMT Party Organisation he formed a 'Pacification Group' (*hsüan-wei-pan*, 宣慰班), which travelled through the villages bringing those responsible there in line with the official stance by means of 'Pacification Gatherings'. They were responsible for the process of cleansing in their respective areas. The police in particular were admonished, as their behaviour during the uprising meant they no longer enjoyed the authorities' full trust. They were expected to prove themselves during the cleansing.⁹³

Yang Liang-kung's figures for Tainan County include 60 insurgents shot dead, 12 arrests in Hsiao-mei (小梅), eight injured officials and 190,000 Taiwan Dollars' worth of equipment stolen from the authorities.⁹⁴

⁹³ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 15 March, p. 1, centre, Report No. 2; 22 March, p. 2, bottom centre; 20 March, p. 2, bottom centre and 23 March, p. 2, centre; Wu Hsin-jung (吳新榮), pp. 22-28.

⁹⁴ Part I, *Tainan-hsien* (台南縣), from line 8.

4.7. The Kaohsiung Region

News of the uprising reached Kaohsiung on 3 March through activists who drove through the streets on lorries reporting on events in Taipei, Taichung, Tainan and other areas. As early as that evening Mainlanders were beaten up by Kaohsiung residents, primarily students and young people. The rage was directed against officials and employees of the authorities in particular. The demonstrators occupied the main police station and the military police headquarters as well as three further police stations, and looted all the weapons to be found.⁹⁵ The majority of Taiwanese police officers defected to the demonstrators, taking their weapons with them. Many Mainlanders fled to the garrison at the Kaohsiung Fort which was on the hill called *Shou-shan* (壽山) in the northwest of the city, above the *Hsi-tzu-wan* (西子灣) bay. By the next day eight hundred people had made their way there. A noteworthy point was that the 'honest and hard-working' (*ch'ing-lien k'u-kan*, 清廉苦幹) teachers, who were predominantly Mainlanders, were distinguished by a Triangle Symbol (*san-chiao cheng-chang*, 三角證章) which was handed to them by the head teacher, with the intention that they avoid becoming a target of the violence.

On 4 March insurgents, who had been joined by the KMT Youth League, attacked the military police at Kaohsiung's station and harbour, forcing them to retreat to the headquarters. During the afternoon attacks were made on a rice store and a police station. The forty or so inmates of the Kaohsiung 'branch' of Tainan's No. 3 Prison were released, as were over two hundred people being held in the Kaohsiung court's remand prison. Meanwhile the Fort garrison stayed where they were. According to P'eng Meng-chi's (彭孟緝) own account he ordered his soldiers not to leave the garrison.⁹⁶

According to Lin Mu-shun the city's Consultative Assembly and representatives of various organisations established a Resolution Committee on 5 March which formulated political demands, however they are not named

⁹⁵ Lin Mu-shun, p. 97. He puts the beginning of the unrest as starting at 8 pm; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 16 March, p. 1, top left (P'eng Meng-chi's (彭孟緝) report on the uprising in Kaohsiung - he states the unrest began at 7.30 pm). See also Chin Yü, p. 34, line 1.

⁹⁶ Lin Mu-shun, p. 98; Chin Yü, p. 34, paras. 3-4; *THCH*, p. 13, para. 3; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 16 March, p. 1, top left and 21 March, p. 2, centre left.

individually. The mayor of Kaohsiung, Huang Chung-t'u (黃仲圖), the chairman of the Consultative Assembly, P'eng Ch'ing-k'ao (彭清靠)⁹⁷ and authority representatives were working towards ending the unrest, or more specifically the insurgents' activities, peacefully. Unconnected with this and at the same time, T'u Kuang-ming (涂光明), leader of the 'City Agency for Settling Enemy [i.e. formerly Japanese] Assets' (*shih-cheng-fu ti-ch'an ch'ing-ch'a-shih*, 市政府敵產清查室) formed a 'Supreme Command' (*tsung chih-hui-pu*, 總指揮部) under his leadership with its headquarters in the No. 1 Middle School (*ti-i chung-hsüeh*, 第一中學) in the San-min (三民) district of the city, in order to coordinate the fighting. His unit was composed primarily of students and young people, but also included around two hundred defected Taiwanese police officers and workers. The same day all the facilities in the city belonging to the authorities and the military were taken, including the headquarters of the military police, who broke through to the Kaohsiung Fort garrison at Shou-shan (壽山). By taking the various facilities the insurgents were able to further arm themselves. Around seven hundred Mainlanders, officials and soldiers were taken captive. Only the Kaohsiung Fort, where General P'eng Meng-chi (彭孟緝) had barricaded himself in, withstood the insurgents. An attempt to persuade him to surrender failed. Three representatives from the 'Supreme Command', who had for this reason made their way to Shou-shan, were stopped by sentries at the foot of the mountain and returned, having achieved nothing.⁹⁸ On the morning of 6 March at around 10 am the Resolution Committee met in the seat of the city government, and in a second attempt it despatched T'u Kuang-ming (涂光明), Huang Chung-t'u (黃仲圖), P'eng Ch'ing-k'ao (彭清靠) and the Consultative Assemblymen Tseng Feng-ming (曾鳳鳴) and Lin Chieh (林界) (who was also head of the Ling-ya (苓雅) city

⁹⁷ This is the father of P'eng Ming-min (彭明敏), the famous figure in the Taiwan independence movement and DPP candidate in the first free Presidential elections of 1996.

⁹⁸ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 98-99; Chin Yü, p. 34, final para. and p. 35, line 2; *THCH*, p. 13, para. 3; (Memoirs of) Yang Chin-hu (Yang Chin-hu (楊金虎), 'Yang Chin-hu ti hui-i' (楊金虎的回憶) [Memoirs of Yang Chin-hu], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 81-85), who was later a member of the National Assembly and mayor of Kaohsiung (p. 82); *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 13 March, p. 1, top, Report No. 3, line 3.

district) to present nine demands to P'eng Meng-chi, of which the most important were the handing over of all weapons and other military goods, and the ban on all soldiers leaving the garrison. There are various versions of the subsequent happenings and exact circumstances. According to his own account, when P'eng Meng-chi (彭孟緝) rejected the demands out of hand one of the visitors attempted to assassinate him, presumably T'u Kuang-ming (涂光明) or Lin Chieh (林界). His assistants prevented it, however. According to Lin Mu-shun, P'eng Meng-chi (彭孟緝) suddenly changed his approach and had the visitors arrested immediately and interrogated them as to the insurgents' position, numbers and firepower. Whereas all the official sources, including the newspapers, report that T'u Kuang-ming (涂光明) coerced the mayor and chairman of the Consultative Assembly to go and see P'eng Meng-chi to demand that the garrison disarm, Lin Mu-shun holds that actually P'eng Meng-chi 'forced' them to say that they had been coerced. The first version is possibly nearer the truth, given that the first attempt by T'u Kuang-ming's 'Supreme Command' had failed, though the exact circumstances are not known. P'eng Meng-chi took all of them captive except the mayor, whom he released to return to the Resolution Committee to convey his report.⁹⁹

P'eng Meng-chi imposed the state of emergency at around 1 pm and, with soldiers he had ordered from Feng-shan (seat of the Kaohsiung county government close to Kaohsiung), broke out of the Fort and captured the city that afternoon with only one hundred to three hundred men. According to P'eng, he had received the order from Taipei at midday to advance into the city in order to suppress the uprising. The soldiers main targets were T'u Kuang-ming's 'Supreme Command' in the No. 1 Middle School, and the city government where the Resolution Committee met, and where they were waiting for the return of the representatives. According to Lin Mu-shun, the soldiers carried out a massacre in the process, by shooting wildly through the streets and at houses. Later bodies

⁹⁹ Lin Mu-shun, p. 99. Lin Mu-shun's assertion that P'eng had T'u Kuang-ming (涂光明), Tseng Feng-ming (曾鳳鳴) and one of the others immediately shot contradicts the consistent claims of various other sources, see below; *THCH*, p. 13, para. 3; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 16 March, p. 1, top left; Yang Chin-hu (楊金虎), p. 82. Lai, Myers et al., pp. 130-131, describe the events in Kaohsiung in only two paragraphs, which is quite inadequate, considering that Kaohsiung was one of the major scenes of the entire 2.28.

were lying throughout the streets. Many were killed particularly in the city government building and its surroundings. This included thirty-four members of the Resolution Committee, among them the four Consultative Assemblymen Wang Shih-ting (王石定), Huang Tz'u (黃賜), Hsü Ch'iu-tsung (許秋粽) and Ch'en Chin-neng (陳金能). The insurgents in the No. 1 Middle School similarly had to yield to the soldiers and fled in the direction of Ta-kang-p'u (大港埔) in the harbour area. During the course of the day at least several hundred people were arrested. The fighting continued until the afternoon of 8 March, though a few insurgents continued to put up resistance alone. T'u Kuang-ming (涂光明) and two other people were also executed on this day. Some were forced to watch the executions of their relatives. It was not until this point that people dared to go out on to the streets to search for their missing relatives. Yang Chin-hu (楊金虎) himself found bodies lying everywhere (*tsung-heng*, 縱橫) in the city government building and the immediate area. Some of them were already in coffins, others were still strewn in the street. This atrocity is confirmed by a British eye witness who spoke of 'hundreds of dead', killed by indiscriminate machine gun fire. On 21 March Lin Chieh (林界) and a man called Ch'en Hsien-kuang (陳顯光) were executed as 'ringleaders'. As late as 22 April the director of the Kaohsiung Prison, Chang Chien-li (張見利) and the prison officer, Chang Chien-i (張見益) were publically executed in the square in front of the station.¹⁰⁰

The cleansing was carried out in Kaohsiung as it was in other areas, i.e. the search was focused on demonstrators who continued to put up resistance, and for

¹⁰⁰ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 100-101; Kerr (1965), p. 304; Chin Yü, p. 35, para. 2; *THCH*, p. 13, para. 3; Yang Chin-hu (楊金虎), pp. 82-83. *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 25 March, p. 2, top left and 27 March, p. 2, top centre. For information on the British eye witness, see the New York Times, 29 March, p. 6, col. 4. Just as Hsieh Hsüeh-hung (謝雪紅) is the most controversial figure amongst the insurgents, so P'eng Meng-chi (彭孟緝) is on the other side. Known to some as the 'butcher of Kaohsiung' (*Kao-hsiung t'u-fu*, 高雄屠夫), see Kerr, 1965, p. 303, and p. 258 in the Chinese translation of his book as well as 'The Memoirs of P'eng Ming-min' (P'eng, Ming-min (彭明敏), 'P'eng Ming-min ti hui-i' (彭明敏的回憶) [Memoirs of Peng Ming-min], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien hui-i-chi* (二二八事件回憶集) [Collection of Memoirs of the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Chang Yen-hsien (張炎憲) and Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) (Pan-ch'iao, Taipei Co.: Tao-hsiang ch'u-pan-she (稻鄉出版社) [Daw Shiang Publ. Co.], 1989), pp. 87-98), p. 97; to the others he is a role model, as he had suppressed the uprising before the troops arrived from the mainland (see Chin Yü, p. 33: 'A brave and intelligent General' (*yu wei chih-yung chien-pei ti chiang-chün*, 有位智勇兼備的將軍).

hidden weapons. It is alleged that up to three hundred rifles were discovered up until 13 March. 'Followers' and particularly students and young people who handed themselves in were supposed to be exempted from punishment. How they were actually treated is not mentioned in the (mainly official) sources. Only Lin Mu-shun reports of indiscriminate shooting at civilians and volleys of shots being fired into houses. The soldiers haphazard advance is confirmed by observations from Yang Chin-hu (楊金虎) of the city government, who had tried together with other dignitaries to put a halt to the demonstrators and their activities, but was arrested on 6 March and himself almost executed. It is not possible to put an exact figure on the number of victims, given the available resources. The fighting and the soldiers' behaviour in Kaohsiung is comparable with Taipei in terms of the numbers of victims (see Yang Liang-kung's (楊亮功) figures below).¹⁰¹ As a result of P'eng's advance on the afternoon of 8 March, the troops despatched from the mainland were able to land with no difficulties and move immediately northwards.

The situation in Feng-shan (鳳山), the seat of the Kaohsiung County government only a few kilometres east of Kaohsiung, also became tense with the arrival of news from Kaohsiung and elsewhere on 3 March. The army units stationed in Feng-shan were able to manage the situation so that unrest did not break out. No acts of violence were directed against Mainlanders and contact could not be established with the insurgents in Kaohsiung. During a public meeting (*chen-min ta-hui*, 鎮民大會) the following day demands were presented to the County Magistrate Huang Ta-p'ing (黃達平), though their exact content is not specified in the sources. At least one important point was that the soldiers withdraw to the barracks. Huang Ta-p'ing accepted the demands, the soldiers did indeed retreat to the barracks and the situation in Feng-shan remained calm, though the sources offer no explanation as to how Feng-shan was seemingly unaffected by events in Kaohsiung, given the troops' retreat. After the landing of the troops from the mainland on 8 March Feng-shan was an unlikely place for insurgents' activities as the Independent Regiment of the 21st Division set up its

¹⁰¹ *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 21 March, p. 2, top centre and *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 15 March, p. 2, centre; Lin Mu-shun, pp. 100-101; Yang Chin-hu (楊金虎), pp. 82-83.

headquarters here.¹⁰² It was less calm in other areas around Kaohsiung. Clashes involving soldiers occurred in Kang-shan (岡山), Nan-tzu (楠梓), Ch'i-shan (旗山), Mei-nung (美濃) and Tung-kang (東港), and police stations were taken. In Ch'i-shan the unrest began on 4 March and carried on for several days until P'eng Meng-chi's army unit reached the area, about thirty kilometres northeast of Kaohsiung, on 6 March. There were no attacks on the Mainlanders living there. In these areas cleansing was carried out from 18 March in a fashion similar to elsewhere, i.e. the local dignitaries were gathered together and instructed by officers on the method of cleansing, and were ordered to provide tip-offs, and given ultimatums for handing over weapons.¹⁰³

News of the uprising in Taipei reached Ping-tung (屏東), a municipality approximately twenty kilometres to the east of Kaohsiung, on 2 March. The deputy chairman of the Consultative Assembly, Yeh Ch'iu-mu (葉秋木), called a meeting for that very evening which was attended by representatives of various organisations, as well as students and young people. Those gathered were united in their desire to support the uprising in Taipei and to take action themselves, though they wanted to wait for the arrival of people from Taipei who were coming to offer their support. Meanwhile, the city government was meeting with representatives of the authorities to discuss ways to avoid unrest by peaceful means.¹⁰⁴

On the morning of 4 March violence targeted at Mainlanders broke out throughout the city. The people travelling from Taipei to offer support arrived in the city at around 11 am. The insurgents organised themselves into units and under the leadership of those who arrived from Taipei as well as a Taiwanese named Chuang Ying-shih (莊迎氏) they went to the city government and demanded of the mayor, Kung Lü-tuan (龔履端), that he release the city seals to them, that the civilian police, military police and military units stationed in Ping-

¹⁰² Lin Mu-shun, pp. 98-99; Chin Yü, p. 35, para. 3; *THCH*, p. 12, para. 3; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 13 March, p. 1, top right, Report No. 4 and 18 March, p. 1, bottom left.

¹⁰³ *THCH* (p. 12, para. 3); *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 6 March, Emergency Issue, centre left; 18 March, p. 1, bottom right, 23 March, p. 2, centre right, 27 March, p. 2, centre right, and *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 9 March, p. 1, bottom centre.

¹⁰⁴ Lin Mu-shun, p. 103; Chin Yü, p. 35, *P'ing-t'ung*, para. 2 to p.36, para. 1.

tung retreat, that they hand over all their weapons, and that Mainlanders be 'concentrated'. However the mayor was in the city's main police station which was occupied by a different group of insurgents under the leadership of Lin Chin-hsiang (林晉祥) and Cheng Yüan-hsiao (鄭元宵). When he refused the demand to distribute weapons and ammunition the crowd stormed the station. The mayor fled under police protection to the headquarters of the military police. The seat of the city government was taken by insurgents at the same time. They were able to further arm themselves after seizing the police weapons depot and disarmed the Ping-tung Sugar Factory security force.

That afternoon they formed a Resolution Committee and voted Yeh Ch'iu-mu (葉秋木) in to chair it. Apart from the military police headquarters, the entire city was under their control.¹⁰⁵

On 5 March the insurgents tried in vain to take the military police headquarters. They retreated temporarily and set up a headquarters in the Central Hotel (*Chung-yang lü-she*, 中央旅社), as well as in the Provincial Girls' Middle School (*sheng-li nü-tzu chung-hsüeh*, 省立女子中學). After having cut off the water and electricity supply to the military police, and having armed themselves with machine guns and fire engines (with which they intended to set light to the military police headquarters) they tried one more time. At around 10 pm the military police and around fifty Mainlanders under their protection fled to Ping-tung airport where they joined the air force ground staff there. The insurgents pursued them and laid siege to the airport until 8 March without successfully taking it. On 5 March the Resolution Committee elected Yeh Ch'iu-mu (葉秋木) to the position of interim mayor (*lin-shih shih-chang*, 臨時市長), which is lauded by Lin Mu-shun as Taiwan's first free election for mayor. At midday on 8 March a battalion of the Independent Regiment of the 21st Division under Liu Ho-hsiao (劉和嘯) reached Ping-tung and implemented the state of emergency. According to Lin Mu-shun many young people were killed in the process. By 11 March the troops had secured more than four hundred rifles, over twenty machine guns,

¹⁰⁵ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 103-104; Chin Yü, p. 36, paras. 2-3: according to this source only ten people travelled from Taipei to P'ing-tung; *THCH*, p. 12, para. 2.

innumerable bayonets and bullets, as well as other equipment. Yeh Ch'iu-mu (葉秋木) and others were arrested as 'ring leaders' and executed on 11 March. According to Kerr, the American Vice-consul, altogether forty-five people were killed. Reports of a massacre were also made by foreign eye witnesses who confirm the indiscriminate shooting of machine guns and scores of executions.¹⁰⁶

The uprising even spread to the southern tip of Taiwan. On 4 March insurgents captured the district leader in Heng-ch'un (恆春) and it was not until 9 March that soldiers from Kaohsiung regained control of the situation.¹⁰⁷

Yang Liang-kung describes more than 200 insurgents killed and over 1200 arrested in Kaohsiung, 171 dead and injured among the residents and 83 dead or injured officials (including Ping-tung and Kaohsiung County). The cost of damage in Kaohsiung reached 70 million Taiwan Dollars. The report of the Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai claims suppression measures in Kaohsiung claimed the largest number of lives, with over 3000 Taiwanese deaths.¹⁰⁸

4.8. Eastern Taiwan

4.8.1. Hualien County

The news, or rather rumours, from Taipei reached Hualien (花蓮), a county town on the east coast on 3 March and led to a tense atmosphere, which had consequences the following day. Hsü Hsi-ch'ien (許錫謙), the KMT Youth League cadre, lead more than twenty young people to the League's office where they forced Secretary Kuo (郭) to call a People's Meeting (*min-chung ta-hui*, 民眾大會) in their name. He immediately released an announcement and young people drove through the streets mobilising the public for the meeting. It took place at around 2 pm and involved around three thousand to five thousand people. The majority of Mainlanders and officials had left their positions and fled to the

¹⁰⁶ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 104-105; Kerr (1965), p. 305; Chin Yü, p. 36, from para. 3; *THCH*, p. 12, para. 2, lines 6-8; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 13 March, Report No. 4, lines 2-4. For information on the foreign eye witnesses, see the New York Times, 29 March, p. 6, col. 6.

¹⁰⁷ *THCH*, p. 12, para. 3, from line 3 and the New York Times, 12 March, p. 14, col. 4.

¹⁰⁸ Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *Kao-hsiung-shih*, 高雄市, final 6 lines, *P'ing-tung-shih*, 屏東市, final 3 lines, *Kao-hsiung-hsien*, 高雄縣, final 2 lines; *Report on the Incident in Taiwan*, p. 276.

barracks of the soldiers stationed in Hualien, who had themselves retreated out of the city, so that there were few Mainlander casualties in the county generally. Those gathered elected the KMT Youth League cadre and Provincial Consultative Assemblyman for Hualien County, Ma Yu-yüeh (馬有岳), to chair, and immediately decided to form a Resolution Committee under his leadership. The new committee drafted a statement with twelve demands which included the demands made in Taipei and in addition expressly demanded autonomy for Taiwan and the abolition of the customs authority.¹⁰⁹ After the meeting various influential people from Hualien organised the young people into armed groups. For example, Cheng Ken-ching (鄭根井) formed a 'Golden Lion Group' (*chin-shih-tui*, 金獅隊), which, according to Lin Mu-shun, took over maintaining public order. Another, the 'White Tiger Group' (*pai-hu-tui*, 白虎隊), was comprised of young people who had served under the Japanese on Hainan Island (海南) during the war. It was led by a man named Kuo (郭), and it disarmed the military police. Hsü Hsi-ch'ien (許錫謙) formed a 'Great Youth Alliance' (*ch'ing-nien ta-t'ung-meng*, 青年大同盟) and gave himself the grandiose title of 'Supreme Commander of the Ground and Air Forces' (*lu-k'ung-chün tsung-szu-ling*, 陸空軍總司令). It is doubtful however, whether such a clear division of duties actually existed. Chin Yü's view that there was a power struggle going on between these groups can not be easily dismissed.¹¹⁰

On 5 March at around 9 am the Resolution Committee held a meeting at which they constituted themselves as a branch committee of the Taipei Provincial

¹⁰⁹ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 107-108, however the twelve demands are not listed in detail; Chin Yü, p. 38, paras. 1-2; *THCH*, p. 13, para. 2; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, centre and 7 March, p. 1, top right, Report No. 3, line 6: 'Report by the Provincial Consultative Assemblyman Kuo Kuo-chi (郭國基)'. Lai, Myers et al., p. 131, do not reveal Ma Yu-yüeh's (馬有岳) identity as a Provincial Consultative Assemblyman and describe him simply as a "member of the Young People's Association", thereby referencing Mien Chih (免之), pp. 199-201, 'Hua-lien fen-jao chi-shih' (花蓮紛擾紀實) [A True Account of the Turmoil in Hua-lien], in *Taiwan erh-erh-pa shih-chien ch'in-li-chi* (台灣二二八事件親歷記) [Personal Experience during the 2.28 Incident in Taiwan], ed. by Taiwan cheng-i ch'u-pan-she (台灣正義出版社) [Taiwan Justice Publishing House] ([n.p.]: 1947), pp. 199-205).

¹¹⁰ Lin Mu-shun, p. 108; *THCH*, p. 13, para. 2; Chin Yü, p. 38, paras. 2-3. The sources do not state whether the leader of the White Tiger group is the same person as the KMT Youth League secretary. According to Chin Yü, this group was lead by Hsü Hsi-ch'ien (許錫謙). Lai, Myers et al.'s otherwise very detailed account of events in Hua-lien (pp. 131-134) makes no mention of the 'Golden Lion' and 'White Tiger' groups.

Resolution Committee representing Hualien County. Fifty people took part, including Ma Yu-yüeh (馬有岳), Cheng Ken-ching (鄭根井), Hsü Hsi-ch'ien (許錫謙), and the forty-seven heads of Hualien's neighbourhood associations. They created six subcommittees along the same pattern as committees in other areas. They included a Denunciation Subcommittee (*chien-chü-tsu*, 檢舉組) to receive information on corrupt officials, a Donations Subcommittee (*mu-chüan-tsu*, 募捐組), which was tasked with collecting donations for the Resolution Committee's work, a Publicity Subcommittee (*pao-tao-tsu*, 報導組), which included the publishers of the regional newspapers. The following list of demands was compiled during the meeting:

1. The [KMT] Youth League, students, young people with military training, Taiwanese police officers and the fire department will together take over maintaining public order.
2. Soldiers and military police officers are forbidden from leaving [their quarters]; if it is absolutely necessary, they must not carry their weapons. The Resolution Committee will provide food as required.
3. The food stores belonging to the Food Supply Office (*liang-shih-chü*, 糧食局) and the Monopoly Bureau must be handed over to the Resolution Committee so that they can be distributed among the public.
4. The facilities enabling the transport, post and electricity networks must resume their normal operation.
5. Corrupt officials must be denounced immediately .
6. No blood must be spilt; all political problems should be resolved peacefully.
7. Three delegates will supervise the county magistrate.
8. All state enterprises should be passed into private ownership, for the good of the people.
9. The customs authority must be dissolved.
10. Medication confiscated by the 'Committee for Settling Japanese Assets' (*Jih-ch'an ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui*, 日產處理委員會) must urgently be made available to the poor.
11. We demand the dismissal of the leader of the 'Food Provision Agency' (*liang-shih shih-wu-suo*, 糧食事務所).¹¹¹

Ma Yu-yüeh (馬有岳) called in vain several times, on behalf of the Resolution

¹¹¹ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 2, centre left.

Committee, for the soldiers in the barracks to surrender their weapons. The insurgents' activities slowed down with the landing of the KMT troops in Keelung, as it was only a matter of time before they reached Hualien. The Resolution Committee also dissolved, in accordance with Ch'en I's order on 10 March, and Mayor Chang (張) resumed his position. However the KMT troops did not enter Hualien until 17 March. Hsü Hsi-ch'ien (許錫謙) as well as the National Assembly member, chairman of the Hualien Consultative Assembly and well-known doctor, Chang Ch'i-lang (張七朗) and his two sons, Chang Tsung-jen (張宗仁), head of the Hualien Middle School, and Chang Kuo-jen (張果仁), a teacher at the same school, were executed 'ringleaders'. Ma Yu-yüeh (馬有岳) was also arrested and one year later was still awaiting trial.¹¹²

According to Yang Liang-kung only four officials were injured in Hualien County. The material costs reached 7,400,000 Taiwan Dollars. He does not report on members of the public who were hurt or killed during the suppression of the uprising. By contrast, Lin Mu-shun writes of the 'terror' caused by the KMT troops who killed many through indiscriminate shooting on the streets, and also arrested many. He does not provide specific figures, however.¹¹³

4.8.2. *Taitung County*

The events in Taipei also affected Taitung (台東) County in the south-east of the island, the most isolated part of Taiwan, from a geographical and communications link point of view. On 1 March Yeh Tzu-feng (葉子楓), an employee of the meteorological station (*ts'e-hou-suo*, 測候所) heard news of the uprising in Taipei over the radio and passed it straight on so that the people also heard the news in the radio. According to the Kaohsiung City Provincial Consultative Assemblyman's, Kuo Kuo-chi's (郭國基), report, who was in Taitung on 3 March, a public meeting (*hsien-min ta-hui*, 縣民大會) was held on 2 March. The following day the young people, including aborigines, who had in the meantime

¹¹² Lin Mu-shun, p. 108; Chin Yü, p. 38, final para.; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 13 March, p. 1, bottom left; Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) 1986, p. 20.

¹¹³ Part I, *Hua-lien-hsien*, 花蓮縣, final three lines.

armed themselves, held a Youth Meeting (*ch'ing-nien ta-hui*, 青年大會) under the leadership of Yeh Tzu-feng in the square in front of the county government building. They demanded that all corrupt officials be 'cleansed' (*su-ch'ing*, 肅清) and that the food supply problem be resolved. County Magistrate Hsieh Chen (謝真) fled, and the young people took control of and ransacked the county government building as well as Hsieh Chen's home. On 4 March widespread violence broke out against Mainlanders, who worked predominantly in the county government. The majority of them came from around Fuchou, in Fukien Province, so they were beaten up to cries of 'Beat the Fuchou people!' (in Taiwanese: *phah Hok-chiu-a*, in Mandarin: *ta Fu-chou-tsai*, 打福州仔). The entire staff of the county government and the Consultative Assembly chairman, Ch'en Chen-tung (陳振宗), then fled. The insurgents took the police weapons depot in the county government building as well as Ma-lan airport. At around 5 pm they occupied the radio station and looted the No. 73 Supply Depot containing weapons, ammunition and food stuffs. At 11 pm more than a thousand insurgents laid siege to the military police headquarters. They eventually took it through their superior power and took possession of the weapons there. Thus the city was in their hands, and the entire government structure throughout the county collapsed.¹¹⁴

In order to fill the administrative vacuum created, several dignitaries and Consultative Assembly members formed a Resolution Committee on 6 March, after which the situation calmed slightly. News of the KMT troop landings in Keelung and Kaohsiung was enough to put a stop to the insurgents' activities. Hence County Magistrate Hsieh Chen (謝真) and his subordinates returned on 12 March and resumed their positions. The Taitung County Consultative Assembly decided on 15 March that the incumbent county magistrate should retain his post. This decision was a formal response to Ch'en I's original proposal for the re-

¹¹⁴ Lin Mu-shun, p. 109; *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, top right, Report No. 3, lines 3-6; Chin Yü, p. 37, paras. 1-2; *THCH*, p. 12, final para. to p. 13, para. 1; Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *T'ai-tung-hsien*, 台東縣; Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰), 1986, p. 20. *THCH* reports that more than 2000 young people took part in the Youth meeting. According to Yang Liang-kung it was merely several dozen (*shu-shih*, 數十). The number of over 1000 insurgents who took control of the military police headquarters is provided by *THCH*. Due to the lack of details in other sources this figure can be neither confirmed nor disproved. Lai, Myers et al. ignore the events in Taitung entirely, making no reference to them (see p. 134).

election of county magistrates and mayors in municipalities. The result of the decision certainly reflects an accommodation to the old and now re-established power structures. On 17 March soldiers from the Independent Regiment of the 21st Division arrived in Taitung from the south, and soldiers from Hualien from the north. They took captive employees of the meteorological station as ‘ringleaders’, and according to Lin Mu-shun, they also arrested many of Taitung’s dignitaries, young people, students and teachers. Many of them were killed during the process of suppressing the uprising. The deputy Regiment Commander of the Independent Regiment, Kuo (郭), took over the implementation of the cleansing in Taitung County. As in other areas, Consultative Assemblymen, head teachers and mayors in the townships were made responsible for them in ‘Pacification Meetings’.¹¹⁵

According to Yang Liang-kung 19 officials were injured in Taitung County, and material costs reached 1,650,000 Taiwan Dollars.¹¹⁶

4.9. The Penghu Islands

The first news of the uprising on the Taiwanese ‘mainland’ reached the Penghu Islands (澎湖列島, or with their Portuguese name: the ‘Pescadores’) during the night of 2 March. An important source of information was the radio broadcast news from Chia-i (嘉義), the nearest city on Taiwan. The following day the people on the Penghu Islands were called on from Chia-i to rise up against the government as people had done on Taiwan. There were many former soldiers on the Penghu Islands, as they had been an important naval base under the Japanese. They, as well as many young people, fully intended to respond to this appeal. However, the military stationed on the islands were alerted by events on Taiwan and implemented the state of emergency before demonstrators were able to take any action at all. Soldiers guarded potential targets, such as the authorities, weapons depots and electricity and water works. A fire which broke out in a naval

¹¹⁵ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 109-110; Chin Yü, p. 37, from para. 3; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 17 March, p. 1, centre left; Liu Yü-ch’ing (劉雨卿), p. 172, para. 3, line 4; the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 21 March, p. 2, top centre and 1 May, p. 4, Report No. 3, top right.

¹¹⁶ Part I, *T’ai-tung-hsien*, 台東縣, final three lines.

electricity plant during a Penghu County Consultative Assembly meeting, and which Ch'en I described as a 'coincidence', was initially interpreted as a signal for the beginning of the uprising, though nothing became of it. The Consultative Assembly established a Penghu County Resolution Committee, though its function was merely to express the Penghu Islanders' support for the demands put forward in Taipei. Whether or not this support stretched to violent action is difficult to ascertain. It was certainly the case among young people and a portion of the population. The attempts of the young people and the Taiwanese employees of the county government to establish an 'Autonomous Youth Alliance' (*ch'ing-nien tzu-chih t'ung-meng*, 青年自治同盟), presumably with military objectives¹¹⁷ could not be realised due to the tight control exercised by the military. The only incident occurred on the evening of 7 March, when a sentry shot a woman in the leg. The Resolution Committee protested fiercely, and demanded the military pay compensation of 100,000 Taiwan Dollars. The demand was quickly met in order to prevent any unrest. The Resolution Committee was dissolved with the news of the suppression of the uprising on Taiwan, without the occurrence of any serious clashes. According to Lin Mu-shun at the same time as the cleansings on Taiwan, a number of young people on Penghu were also arrested.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ given that in Taipei (see p. 65) and Hsinchu (see p. 114) organisations of the same name had been formed with clear military objectives.

¹¹⁸ Lin Mu-shun, p. 111-112; Chin Yü, p. 39. See also Yang Liang-kung, Part I, *P'eng-hu-hsien*, 澎湖縣. Lai, Myers et al.'s assertion (p. 135) that no organisations were formed on the Penghu Islands at all is proven false by the concurring information provided by the sources mentioned.

5. The Central Government's Response

In order to answer this question, to start with we face the problem through what channels or through whom the Central Government learned of the events in Taiwan. Above all, it would be crucial to know what the Central Government learned of these events and in what way events were presented. Unfortunately not enough is known about this even today, as on the one hand the archives are not yet accessible, and on the other, written records are unavailable due to the informal communications methods (telephone and telegram) that were used. In this relation only the *KSCW* document collection is available, which is partly referred to in this work.¹ The alternative is to compile information from the sources (reports, memoirs, American diplomatic dossiers etc.) to try and construct an integrated picture of events. As far as the official assessment of events in Taiwan is concerned, the published official response and reports are available.

The Central Government was informed early by Ch'en I. Lin Mu-shun reports of telegrams Ch'en I started sending to the Central Government on 1 March describing events and requesting troops. He does not provide information on how he received this information, and explains merely that 'the public found out about it' (*pei jen-min huo-hsi*, 被人民獲悉).² According to his published diary, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) learned about events in Taipei as early as 28 February.³ On 6 March Ch'en I conveyed his explanation of the uprising in Taiwan to Chiang Kai-shek, that fully corresponded to the later circulated official version of events.⁴ However, Chiang Kai-shek also received information from sources other than those with a conspiracy theory viewpoint (ie the uprising was caused by 'Communists', 'careerists' and 'thugs'), but which were rather based on solid facts. He received first hand information on 5 March when the American Embassy

¹ See above, Section 3.3.3., p. 103, fn.219.

² Lin Mu-shun, p. 20.

³ Ch'in, Hsiao-i (秦孝儀), ed., *Tsung-t'ung: Chiang-kung ta-shih ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao* (總統：蔣公大事長編初稿) [The President of the Republic: A Preliminary Draft of Source Materials About the Major Events of Chiang Kai-shek's Life] (Taipei: [n.pub.], 1978), vol.6, Part 2, p. 396. In China during the KMT era, and still today in KMT circles, Chiang Kai-shek is usually known in Chinese as Chiang Chung-cheng (蔣中正).

⁴ *KSCW*, doc. 16, pp. 122-129. See also lead article in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, March 28, p. 2, top left; see above, 3.3.3., p. 92.

passed on a letter from the 'Political Reconstruction Association'. A Special Report from the secret service on 6 March informed Chiang Kai-shek of the high inflation and unemployment since 1946, of the state-owned enterprises' monopolisation of the economy, the widespread corruption and the 'language problem' which existed between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders. The acute food shortages in January and February 1947 were described as triggering factors, as well as the Governor's Office's increased control over trade and the domestic economy. Li I-chung (李翼中), the head of the Party Organisation on Taiwan, which was controlled by the CC Faction, informed Chiang Kai-shek of the situation in Taiwan on 7 March, and Ko Ching'en (葛敬恩), Ch'en I's secretary similarly informed him on 14 March.⁵

The 'Supreme Commission for National Defence' (*kuo-fang tsui-kao wei-yüan-hui*, 國防最高委員會) on 6 March advised that the Governor's Office be transformed into an ordinary provincial government, and that 'senior officials' be despatched to Taiwan to assist in resolving the situation. Ch'en I was obviously not trusted to be able to gain control over the situation himself, despite his assertions to the contrary.⁶ In order to silence the criticism against him, which was voiced both publicly and within the KMT, Ch'en I felt the need to send a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek on 12 March to paint the picture from his point of view once again, and in particular to defend the monopolised economic policy he had led.⁷

According to Lin Mu-shun, the soldiers Ch'en I had requested from the Central Government were assured him by 2 March.⁸ According to the memoirs of the commander of the 21st Division, General Liu Yü-ch'ing (劉雨卿), the Central

⁵ *FRUS*, No. 479, p. 435; *KSCW*, doc. 16, pp. 130-134 (Secret Service Report). It is not clear from which of the two rival secret service organisations this information came; whether from the 'Office for Investigations and Statistics' (*kuo-chia chün-shih wei-yüan-hui tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi chü*, 國家軍事委員會調查統計局), which was controlled by the Whampoa Faction, or the 'KMT Central Executive Committee Office' (*Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui*, 中央執行委員會), which was controlled by the CC Faction. For information on these two organisations, see Pepper, p. 47 fn., and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, pp. 124 and 131.

For information on Li I-chung (李翼中), see Ch'in Hsiao-i (秦孝儀), vol. 6, Part 2, p. 399 and *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, centre left; for information on Ko Ching'en (葛敬恩), see *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 16 March, p. 1, top left.

⁶ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 9 March, p. 1; *KSCW*, doc. 41, p. 176; *FRUS*, No. 498, p. 437.

⁷ *KSCW*, doc. 101, pp. 265-270.

⁸ He states (p. 23) that 100,000 soldiers were assigned to him. Kerr (1965), p. 292, reports a total of 13,000 soldiers who landed on Taiwan on 8 March.

Government decided on 5 March to despatch the 21st Division, under his command, to Taiwan. On 6 March Ch'en was informed that the 21st Division and two battalions of the 4th Regiment of the military police had left Shanghai and Fuchou respectively. According to Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚) and Lai, Myers et al., at least two divisions landed on Taiwan. These landings did not only take place on 8 March. Reinforcements arrived on Taiwan on 17 March so that the total number of soldiers must have reached fifty to sixty thousand, as one Chinese officer informed Kerr.⁹ As is often mentioned in the subject material, Ch'en I was personally trusted by Chiang Kai-shek, which may have played a role in the Central Government's quick positive response to Ch'en I's requests for additional troops.¹⁰

At this stage a Communist victory on the mainland was a long way off, and so the idea of Taiwan as a final retreat was not yet considered. Certainly the uprising occurred at a critical point for the KMT. The last American mediation attempts which would build a coalition of the KMT and CCP (the Marshall Mission) failed in January, and full-scale civil war broke out. On 2 March the CCP negotiation delegation returned from Nanking to their headquarters at Yen'an (延安). At the beginning of the month heavy fighting between Communist and KMT troops took place in the Changchun (長春) area of Manchuria. In addition, the KMT was preparing for its attack on Yen'an which was captured on 19 March, though it could only be held for a short time.¹¹ The KMT had reached a critical stage in one other respect as well. With the end of the mediation attempts it tried to establish explicit American support for itself, rather than the wavering, dissociated attitude previously displayed. This included lifting the partial weapons embargo which had been imposed in August 1946 in order to emphasise the USA's 'neutral' role during the Marshall Mission and to protect further economic assistance worth

⁹ Ch'in Hsiao-i, p. 398 and (The Memoirs of) Liu Yü-ch'ing (劉雨卿) p. 171; Lin Mu-shun, p. 31; *The China White Paper*, p. 931; *FRUS*, No. 637, p. 456.

¹⁰ Boorman, vol. 1, p. 252, para. 5 and p. 253, para. 2; Kerr (1965), pp. 49-50, p. 52. In addition, both originally came from the northern part of Che-chiang Province (浙江).

¹¹ *A Decade of American Foreign Policy*, pp. 727-728; Pepper (p. XVIII); *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 2 March, p. 1, and *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 20 March, p. 1.

US\$ 500 million, which was still being negotiated.¹² A rebellion in Taiwan was therefore most inopportune, all the more as it had only been handed over to China after the end of the war on the basis of the Cairo Declaration of 1943. Against this backdrop the KMT was working hard to create the impression that they were moving towards democratisation, or at the least, a good administration. Moreover, Taiwan was the only province which at this point had not been pulled into the civil war, and was one of China's most developed provinces.

Two other factors must have led to Central Government's swift and severe reaction. Firstly was the systematic rounding-up of officials and Mainlanders in 'concentration camps' (*chi-chung-ying*, 集中營),¹³ as described in the official sources. The sources claim that around 2500 people were 'concentrated' at various places. Other places are said to have done the same, though no definite figures are provided. In addition, the speed with which the uprising spread and the insurgents armed themselves with their ensuing initial successful advances must have played a role. The sources state that there were between 15,000 and 20,000 armed insurgents, carrying mostly rifles, but also hand grenades, machine guns and small canons.¹⁴ In Taichung fire engines were even misappropriated as flame-throwers.¹⁵ It was therefore a distinct possibility that the insurgents would be able to take control of the whole island.

The first justification for the deployment of troops was given during a speech by Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking on 10 March. In it he spared Ch'en I from direct criticism and responsibility for the outbreak of the uprising, but also left him out in the cold by announcing that he was to wait for the arrival of a senior official in Taiwan who would 'help' him resolve the issue. Chiang held the Taiwanese who had fought in the South Pacific under the Japanese responsible for the outbreak of unrest, and claimed they had exploited the incident on 27 February to agitate the

¹² Pepper, pp. XVII ff. The embargo was lifted in May 1947; for information on the loan negotiations see Kerr (1965), p. 316; for information on the USA's still undecided stance, see also the *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 23 March, p. 1, centre right.

¹³ These were not concentration camps in the European, or German, sense. The use of this term must be attributed to the official propaganda polemic. As far as the sources report, Mainlanders were held under guard in buildings belonging to the authorities. Even the official sources rarely mention anything resembling maltreatment.

¹⁴ The most detailed information on this is found in *THCH*, p. 27.

¹⁵ See above, Section 4.5, Taichung, 台中, p. 120 and p. 122.

people. They included ‘Communists’ among their rank. He contrasted this with the ‘law-abiding’ spirit of the Taiwanese who had, up until the incident, faithfully supported the Central Government. Chiang was obviously at pains to trivialise the uprising as an isolated ‘incident’ which a tiny proportion of the population had usurped for their own use. Of course, he did not mention that the people, at least as far as challenging Ch’en I’s regime was concerned, largely supported the movement. He ascribed the further escalation to the Resolution Committee’s ‘unreasonable suggestions’, such as the dissolution and disarmament of the Garrison Command and all its units,¹⁶ which were carried out despite the Central Government’s consent to transform the Governor’s Office into an ordinary provincial government.

Given that Ch’en I had publicly characterised the uprising against his administration as ‘treasonous’ (*p’an-ni-hsing*, 叛逆性), and therefore directed against the Central Government, Chiang Kai-shek had little choice but to outwardly accept this assessment, even though he had received reports on the actual causes for the uprising. Thus he did not disclose that the Taiwanese disappointment and dissatisfaction with Ch’en I’s leadership (and therefore the Kuomintang) had been increasing for at least one year, and that the causes behind this were experiences of discrimination and Ch’en I’s failed economic policies. This was the reason the uprising spread so quickly from Taipei throughout the province.

Chiang Kai-shek’s speech contained veiled threats to all on Taiwan who did not want to cooperate with the authorities. Chiang called on the Taiwanese ‘to listen to reason’ and to ‘maintain strict discipline’, otherwise they would only ‘harm the state and themselves’ (*hai-kuo tzu-hai*, 害國自害). The speech was printed as a flyer and scattered over Taiwan’s most important cities on 12 March.

In it Chiang also explained that all military personnel and employees of the provincial administration were under strict instructions not to carry out revenge attacks. A telegram reiterating this was sent to Ch’en I on 13 March. This was an indirect confession that revenge attacks did in fact occur. He seems, therefore, to

¹⁶ I.e. demands which exceeded the provincial government’s authority.

have been well-informed about the course of the suppression, not least thanks to the American Embassy which alerted him on 11 March that

...systematic repression has started with arrests and executions.

Events in March however, prove that Chiang's instructions were not followed.¹⁷

The announcement that 'senior officials' would be sent to Taiwan may also have been a reaction to the lively response that the events in Taiwan sparked in the Chinese public arena. The press in Shanghai was extremely critical of Ch'en I and the bloody suppression on Taiwan. Ch'en I's appointment to Governor of Taiwan in 1945 was strongly criticised in the press due to his dubious reputation as Governor of Fukien.¹⁸ Between 4 and 11 March representatives of various Taiwanese organisations in Peking, Shanghai and Nanking, including first and foremost the Homeland Associations (*t'ung-hsiang-hui*, 同鄉會) and the Taiwanese students' associations, added their voice to Taipei's reform demands, and also called for a comprehensive clearing up of events as well as the punishment of Ch'en I and others responsible in military circles.¹⁹ Several Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai formed a 'Joint Support Committee for the 28 February Massacre in Taiwan' (*Taiwan erh-erh-pa ts'an-an lien-ho hou-yüan-hui*, 台灣二二八慘案聯合後援會). They announced the reform demands for Taiwan during a press conference held on the evening of 5 March, and on 6 March they sent representatives to put them before the Central Government. During the following days more discussions and demonstrations by the Taiwanese students took place.²⁰ On 11 March representatives of the Taiwan Democratic League (*Taiwan min-chu t'ung-meng*, 台灣民主同盟) publicised the demand being made in Taiwan to place the province under a UN mandate.²¹ Several influential Taiwanese, who were pushing the Legislative Yüan, the Control Yüan and the Interior Ministry for a peaceful resolution, were sent by the Defence Minister, Pai Ch'ung-hsi (白崇禧), to Taiwan to 'pacify' (*hsüan-wei*, 宣慰) the people. Their

¹⁷ See Appendix IX for the wording of Chiang's speech; *FRUS*, No. 539, p. 440. For details of the telegram sent to Ch'en I, see above, Section 3.3.3., p. 102.

¹⁸ Kerr (1965), p. 55.

¹⁹ Lin Mu-shun, pp. 113-114.

²⁰ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, bottom left; *Chung-hua Jih-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, bottom left and 11 March, p. 1, bottom right; Lin Mu-shun, p. 113.

²¹ Kerr (1965), p. 313.

actual objective, however, was to glean an idea of the true state of affairs. They were prevented from leaving their hotel by soldiers who had been posted to them for their 'protection', and so they flew back to Nanking the very same day. The most direct expression of solidarity for Taiwan was the Nanking and Shanghai Homeland Associations' delegation which flew to Taiwan on 12 March to investigate the situation there. The scathing criticism of the suppression methods it reported on 12 April exposed in precise detail the brutal behaviour of the security forces and those responsible for them.²²

The 'senior official' despatched by the Central Government was the former warlord and then-Defence Minister Pai Ch'ung-hsi (白崇禧), who arrived in Taiwan on 17 March and was tasked with 'pacifying' the people and conveying the Central Government's orders to Ch'en I (陳儀).²³ In a radio broadcast at 6.30 pm the day he arrived, Pai announced measures which the Central Government had already agreed to. The most important of these were: The transformation of the Governor's Office into an ordinary provincial government, vague consent to the re-election of the mayors in municipalities and the county magistrates through public elections 'at a specified time' (a re-election on 1 July, as Ch'en I had originally assured, was no longer considered). In addition, as many Taiwanese as possible were to be employed in public office. Taiwanese were to enjoy equal treatment and the private sector economy was to be promoted. This was to be achieved through extensively limiting the state sector, which was under Ch'en I's absolute control, and by abolishing organisations and regulations which contravened Central Government laws. However, this was not elaborated further. Apart from 'Communists and rebels', the authorities were to treat all others involved in the unrest with leniency. These attempts to pacify the public were obviously desperately needed. The terror had continued for so long that the government-biased *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報) complained on the same day in its lead article that many students and school pupils remained in hiding instead of attending classes, and that workers and others had not returned to their work places. Even Pai Ch'ung-hsi (白崇禧) admonished the soldiers on 18 March to

²² (Memoirs of) Yang Chao-chia (楊肇嘉), pp. 48-50; New York Times, 14 March, p. 18, col. 7; *Report on the Incident in Taiwan*, pp. 276-277.

²³ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 13 March, p. 2, top right, line 4.

turn to their superiors when faced with problems in securing necessary provisions, rather than ‘molesting’ the public. As the army did not generally provide provisions for the soldiers, they were accustomed, as on the mainland, to ‘provide for themselves’ from the public, usually without paying. This practise had been causing much ill-feeling long before 27 February. Pai Ch’ung-hsi warned the military police not to make any arbitrary arrests and emphasised that all those arrested would be tried publicly, though this did not in fact happen. During the following days Pai Ch’ung-hsi visited all of Taiwan’s major cities.

From the time Pai arrived, Ch’en I gradually relinquished both civil and military command, so that it was merely a question of time until he was replaced. The first step was the nominal handover of power over the Garrison Command to Chief of Staff K’o, which Ch’en I had informed Chiang Kai-shek about on 12 March. It can be assumed that second step were the orders that Pai Ch’ung-hsi relayed from the Central Government, the exact details of which are not yet known. In any case, Pai had taken on the duty of mollifying the public and it was in his name that the planned cleansings were publicised. It was no surprise then when Ch’en I gave up defending his policies and admitted his ‘misinterpretations of the situation’ and ‘incompetence’ and therefore offered his resignation, explaining that he had lost both civil and military control. Chiang’s reply did not disagree with Ch’en, but he made it clear that Ch’en’s responsibility was still to maintain ‘peace and order’ until the new provincial government had been formed. Important decisions about who should have a role in the new provincial government were left to Pai Ch’ung-hsi.²⁴

On 27 March Pai Ch’ung-hsi summarised the conclusions of his visit in a speech broadcast over the radio. He simplified the reasons for the outbreak of the uprising into two points. The more profound reason was the destructive influence of the Japanese education, which taught the people contempt for all things Chinese. This was why students and young people had joined the insurgents. ‘Communists and careerists’ were directly responsible for the outbreak; they had exploited the incident on 27 February to incite the people. This was in fact an

²⁴ *KSCW*, docs. 101, pp. 265-270; 113, p. 294; 118, pp. 300-301 and 117, p. 303. For details on the orders given to Ch’en I, see *ibid.*; (The Memoirs of) Pai Ch’ung-hsi (白崇禧), p. 69.

extreme over-generalisation, as Communists had only had a noteworthy influence in Taichung. He blamed the peoples' dissatisfaction partly on the powerful monopolisation of the economy, difficulties with adjusting after the end of the war, which led to unemployment, and the sacking of many Taiwanese in 1945 due to 'incompetence' and 'some corrupt officials'.²⁵ He absolved Ch'en I of any responsibility for what happened and did not allude at all to the terror and tyranny of the government troops even before the reinforcements arrived. As a reform package he suggested full privatisation of the light industry, distributing state-owned land among landless farmers, and reducing the monopoly system to marketing tobacco products and alcohol as well as restricting the Trading Bureau's activities to exporting finished products and purchasing raw materials. On a political level he spoke in favour of employing as many Taiwanese as possible and of establishing a special Control Yüan department for Taiwan Province to control corruption.²⁶ Pai wrote in his memoirs that he had suggested Ch'en I and Chief of Staff K'o Yüan-fen (柯遠芬) be punished and that Ch'en I be relieved from office.²⁷ The Control Yüan member Yang Liang-kung's investigation report, which he also submitted in April to the Central Government, offered similar advice.²⁸

There were already some in Nanking who were calling for Ch'en I's withdrawal. In the Legislative Yüan Liu Wen-tao (劉文島), who was said to belong to the CC Faction which stood in competition to the Political Studies Faction which Ch'en I belonged to, was particularly vocal on this issue. The KMT Central Executive Committee denounced Ch'en I on 22 March and also called for his withdrawal. Ch'en I had had bad publicity in the USA and the bloody suppression of the uprising showed the KMT in a bad light. To be granted

²⁵ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 19 March, p. 1 (also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 239-240), 20 March, p. 1, top centre, item 5 and 28 March, p. 2 (also in Huang Ts'un-hou, pp. 241-242); Kerr (1965), pp. 314-315, and Pai Ch'ung-hsi's report from 7 April 1947 in Nanking into his mission to Taiwan, reprinted in the United Evening News (Pai Ch'ung-hsi (白崇禧), 'Taiwan shih-pien chih ch'i-yin chi shan-hou ts'uo-shih' (台灣事變之起因及善後措施) [The origins of the Incident on Taiwan and the measures taken to deal with the Aftermath], '*Lien-ho Wan-pao*' (聯合晚報) [United Evening News], 10 March 1988, p. 3). Taiwanese were described as 'incompetent' merely because of their lack of knowledge of Mandarin Chinese (*kuo-yü*, 國語).

²⁶ Ibid. (Pai Ch'ung-hsi's report).

²⁷ (The Memoirs of) Pai Ch'ung-hsi, p. 72.

²⁸ Yang Liang-kung, Part IV.

financial aid the KMT had to at least be seen to want to reform the political system in Taiwan, in order to prevent those in the USA who were calling for a UN mandate under US trusteeship from gaining influence. On 28 March Ch'en I handed in his resignation, which was accepted on 31 March. When he left office on 29 April the arrests and executions had not yet ceased, though they had reduced in number. The American Embassy had also informed Chiang Kai-shek about this via a memorandum from Kerr.

Ch'en I's successor was the US-educated Wei Tao-ming (魏道明), who came from the diplomatic service, unlike Ch'en, whose background was in the military, and who had been ambassador to the US from 1942 to 1946, which meant he made a good impression. He remained governor of Taiwan until 5 January 1949, when he was replaced by General Ch'en Ch'eng (陳誠) who was preparing for the KMT's retreat from the mainland to Taiwan.²⁹ Although Wei lifted the state of emergency on 15 May by transforming the Governor's Office into an ordinary provincial government, the arrests relating to the uprising continued. Even around the time of the first anniversary of the 28 February Incident many arrests and house searches were taking place, though there were no serious incidents. Wei Tao-ming was unable to put a halt to the suppression as he lacked control over the army, the Party Organisation and the military police, which were now operating more intensively. Wei did indeed appoint seven Taiwanese as department heads (out of fifteen), though as Kerr reports, each had a Mainland deputy and was not able to select their own subordinates. Only at the lower levels of the administration were many Taiwanese promoted to deputy section chiefs (*fu-k'o-chang*, 副科長).³⁰ This was merely a superficial 'reform' and bore no relation to the original reform demands for democratic self-administration. Wei abolished the Monopoly Bureau in its original form, renamed it the 'Public Sales Bureau' (*kung-mai-chü*, 公賣局), as it was known until privatisation in 2002, and reduced the number of products it marketed. However, due to the inflation crisis in Shanghai

²⁹ New York Times, 22 March 1947, p. 16, col. 1; Wang K'ang (王康) p. 225; Lai, Myers et al., p. 165; *FRUS*, No. 659, pp. 450-455, Kerr's Memorandum of 21 April.

³⁰ Kerr (1965) pp. 316, 319, 337, 338, 341 and 349; for information on the secret police see Kerr (November 1947), p. 226. According to him, the number of soldiers in Taiwan had been reduced. For Wei's biography, see Boorman, vol.3, pp. 406-408; Lai, Myers et al., pp. 165-166.

and the continued corruption problems, the economic situation barely improved.³¹

Wei Tao-ming and the Central Government continued with their diplomatic and propaganda efforts to influence public opinion in the USA in their favour, and particularly to counteract the impression that the Taiwanese were hoping for a UN trusteeship under US administration, as was being suggested by the American press, whilst at the same time fighting moves in the US to make this a reality. Wei therefore sent Cheng Nan-wei (鄭南渭), the head of the Taiwan Office of the state Central News Agency, who had already been operating in this role under Ch'en I, on a promotional tour of the USA.³²

Indeed the American diplomatic sources report of numerous Taiwanese visiting the Consulate to request American intervention in Taiwan. A petition signed by 141 people representing 807 people was directed at General Marshall, the USA's new Secretary of State. It stated that the

...shortest way of reformation of Provincial Government is wholly to depend upon United Nations joint administration in Formosa and cut political and economic concern with China proper for years until Formosa becomes independent.³³

Another delegation visited the Consulate to propose an Allied administration on Taiwan for a limited amount of time until Taiwan was able to play a role as an autonomous province in a united, democratic China.³⁴ The Consulate, and in particular Vice-consul George Kerr, supported the idea of limited intervention, as did the Ambassador in Nanking, John Leighton Stuart. This would make use of the still-unresolved question of Taiwan's sovereignty. The Consulate reported on 3 March

...American prestige high and intervention profoundly desired by Formosans, who believe representations at Nanking and

³¹ Lai, Myers et al., p. 166; Kerr (1965), pp. 339-340.

³² Kerr (1965), pp. 350-352 and p. 361. For information on Cheng Nan-wei (鄭南渭), see above, Section 3.2.2., p. 49 and p. 50, fn.81. Of course the KMT did everything possible never to risk losing its control over Taiwan through such demands again, and therefore blankly denied its existence. As the CCP's military successes increased, Taiwan began to be considered a possibility for the KMT's final retreat.

³³ *FRUS*, No. 448, p. 430.

³⁴ See also the *New York Times*, 29 March, p. 6, col. 4.

direct intervention here justifiable for UN under present Japanese *de jure* sovereignty status.³⁵

It is difficult to say to what extent the delegations which visited the Consulate represented general sympathy among the Taiwanese for a UN mandate under the USA. In Washington however, these plans were averted by the 'Director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs', John Carter Vincent. Kuomintang China was still too important to the USA as a political partner in Asia to allow plans such as these to come to fruition at a time when the Shanghai press was already denouncing the USA's 'imperialist intentions'. One can therefore draw the conclusion that there were strong currents in diplomatic circles supporting a form of USA trusteeship, or at least joint administration. However it did not become official US policy. These currents aside, the main role the USA played in the uprising and its suppression was the ships and other facilities it provided to transport the KMT troops to Taiwan. The USA, in actual fact, offered considerable support to the KMT in suppressing the uprising, and even made it possible at all.³⁶

The KMT's policy after the suppression of the uprising can be briefly summarised as bringing peace, at least superficially, to the areas behind the frontline in the civil war, and to limit the damage the suppression of the uprising caused to international relations.

Despite the demands not being acceptable to the Central Government, they could have attempted to negotiate with the Resolution Committee or Provincial Consultative Assembly, for example. With good-will, compromises could have been reached on many of the issues, such as bringing the constitution into effect on Taiwan at the same time as on the mainland, and drawing up an autonomy statute, which the constitution would have enabled.³⁷ As only a small minority of the armed insurgents sought the full separation of Taiwan from China, by serious efforts at reform the KMT may have been able to win back public support as well

³⁵ And after Japan's surrender therefore under Allied sovereignty; *FRUS*, No. 468, p. 433. See also No. 468 (p. 433), regarding preparations for a similar petition, the receipt of which is not later reported.

³⁶ Kerr (1965), pp. 326-328; *FRUS*, No. 893, p. 460; No. 1080, p. 467 and No. 2080, pp. 471-474.

³⁷ Draft constitution of 1946, Chapter XI, Part I, particularly Art. 112; Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, p. 456.

as the Taiwanese elite. The armed insurgents would thereby have had no more reason to exist, and they would have lost public support for them. It would also have brought peace to Taiwan and have kept the KMT's 'rear flank' free. The KMT's priorities were already set, however. They selected the short, brutal solution in order to achieve the short-term, superficial goals of 'peace', and to limit damage to their international relations, goals that the Central Government fully achieved. The price of this solution was hostility which would last for an unforeseeably long time, a subjugated people, and the creation of a trauma which would continue to have an effect for decades. Assuming that the various possibilities were in fact weighed up, the leadership at the time was willing to pay the price for their short-term priorities.

6. Summary and Conclusion

The uprising in February and March 1947 was the result of developments after the Second World War when Taiwan returned from Japanese to Kuomintang control, which was greeted with genuine joy by the Taiwanese, but which led to an explosive situation just one and a half years later.

A concoction of closely connected adverse economic, political and psychological factors were to blame. The economic factors were hyperinflation, unemployment and the monopolisation by various provincial government departments of the Taiwanese economy, former Japanese assets and the banking system, so that the local economy had virtually no opportunity to develop.

In the political arena nepotism was to blame, and it spread to the field of education and also the economy. As a result, important positions were filled by Mainland Chinese, and often wholly unqualified people instead of Taiwanese, which dashed their hopes of playing an important and equal role in society after Taiwan returned from Japanese colonialism to the 'fold of the fatherland'. In addition, the security forces carried out arbitrary acts which was a completely unfamiliar experience, as the Japanese had stuck fast to their own strict laws.

Psychologically the mutual suspicion which developed over time contributed to the uprising. Many Mainlanders seemed to view Taiwan more of a conquered province than a liberated one. Taiwan was unknown to them. The Japanese legacy was everywhere; in the clothing, cuisine, architecture, and even the language, as many Taiwanese spoke Japanese as well as their own Min-nan dialect, though very rarely Mandarin Chinese. The Taiwanese, in turn, felt discriminated against as 'second class Chinese', and treated the ineptitude of many Mainland office-holders and their unfamiliarity for 'modern' comforts, such as bicycles and a domestic water supply, with contempt.

The Central Government was caught off guard by the uprising, and within 10 days sent an estimated fifty thousand to sixty thousand soldiers to suppress it. It responded so rapidly because the civil war with the Chinese Communists on the mainland broke out at the same time, and the USA wavered in its support for the KMT. Apart from that, Taiwan was the only province in China where KMT control had not been threatened by the CCP, which had practically no base in

Taiwan at all.

The events in Taiwan have been described in detail in the previous chapters. Here the course of the uprising is summarised as follows:

Phase 1

- 1.1 News of the events in Taipei sparks spontaneous demonstrations against corruption, discrimination against the Taiwanese and the bad economic circumstances, but also against Ch'en I and his government's local representatives.
- 1.2 Mainlanders are beaten up and some killed, and in places they are 'concentrated' (as reported in Pan-ch'iao and I-lan in Taipei County, Taichung, Chia-i, Kaohsiung and Pingtung). Some of them go into hiding and others seek the protection of military units or the military police. At the same time incidents occur provoked by military patrols' indiscriminately shooting, particularly after the state of emergency is imposed, and clashes with insurgents, primarily young people and students.
- 1.3 It is the young people and students who mobilise the public. They spontaneously form paramilitary groups which attack police stations and similar installations in order to arm themselves. They take on police duties, particularly in light of the fact that most police officers, the majority of whom are Taiwanese, leave their posts and join the insurgents.

Phase 2

- 2.1 Some time later and concurrently with above development, demonstrations and gatherings take place at which demands targeted at the government are formulated. The demands formulated and made public by the Taipei Resolution Committee are broadly adopted. Demands relating to local conditions are added. The municipalities' and county Consultative Assemblies adopt an ambivalent stance. Some become the mouthpiece for the peoples' demands such as in Keelung, Taipei County, Hsinchu, Taichung, Taichung County, Changhua, Chia-i, Kaohsiung, Ping-tung and Hualien, whilst others remain in the background such as in Taitung, the Penghu Islands or cooperate with the authorities as in Taoyüan, Hsinchu County and Tainan to prevent the unrest from spreading.
- 2.2 Subcommittees are formed in all counties and municipalities, apart from Hsinchu County (administrative seat in Taoyüan) and Kaohsiung County (administrative seat in Feng-shan), in accordance with the Taipei Resolution Committee's request. Some smaller areas (such as Taichung County and Tainan County) form their own Resolution Committees. According to the sparse information available in the source material, the subcommittees only have irregular and limited contact with the Taipei Resolution Committee.
- 2.3 Various armed groups launch attacks on the authorities, the military police and the military. The Ch'en I government loses its control over almost the

whole island, as at this point they have only a small number of troops at their disposal. The groups of insurgents do not operate in isolation, but rather a wide range of groups from Taipei and Kaohsiung coordinate and cooperate, albeit to a limited extent.

Phase 3

3.1 On 8 March KMT troops from the mainland advance from Kaohsiung in the south and Keelung in the north. In the process massacres occur in many places, primarily of Taiwan's intellectual and political elite, ie those involved in the Resolution Committees, students and young people. On-going and intense fighting with the insurgents occurs above all in central Taiwan in the areas of Taichung and Chia-i. The remains of the armed resistance isn't dispersed until 16 March. Once the west of the island is brought under control the KMT troops move on to the east of the island, where a power vacuum has been existing since 8 March. Cleansings in the cities and rural areas for actual or assumed insurgents continue at least until the end of April.

The following will look into several aspects of the uprising in more detail.

Although the uprising took place mainly in the larger cities, this was by no means exclusively the case. In several smaller rural areas Resolution Committees or similar councils were also formed. The most detailed description of this is provided by Wu Hsin-jung (吳新榮) who reports on developments in the Pei-men (北門) area of Tainan County and Tainan County as a whole. One must not forget the groups of young people who formed in the Taichung area and poured into Taichung City to support the insurgents there. In some more remote areas, the mayors and officials were removed from their posts and put under guard. Another example are the reports from various parts of Kaohsiung County, such as those from Ch'i-shan (旗山) and Heng-ch'un (恆春). The apologist stance of Lai, Myers et al.'s work is unfounded in assuming that

Eighty percent – the rural population – did not participate.

The then-American Vice-consul, George H. Kerr, claims otherwise

Meanwhile, in every town and village, Formosans demanded that the men from the mainland hand over their offices.¹

¹ Lai, Myers et al. p. 174; Kerr (November 1947), p. 225.

The theory that Communists were partly or even wholly responsible for the outbreak and spread of the uprising can be laid aside. In his speech on 10 March Chiang Kai-shek placed the responsibility for the uprising 'to a certain extent' on Communists, without offering any reasons for this. In later years the official reason of a 'Communist conspiracy' was re-used, as exemplified in a statement by Taiwanese Premier Yü Kuo-hua (俞國華) in 1986. The Communists actually only gained any influence in the Taichung region under Hsieh Hsüeh-hung (謝雪紅), though they lost their strength after 4 March with the transfer of power in the Resolution Committee. Lai, Myers et al. also explicitly renounced this 'Communist conspiracy theory' and commented

There is no evidence that Communist ideas inspired a significant number of dissidents. [...] Therefore, the thesis advanced by both the CCP and the KMT that Communist influence was basic to the Uprising is nonsense.²

If one assumes that Lai, Myers et al.'s affinity to the authorities indicates that the authorities shared his conclusions, then this quote of his represents progress in the official interpretation of the uprising.

There are two strands of action of the uprising on the Taiwanese side. On the one side was the conservative elite, the Consultative Assemblymen, Political Councillors and other dignitaries who were prepared, almost to the end, to believe Ch'en I's promise to withdraw the armed patrols, which had not been implemented in Taipei by 4 March. A more serious issue in this respect was Ch'en I's failed attempt to move troops up from the south to Taipei. The reason for this trust may well have lain in their unwillingness to renounce their loyalty to the Central Government, regardless of all the ill-omens, as George Kerr points out

Members of the Committee, who conferred frequently with the Governor General, were principally conservatives who,

² Yü Kuo-hua (俞國華), 'Erh-erh-pa wei Chung-kung yin-mou shih-chien' (二二八為中共陰謀事件) ['2.28' was a CCP plot], in *Erh-erh-pa shih-chien chen-hsiang* (二二八事件真相) [The Truth on the 2.28 Incident], ed. by Min-T'ai t'ung-hsün-she (閩台通訊社) [News Agency for Fukien and Taiwan], Hsin kuan-tien ts'ung-shu 7 (新觀點叢書) [New Standpoint Series 7] (Taipei: [n. pub.], 1985), pp. 433-434; Lai, Myers et al., p. 174.

although detesting Ch'en I as a person, trusted him as the responsible appointee of Chiang Kai-shek.³

On the other hand, during the second phase, after around 4 March, more radical demands were pushed through the Resolution Committee, partly as a result of pressure from various members, such as students and young people, partly through pressure from the meetings' audience members since later on several dignitaries did not want to expose themselves too much, so more determined people like Wang T'ien-teng (王添燈), who publicly represented the reform programme, came to the fore. It's not possible to say the extent to which the Taipei Resolution Committee was infiltrated by Ch'en I's, the military's or other groups' agents, and to what extent they consciously introduced radical demands so that the entire reform movement could later be labelled treasonous, as Lin Mu-shun (林木順) and Shih Ming (史明) claim. These assumptions are not only aimed at Ch'en I's and the secret service's agents, but also and particularly at Chiang Wei-ch'uan (蔣渭川), the chairman of the Political Reconstruction Association which infiltrated the Resolution Committee on the CC Faction's orders. There are, however, indications which imply that the Resolution Committee was indeed infiltrated. If Lin Mu-shun's claim is correct that Hsü Te-hui (許德輝), the leader of the 'Righteous Service Corps', which was nominally subordinate to the Resolution Committee, actually answered to Lin Ting-li (林頂立), the head of the secret service in Taiwan, this would imply deliberate infiltration. Chin Yü, a source close to the authorities, claims that some dignitaries in the Taichung Resolution Committee were simultaneously leaking information to the authorities. It is unlikely that this was the case only in Taichung, and it is equally unlikely that Ch'en I, who had tried to organise undercover troop movements, would not have also tried infiltration. However, until further sources, particularly documents from the authorities, are made available, this can neither be qualified nor its significance in the course of the uprising evaluated.

Unlike older dignitaries, the younger Taiwanese from the beginning had less patience and viewed Ch'en I's behaviour as delay tactics or deception, which his

³ Kerr (November 1947), p. 224.

attempts to move troops exemplified. They began to form paramilitary groups as early as 2 March. Their function was to take on police duties, as many of the police officers had left their posts. This was to remove the authorities' pretext for patrols, which would protect the people from the indiscriminate shooting they carried out. The students' and young people's actions after the first outbreak of dissatisfaction and violence had died down, can be seen as a response to the patrols, or were caused by the fear of potential incidents. The No. 3 Aeroplane Factory in Taichung is the clearest example of this provided in the sources, which was besieged out of the fear that the soldiers stationed there would raid the city, as reported by the Taiwanese Second Lieutenant Li Pi-ch'iang (李碧鏘), who was part of the garrison in the factory, in his memoirs.⁴ The take over (*chieh-kuan*, 接管) of other authorities such as the city government came primarily about out of their desire to replace corrupt and incompetent officials rather than taking over governing the city themselves. This is the reason that in places like Ping-tung (屏東) on 5 March an 'interim mayor' was elected, rather than a successor of the former mayor. Several cities and counties responded similarly to Ch'en I's offer to suggest candidates to succeed their mayors and county magistrates. This leads to the conclusion that the intention was not to fully wrest Taiwan from Central Government control through the temporary takeover of power, but rather await far-reaching reforms, as indicated by the acceptance of Ch'en I's offer. The majority of slogans called for 'a greater level of autonomy'; demands for independence, the formation of a provisional government or trusteeship under the UN or USA were only rarely heard. The students' and young peoples' organisations only prepared for armed resistance against Central Government troops once their arrival from the mainland was expected out of disappointment that their hopes for reform had been answered in this way.

By tracing the culmination of the situation back to 'radicals' and 'extremists', Lai, Myers et al. convey a false picture, without mentioning the tactics game Ch'en was playing, much as he fails to mention Ch'en I's attempt to transport troops on 2 March.⁵ It is certain that from the beginning Ch'en I did not seriously

⁴ Li Pi-ch'iang (李碧鏘), p. 244.

⁵ Lai, Myers et al. pp. 175-178.

intend to agree to the reforms, but was rather playing for time until reinforcements arrived from the mainland. Regardless of whether additional troops were actually promised on 2 March (as Lin Mu-shun claims) or a few days later, it remains a fact that the decision to deploy the 21st Division was not made later than 5 March in Nanking (南京), as various sources agree. It is almost inconceivable that this decision was reached without Ch'en I requesting it. This is enough reason for the assumption that Ch'en I was expecting reinforcements some days before the decision was made and was merely playing for time in all ensuing negotiations with the Resolution Committee and other representatives of the Taiwanese people. Only when further official documents are made available can the exact details of Ch'en I's contact with the Central Government regarding timings and content be clarified.

The ruthless implementation of the cleansings later on, and the excesses which took place in it can therefore not be explained by

[...] the ensuing terror was caused partly by irresponsible decisions and lack of discipline in the field.

as Lai, Myers et al. attempt to explain.⁶ The unclear terms of the state of emergency contributed to an increased number of victims, as did Ch'en I's announcement on 10 March that 'traitors and thugs will be wiped out', which had the effect that the soldiers did not exercise much caution when they were implementing the cleansings. The targeted search for young people and students amongst members of paramilitary organisations, the immediate shooting of members of the Resolution Committees or their later executions all indicate a preconceived plan to direct the cleansings at individuals or groups of people. Given that the troops who had come from the mainland were barely familiar with the circumstances in Taiwan and could not have known the prominent Taiwanese by name, the persecution and excesses can not be explained by a lack of discipline among individual officers or soldiers. Here, a failed governor was playing out his personal campaign of vengeance against actual or assumed enemies. His subordinates must also carry some responsibility, such as Chief of Staff K'o Yüan-

⁶Lai, Myers et al., p. 178.

fen (柯遠芬), who was even criticised by Defence Minister Pai Ch'ung-hsi (白崇禧) for his casual attitude towards human life. K'o stated that he would 'rather kill ninety-nine innocent people than allow one guilty person to escape' (*wang-sha chiu-shi-chiu-ko, chih yao sha-szu i-ko chen-ti chiu k'o-i*, 枉殺九十九個, 只要殺死一個真的就可以). Pai countered this with the expression better 'kill one culprit and punish another hundred' (*yu tsui-che sha i ch'eng pai*, 有罪者殺一懲百). In other words, only ringleaders should be killed.⁷

As the Central Government's priorities were to re-establish 'calm' on its outer perimeters and to minimise the damage to its international relations, it must take responsibility for denying a peaceful resolution and also, at the very least, political responsibility for the brutal implementation of the chosen solution and the massacre which occurred in the process of the uprising, as Ch'en I was their representative in Taiwan. The lack of discipline amongst the KMT conscripts was well known, so that attacks and lootings by the soldiers had to be expected.

When it comes to the issue of responsibility for the effects of the suppression of the uprising, the number of victims and the groups of people to whom most of the victims belong are closely interrelated. The figures for the number of victims vary widely, depending on whether they come from the government-biased side, or from those sympathetic to the insurgents and the independence movement. The most accurate figures are from Yang Liang-kung, who provides the following for individual cities and counties:

- A total of 1300 dead and injured Mainlanders (separate figures for deaths and injuries are rarely given). Information for Hsinchu County is not provided. The vast majority of these are Mainlanders who were beaten up by Taiwanese in the beginning stages of the uprising, as is shown by Yang's figures for Taipei: he gives only 33 dead as contrasted to 866 injured.
- A total of 1173 injured and dead Taiwanese (insurgents and members of the public). Figures for Taipei County, Hsinchu, Taichung, Hualien and Taitung, as well as for the cities of Changhua and Tainan are missing.

These figures add up to a total of 2473 victims. Yang himself concedes that in Taipei the actual number of victims was 'far higher than the statistical figures'

⁷ (The Memoirs of) Pai Ch'ung-hsi (白崇禧) p. 72.

provided (*yüan tsai t'ung-chi shu-tzu chih shang*, 遠在統計數字之上). It can be assumed that this is the case for all other cities and counties, as his figures are based on figures published by the relevant local administration. For the rest, the figures he provides for the number of Taiwanese victims do not even cover most of Taiwan. Lai, Myers et al. suggest a figure which is probably closer to the actual number of victims. This is based on statistics produced by the Security Headquarters (*pao-an szu-ling-pu*, 保安司令部) in 1956. It puts the number of victims at 6317 divided into fourteen different groups, though does not differentiate between injuries and deaths. Considering the groups of people that this number is divided into, it is likely that it refers only to Taiwanese victims.⁸ George Kerr estimates the number of Taiwanese deaths at between 5000 and 10,000, which can be considered plausible, and represents a huge loss of human life for a small province with a population at the time of around 6 million people. The Taiwanese organisations in Shanghai's report in April 1947 suggested a figure of just over 10,000 Taiwanese. Estimates of between 30,000 and 40,000 deaths are unlikely to be correct.⁹ Doubtless though, the Taiwanese took a much heavier toll of lives than the Mainlanders. Whilst the Mainlanders were attacked with sticks or merely bare hands, many Taiwanese fell victim to the use of firearms. This explains the relatively high number of deaths vs. injuries among Taiwanese casualties and the opposite ratio among Mainlanders.

A considerable portion of the Taiwanese elite, politicians, intellectuals and entrepreneurs fell victim to Ch'en I's campaign of revenge. The sources name two members of the National Assembly (from seventeen), one Political Councillor (from eight), two Provincial Consultative Assemblymen (from thirty), the deputy chairs of the Keelung and Ping-tung Consultative Assemblies, as well as twelve municipality and county Consultative Assemblymen killed. Added to this list were doctors, journalists, solicitors, public prosecutors, local dignitaries and many ordinary people who had been working with the Resolution Committees. Several

⁸ Lai, Myers et al., Table 10, p. 160.

⁹ In Wang Yün-sheng (Wang, Yün-sheng (王芸生), *Taiwan shih-hua* (台灣史話) [History of Taiwan] (Peking: Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien ch'u-pan-she (中國青年出版社) [China Youth Press], 1978), 140 pp. (p. 105), for example.

thousands were arrested, imprisoned, or were being searched for.¹⁰

As for material damage, Yang Liang-kung puts the cost at 478,172,423 Taiwan Dollars, though details are missing for Taipei, Hsinchu and Chia-i counties. The cost in Changhua is described as being 'low', whilst in Tainan County and Kaohsiung there was a 'high' level of material damage. Lai, Myers et al. put the material cost at 616,470,611 Taiwan Dollars, based on figures from the April 1947 edition of *Taiwan Yüeh-k'an* (台灣月刊), the monthly publication from the Governor's Office's Press Office, as well as the *Hsin-sheng-pao* of 7 June 1947. According to him, there was in addition a 550,000,000 Taiwan Dollar loss in production.¹¹ In view of the population of Taiwan and an average monthly income of less than 1000 Taiwan Dollars, the material costs were also unusually high. It is not possible to convert the amount of these losses into US Dollars given the high inflation rate at the time, because there was a different currency in operation on the mainland (*fa-pi*, 法幣 or *kuo-pi*, 國幣). The figure for the number of victims and the material costs can only be clarified when further official records are made available (for example, hospital statistics), as far as exact figures can be calculated at all after forty years.

The question of why the uprising failed is only posed if the author in question had an interest in it succeeding. In works biased towards the government standpoint this question is of no interest, as only the 'successful' suppression of the uprising is important. This applies to the secondary literature as well as to the source material.

However, this question is of general interest. Before answering it, one must first establish the criteria by which 'success' and 'failure' should be measured. The only criterion can be the goals which the uprising aimed to achieve.

In works written by authors in support of the independence movement the actual goals are not used to measure success, but rather the goal which they feel should have been pursued, in their view this was the goal to fight for

¹⁰ Lin, Mu-shun, pp. 115-119; Li Hsiao-feng (李筱峰) pp. 216-219.

¹¹ Lai, Myers et al. (unpublished manuscript of 1988), p. 201. In his 1991 book these detailed figures are omitted for some reason and only the rough estimate given of 'property destroyed by rioters valued at over 1 billion old Taiwan dollars' (p. 175).

independence. These authors see the actual goals as reason for the uprising's failure. The following factors are considered responsible.

1. The lack of coherent leadership, since the uprising broke out spontaneously.
2. The leaders of the uprising did not have a shared ideology, i.e. of 'Taiwanese Nationalism'.
3. 'Opportunists' who worked with the Resolution Committee, but were also following Ch'en I's orders. In other words, the downfall lay in not effectively removing opportunists and agents.
4. The failure to form an integrated 'battle strategy' to prevent the 21st Division from landing on Taiwan (in Lin Ch'i-hsü, 林啓旭), as well as the failure to take all the army depots in time, which could have armed 5 divisions, then to transport the equipment into the mountains and later to gradually drive the troop reinforcements out of Taiwan (in Shih Ming, 史明),¹²
5. A lack of understanding of the 'Chinese character' (*pen-hsing*, 本性),¹³ so that although the leadership of the Resolution Committees did not trust Ch'en I, they continued to deal with the Central Government, *ergo* Ch'en I as well.
6. The lack of mass mobilisation, most importantly of the farmers, workers and aborigines (i.e. the socially disadvantaged) in order to crush the 'enemy's' fighting power as early as possible.¹⁴

Measured against the goals put forward by these authors, the factors outlined above are acceptable reasons for labelling the uprising a 'failure'. In actual fact the Resolution Committee's reform programme was not aiming for independence, and neither were the armed insurgents. Instead they were pushing for fundamental reform and a larger degree of autonomy for Taiwan as a Chinese province. This also helps explain why the insurgents tended to concern themselves with just the takeover of power in local areas and did not make any serious attempts to organise themselves under a single leadership working towards a shared goal. They lacked the organisational capabilities to achieve this within such a short time. The transfer of power in the Taichung Resolution Committee on 4 March from Hsieh Hsüeh-hung (謝雪紅) to Wu Chen-wu (吳振武) played a role in this, as from then

¹² This view, presented by Shih Ming, stands in contrast to the priority outlined by Lin Ch'i-hsü not to allow reinforcements to land at all.

¹³ The literature in support of the independence movement categorises 'Taiwanese' (*Taiwan-jen*, 台灣人) on one side and 'Chinese' (*Chung-kuo-jen*, 中國人, i.e. Mainlanders) on the other to create a clear divide according to the independence movement which assumes two separate 'nations'.

¹⁴ Lin Ch'i-hsü (林啓旭), pp. 223-229; Shih Ming (史明), pp. 796-797; Lin Mu-shun's Foreword, pp. 5-8.

on direct support for the insurgents in other areas stopped.¹⁵ Even if Ch'en I had been toppled from power and a form of *de facto* independence had come into being, it would not have had much long-term success, given the superior strength of the KMT troops. At any rate it can not be considered to have been the first expression of a Taiwanese national consciousness, this was rather a consequence of its brutal suppression.¹⁶

The declared goals of the uprising, such as autonomy, a move away from the monopolised economic policy as well as democratic reforms were not achieved. Autonomy was not in the KMT's interests. Rather they wanted to retain a tight control over their rear flank and what would later become possibly their final retreat. Ch'en I's successor, Wei Tao-ming (魏道明), did in fact initiate a limit on the monopolised economy, though not nearly to the extent the Taiwanese had hoped for. The same was true of democratic reforms which consisted merely of superficial adjustments, such as appointing seven Taiwanese to head the provincial government departments, out of a total of fifteen. All of these were *pan-shan* (半山) Taiwanese, however, who had moved to the Chinese mainland in the 1920s to join the KMT. When the KMT took over Taiwan in 1945, they returned to take up middle tier administration positions. Due to their long absence from Taiwan and their close association with the KMT they were not considered true representatives of the interests of the people. These changes are more likely to have been made in order to avoid a repetition of the uprising, by implementing superficial reforms and simultaneously maintaining strict control through the security forces.

Explaining these points in this way makes it possible to define the events in Taiwan as an 'uprising'. Publications which represent the official version of events almost exclusively use the belittling term 'incident' (*shih-chien*, 事件 or *shih-pien*, 事變), which has become naturalised in Taiwan to such an extent that

¹⁵ Lin Mu-shun considers this transfer of power to have had an important influence on the course of the uprising (Issue 27, para. 1, from line 10).

¹⁶ Lin Ch'i-hsü (林啓旭), pp. 217-218, sees the 2.28 rebellion as the first manifestation of a Taiwanese national consciousness. Ong Ioktek (王育德), pp. 161-162, rather argues that a successful rebellion would have led Taiwan from a 'high degree of autonomy' eventually to independence. The brutal suppression of 2.28 according to him caused a firm resolve among Taiwanese towards independence.

even the opposition often uses it. In independence movement circles the phrases ‘February Revolution’ (*erh-yüeh ko-ming*, 二月革命) or the ‘Great Revolution of 28 February’ (*erh-erh-pa ta ko-ming*, 二二八大革命) are used.¹⁷ However, the uprising lacked a strategy, which would have helped achieve this goal. The description ‘spontaneous revolution’ is inappropriate, as there was no public will to topple the political system and replace it with a new one. Therefore ‘uprising’ is the only adequate term, which is why it was used in the title of this work. The corresponding Chinese term would therefore be *ch’i-i* (起義) or *min-pien* (民變) (‘peoples’ revolt’ or ‘people’s uprising’), which is sometimes used by Lin Mu-shun. Lai, Myers et al. selected the term ‘uprising’ or ‘rebellion’ in his work.¹⁸ The use of a word like ‘uprising’ or ‘insurrection’ could lead to a more appropriate evaluation of events on Taiwan.

¹⁷ Lin Mu-shun and Shih Ming, for example.

¹⁸ Lai, Myers et al., pp. 7-8.

7. Appendices

7.1. Appendix I

Ch'en I's first radio speech after the incident on 27 February, broadcast 1 March, 5 pm¹

People of Taiwan,

The day before yesterday, on the evening of 27 February, someone was inadvertently injured during the confiscation of smuggled tobacco. I have already resolved this issue. I have handed the individual who injured this person during the confiscation of the smuggled tobacco over to the courts so they can strictly interrogate him and punish him accordingly. I have provided for the medical treatment of the woman who was hit and injured, though her injuries are by no means serious, and have also given her compensation. I have paid very generous financial support to the family of one person who was injured and who later died. I think you can all be satisfied with the way this matter has been dealt with.

During the disturbances yesterday government employees were killed, and buildings and objects were destroyed by fire, causing much damage. This really is a great calamity. In order to protect the people and to maintain order, the government felt compelled to impose the state of emergency.

Today the members of the Provincial Consultative Assembly, the City Consultative Assembly [of Taipei], members of the National Assembly and Political Councillors have requested that I lift the state of emergency. You must understand that the state of emergency is a consequence, not the cause. The disturbances were the cause, and the state of emergency the consequence. If there are no more disturbances, there will of course be no more need for the state of emergency. I have already thoroughly satisfied the Consultative Assemblymen's concerns. The state of emergency will be lifted from midnight tonight. After the state of emergency is lifted, however, peace and order must be maintained. Therefore, gatherings are temporarily forbidden. General strikes, lesson boycotts, industrial strikes, beating people up, and other actions which undermine public security must not continue to occur.

As for those people who were involved in and arrested during yesterday's disturbances, I am aware that there are some who blindly joined in, without thinking. I have agreed to the Consultative Assemblymen's request to free them. However, there is no assurance that there are not some very bad people amongst them, which is why the heads of the neighbourhood associations must provide a guarantee for them.

There is another issue. The Consultative Assemblymen would like to send representatives to form a committee together with the government which would settle everything to do with the disturbances. I have also agreed to this. If anyone has any suggestions, take them to the Committee, and they will be passed on to me.

¹ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 2 March, p. 2, top right, also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚) pp. 205-206.

I know that the vast majority of Taiwanese people obey the laws and do not transgress them. I hope that you will in future [continue to] trust the government and work together with it. Everyone must themselves maintain public security and rigorously preserve order so that life goes back to how it was before the 27th [February]. The Taiwanese peoples' reputation depends on this. I hope that you will take special care over this, and conscientiously act accordingly.

7.2. Appendix II

The draft Resolution Committee's General Organisational Statute of 4 March, passed on 5 March²

1. The committee is named the 'Committee for Settling the Incident on 28 February'. Its main goals are a united Taiwanese people, reform of the political system and resolving the incident on 28 February.
2. The seat of the Committee is in Taipei. There are subcommittees in all counties and municipalities.³ Each subcommittee will determine its own structure.
3. The committee will be dissolved the same day its goals are achieved.
4. The committee consists of the following members:
 - a) Taiwanese members of the National Assembly, Political Councillors, the Provincial and Taipei City Consultative Assemblymen.
 - b) The Consultative Assemblies in the other municipalities and counties will each send three representatives.
 - c) Province-wide organisations will each send three representatives. Municipality and county organisations will each send two representatives. Organisations which have reached a certain size though have not yet been officially established will be treated in the same way.
 - d) Employees and students at all colleges above middle school level will send one representative. Each faculty within the universities will be regarded as a separate unit which will send two representatives from among the employees and students.
 - e) In addition to the above representatives, those detailed in section a) will name ten to thirty further prominent individuals as members of the Committee.
5. The Committee will decide on its governing guidelines, which will be implemented by the Standing Committee.
6. All Committee members in Article 4 will select from amongst themselves a fifth of their membership to form the Standing Committee. The Committee members detailed from Section 2 [of Article 4] who are already present shall

² *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 6 March, p. 1, also in Huang Ts'un-hou, pp. 210-212.

³ Here 'cities' refers to Taiwan's nine municipalities.

take part in the vote. If the number of Committee members later increases, by-elections will take place. The number of new members to be elected [to the Standing Committee] will be rounded down if it is less than four-tenths, and rounded up if more than five-tenths of a whole number.⁴

7. The Standing Committee will elect a seven-strong Steering Committee to represent the Resolution Committee, and to call meetings of the Resolution Committee and Standing Committee. The Steering Committee's decisions must be agreed by more than one-half of its membership.
8. The Steering Committee will establish a Secretariat responsible for the Resolution Committee's, the Standing Committee's and the Steering Committee's routine matters.
9. The Standing Committee will establish a Resolution Office and a Political Office. Each Office will have one chairman and two deputy chairmen. They will be appointed by the Standing Committee.
10. Each Office will establish subcommittees for each of the issues it is responsible for. Each subcommittee will have one chairman and two deputy chairmen. They will be appointed by the Steering Committee on recommendation by the chairman of the relevant Office. In important matters, the chairmen of the Offices will call a decision-making meeting involving all above the rank of a subcommittee deputy chairman.
11. Each subcommittee will have members who will be appointed by the chairman of the relevant Office on recommendation by the subcommittee chairman.
12. The Resolution Office's objective is to resolve the current exceptional circumstances. To this end a General Affairs Committee, Public Security Subcommittee, Investigation Subcommittee, Transport Subcommittee, Food Supply Subcommittee and a Finance Subcommittee will be established.
13. The General Affairs Committee is responsible for drafting and receiving documents, personnel issues as well as all matters which do not fall under any other Section's responsibilities.
14. The Public Security Subcommittee is responsible for maintaining public security and instructing the public in order that they do not come to harm.
15. The Investigation Subcommittee is responsible for collating information as well as propaganda work.
16. The Transport Subcommittee is responsible for maintaining public transport connections, and for providing transport when needed by the Resolution Committee.
17. The Food Supply Subcommittee is responsible for providing the public with a consistent supply of food, as well as purchasing food stuffs for the Resolution Committee.

⁴ I.e., With the addition of twelve new members only two would be elected on to the Standing Committee (two-fourths of a whole). Thirteen or more new members would elect three to the Standing Committee (two-sixths of a whole; quotient of 2.6).

18. The Financial Subcommittee is responsible for collecting donations for the Resolution Committee, as well as bookkeeping of revenues and expenses and managing the balance.
19. The Political Subcommittee's aim is the reform of Taiwan's political system. Initially a Planning Subcommittee and a Negotiation Subcommittee will be formed. Further subcommittees will be formed as the need arises. The Standing Committee will determine this.
20. The Planning Subcommittee's responsibility is to ascertain the current political system's weaknesses and devise a plan for the political and economic reform of Taiwan Province.
21. The Negotiation Subcommittee's responsibilities are to conduct negotiations with the Governor's Office and the Central Government for a programme of reform of the political and economic system in Taiwan Province, as well as to establish contact with the mainland and conduct propaganda work aimed at the mainland.
22. At Resolution Committee meetings (excepting the Steering Committee), decisions made in the presence of more than half the membership, with the agreement of more than half those present, are valid.
23. Amendments to this Statute can only be undertaken following a Resolution Committee decision.
24. This Statute comes into effect on this day. The Standing Committee shall determine the exact implementation methods.

7.3. Appendix III

The Resolution Committee's 'Message to All Fellow Compatriots', 6 March⁵

Compatriots from all provinces,

Our goals in the incident of 28 February were to remove corrupt officials and to fight for reform of the political system in Taiwan. It was not our goal to force out our compatriots from other provinces. We invite you to contribute towards the reform of Taiwan's political system so that we may soon realise a transparent and open political system in Taiwan. We hope that all compatriots, for whom the nation's destiny lies close to their heart, will enthusiastically participate and reach out their hands to us so that we can together move towards victory in this battle. Compatriots! We are all descendants of the Yellow Emperor and are all part of the great Han nation. Therefore each citizen carries the responsibility for prosperity and adversity of the nation and its political system. You must all assert your patriotic zeal and move forwards with us. We sincerely invite everyone to help and support us. Regarding the issue that several compatriots from other provinces were beaten on 28 February, this occurred due to a misunderstanding at the time. We have a great sense of sorrow for these compatriots' suffering. Occurrences

⁵ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 1, top right, also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚) p. 226. See also Lin Mu-shun, pp. 30-31.

such as these will absolutely not be repeated in the future. We hope that all will step forward free of concern, to realise these goals. Our slogan is the improvement of Taiwan's political system.

Long live the Republic of China!
Long live the National Government!
Long live Chairman Chiang!

7.4. Appendix IV

The Taiwan Political Councillors' telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, 6 March⁶

Urgent! To the Central News Agency to be forwarded to the Chairman of the National Government and Chairman of the Executive Yüan, His Excellency Chiang [Kai-shek], as well as all Chairmen of the Yüan and the [Government] Committees and all Ministers: On 27 February officials of the Taipei City Monopoly Bureau arrested a woman selling cigarettes. This led to one person in the crowd being shot dead, causing widespread outrage. The result was a great tragedy in which many people were killed or injured. The reasons for this incident lie in the alienation of the people from the government, in the many instances of officials abusing their positions for personal gain, in the chaotic staffing policy, in the lack of observance by some officials of laws and discipline and their contempt for Taiwanese personnel, in the unequal pay Taiwanese staff receive compared to those from other provinces and in the transfer of the majority of former Japanese assets (for which the Taiwanese people sweated blood and tears) to state ownership or management, amongst other reasons. All this led to increasing resentment amongst the people which eventually led to the incident. The unrest becomes more widespread by the day, and therefore effective measures must be prepared which will resolve the situation. We therefore urgently request that you accept the following proposals. This would be of great advantage to Taiwan, and to the nation as a whole.

1. The General Secretary position and the heads of the departments in the authorities should be filled by qualified Taiwanese people.
2. As far as is possible, the positions of senior judge of the various levels of jurisdiction and senior public prosecutor should be filled by Taiwanese people.
3. The Monopoly Bureau should be abolished and replaced by a standard state enterprise.
4. The Trading Bureau should be transformed into a [state] trade authority which does not exist to gain profit.
5. When handling the [former] Japanese assets, consideration should be paid to the legitimate interests of the people.

⁶ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 7 March, p. 2, top right, also in Huang Ts'un-hou, p. 227.

6. In accordance with [Sun Yat-sen's] 'Outline for National Reconstruction', public elections for mayors [of municipalities] and county magistrates should be held immediately.
7. The peoples' right to the freedom of opinion, publication, association and assembly must be guaranteed.
8. The security of the peoples' lives and property must be guaranteed.
9. We request that a senior official is sent to Taiwan shortly to assist in resolving this incident. Weapons must not be used to suppress the unrest to prevent it becoming even more widespread.

This telegram was written in haste, with greatest respect in urgent anticipation of a reply, by all Taiwan Province's Political Councillors.

7.5. Appendix V

The 'Political Reconstruction Association's Programme for the Reform of the Political System in Taiwan', 6 March⁷

1. The Taiwan Governor's Office should be transformed into a provincial government. Until the Central Government approves, the current system should be temporarily maintained.
2. The General Secretary [of the Provincial Government] post, and the senior officials in every department [of the Provincial Government], office and committee should be held by a Taiwanese person. If the Reform Commission deems it necessary, Mainlanders may also be appointed.
3. Public elections for the mayors [of the municipalities] and county magistrates must be concluded before the end of June of this year.
4. The Central Government is to be requested to grant the government of this province wide-ranging powers to control economic and financial policies, as well as manage the [former] Japanese assets.
5. The Central Government is to be requested to recognise Taiwanese judges' qualifications. As far as possible, Taiwanese people should be appointed to positions at all levels of the public prosecutors' offices.
6. The practical measures listed above, as well as other improvements, should be implemented by a 'Commission for the Reform of the Political System in Taiwan'.
7. The 'Commission for the Reform of the Political System in Taiwan' should be formed before 15 March. It should be formed in the following way: representatives of the district townships and cities select a candidate, from whom the Consultative Assembly of the municipality or county shall elect representatives, as follows

⁷ Huang Ts'un-hou, pp. 227-228.

Taipei:	2	Tainan:	1
Taipei County:	3	Tainan County:	4
Keelung:	1	Kaohsiung:	1
Hsinchu:	1	Kaohsiung County:	3
Hsinchu County:	3	Pingtung:	1
Taichung:	1	Penghu County:	1
Taichung County:	4	Hualien County:	1
Changhua:	1	Taitung County:	1
Chia-i:	1		

8. The Reform Commission should assess and determine the question of maintaining, abolishing or reforming the Monopoly Bureau, the Trading Bureau and other state enterprises.
9. The Reform Commission should assess and make a decision on the abolition or centralisation of [the Provincial Government's] Propaganda Commission [with other institutions], the work and re-education camps and other facilities.

7.6. Appendix VI

Ch'en I's radio speech, 6 March, 8.30 pm⁸

People of Taiwan,

Since the incident in Taipei on 28 February I have made two radio broadcasts to you all and have announced the peaceful measures to resolve the situation. Thanks to the combined efforts of the military police, the police and residents, the situation in Taipei has been stable for the past few days. In counties and municipalities where there were still problems, the situation also seems to be improving. I expect that we will be able to return to normal life soon. There is another problem which lies close to everybody's heart, and that is the question of how the political system can be improved. If we really do want to improve the political system, we must address the staffing issue. I have also been thinking about this matter. I would like to share my thoughts sincerely and openly with you.

⁸ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 1, also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 228-230.

Firstly, as far as the provincial administrative body is concerned, I am considering transforming the Governor's Office into an [ordinary] provincial government, and have requested instructions from the Central Government. As soon as the Central Government grants permission the transformation will take place. As far as possible, Taiwanese people will be appointed as government members, or heads of agencies or bureaus during the restructuring. I hope that the Provincial Consultative Assembly, as well as all other legal organisations which represent public opinion, nominate for election appropriate Taiwanese individuals of noble character, correct thinking and with outstanding abilities, to be recommended to the Central Government.

Secondly, as far as the administrative bodies at the county and municipality level are concerned, I have set the date for public elections for county magistrates and mayors [of municipalities] on 1 July, on condition that preparations have been made by that date. An election law must have been drawn up and approved by the Central Government by 30 June. Public, direct elections for county magistrates and mayors will take place from 1 July. If public opinion considers any current county magistrates and mayors unsuited to their jobs, I can remove them from their positions before the public elections for county magistrates and mayors. In addition local county and city Consultative Assemblies (together with other legal organisation who want to be involved; local public figures should decide on this, I just hope that they represent the majority opinion) may suggest three candidates from whom I will select one as county magistrate or mayor. They will be responsible for preparations for the public vote of the county magistrates and mayors. If public opinion holds that the current county magistrates or mayors are well-suited to their positions, then they will continue in them.

As for reforms of other provincial-level administration bodies, once the government has been restructured, it will decide on this matter. The new county magistrates and mayors will be responsible for this at county and city level.

I have decided upon these solutions to the political problems. The most important matter at the moment, however, is the quick restoration of order. Otherwise traitors will be able to use the opportunity to cause unrest and the situation in the areas affected will deteriorate. This afternoon lawless elements were driving around and took weapons off the soldiers in the street. In the meantime the supply of rice becomes increasingly stretched by the day. I have been told that since order has not yet been restored, the black market rice price has skyrocketed to over 60 Taiwan Dollars [*Chin*]. It is the ordinary people who are affected by this; for them life is extremely difficult. I have also heard that for several days the students at Taiwan University have eaten nothing but rice porridge. I am extremely worried about these things. You must understand that the rice shortage at the moment has been caused solely by the lack of order. To resolve the rice shortage quickly, order must quickly be restored.

I have heard that some compatriots have gone into hiding because of rumours put into circulation by traitors in order to mislead the people. I hope that you have trust in the government and do not believe the rumours under any circumstances. The Chinese nation's greatest virtue is her magnanimity, not meeting evil with evil. It can not be that we do not bring this great and beautiful virtue to bear on our Taiwanese compatriots! This afternoon I spoke to government employees and teachers in Taipei, and I urged them to demonstrate this magnanimity, this virtue

of the Chinese nation, and to forget this sad incident. They should have friendly and sincere dealings with the Taiwanese people, and stand side by side with them.

Compatriots! I have already explained the principles along which the political problems will be resolved. As soon as the measures have been decided, they can be implemented. From today onwards everyone should keep a level head and assist the government in re-establishing order, solving the rice supply problems, preparing for the restructuring of government and the public election for county magistrates and mayors. Plain speech is reliable, and I take full responsibility for what I have said. After this bitter experience I hope that the government and the people will together fight for stability and prosperity, for a happy and peaceful life.

7.7. Appendix VII

The 28 February Incident from the Resolution Committee's point of view and the 42 demands of their 'General Outline for Resolution'

1 The causes of the incident on 28 February

The incident on 28 February in Taiwan was triggered off by Monopoly Bureau officers confiscating smuggled cigarettes. They had often stripped the small street vendors of their wares and belongings at gunpoint (this alone is anything but just), and they also often beat the tobacco sellers up using the butts of their guns. On the evening of 27 February, one person was shot dead during the confiscation of smuggled cigarettes. This unleashed widespread outrage and led to clashes between the public and government authorities. These incidents, which occurred on 28 February in Taipei, immediately spread throughout the entire province. Clashes occurred everywhere between the public and the military [or military police], and led to bloodshed. Other than in Taipei, where the situation has calmed, bitter, armed fighting is still carrying on in many other areas.

Can the shooting of one person during the confiscation of smuggled cigarettes really provoke an incident of such a huge scale? Absolutely not! The shooting dead of one person during the confiscation of smuggled cigarettes was merely the trigger. This incident is the result of the peoples' dissatisfaction with over one year of corrupt politics.

More than a year after Taiwan was won back, this is the political situation: on the one hand, in his public speeches Governor Ch'en paints a beautiful picture; he speaks of how much one has to serve the People and work towards securing the Peoples' living conditions. In actual fact there are senior and less senior corrupt officials in every region, who are fighting over enemy [i.e. former Japanese] assets. They bully the public everywhere by bending the law or using their

⁹ The most reliable version of the reform programme is found in the *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 8 March, p. 2, also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 230-234. It hardly differs from the other sources. Only Kerr (pp. 475-479) mysteriously omits ten demands, which are not the ten that were added later on.

weapons. Human rights are no longer protected, there is no freedom of opinion and publication, public finances are in ruin, the price of goods continue to rocket, industry and mining are bankrupted, agriculture declines ever more and mass unemployment is rife. If they are unable to secure their livelihoods any longer it must be expected that one day people all over Taiwan will no longer continue to endure this kind of suffering. The people were full of rage, but they didn't dare to oust Ch'en I. The atrocity committed by the Monopoly Bureau agent led to the rage felt by all the people of Taiwan to be unleashed at once.

It is clear that this incident is entirely the product of corrupt politics. It was not brought about by the illegal actions of the Monopoly Bureau agents alone, nor by narrow-minded, provincial attitudes. Thus the government in Taiwan alone carries responsibility for this incident.

2 *The course of events during the incident on 28 February*

When a Monopoly Bureau agent killed a simple citizen on the evening of 27 February, he unleashed outrage throughout the city. The lorry belonging to the officials and the goods they had confiscated were immediately burned by the crowd. The following day, 28 February, all the shops were closed and people joined trains of demonstrators heading for the Taiwan Provincial Monopoly Bureau to demand the culprits be punished. Armed police surrounded the building, preventing the crowd from getting any closer. Enraged, the crowd immediately turned and headed to the Taipei City Monopoly Bureau to seize the culprits. They had already fled, however. In a state of extreme agitation the crowd destroyed the office equipment and dragged it onto the street where they set it alight. In order to fulfil their original objective, the crowd then moved off towards the Governor's Office building to convey to him their demands. Though there too armed soldiers and military police were prepared and on high alert, and did not allow the crowd to approach the building. In the general noise, the soldiers posted on the roof of the Governor's Office building utterly unexpectedly opened fire at the crowd with volleys of machine gun fire. Several people were killed or injured. The crowd became ever more irate and the situation more critical. At this point a group of Taiwanese returned to the city centre where they ransacked the large department stores funded by bureaucrats' money, as well as the shops of the Mainlanders, who were in cahoots with them. They pulled furniture and household goods onto the street and set fire to them. Armed police officers and soldiers arrived on the scene just as these objects were being burned. They fired rounds into the crowd, whereby not a few met their end. The following day, 1 March, a large crowd of people gathered in front of the Railway Administration Committee building (near Pei-men-ting, 北門町). Soldiers' machine gun fire killed and injured several dozen. As soon as news of this had spread, public sentiment shifted throughout Taiwan. The situation in Taipei has now calmed somewhat due to intervention by the Committee for Settling the Incident of 28 February. In central and southern Taiwan however, the people are trying to persuade the armed government units to lay down their arms to avoid massacres from happening. This situation has already claimed many victims.

3 *How to settle the incident on 28 February*

It has now become clear that this incident is a result of corrupt politics. If it does not lead to fundamental political reform, there is no guarantee that similar or even more catastrophic incidents do not occur in the future. Therefore the people of Taiwan, both Taiwanese and Mainlanders resident here, should propose means of settling the incident. Representatives from the Government and the authorities should adopt a sincere and honest approach to work with the people towards finding a solution. They should under no circumstances retain the arrogance and wrong attitude of the bureaucrats.

The proposals that have thus far been received are summarised here, divided into measures to overcome the current situation, and more fundamental measures.

Part I: Overcoming the current situation

1. All government armed forces should on their own accord give the order to lay down their weapons and hand them to the local Resolution Committee or military police unit for storage in order to prevent further bloody clashes.
2. After the government's armed forces have been disarmed, public order will be maintained in each area by the military police, unarmed police and civil organisations jointly.
3. Armed hostilities must under no circumstances take place where there is no threat posed by armed government forces. Corrupt officials, whether Taiwanese or Mainlanders, can only be denounced if they are to be arrested by the Resolution Committee in conjunction with the military police and then severely punished in accordance with the law. Beyond this, they must not be harmed in any way, as this would merely cause strife.
4. Proposals for political reform may be handed to the Provincial Resolution Committee, which will later decide on them.
5. The government must not under any circumstances undertake any further troop movements or request troops from the Central Government in order to settle the incident by force of arms, which can only lead to severe bloodshed and intervention from abroad.
6. Before the political problems are thoroughly resolved all government actions (whether military or political) must first be arranged with the Resolution Committee in order to avoid public misgivings regarding the government's sincerity, which would lead to all forms of misunderstandings.
7. No member of the public may be held responsible in relation to this incident; in future, no one involved in the incident may be arrested on the grounds of statements that he made. Generous compensation is to be paid for all injured or killed during the course of the incident.

Part II: Fundamental measures

a) Regarding the military

1. Soldiers who are not well-educated and trained must in no case not be stationed in Taiwan.
2. The Central Government may send officials to Taiwan in order to sign up troops to defend Taiwan.
3. Until the civil war on the mainland has finished no troops can be signed up in Taiwan, other than for the defence of Taiwan, in order to avoid being drawn into the whirlpool of the civil war.

b) Political measures

1. An autonomy statute for Taiwan should be passed in order to realise Sun Yat-sen's ideal of the Outline for National Reconstruction as the highest political standard.
2. The mayors in the municipalities and the county magistrates should be re-elected by public vote before June of this year. The county and municipality Consultative Assemblies should also be re-elected.
3. The Provincial Consultative Assembly (which should act as the Provincial parliament after its re-election) shall approve the choice of personnel for the provincial government authorities. The Provincial Consultative Assembly shall be re-elected before June of this year. The Governor's Office shall make suggestions regarding current personnel to the Provincial Resolution Committee, which will examine and decide upon these suggestions.
4. The heads of the provincial government departments should consist of more than two-thirds of people who have lived in Taiwan for more than 10 years (including, as far as possible, the head of the Secretariat [of the Governor's Office], the head of the Departments for Internal Affairs, Finance, Industry and Mining, Agriculture and Forestry, Education and the Police).
5. The [Governor's Office] Police Department, as well as the police authorities in the counties and municipalities should be headed by Taiwanese people. The Provincial Police Brigade, the Railway Police [which was subordinate to the Railway Administrative Commission] and the Industry and Mining [Department's] police units should be dissolved.
6. More than one half of the members of the Legal Commission should be Taiwanese, from whom the Committee chair will be selected.
7. Suspects may only be arrested by police authorities.
8. The military police may only arrest military personnel.
9. Politically-motivated arrests and imprisonments are forbidden.
10. Everyone is free to hold gatherings and form unarmed associations.

11. There is to be absolute freedom of opinion and publication as well as the right to strike; the restriction under which newspapers must seek approval and be registered are to be removed.
12. The regulations controlling the formation of civil organisations are to be removed.
13. The inspection of candidates for the Consultative bodies is to be abolished.
14. The mode of election to the Consultative bodies is to be amended.
15. A uniformly progressive income tax is to be introduced; other than Luxury and Inheritance tax, no other extraordinary taxes may be introduced.
16. The most senior post-holder of all public enterprises must be Taiwanese.
17. Public Enterprise Control Committees are to be formed by public election; the provincial government is to be tasked with and be given full powers to find a solution to the problem of the [former] Japanese assets; administrative commissions are to be set up for each factory and mine taken over [from the Japanese], whose membership must be more than one half Taiwanese.
18. The Monopoly Bureau is to be dissolved, and staple food rationed.
19. The Trading Bureau is to be dissolved.
20. The Propaganda Commission is to be dissolved.
21. All senior judges and senior public prosecutors must be Taiwanese.
22. More than one half of the personnel subordinate to the judges and public prosecutors must be Taiwanese.

Further reform plans shall await the 10 March, when public opinion throughout the province has been consulted. They should then be dealt with by the restructured government.

(Report in the *Hsin-sheng-pao* (新生報): Yesterday (7 March) at 3.30 pm the Resolution Committee held a plenary meeting which was inaugurated by the provisional chairman P'an Ch'ü-yüan (潘渠源). In addition to the original twenty-two demands, which were unanimously adopted [for political reforms see above], the following demands have been appended and adopted:¹⁰

1. Taiwanese should be employed in the army, navy and air force, as far as is possible.
2. The Garrison Command should be dissolved to prevent the abuse of military power.
3. The Governor's Office for the administration of Taiwan Province is to be transformed into a provincial government by the end of March; until the Central Government approves this, the Political Office of the Committee for

¹⁰ Lin Mu-shun traces these articles back to the activities of representatives from the 'Association for Political Reconstruction', the students, the unions, the 'Democratic Alliance' and the people of 'unclear origin'. See also Lin Mu-shun, p. 34.

Settling the Incident of 28 February shall temporarily carry out the transformation, and the corresponding posts shall be filled by upright, well-known individuals who shall be voted into them by public election.

4. The Resolution Committee's Political Office shall be formed before 15 March. Representatives of the districts' townships and cities should elect a candidate to this body, from which the Consultative Assembly of the respective county or municipality shall elect representatives according to the following ratio

Taipei:	2	Tainan:	1
Taipei County:	3	Tainan County:	4
Keelung:	1	Kaohsiung:	1
Hsinchu:	1	Kaohsiung County:	3
Hsinchu County:	3	Pingtung:	1
Taichung:	1	Penghu County:	1
Taichung County:	4	Hualien County:	1
Changhua:	1	Taitung County:	1
Chia-i:	1,		

Total: 30 people

5. Work camps and other unnecessary facilities are to be dissolved or amalgamated [with others]; the Resolution Committee's Political Office will investigate this problem and make a decision on it.
6. Regarding Japanese assets, the Central Government is to be requested to permit the Provincial Political Office to resolve this problem independently.
7. The political status, economic situation and legitimate interests of our Kaoshan kinsmen¹¹ must be effectively guaranteed.
8. The labour protection law will come into effect on 1 June of this year.
9. People detained on suspicion of war crimes or treason charges are to be immediately and unconditionally released.
10. The estimated current cost¹² for the 150,000 tonnes of sugar which was delivered to the Central Government should be returned to Taiwan Province.

¹¹ Another term for the aborigines.

¹² Or the 'then' cost; here the Chinese is ambiguous (*shih chia*, 時價). Given the prevailing hyper inflation of the time, it is assumed that the current cost is meant.

7.8. Appendix VIII

Ch'en I's radio speech regarding the re-imposition of the state of emergency, 10 March, 10 am¹³

Compatriots of Taiwan,

Yesterday I again imposed the state of emergency, temporarily. I would with utmost sincerity like you, kind-hearted compatriots who comprise the vast majority [of the population], to know that I imposed the state of emergency solely for your protection. You must under no circumstances believe the traitors' rumours. You must not be distrustful, or afraid. Rest assured, law-abiding compatriots will not come to harm.

The state of emergency has been re-imposed solely to do away with the small number of traitors and rioters. Kind-hearted compatriots will be unable to live in peace until they have been wiped out.

I have spoken on the radio three times since the incident of 28 February. Regarding the incident when tobacco was confiscated, I have initiated severe punishment of the Monopoly Bureau agents who were responsible for the injuries, in accordance with the law, and I have also provided for the medical treatment and generous compensation for those injured and killed. No investigations have been made into those people who beat up others. As far as improvements to the political system are concerned, the Governor's Office will be restructured and as far as possible individuals from the province will be appointed. County magistrates and mayors will be voted in public elections. [Other] improvements to the political system can be discussed and decided on later, in accordance with the law. I have therefore agreed to almost everything that the majority of compatriots had hoped for and demanded, as long as this was within the law. I was certainly of the opinion that order could be fully restored and calm would return once again. However, since the state of emergency was lifted in Taipei on 1 March, [security forces] have been continuously disarmed, private property looted, and authority buildings and depots have even been attacked. In addition, treasonous demands have been made. In all counties and municipalities weapons have been looted, authority personnel have been locked up and authority buildings laid under siege. Dear Compatriots! Just ask yourselves if such actions are lawful, whether they should be happening. I think that all the kind-hearted compatriots know, without exception, that such actions are illegal and treasonous.

Dear Compatriots! You hoped for a solution to the incident on 28 February in which smuggled tobacco was confiscated and people injured, as well as improvements to the political system. A very small number of traitors and rebels have been using every opportunity, however, to circulate irresponsible rumours and thereby cause discord, to mislead the people and make them anxious, and by

¹³ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 2. An incomplete translation may also be found in Kerr, pp. 295-296.

this means to realise their treasonous conspiracy. Life for the kind-hearted compatriots has been full of suffering over the last 10 days. Dear Compatriots! The traitors and rebels alone have been the cause of this suffering. In order to bring this suffering to an end, the government had no choice but to impose the state of emergency to eradicate the traitors and rebels who are causing nothing but pain to all compatriots. I hope that you have all fully understood this.

The transfer of National Army troops to Taiwan is solely for the protection of the whole population throughout the province, and to eradicate the rebels. There are absolutely no other intentions behind it. Even though there is a small number of rebels amongst my Taiwanese compatriots, the vast majority are extremely kind-hearted. They provided many kinds of rescue services for Mainlanders who had been beaten up. This solidarity shows concern for the welfare of compatriots, which I find deeply moving. I would like to express my sincere thanks to all kind-hearted Taiwanese compatriots. I hope all the more that all kind-hearted Taiwanese compatriots will assert their sense of justice. We should all be sincere and kind to one another and build a new Taiwan.

I hereby announce the emergency measures for the restoration of order and for the maintenance of public order, in the following points. Understand that they are immediately effective.

1. All those employed in transport, be it the railway or any other mode of transport, must take up their occupations again and must not remain absent. Should rebels come and threaten you, I will have them severely punished. You need not be afraid.
2. Workers must return to their workplaces, all shops must reopen, and the whole populace must take up their everyday activities again.
3. Gatherings and demonstrations are strictly forbidden.
4. It is absolutely forbidden to collect donations from the public, regardless in whose name.
5. The price of goods must not be increased.
6. I will put a stop to any other illegal actions. Finally, I hope that you will all conduct yourselves in a legal manner, and maintain order.

7.9. Appendix IX

Chiang Kai-shek's speech from Nanking on the situation in Taiwan, 10 March¹⁴

Various newspapers have reported on the causes of this tragic incident in Taiwan, so I need not go into it in more detail. Since Taiwan was returned last year,¹⁵ the Central Government has posted only few regular troops on the island as order was

¹⁴ *Hsin-sheng-pao*, 11 March, p. 1, also in Huang Ts'un-hou (黃存厚), pp. 236-237. Translation also in Kerr, pp. 307-309.

¹⁵ It should in fact read 'two years ago', i.e. 1945.

well-established. According to my information public order was maintained by the military and civilian police. During the course of last year the compatriots have sincerely demonstrated their law-abiding character and support for the Central Government in the areas of agriculture, industry and education. Their patriotic and self-respecting spirit is in fact not weaker than that of their compatriots in any other province. Some of the Taiwanese who were conscripted by the Japanese and served in South-east Asia during the war and who then became members of the Communist Party, have unexpectedly used the recent [incident] of the implementation of the Monopoly Bureau's ban on tobacco sellers to agitate the people and to incite disturbances, as well as put forward demands for political reform. The Central Government will shortly transform to a constitutional form of government. In order that the Taiwanese administration is soon back on the right course, the Central Government will grant responsibility earlier to the local authorities, which are intended to be governed at a local level, in accordance with the Constitution. Governor Ch'en has already announced the creation of an [ordinary] provincial government and the dissolution of the Governor's Office at a specified point in time, on the Central Government's instructions, as well as the Central Government's approval to implement public elections for county magistrates within a set period.¹⁶ All Taiwanese compatriots were exhilarated about this and were more than pleased to accept it. This tragic incident should therefore have been brought to an end. Last Friday (7 [March]) the so-called Committee for Settling the 'Incident of 28 February' unexpectedly raised unreasonable demands, such as for the dissolution of the Taiwan Garrison Command and that they deposit their weapons with the Committee for storage. They also demanded that members of the land, sea and air forces in Taiwan may only be Taiwanese.¹⁷ These kinds of demands breach the boundaries of local politics, and the Central Government naturally can not accept them. In addition, yesterday attacks on the authorities took place continuously, as well as other illegal activities. Therefore the Central Government took the decision to despatch troops to Taiwan in order to maintain public security there.¹⁸ According to reports, the despatched troops landed safely in Keelung yesterday evening¹⁹ and order prevails [there]. I am convinced that normality will return very shortly. In addition a senior official will be sent to Taiwan to offer Ch'en I support in settling this incident. I have already sent a telegram to all members of the armed forces and officials strongly urging them to calmly await the arrival of a senior official to settle [the incident] and not to carry out revenge attacks, in the hope that all the compatriots in Taiwan will treat each other friendly and assist each other, provide support for each other and cooperate. I desperately hope that the Taiwanese compatriots show insight, maintain strict discipline, and do not allow themselves to be misguided by traitors, as otherwise the Japanese will be laughing up their

¹⁶ In fact, Ch'en I had announced the re-election of county magistrates (and mayors in the municipalities) by 1 July, not just within a set period. See Appendix IV and above, p. 74.

¹⁷ In fact it was intended that the Resolution Committee together with the military police would store the weaponry (Part I, Article 1). As far as the composition of the armed forces in Taiwan is concerned, the reform programme merely states 'as far as possible' (see Appendix V, Article 1 of the 10 demands later appended).

¹⁸ The decision was of course not due to events the previous day, but had been made five days previously. See above, p. 170.

¹⁹ The landing of troops actually began one day previously, on 8 March. See above, 3.3.3., p. 86.

sleeves. They must not act recklessly and blindly, as this would merely cause harm to themselves and the nation. I urgently hope that they recognise the difference between dutiful and treasonous behaviour, and differentiate between fortune and calamity. They must gain thorough insight and dissolve all illegal organisations of their own accord and restore order in their areas so that all our Taiwanese compatriots are able to go about their business in peace and succeed in building the New Taiwan. Only then will they be free of the debt they owe to all the Chinese compatriots who made sacrifices and fought arduously over the last 50 years for the return of Taiwan.

Glossary

Glossary of personal names

Andō Rikichi	安藤利吉	Ch'en Chen-tsung	陳振宗
Chang	張	Ch'en Chin-neng	陳金能
Chang Chien-i	張見益	Ch'en Ch'eng	陳誠
Chang Chien-li	張見利	Ch'en Ch'eng-i	陳澄液
Chang Ch'ing-ch'uan	張晴川	Ch'en Ch'un-chin	陳春金
Chang Ch'i-lang	張七朗	Ch'en Fu-chih	陳復志
Chang Hsüeh-liang	張學良	Ch'en Hai-ho	陳海河
Chang Huan-k'uei	張換奎	Ch'en Hai-sha	陳海沙
Chang Hung-mo	張鴻模	Ch'en Han-p'ing	陳漢平
Chang Kuo-jen	張果仁	Ch'en Hsien-kuang	陳顯光
Chang Li-sheng	張曆生	Ch'en Hsin	陳忻
Chang Mu-t'ao	張慕陶	Ch'en Hua-tsung	陳華宗
Chang Shen-ju	張深儒	Ch'en Huai-jang	陳懷讓
Chang Shih-ku	張式穀	Ch'en I	陳儀
Chang Shou-ling	張壽齡	Ch'en I-sung	陳逸松
Chang Tsung-jen	張宗仁	Ch'en Ken-huo	陳根火
Chang Wen-huan	張文環	Ch'en Kuo-fu	陳國夫
Chao Ch'eng	趙誠	Ch'en Li-fu	陳立夫
Chao Lien-fang	趙連方	Ch'en Lin-ts'ang	陳霖蒼
Ch'en An-ch'a	陳按察	Ch'en Pi-nan	陳比南
Ch'en Chen-pin	陳貞彬	Ch'en Shang-wen	陳尚文

Ch'en Sung-chien	陳松堅	Chu Wen-po	朱文伯
Ch'en Tien-shun	陳天順	Chuang Ch'ui-sheng	莊垂勝
Ch'en Ch'ing-piao	陳清標	Chuang Meng-hou	莊孟侯
Ch'en Ts'uan-ti	陳篡地	Chuang Ying-shih	莊迎氏
Ch'en Wen-hsi	陳文溪	Chung I-jen	鍾逸仁
Ch'en Wu	陳屋	Chuo Kao-hsüan	卓高烜
Cheng Ken-ching	鄭根井	Fan Shou-k'ang	范壽康
Cheng Nan-wei	鄭南渭	Fu Hsüeh-t'ung	傅學通
Cheng Yüan-hsiao	鄭元宵	Han Shih-ch'üan	韓石泉
Chiang Kai-shek	蔣介石	Ho Han-wen	何漢文
Chiang Shih-ch'in	蔣時欽	Hou Ch'ao-tsung	侯朝宗
Chiang Wei-ch'uan	蔣渭川	Hou Ch'üan-ch'eng	侯全成
Chien Ch'ing-chiang	簡清江	Hsieh Chen	謝真
Chien Sheng-yü	簡聖埳	Hsieh Hsüeh-hung	謝雪紅
Chien Wen-fa	簡文發	Hsieh O	謝娥
Ch'iu Yüan-yang	邱鴛鴦	Hsiung K'o-hsi	熊克熙
Chou Ching-yü	周競宇	Hsü Chen-hsü	許振緒
Chou Ch'ing-chih	周清之	Hsü Ch'ing-feng	許慶豐
Chou I-o	周一鶚	Hsü Ch'iu-tsung	許秋粽
Chou Ming	周明	Hsü Ch'un-ch'ing	徐春卿
Chou Pai-lien	周百鍊	Hsü Hsi-ch'ien	許錫謙
Chou Yen-shou	周延壽	Hsü Te-hui	許德輝

Hu Fu-hsiang	胡福相	Hung Yen-ch'iu	洪炎秋
Huang Ch'ao-ch'in	黃朝琴	Jen Hsien-ch'ün	任顯群
Huang Ch'ao-ch'ing	黃朝清	Ko Ching-en	葛敬恩
Huang Ch'ao-sheng	黃朝生	K'o Yüan-fen	柯遠芬
Huang Ch'un-ch'ing	黃純清	K'o Lin	柯麟
Huang Chung-t'u	黃仲圖	K'o Pao-hsiang	柯寶象
Huang Huo-ting	黃火定	Kung Lü-tuan	龔履端
Huang Kuo-shu	黃國書	Kuo	郭
Huang K'o-li	黃克立	Kuo Chang-yüan	郭章垣
Huang Ma-tien	黃媽典	Kuo Kuo-chi	郭國基
Huang Pai-lu	黃百祿	Kuo Shao-tsung	郭紹宗
Huang Sheng-ch'in	黃生琴	Lai Yüan-hui	賴遠輝
Huang Shu-shui	黃樹水	Li	李
Huang Ta-p'ing	黃達平	Li Ch'iao-sung	李喬松
Huang Ts'un-hou	黃存厚	Li Hui	?
Huang Tung	黃棟	Li I-chung	李翼中
Huang Wen-hui	黃文輝	Li Jen-kuei	李仁貴
Huang Wu-tung	黃武東	Li Kuo-tse	李國澤
Huang Tz'u	黃賜	Li Pi-ch'iang	李碧鏘
Hung	洪	Li Wan-chü	李萬居
Hung Huo-lien	洪火煉	Li Yu-pang	李友邦
Hung Tzu-min	洪字民	Li Yu-san	李友三

Liao Chün-yeh	廖駿業	Lin Tsung-hsien	林宗賢
Liao Wen-i	廖文毅	Lin Wu-ts'un	林梧村
Lien Chen-tung	連震東	Lin Wei-kung	林爲恭
Lin Chang-en	林章恩	Ling Chien-hsien	凌諫銜
Lin Ch'ao-ming	林潮明	Liu Ch'i-kuang	劉啓光
Lin Chiang-mai	林江邁	Liu Ch'ing-shan	劉青山
Lin Chieh	林界	Liu Ch'uan-lai	劉傳來
Lin Chin-hsiang	林晉祥	Liu Ho-hsiao	劉和嘯
Lin Chin-piao	林金標	Liu K'uo-ts'ai	劉闊才
Lin Chung	林忠	Liu Ming	劉明
Lin Hsi-lu	林西陸	Liu Ming-ch'ao	劉明朝
Lin Hsien-t'ang	林獻堂	Liu Ts'un-chung	劉存忠
Lin Jih-kao	林日高	Liu Yü-ch'ing	劉雨卿
Lin Jun	林潤	Lu Ping-ch'in	盧炳欽
Lin Lien-tsung	林連宗	Luo Chou-neng	駱周能
Lin Mao-sheng	林茂生	Luo Shui-yüan	駱水源
Lin Mu-shun	林木順	Lü Po-hsiung	呂伯雄
Lin Pi-hui	林璧輝	Ma Yu-yüeh	馬有岳
Lin Shih-tang	林詩黨	Pai Ch'eng-chih	白成支
Lin Shih-t'ien	林氏田	Pai Ch'ung-hsi	白崇禧
Lin Shui-t'ien	林水田	P'an Ch'ü-yüan	潘渠源
Lin Ting-li	林頂立	P'an Mu-chih	潘木枝

Pao K'o-yung	包可永	Tu Ts'ung-ming	杜聰明
P'eng Ch'ing-k'ao	彭清靠	T'u Kuang-ming	涂光明
P'eng Hsüeh-p'ei	彭學培	T'ung Ping-hui	童炳輝
P'eng Meng-chi	彭孟緝	Wang I-ch'ing	王一慶
Shih Chiang-nan	施江南	Wang Kuei	王貴
Shih Hung-hsi	史宏熹	Wang Min-ning	王民寧
Shih Yen-han	石延漢	Wang Shih-ting	王石定
Su Hsin	蘇新	Wang T'ien-teng	王添燈
Su Shao-wen	蘇紹文	Wei Tao-ming	魏道明
Su Wei-liang	蘇惟梁	Wu Hung-sen	吳鴻森
Sun Chih-chün	孫志俊	Wu Chen-wu	吳振武
Sung Chen-chü	宋振	Wu Ch'un-lin	吳春霖
Sung Fei-ju	宋斐如	Wu Hsin-jung	吳新榮
T'ang Te-chang	湯德章	Wu Kuo-hsin	吳國信
Ting	丁	Wu Yu-jung	吳有容
Ting Jui-pin	丁瑞彬	Wu Yung-ch'ang	巫永昌
Ts'ai P'ei-huo	蔡培火	Yang	楊
Ts'ai P'eng-fei	蔡鵬飛	Yang Ch'ing	楊請
Ts'ai T'ieh-ch'eng	蔡鐵成	Yang Chün	楊俊
Tseng Ch'ung-lang	曾重朗	Yang K'o-huang	楊克煌
Tseng Feng-ming	曾鳳鳴	Yang K'uei	楊達
Tu	杜	Yang Liang-kung	楊亮功

Yang T'ao	楊陶	Yen Ch'in-hsien	顏欽賢
Yang Yüan-ting	楊元丁	Yin Chan-k'uei	殷占魁
Yeh Ch'iu-mu	葉秋木	Yu Mi-chien	游彌堅
Yeh Jung-chung	葉榮鐘	Yüan Kuo-ch'in	園國欽
Yeh Teh-ken	葉德根	Yüeh Hsing-ming	岳星明
Yeh Tzu-feng	葉子楓	Yü Kuo-hua	俞國華
Yen Chia-kan	嚴家淦		

Glossary of geographical names

Changchun	長春	Hsi-chih	汐止
Changhua	彰化	Hsi-men yüan-huan	西門圓環
Chekiang	浙江	Hsi-tzu-wan	西子灣
Chi-chi	集集	Hsiamen	廈門
Chi-lung	基隆	Hsiang-ch'eng-ting	鄉成町
Ch'i-shan	旗山	Hsiao-mei	小梅
Chia-i	嘉義	Hsinchu	新竹
Chin-kua-shih	金瓜石	Hsin-feng	新豐
Ch'ing-shui	清水	Hsin-hua	新化
Chu-nan	竹南	Hsin-tien	新店
Chu-shan	竹山	Hsin-ying	新營
Chu-tung	竹東	Hu-k'ou	湖口
Chung-li	中壢	Hu-wei	虎尾
Erh-shui	二水	Hualien	花蓮
Feng-shan	鳳山	Hung-mao-p'i	紅毛埤
Feng-yüan	豐原	I-lan	宜蘭
Fuchou	福州	Jih-Yüeh-T'an	日月潭
Fukien	福建	Jui-fang	瑞芳
Hainan	海南	Kang-shan	岡山
Heng-ch'un	恆春	Kaohsiung	高雄
Hsi'an	西安	Keelung	基隆

Kiangsu	江蘇	Pen-ting	本町
Kuan-hsi	關西	Penghu	澎湖
Kuei-tzu-t'ou	龜子頭	P'ing-tung	屏東
Lien-yün-kang	連雲港	P'u-li	埔里
Lin-nei	林內	San-ch'ung	三重
Ling-ya	苓雅	San-min	三民
Luo-tung	羅東	Shanghai	上海
Mei-nung	美濃	Shih-lin	士林
Men-p'ai-kou	門牌溝	Shou-shan	壽山
Men-p'ai-T'an	門牌潭	Shui-li-k'eng	水里坑
Miao-li	苗栗	Shui-tao-ting	水道町
Nanking	南京	Sung-shan	松山
Nan-men	南門	Su'ao	蘇澳
Nan-tzu	楠梓	Ta-chia	大甲
Neng-kao	能高	Ta-hsi	大溪
Pa-tu	八堵	Ta-kang-p'u	大港埔
Pan-ch'iao	板橋	Taichung	台中
Pei-kang	北港	Tainan	台南
Pei-men	北門	Taipei	台北
Pei-men-lu	北門路	Taitung	台東
Pei-men-ting	北門町	Taiwan	台灣
Pei-t'ou	北投	T'ai-p'ing	太平

T'ai-p'ing-lu	太平路	Yüan-ch'üan	圓圈
Tan-shui	淡水	Yüan-lin	員林
Taoyüan	桃園	Yün-lin	雲林
Ti-hua-chieh	迪化街		
T'ien-chung	田中		
Tou-liu	斗六		
Tou-nan	斗南		
Ts'ao-t'un	草屯		
Tseng-wen	曾文		
Tso-ying	左營		
Tung-kang	東港		
Tung-shih	東石		
Tung-shih	東勢		
Wan-hua	萬華		
Wu-she	霧社		
Yen-an	延安		
Yen-p'ing pei-lu	延平北路		
Yen-shui	鹽水		
Ying-ko	鶯歌		
Yung-lo-ting	永樂町		
Yü-ch'ih	魚池		
Yü-ching	玉井		

Glossary of other names and terms

A-mei	阿美
A-shan	阿山
ch'ang-wu wei-yüan-hui	常務委員會
chen-min ta-hui	鎮民大會
Ch'en chang-kuan shih-hsing no-yen	陳長官實行諾言
cheng-chih chien-she hsieh-hui	政治建設協會
cheng-hsüeh-hsi	政學系
Cheng-Hua	正華
cheng-wu-chü	政務局
chi-chung-ying	集中營
chi-hua-tsu	計劃組
chi-yen hsüeh-an tiao-ch'a wei-yüan-hui	緝煙血案調查委員會
ch'i-i	起義
ch'i-wu kung-ying-chan ti-szu chih-k'u	七五供應站第四支庫
Chia-i-ko	嘉義閣
Chia-i san-erh ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui	嘉義三二處理委員會
chiao-she-tsu	交涉組
chiao-t'ung-cheng	交通證
chiao-t'ung ch'u-chang	交通處長
chiao-t'ung-tsu	交通組
chieh-kuan	接管
chieh-yen szu-ling-pu	戒嚴司令部
chien-ch'a-shih	監察使
chien-chü-tsu	檢舉組

chien-fei pao-t'u	奸匪暴徒
chien jen chi k'ai-ch'iang	見人即開槍
Chien-kuo	建國
chien-tang	奸黨
chih-an fu-wu-tui	治安服務隊
chih-an lien-ho pan-shih-ch'u	治安聯合辦事處
chih-an-tsu	治安組
chih-an wei-ch'ih-hui	治安維持會
chih-hsien kuo-ta tai-piao	制憲國大代表
chih hui ch'ih, i wu k'o ch'ü	只會吃,一無可取
Chin	斤
chin-nien wei hsing-hsien-nien	今年爲行憲年
chin-shih-tui	金獅隊
Chin-ting	錦町
ching-ch'a ta-tui	警察大隊
ching-cheng ko-hsin t'ung-meng	警政革新同盟
ching-pei tsung-szu-ling-pu pieh-tung-tui szu-ling	警備總司令部別動隊司令
ching-wu ch'u-chang	警務處長
ch'ing-ch'u	清除
ch'ing-hsiang	清鄉
ch'ing-lien k'u-kan	清廉苦幹
ch'ing-nien ta-hui	青年大會
ch'ing-nien ta-t'ung-meng	青年大同盟
ch'ing-nien tzu-chih t'ung-meng	青年自治同盟

chiu-hu-tsu	救護組
chu	豬
chu-fan	主犯
chu-hsi-t'uan	主席團
ch'u-chih	處置
ch'u-li-chü	處理局
ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui	處理委員會
Chung-hua Jih-pao	中華日報
chung-i fu-wu-tui	忠義服務隊
Chung-kuo-jen	中國人
chung-shan-chuang	中山裝
chung-shan kung-yüan	中山公園
Chung-shan-t'ang	中山堂
chung-tui	中隊
Chung-wai Jih-pao	中外日報
chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui	中央執行委員會
Chung-yang chü-lo-pu	中央俱樂部
Chung-yang hsi-yüan	中央戲院
Chung-yang lü-she	中央旅社
chung-yang t'ung-hsün-she	中央通訊社
Ch'ung-chien Jih-pao	重建日報
ch'ü	區
ch'üan-tao	勸導
chün-t'ung	軍統

erh-ch'i pu-tui	二七部隊
erh-chung-hui	二中會
erh-erh-pa ho-p'ing-jih ts'u-chin-hui	二二八和平日促進會
erh-erh-pa pu shih min-pien	二二八不是民變
erh-erh-pa shih-chien	二二八事件
erh-erh-pa shih-chien ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui	二二八事件處理委員會
erh-erh-pa ta ko-ming	二二八大革命
'erh-erh-pa' wei chung-kung yin-mou shih-chien	二二八為中共陰謀事件
erh-yüeh ko-ming	二月革命
fa-chih wei-yüan-hui	法制委員會
fa-pi	法幣
fa-shang hsüeh-yüan	法商學院
fan-tui nei-chan	反對內戰
fang-wei szu-ling-pu	防衛司令部
Fu-hsing	復興
fu-k'o-chang	副科長
fu-wu-tui	服務隊
hai-kuo tzu-hai	害國自害
Hai-nan-tao kuei-T'ai-che t'ung-meng	海南島歸台者同盟
Hai-p'ing	海平
han-chien chan-fan	漢奸戰犯
Ho-p'ing Jih-pao	和平日報
hsien-min ta-hui	縣民大會
Hsin-sheng-pao	新生報

Hsin-T'ai kung-szu	新台公司
hsin-wen-chü	新聞局
hsin-wen-shih	新聞室
hsing-cheng chang-kuan kung-shu	行政長官公署
hsing-ch'u	刑處
hsing T'ai t'ung-chih-hui	興台同志會
Hsing-T'ai Jih-pao	興台日報
hsing-tung-tui	行動隊
hsüan-ch'uan wei-yüan-hui	宣傳委員會
hsüan-ch'uan-tsu	宣傳組
hsüan-wei	宣慰
hsüan-wei-pan	宣慰班
hsüeh-sheng-chün	學生軍
hsüeh-sheng lien-ho-chün	學生聯合軍
hsüeh-sheng lien-meng	學生聯盟
hsüeh-sheng tzu-chih-hui tai-piao	學生自治會代表
hsüeh-sheng tzu-chih t'ung-meng	學生自治同盟
Hua-nan shang-yeh yin-hang	華南商業銀行
Huang-p'u-hsi	黃埔系
hui-ch'ang chih-hsü hun-luan	會場秩序混亂
huo-shou shih i-ko nü-jen	禍首是一個女人
i-yung tsung-tui	義勇總隊
Jen-min Tao-pao	人民導報
jen-min tzu-yu pao-chang wei-yüan-hui	人民自由保障委員會

jen-tsui	認罪
Jih-ch'an ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui	日產處理委員會
Jih-hsin	日新
jo-kan shih-min	若干市民
jo-ying kan-szu-tui	若櫻敢死隊
kai-ko pen-sheng cheng-chih fang-an	改革本省政治方案
kai-ko pen-sheng fu-pai cheng-chih	改革本省腐敗政治
kan-shu	甘薯
kao ch'üan-kuo t'ung-pao-shu	告全國同胞書
Kao-sha hsi-yüan	高沙戲院
ken-pen ch'u-li	根本處理
ko-sha wu-lun	格殺無論
kou ch'ü, chu lai	狗去,豬來
ku-chang	股長
kuan-wai	關外
kung-hsüeh-yüan	工學院
kung-k'uang-ch'u	工礦處
kung-mai-chü	公賣局
kung-pu chen-hsiang	公佈真象
Kung-shang Jih-pao	工商日報
kung-shang yin-hang	工商銀行
kuo-chia chün-shih wei-yüan-hui tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi-chü	國家軍事委員會調查統計局
kuo-fang tsui-kao wei-yüan-hui	國防最高委員會
Kuo-min-tang	國民黨

Kuo-min-tang tang-shih wei-yüan-hui	國民黨黨史委員會
kuo-min ts'an-cheng-hui	國民參政會
Kuo-sheng-pao	國聲報
Kuo-shih Jih-pao	國是日報
kuo-pi	國幣
kuo-yü	國語
Lao-sung	老松
liang-shih-chü	糧食局
liang-shih shih-wu-suo	糧食事務所
liang-shih-tsu	糧食組
lien-ho pu-tui	聯合部隊
lien-ho hao-wai	聯合號外
lien-luo-tsu	聯絡組
lien-pao-lien-tsuo-fa	連保連座法
lin-shih shih-chang	臨時市長
lu-hai-k'ung-chün tsung-szu-ling	陸海空軍總司令
lu-k'ung-chün tsung-szu-ling	陸空軍總司令
Ma-lan	馬蘭
mang-ts'ung	盲從
mao-i-chü	貿易局
mei-k'uang chung-i fu-wu-t'uan	煤礦忠義服務團
meng-lieh kung-chi	猛烈攻擊
mi-shu-shih	秘書室
min-cheng-ch'u	民政處

Min-chin-tang	民進黨
Min-chu chin-pu tang	民主進步黨
min-chu lien-meng	民主聯盟
min-chu tzu-chih	民主自治
min-chung ta-hui	民眾大會
min-chien fu-tse jen	民間服責人
Min-hsiung	民雄
min-i	民意
Min-nan	閩南
Min-pao	民報
min-pien	民變
Min-sheng-pao	民生報
mu-chi	木屐
mu-chüan-tsu	募捐組
nan-pu fang-wei szu-ling	南部防衛司令
nu-hua chiao-yü	奴化教育
nung-lin chih-yeh hsüeh-hsiao	農林職業學校
nung-lin ch'u-chang	農林處長
ou-ta	毆打
phah Hok-chiu-a	打福州仔
pai-hu-tui	白虎隊
pan-shan	半山
pan-shan-men	半山們
p'an-ni-hsing	叛逆性

p'ang-ta	龐大
pao-an ching-ch'a-tui	保安警察隊
pao-an szu-ling-pu	保安司令部
pao-an wei-yüan-hui	保安委員會
pao-kuan	保管
pao-mi-chü	保密局
pao-tao-tsu	報導組
pao-t'u	暴徒
pei jen-min huo-hsi	被人民獲悉
pei-p'an ti sheng-ming	背叛的聲明
pen-hsing	本性
pen-sheng-jen	本省人
pen-sheng tsai-tu hsüan-pu chieh-yen	本省再度宣布戒嚴
pen-shih chih-an hsieh-chu wei-yüan-hui	本市治安協助委員會
pi-jan kuo-chia she-hui-chu-i	必然國家社會主義
pieh-tung-tui	別動隊
pu-fa chih t'u	不法之徒
pu-liang fen-tzu	不良份子
san-chiao cheng-chang	三角證章
san-ch'ing-t'uan	三青團
san-min-chu-i ch'ing-nien-t'uan	三民主義青年團
sao-tang-chou-pao	掃蕩報
shan-hou ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui	善後處理委員會
shan-ti-jen	山地人

Shan-tzu-ting	山子町
sheng-cheng kai-ko kang-yao	省政改革綱要
sheng-cheng kai-ko wei-yüan-hui	省政改革委員會
sheng-li nü-tzu chung-hsüeh	省立女子中學
sheng-tang-pu	省黨部
shih-cheng-fu ti-ch'an ch'ing-ch'a-shih	市政府敵產清查室
shih-chia	時價
shih-chien	事件
shih-chien ching-kuo	事件經過
shih-chiu chün-hsieh-k'u	十九軍械庫
shih-fan hsüeh-yüan	師範學院
shih-min ta-hui	市民大會
shih-pien	事變
shu-pai	數百
shu-shih	數十
shu-shih-wan min-chung	數十萬民眾
Soku-hō	速報
su-ch'ing	肅清
su-ch'ing hui-i	肅清會義
sui-ching-ch'ü	綏靖區
sui-ching hui-i	綏靖會義
sui-jan hui chiao yeh hui k'an men	雖然會叫也會看門
szu-fa tu-li	司法獨立
szu yeh pu ta-ying	死也不答應

ta Fu-chou-tsai	打福州仔
ta-jen hsien-sheng-men	大人先生們
ta-miao	大廟
Ta-ming-pao	大明報
ta-tao t'an-kuan wu-li	打倒貪官污吏
ta-tui	大隊
Ta-t'ung ch'ing-nien t'ung-meng-hui	大同青年同盟會
ta tuo-shu jen tou shih pei ts'ao-tsung	大多數人都是被操縱
Tai-wan Shim-pō	台灣新報
T'ai-chien	台奸
T'ai-chung-hsien jen-min tzu-yu pao-chang wei-yüan-hui	台中縣人民自由保障委員會
T'ai-chung hsüeh-sheng wei-ch'ih chih-an fu-wu-tui	台中學生維持治安服務隊
T'ai-chung shih-cheng lin-shih chien-li wei-yüan-hui	台中市政臨時監理委員會
T'ai-chung ti-ch'ü shih-chü ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui	台中地區時局處理委員會
T'ai-chung ti-ch'ü chih-an wei-yüan-hui	台中地區治安委員會
tso-chan pen-pu	作戰本部
T'ai-k'ang	太康
T'ai-nan-shih ko-chieh lien-ho ta-hui	台南市各界聯合大會
T'ai-pei fa-hsien kung-fei	台北發現共匪
T'ai-pei-shih lin-shih chih-an wei-yüan-hui	台北市臨時治安委員會
T'ai-pei ta-hsüeh	台北大學
T'ai-pi	台幣
T'ai-p'ing	太平

T'ai-ta	台大
T'ai-wan ching-chi Jih-pao	台灣經濟日報
T'ai-wan ch'ing-nien-t'uan	台灣青年團
T'ai-wan erh-erh-pa ts'an-an lien-ho hou-yüan-hui	台灣二二八慘案聯合後援會
T'ai-wan-jen	台灣人
T'ai-wan kuang-po tien-t'ai	台灣廣播電台
T'ai-wan kung-ch'an-tang	台灣共產黨
T'ai-wan kung-shang yin-hang	台灣工商銀行
T'ai-wan kung-tso-t'uan	台灣工作團
T'ai-wan min-chu lien-chün	台灣民主聯軍
T'ai-wan min-chu lien-meng	台灣民主聯盟
T'ai-wan min-chu t'ung-meng	台灣民主同盟
T'ai-wan min-chu tzu-chih cheng-fu	台灣民主自治同盟
T'ai-wan Min-sheng-pao	台灣民生報
T'ai-wan-sheng ch'ing-nien fu-hsing t'ung-chih-hui	台灣省青年復興同志會
T'ai-wan-sheng tzu-chih ch'ing-nien t'ung-meng	台灣省自治青年同盟
T'ai-wan ta-hsüeh	台灣大學
T'ai-wan yin-hang	台灣銀行
T'ai-wan Yüeh-k'an	台灣月刊
T'ai-ya	泰雅
t'an-kuan wu-li	貪官污吏
T'ang-shan-jen	唐山人
t'e-pieh chih-yüan-tui	特別支援隊
ti-erh chung-tui	第二中隊

ti-i chung-hsüeh	第一中學
tiao-ch'a-tsu	調查組
tiao-ch'a wei-yüan-hui	調查委員會
t'ieh-lu ching-ch'a-shu	鐵路警察署
t'ieh-lu fu-wu-tui	鐵路服務隊
t'ieh-lu kuan-li wei-yüan-hui	鐵路管理委員會
t'ieh-lu t'iao-cheng wei-yüan-hui	鐵路調整委員會
T'ien-ma	天馬
t'ing	廳
tou-cheng tao-ti	鬥爭到底
Tou-liu ching-pei-tui	斗六警備隊
ts'an-i-hui	參議會
ts'an-i-yüan	參議員
tso-chan pen-pu	作戰本部
tsu-chang	組長
tsu-chih ta-kang ts'ao-an	組織大綱草案
tsu-kuo huai-pao	祖國懷抱
tsung-chih-hui-pu	總指揮部
tsung-heng	縱橫
tsung-shang-hui	總商會
tsung-wu-tsu	總務組
ts'ai-cheng-ch'u	財政處
ts'ai-wu-tsu	財務組
ts'an-cheng-yüan	參政員

ts'an-mou-chang	參謀長
ts'e-hou-suo	測候所
tsou-kou	走狗
tu-li-t'uan	獨立團
tui mu-ch'ien ti ch'u-li	對目前的處理
tung-men ying-fang	東門營房
t'ung-hsiang-hui	同鄉會
Tzu-ch'iang-pao	自強報
tzu-chih lien-chün	自治聯軍
tzu-hsin-shu	自新書
tzu-wei-tui	自衛隊
Tzu-yu Jih-pao	自由日報
tz'u-chi	刺激
wai-sheng-jen	外省人
wan-ch'üan sheng tzu-chih	完全省自治
wang-sha chiu-shi-chiu-ko, chih yao sha-szu i-ko chen-ti chiu k'o-i	枉殺九十九個,只要殺死一個真的就可以
wei cheng-fu	偽政府
wei kuo-chia min-tsu li-ch'ang erh nu-li	爲國家民族立場而努力
wen-hsien, ch'uan-shuo, i-wen	文獻,傳說,佚文
wu-chuang sou-ch'a	武裝搜查
yao-ch'iu sheng-huo ti pao-chang	要求生活的保障
yao-ch'iu T'ai-wan tzu-chih	要求台灣自治
yao-sai	要塞
Yen-p'ing hsüeh-yüan	延平學院

yu-hsiang ch'ing-nien-t'uan T'ai-pei chih-pu	憂鄉青年團台北支部
yu tsui-che, sha i ch'eng pai	有罪者,殺一懲百
yu wei chih-yung chien-pei-ti Chiang-chün	有位智勇兼備的將軍
yung-hu kuo-min cheng-fu	擁護國民政府
yung-shih	勇士
Yüan	元/圓
yüan tsai t'ung-chi shu-tzu chih shang	遠在統計數字之上
Yüeh-kung	月宮

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